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ADDENDUM
1. The current US SCC Commissioner is Ambassador Robert Joseph, his 
CIS counterpart is Major General Vladimir Kuklev.
2. The current US SCC Deputy Commissioner is Mr. Bensen Adams. His 
CIS counterpart was, until November 1991 Mr. Viktor Shabannikov. The CIS will 
have appointed a new Deputy by the time of the next SCC Meeting.
3. There has been one meeting of the JCIC. Russia has suggested that the 
next meeting of the JCIC, scheduled for January 1992 be moved from Geneva to 
Moscow. The US is now working out arrangements for the next JCIC.
4. The US JCIC Representative is Ambassador Steven Steiner. His Deputy 
is Dr. George Look. The CIS JCIC Representative is Dr. Viktor Shabannikov; his 
Deputy is Colonel A.N. Luk’vanov
This information was kindly supplied by the US Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency, 24/1/92.
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VAbstract
States are dynamic entities. This thesis argues that one of the reasons that States are 
dynamic is that the processes that underly their formation are essentially dialogic - 
literally, of dialogue, or discourse. This thesis takes as its starting point the notion 
that in order to analyse the processes of state-making it is important to take 
account, not only of the grand foundational practices of establishing constitutions 
and fighting wars, but of the almost mundane, day-to-day practices that reinstate 
the state at every turn.
One way to observe the practices of state-maintenance is to note and observe the 
disruptions and discontinuities by which state-making reveals itself in the patching- 
up, or maintenance of its notional boundaries. This thesis argues, therefore that the 
fragility of state-making reveals itself when the state is most loudly maintaining its 
security and integrity.
One arena in which this can be observed is in the practices that maintain an arms 
control regime, as, for example, SALT. By observing and analysing the operation 
of the SALT Standing Consultative Commission through its handling of 
compliance issues between the US and the Soviet Union, it is argued that one can 
observe the operation, at a specific site, of state-making, and the effects of a shift 
in US ideological practice upon the process of state making in the United States.
In the historical changes that came about with the change in administration from 
Carter to the first Reagan administration, the arms control process was challenged 
to survive in an era of uncertainty in which discourse about the state invoked a 
discourse of danger.
Drawing on the broadly-termed 'post-structural' perspectives from literary theory, 
this thesis undertakes a 'close reading' or textual analysis approach to the empirical 
texts performed by the arms control community about the relationship between 
arms control and the notion of the state with which it operates. Contrary to the 
assumptions of those critical of poststructuralist approaches, this thesis does not 
reject the empirical along with its rejection of empiricism. Where this thesis uses or 
implies terms like 'construct', or 'invention' or 'texting' such usage is to be taken 
to imply the anthropological or sociological senses of these terms, rather than the 
glib 'common-sense' notion of things being arbitrarily 'made up.' As a result 
preference is given to the term 'construe' over 'construct' to emphasise the 
precedency given to meaning over inherent structure.
The analytical approach taken here is rigorously concerned with the kind of world 
one needs to presuppose in order to make sense of the texts produced by and 
through arms control discourse. To perform such an analysis one must draw on 
actual, 'real,' records of behaviours conducted in the name of the state - hence the 
concern with empirical records that, in the reading, are produced as text. The 
principal underlying assumption explored in this thesis is that states, like other 
'identities' (family, individual, institution etc,) are the products, or symptoms, of 
those practices that are engaged with the maintenace of boundaries 'in the name of 
the state or other 'identity' so produced.
It is argued that such an approach offers a useful explanation of the historically- 
demonstrated instability of such large-scale identity-structures as states.
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Introduction 
I
This thesis is about the processes underlying the question of what 
constitutes a State. This process is considered in relation to a particular 
set of historical, empirical practices that have their expression in the 
arm s control process. Specifically, it is located, for the purposes of 
analysis, w ith in  the debates su rro u n d in g  com pliance or non- 
compliance with the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks Treaties (SALT) 
as m ed iated  by and th rough  the SALT Standing C onsultative 
Com mission on Arms Limitation (SCC) during the period roughly 
coinciding with the decade from 1975 - 1985. Its concerns, therefore, are 
both theoretical and practical.
The 1990s are shaping up, as one wit has described it, to be the decade of 
M utual Unilateral Disarmament (MUD). In the half-decade from 1986- 
1991 the relationship between the superpowers has changed radically, 
and, it would appear, irreversibly. With the transmogrification (not to 
say demise) of the former Soviet Union the strategic nuclear picture 
has also changed, and of the body of nuclear analysts, some have 
declared that their role is as historians of the 'Cold War.' For others it 
is 'the end of history,'1 while still others cling to a binary threat in a 
w orld  that is rap id ly  becom ing m ultipolar. W ithin their own 
frameworks they are all 'right' which is to say that under the sets of
1 This phrase comes from the title of Francis Fukuyama "The End of History" The 
National Interest 1989. Volume 16:3-18.
terms w ithin which they operate, events can be read in terms of their 
self-consistency within the parameters of their analysis.
This thesis is not about the 'rightness' or 'wrongness' of any one of 
those positions. W hat is of in terest in all this are the kinds of 
structures that enable events to be articulated (narrativised) and the 
kinds of worlds established as symptoms of particular ways of thinking 
about events in the world. To do this on a global scale would require as 
m any theses as there are 'realist' case studies. My aim here, and for 
specific sets of reasons, is to examine one such case in particular.
In the 1990s we are seeing a vertical decline and a lateral proliferation 
of nuclear w eapons. W hile the present sets of changes in the 
in te rnational/in terno tional landscape appear categorical, w hat is 
em erging is that the conditions under which these changes are 
occurring have their own history. W hat we are witness to, therefore, is 
not the end of history, but its operation. This can be viewed as an 
alteration in the sets of practices that have enacted, both the State of the 
Soviet Union and the State of the United States of America.
The Manachaeism of the Self/O ther dichotomy that characterised the 
'Cold W ar' has been articulated along ideological lines and found its 
m ost compelling expression in the nuclear arms race betw een the 
former superpowers. After 1945 the nuclear arms race may be said to be 
an 'expression' (that is, a prim arily communicative act) since, despite 
(and partly because of) the m ateriality of the weapons themselves, 
w hat has counted above all is their overall 'potential' or w hat their 
specificities 'signified.' Nuclear weaponry has thus represented, first 
and foremost, a discursive practice.
3W ithin the conceptual framework of 'security' nuclear weapons have 
played (and continue to play) an im portant role in articulating the 
identity of the state. Since 1946 (Brodie, Schelling) however, their role 
has been a deeply ambivalent one insofar as deterrence has proved to 
be a Platonic pharmakon - at once poison and medicine. The reversal 
of the Clausewitzian maxim - from war conceived as an instrument of 
policy, to policy conceived as a corollary of war (albeit metonymic of its 
instrum ents) - forced upon the security state2 by the potentially 
catastrophic consequences of any large-scale use of nuclear weapons, 
has rendered the notion of force in ironic terms. Force, under the 
nuclear regim e m ust be seen to rem ain  an enunciative, or 
illocutionary force, rather than a straightforward physical force.
W hat is interesting about this is that the modes of pow er invoked 
under the nuclear regime of the security state are norm ative and 
judgem ental rather than coercive. This is especially visible within the 
dom ain of policy of arm s control. In this dom ain pow er and 
knowledge are coterminous. As practiced within the larger domain of
2 Here, the term Security State is used as opposed to other modes of articulating the 
state in order to discuss those aspects of the state that are constituted in relation to 
issues of the integrity of the boundaries of the state. In other words this is the aspect of 
the state with which the military forces have been traditionally concerned.
This thesis uses three terms to refer to the state:
i. the state - this refers to the sovereign state as articulated in international law.
ii. the security state - as defined above
iii. the strategic arms community - those policymakers and their analysts who 
articulate the security state through their policies and long term strategic goals. Those 
who are professionally concerned with the territorial integrity of the state.
In short, the strategic arms community are those who are narrowly concerned with the 
security aspects of the state - the security state. This in turn, represents a subset of the 
sovereign state as a whole.
4the security state, nuclear arms control arguably constitutes one of the 
sites at which the State is enacted in relation to other states. In the case 
of the former superpowers during the Cold War, the relationship was 
constituted in largely bilateral terms.
The first phase of the Cold War, from the late 1940s to the early 1970s 
w as characterised by the constitu tion of the Soviet U nion as 
Manichaean Other to the United States. W ith the developm ent of 
detente in the early 1970s the conditions em erged to allow the 
negotiation of the Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) and the Interim 
Agreement on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, collectively 
known as SALT I. This set of agreements, designed to enact a regime of 
m utual vulnerability, m arked an historic m om ent in the history of 
nuclear weapons for two reasons:
1. as a crisis stability m easure, the enacting of a pact of 
m utual vulnerability in the context of a strategy of Mutually 
Assured Destruction, the ABM Treaty raised the stakes of 
nuclear use beyond rational possibility.
2. as a treaty of indefinite duration, a m echanism  was 
established in order to negotiate the meaning of ambiguous 
elements of treaty language, and in which to voice concerns 
over ambiguous treaty compliance. The establishment of this 
mechanism m arked the recognition of the historicity of the 
terms within which the Treaty was to be enacted. At a time 
when other areas of social science research were establishing 
a-historical modes of analysis through game-theory models, 
the practitioners of arms control recognised that in the world 
of action, change is a categorical condition. The mechanism 
w ith  the responsibility  for negotiating  ongoing treaty  
compliance in the face of technological and historical change 
is the S tanding  C onsu lta tive  C om m ission on Arm s 
Limitation (SCC).
n
Reading through any num ber of United States Congressional Reports 
and Hearings on arms control and on compliance or noncompliance
w ith arms control agreements, one cannot help but notice recurrent 
sets of phrases. These phrases are concerned with 'national security,' 
w ith the 'behaviour' of 'the Soviet Union' and with the 'relationship' 
between the United States and the Soviet Union. Some speak of 'self- 
interest' that has aligned nations, while others report that 'the US 
G overnm ent has determ ined that the Soviet Union is violating ... 
'various arm s control treaties.' M oreover, the consequences of this 
'Soviet noncompliance' are represented such that it 'calls into question 
im portant security benefits from arms control, and could create new 
security risks; undermines confidence in the arms control process; casts 
doubts about the reliability of the Soviet Union as a negotiating 
partner; and damages the chances for a more constructive US/Soviet 
rela tionsh ip . '3
Even from this small sample, several features emerge that w arrant 
closer inspection. W hen we think of 'behaviour,' or 'self-interest,' or 
’noncom pliance,' or even 'relationship' and consider w hat kind of 
entity m ight have these characteristics, or be able to act in such a 
m anner, it would seem reasonable to suppose that we are discussing 
people. When we read the textual context in which these actions take 
place, the context reveals that these entities are States. There are two 
possible assumptions that could lead to such a formulation. The first, is 
that states may be construed as actors and are therefore capable of 
action. This requires that states operate metaphorically as individual 
people. The second is that those who carry out the actions are indeed
3 US Government, House Committee on Armed Services. Review of Arms control and 
Disarmament Activities 98th Congress Report. Special Panel on Arms Control and 
Disarmament of the Procurement and Military Nuclear Systems Subcommittee of the 
Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives, 98th Congress, 1985. p.5
collections of individual people acting in the name of the state - that is, 
that the state is metonymic of the people it contains.
Proponents of the first assumption require that states are ontologically 
prior to their action ,4 and that states interact within a system of states. 
Foremost among the proponents of this assumption is Hedley Bull. In 
his Anarchical Society, Bull argues, after Hobbes, that states exist as 
islands of order in an ocean of disorder (anarchy). He further argues 
that there exist forms of order (rules) within a system of states that 
operate  outside of in ternational law. M oreover, he argues that 
whatever the substantive issues of the day, they take place, or are dealt 
w ith in the context of the existing political structure of the world. 
W hile this represents an oversimplification of Bull's argum ents, it 
remains the case that for Bull, the constitutive practices of states are 
outside of the bounds of any study of the substantive issues of the day. 
Such an assumption serves to maintain the theory/practice dichotomy 
characteristic of 'Classic Realist' political philosophy.
Proponents of the second assumption require the state to be a persona 
ficta of the people em pow ered to make policy 'in the name of the 
sta te . '5 For Kenneth Waltz, as with Rousseau and Kant, the state is a 
product of individuals acting in concert to produce policy 'in the name 
of the state.' He argues that those so empowered, do so in a manner 
such that dissenters are carried along, either through their inability to 
bring force to bear to change the decision, or through 'their conviction,
4 Proponents of this view indude Spinoza and Hobbes.
5 Waltz, Kenneth. Man, the State and War. New York, London: Columbia University 
Press, 1965. p.178.
7based on perceived interest and customary loyalty, that in the long run 
it is to their advantage to go along with the national decision and work 
in the prescribed and accepted ways for its change .'6 Thus the State, 
under this assumption is metonymic of the people who enact the State.
Such a view, although more complex than the Hobbesian state-as- 
actor, is still predicated upon the unitary , rational individual of 
psychology that is itself constituted as ontologically prior to the 
activities in which it is engaged. Recent approaches to subjectivity offer 
a critique of the rational unitary subject of psychology. Insofar as for 
Hobbes the State functions like an individual person and that person is 
construed as a unitary individual, and insofar as for W altz the State is 
a collection of unitary individuals enacting the state, recent approaches 
to culturally based subjectivity do not construe the individual as 
unitary, but rather as a site upon which multiple subject positions may 
be enacted. Moreover, insofar as the subject is culturally construed by 
its entry into the symbolic order at a specific time and place, then the 
available subject positions are historically differentiated such that the 
foundations upon  w hich action is p red ica ted  (includ ing  the 
ethical/m oral order) are to a large degree historically contingent.
Such a view would argue that, far from being a unitary and originary 
source, subjectivity is rather an effect of the process of enacting (by 
differentiating) the subject. The subject, under this rubric, is a cultural 
artefact, a symptom of its practices. Subjectivity is therefore a verb (or 
process) rather than a noun (or object). This account of subjectivity 
would therefore articulate the state as a mode of subjectivity that is of
6 Ibid.
8the same kind (if of a different order) as that of the individual. The 
distinction between the individual and the state, insofar as they can be 
said to act, is one of locus of practice rather than of ontological 
difference .7
If this is the case, then analysis of the state should be able to proceed 
from an analysis of the practices by which the state differentiates itself 
from its Other. That is to say, by w hat actions does it enact (and by 
enacting, maintain) its identity? By what means does the state 'read,' 
and by 'reading' 'write,' its other. How does the State m aintain its 
integrity? And what do we mean by 'state?' - is the state not itself the 
kind of multiple subject that individuals are, according to the roles it is 
called upon to play? This thesis sets out to argue that the state is indeed 
as m ultiple a subject as the individual. States are most visible through 
the sets of practices by which they enact their boundaries. This is what I 
have and  shall continue to term  the 'secu rity  sta te ' - the 
m ilitary/strategic state. States police their boundaries in both a literal 
and textual form. This thesis focusses on a set of practices within the 
security state. Moreover, I intend to argue that, if the security state is a 
product of the practices that enact and m aintain it, then one can 
exam ine this process by looking at m icro-structures. One such 
m icrostructure is the SALT Standing Consultative Commission on 
Arms Lim itation (SCC). By exam ining the activities, context, and 
conditions that make possible its establishment and operation I intend
7 While there are clear ontological differences between biological individuals and 
states, I am dealing here with the cultural individual which is socially produced 
through communicative acts within a cultural framework. In this sense, states and 
individuals may both be considered in terms of ’speaking subjects' rather than as 
biological entities.
to examine and trace the process of change that forms the underlying 
condition that makes possible the identity of the state.
in
Drawing on the analytical tools of cultural anthropology and discourse 
analysis, this thesis attem pts to trace the process of change in the 
articulation of the identity8 of the state w ithin the domain of arms 
control compliance through the actions and potential to act of the 
SALT Standing consultative Commission on Arms Limitation (SCC) at 
a specific historical moment: the decade marked by the transition from 
the Carter Presidency to the first term of the Reagan Presidency of the 
United States of America. That is the period covered roughly by the 
decade from 1975-1985.
By engaging in a practice of reading the development and deployment 
of nuclear weapons and their associated systems and technologies as 
cultural artefacts, and, moreover, as artefacts produced and deployed 
w ithin a culturally coded system, an attem pt is m ade to chart the 
changing face of the relationship between the entities articulated as the 
United States and the Soviet Union during the period in question. 
That these readings become a focus for the attention of the SCC renders 
these deployed artefacts as embedded within a cultural value system
8 Identity: the self or the state construed in cultural terms by invoking the self or the 
state.
Other: that which is not 'self or 'core'. One may be accorded the status of Other by 
marginalisation - relegated to the 'periphery'.
Boundaries - that notional space that divides self from Other. In the case of states 
these are the borders of the sovereign state plus the boundaries of its operation. 
Boundaries are defined by the speech acts of the self (on both sides) toward the other. 
By identifying the other, the self is defined and even bounded and given meaning as a 
term.
10
that, in the choices made about developm ent and deploym ent, they 
signal, or make visible the conceptual boundaries of the state as 
enacted in all of the related practices of arms control that are mediated 
through the good offices of the SCC. Reading the texts surrounding 
these artefacts, the process of the narrativisation of history is rendered 
visible. As Greg Dening notes:
W ithin any culture an artifact is a manifold text of values, of 
systems, of perceptions and relations. Beauty, the means and 
relations of production , ow nership  and exchange, and 
m orality are w ritten into the cultural things we have in 
hand [or in silo?] In the context of our culturally given signs 
and symbols we read the meanings encapsulated within our 
things. Where things cross a cultural boundary we re-invent 
their meanings. [Soviet view of Nuclear targeting? - of arms 
control?, of the SCC?]9
IV
This thesis operates under assum ptions that reject the notion of a 
dichotomy, even a necessary distinction, between theory and practice. 
This is reflected in the organisational m acrostructure of this thesis. 
There is, therefore, no separate 'theory chapter' as such, as the theory 
unfolds throughout and forms a necessary part of the practices of 
reading that are brought to bear on the historical material at hand. In 
loose terms, the thesis is divided, for analytical purposes, into three 
sections, (discounting the Introduction and Conclusion) comprising 
Chapter Two on the SCC's structure and functions, a second section 
formed by Chapter Three on the operation of the SCC under Carter and
9 Dening, Greg. History's Anthropology: The Death of William Gooch. ASAO Special 
Publications. Ed. Ivan Brady. Lanham, New York, London: University Press of 
America, Association for Social Anthropology in Oceania, 1988. p.l.
a third section formed by Chapter Four on the SCC during the first 
term of the Reagan Presidency.
11
The first, necessarily a fairly short section deals with the establishment, 
the structure, and the functions of the SCC as constituted in the 
agreem ents that established it. I say necessarily, as little has been 
w ritten  specifically on the SCC. From lim ited w ritten  sources 
supplem ented by interview  m aterial the author was able to piece 
together a picture of the SCC and its operation, and the need for secrecy 
in its negotiating practices and the products of those negotiating 
practices.
The second and m uch larger section deals w ith the time period 
surrounding the Carter presidency. Following a brief history of the 
weapons systems that were subsequently limited by the SALT Treaties, 
this section deals with the issues and practices of the SCC under Carter. 
By examining the emergence of specific strategic systems, themselves a 
p roduct of m ilita ry /strateg ic  and funding decisions it is arguably 
possible to read off some of the political perceptions of the capabilities 
of the Other in terms of the nature of the threat that the developed 
systems were designed to counter. The importance of perception and 
its translation into real technical weapons system s should not be 
underestim ated in the constitution of the nuclear regime.
As I have hinted at, these systems required funding. This was at a 
m oment in history when, following the draw-down after the Vietnam 
W ar, defence funding was a highly politicised issue. The issue of 
defence spending as an aspect of the approval process for the 
developm ent of specific w eapon technologies and their support 
systems serves to dem onstrate the role of the domestic polity in the
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United States in responding to ideological and discursive threats to the 
integrity of the identity of the United States security state. At this point 
in the thesis it is in tended to argue that funding decisions for 
technological research and development were im portant, not only in 
and of themselves, but for the purposes of signalling to the 'Other' the 
intention to provide new paradigmatic choices over the future defence 
technology structure. It is also intended to show how the issue of 
defence funding almost a decade before represents part of the process of 
constitu ting a political and m aterial reality for those that follow. 
Moreover, the development of specific forms of technology concretises 
and encodes the discourse of danger10 mobilised to constitute the 
security state, but also this concretising forms part of the process of 
constituting the objects of SCC discourse in terms of whether or not 
they constitute a threat to, or a continuation of, the SALT I Treaties. 
Thus the sto ry  of w h a t m akes possib le  som e of C arter's  
decisionm aking rests on an undof the techno-strategic context in 
which his decisions were made.
An argum ent is further m ade over the issue of the 'standard ' of 
verification to be applied to the arms control agreements signed half a 
decade before Carter came to power. The standard  of verification 
arguably offers a political barometer of the state of relations between 
the Treaty partners. But it does much more than that. The standard of 
verification also offers an indicator of the fragility of the identity of the 
United States in terms of the degree to which it feels it necessary to
10 By posing the Other as threat the boundary making is made 'louder'/stronger. By 
building actual solid weapon systems in response to the perceived threat then the 
weapons form solid tokens that stand for and symbolise the threat posed by the other. 
The discourse of danger is mobilised by those whose job is to professionally police the 
boundaries between self and other in the name of the state.
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m onitor the agreed boundaries surrounding the extent of m utual 
vulnerability inscribed in SALT I. Observing changes in the standard of 
verification arguably provides an instance at which one can chart a 
'wind-change' in the identity-making inscription of the state.
Again part of the constitution of objects of knowledge for the SCC lies 
in the terms of the treaties and agreements that form the surface raison 
d 'etre of the SCC itself. Moreover, by examining the accusations made 
on both sides regarding non-compliant behaviour with respect to the 
SALT Treaties, that is to say, the content of the accusations, one should 
be able to construe the range of activities open to the purview  of the 
SCC, thereby comparing this range of actual activity with the potential 
under the regulations of the SCC. By locating the extent to which the 
SCC was able to perform  in relation to its potential, one has (albeit 
subjectively) the potential to construct a scale showing the extent to 
w hich the SCC was able to negotiate in o rder to ensure that 
noncom pliant behaviour ceased, or was clarified in a m anner so as to 
resolve questions of ambiguous behaviour.
C hapter Three also points out that the SCC did not function in a 
vacuum. In order for ambiguous compliance behaviour to be located, 
the resources of in telligence surveillance satellites and their 
bureaucracies play their role in the constitution by identification of the 
O ther. By textually constituting the O ther through isolating and 
in terp reting  their behaviour, the identity  of the self is thereby 
constituted and maintained. This chapter argues that this process is as 
much a concrete reality as a textual one. It becomes textual through the 
process of interpretation. In the case of the state this interpretation is 
perform ed at a num ber of sites that com prise specific, though 
interlocking interpretive communities. Thus the discourses of policy
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are characterised by m ultiplicity, complexity and uncertainty. The 
au th o rita tiv e  o rdering  of this com plexity, the policing of the 
boundaries of 'acceptable' in ternational behaviour represents the 
principle that characterises political life. Finally, this chapter argues 
that verification of arms control agreements itself constitutes a form of 
pow er articulated as knowledge, such that the ability to identify, and 
thus 'nam e,' the behaviours of the O ther m akes possible the 
invocation of normative and normalising judgement. As a moment of 
interface betw een the self and O ther, the SCC serves to m ediate 
betw een m ultiple sites of discursivity that are, singly and together 
constitutive of the identity of the strategic arms community, that in its 
turn  forms one of the kinds of practice that constitutes the security 
state, and ultim ately the political com m unity operating under the 
identity of the state as a symptom of those practices.
The third section encompassed by Chapter Four is concerned with the 
practices surrounding the SCC under the first term of the Reagan 
Presidency. Noting that the SCC was considered to be largely ineffective 
under Reagan, an attem pt is m ade to locate the source of that 
ineffectiveness. Given that under Carter the SCC appeared to be highly 
successful within the fairly narrow constraints of its mandate, it would 
seem surprising if the source of its ineffectiveness lay within the SCC 
process itself. Chapters two and three suggest that, as with other 
identities, the SCC may also be conceived as a symptom of, not only its 
practices, but the political environm ent11 in which its activities took 
place. W ith the new  conservatism  ush ered  in by R eagan's
11 By 'political environment' is meant the millieu comprising the Cold War, the 
domestic political community and the politics of the international arms control 
community.
adm inistration, the seeds of its failure may well be construed as 
stem m ing from the changes in the political environm ent in which it 
finds itself.
C hap ter four opens, therefore, w ith a passage on the rise of 
conservatism  in the form of the Committee on the Present Danger 
(CPD) tha t served as a m outhpiece for Am erican conservatism . 
Interestingly, to trace the rise of the CPD one finds, not only its Cold 
W ar origins in its first incarnation, but also its rebirth on the eve of the 
Carter Presidency. That it emerged as a side-effect of the reaction to 
Detente on the eve of the first Democrat President of the Detente era 
suggests that its intentions were not as bipartisan as it was made out to 
be. The account of the failure of SALT II to be ratified attributes much 
of that failure to the rise of neoconservatism during the beginning of 
the Second Cold War that arose with the election of CPD member 
Ronald Reagan to the Presidency.
The chapter goes on to argue that this period was characterised more by 
controversies over past compliance than by progress tow ards new 
agreem ents. The acrim onious public debate over alleged Soviet 
noncom pliance w ith arm s control agreem ents rendered  the SCC 
powerless in the face of a conservatism not seen since the McCarthy era 
of the 1950s. Despite all the acrimony, however, Reagan was obliged 
under the principles of international law to comply, even with the 
unratified SALT II Treaty, thus suggesting that there is a palpable 
norm ative force even in the so-called realm of international anarchy. 
This section of the thesis explores the normative power of inscription 
as expressed through the practice of international law.
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Once again the issues raised as am biguous behaviour, or potential 
violations are canvassed in order to explore the operation of the SCC 
during this period. Although there is no access to the processes of the 
SCC, there is access to the texts surrounding its operation as expressed 
in the Presidential Reports on Soviet noncom pliance and related 
Congressional Hearings.
Of particular interest here, is the way in which the issue of the large 
phased-array radar at Krasnoyarsk was taken up as a sign of Soviet 
intentions to abrogate the terms of the ABM Treaty. This section brings 
together a num ber of salient sets of practices, each relatively minor in 
and of itself, bu t taken together form a collusion of discourses that 
m ade possible the articulation of the Krasnoyarsk radar as a violation 
and as a sign of political intent. This large concrete artefact was thus 
endow ed with m eaning, thus rendering it as a cultural icon. This 
section argues that the formulation of the Krasnoyarsk radar as a sign 
required a num ber of historically prior moves. Central to these moves 
was, not only the signing and ratification of the ABM Treaty, but the 
funding and developm ent of national technical means of verification 
and the associated bureaucratic mechanisms.
The bulk of the literature on the discovery of the Krasnoyarsk LPAR 
holds that it was found by photo-interpreters examining imagery from 
a KH-9 (Big Bird) satellite. Again this forms an oversimplification of 
the process, as, to set the event in its context, it becomes apparent that 
the KH-9 needed a 'trip-wire' to justify scanning a particular sector of 
the Soviet Union (as it was then constituted). The evidence suggests 
that the role of the JUMPSEAT radar 'ferret' satellites has been 
underplayed. Either way, Krasnoyarsk did not emerge as a 'bolt from 
the blue' discovery, bu t was contextually situated  in a specific
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policymaking community that allowed the radar to be interpreted in a 
culturally  specific way at a specific point in time. M oreover, the 
construction of the radar, itself the p roduct of political decisions 
regarding resource allocations, was also constrained by geography.
The section argues that the role of the SCC was rendered problematic 
by the political posturing of the Reagan adm inistration 's renewed 
Manichaeism. It is argued that, not only was the Krasnoyarsk radar a 
violation in name, but that in real terms the m ilitary significance of 
the violation was small, and, insofar as the term 'deployed' was never 
fully defined, the Krasnoyarsk radar does not represent an unequivocal 
v iolation.
C hapter Four concludes by examining the relationship between the 
political process and the community that arises as a consequence of the 
enacting of that process. The chapter as a whole sets out to show 
som ething of the complexity and scope of the range of discourse 
communities that feed into the process of constituting an event as a 
potential arms control violation. In so doing, the chapter seeks to 
e stab lish  th a t the po litica l p rocess and o rien ta tio n  of the 
adm inistration in each of its bureaucracies, not only influences the 
in te rp re ta tion  of an event as a violation, b u t in the way the 
construction of, for example, a concrete artefact, becomes construed in 
narrative terms as an event .12
12 By Event is meant: a meaningful act; a topic for discussion. Thus the building of the 
Krasnoyarsk radar was a material event (something that happened) which generated 
narratives interpreting the act as a meaningful violation event. In this sense the radar 
was, in addition to its radar function, also therefore, a 'sculpture' - a meaning-laden 
artefact.
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If this is so, then the SCC is not only a conduit for policy. It is also acts 
as a sign that represents the constitution of a whole domain of policy, a 
space for action in which are brought together a number of other policy 
dom ains. Moreover, a num ber of themes arise from this in terms of 
how the various domains of policymaking build into a picture of the 
operation of the (virtual) field in which identity is articulated as the 
practices of military security through the operation of a number of sub­
com m unities distributed across various domains of the defence and 
foreign policy community at large.
The K rasnoyarsk rad ar issue, m ediated  th rough  the Standing 
Consultative Commission may be viewed in terms of the materiality 
of discourse. It shall be argued later, that at the cultural level (the level 
of image and perception in Jervis' terms), the purpose of large, phased 
array radars was to assist in the disciplining of boundaries between Self 
and Other - between those on the 'inside' and those on the 'outside.' 
But m aintaining interiority and exteriority can involve more than the 
system atic  m aintenance of physical boundaries by observing, 
iden tify ing  and contro lling  the legitim ate passage across the 
boundaries. The ABM Treaty lim itations on LPARs serve a more 
sophisticated purpose: the disciplining of the disciplining of the 
boundaries. This is itself a boundary enacting process of the same kind 
but of a different order.
The role of the intelligence assets, the intelligence comm unity, the 
A rm s C ontrol and  D isarm am ent Agency in the p roduction  of 
knowledge about the behaviours of the Other represents an aspect of 
the norm ative power that is invoked through the SCC. The process of 
narra tiv ising  the events produced by the activities of the Other 
represents a process of virtual spatialisation of the Other. The effect of
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this could be construed, through the production of otherness (by 
specification), as an aspect of the production of self identity (through 
being differentiated from the actions of the Other). Thus, it could be 
argued, that the identity of the self (construed as State) is a symptom of 
the practice of defining and naming the otherness of the Other. This 
thesis argues that this process takes place on both sides of the US- 
Soviet divide. A corollary of this is that the moment that the self ceases 
the practice of m aintaining the boundaries, either within or external to 
the State, then a new identity will be articulated and the State will no 
longer be what it was.
At any point in time, this process could be argued to take place at 
countless sites, articu la ting  for d ifferent purposes a range of 
collectivities or identities. If these could be argued to take place in the 
symbolic order (and where else does conceptualisation take place?) 
then  this thesis rep resen ts a contribution  to the lite ra tu re  of 
’signalling ' and theorists of percep tion /m ispercep tion , of whom 
Robert Jervis and Thomas Schelling are the chief proponents.
In sum m ary, this thesis sets out to show that states are indexically 
linked to their practices of boundarym aking; and that these are 
prim arily cultural practices of which states may be seen to be products, 
rather than as sources (as traditionally conceived in Perception, Game 
and Psychological theories). This thesis can be distinguished from the 
w ork of (i) Jervis, (ii) Schelling and (iii) Larson for the following
reasons:
i. Jervis' Perception theory13 assumes a relatively unitary 
actor w ithin its otherw ise discursive fram ework. It also 
assumes a relatively uniflow model of com m unication in 
which a signal is assum ed to be sent and received, rather 
than produced at both the 'sending' and 'receiving' end. 
Thus Perception theory would find it relatively difficult to 
cope with or to explain mixed signals or with signal from 
different sectors of the actor. Perception Theory's key terms 
can be defined as follows:
Signalling: - statements or actions the meanings of which are 
established by tacit or explicit understandings among the 
actors. Signals are issued mainly to influence the receivers' 
image of the sender.
Indices (or indexes): - statements or actions that carry some 
inherent evidence that the image projected is correct because 
they are believed to be inextricably linked to the actor's 
capabilities or intentions, and because they are believed to be 
beyond the ability of the actor to control for the purposes of 
projecting a misleading image.
A lthough this is one of the more sophisticated models, it remains 
incomplete due to its assumptions outlined above. Insofar as discourse 
theory operates with a non-unitary actor model and a reader-respose 
communication model, it could be said to offer a more useful depth of 
com plexity in its analysis. This thesis assum es that the actor is 
essentially divided and culturally produced as a product of those who 
invoke the idea of the actor (themselves a product of historically 
derived discourse formations).
ii. Schelling's Game Theory also assum es a relatively 
unitary  actor and operates an oversim plified m odelling 
system that assumes a rational actor (one who will always 
work to maximise self gain to the exclusion of all others). 
Moreover, it assumes that each other player of the game is 
rational in the above sense. Finally, game theory operates 
exclusively to illustrate situations of conflict of interest.
13 See Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images in International Relations Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 1970.
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It is therefore, at best a m odelling system  capable of 
in d ica tin g  ideal outcom es (o ther factors rem ain ing  
unchanged). Such idealistic m odelling systems are apt to 
over simplify complex situations. It assumes that the the 
choice of the game is appropriate to to the situation - ie that 
the 'rules of play' obtain. By assuming that all players are 
rational (in a narrowly defined sense), then account cannot 
be taken of non-ration actors. Finally, Game Theory assumes 
that the players are unitary - ie they are operating only one 
game at a time .14
iii. Larson's psychological theory15 is probably the closest to 
the discourse model used in this thesis. The key distinction 
from Larson lies in the question of the locus of meaning. 
W here Larson and discourse theory acknowledge that states 
are cultural products, Larson sees psychological analysis of 
the key decision m akers as the m ost appropriate m ode, 
whereas discourse analysis looks to the texts produced by the 
key decisionm akers - their sym ptom s - as the m ost 
appropriate mode of analysis. Since each theoretical position 
will generate different products, this thesis is offered as a 
contribution to the work of these theorists, rather than a 
complete substitution. Political analysis is not a zero-sum 
game.
Insofar as the assum ptions of th is thesis articu la te  an anti- 
foundationalist position (note that this does not m ean w ithout 
historically, culturally-based foundations) then this thesis contributes 
to the literature that some have term ed postm odern. M oreover this 
thesis contributes to discourse analysis in term s of the notion of 
'read ing ' or constru ing  m eaning from  concrete artefacts as a 
fundam entally textual practice.
14 See Anatol Rappaport (ed.) Game Theory as a Theory of Conßict Resolution 
Dordrecht-Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company. 1974.
15 See Deborah Welch Larson Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation 
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985.
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CHAPTER II
Standing Consultative Commission on Arms Limitation 
2.1 Introduction
To study any aspect of the SCC is a study in [re]constructing a centre 
from its margins. Indeed the publicly available texts bound a 'centre' 
that is largely [and literally] erased. This leaves the student of the SCC 
with a project that is a study in marginality, marked by deletions in the 
official docum entation, leaving only traces and glim pses of the 
organisation's, arguably central, role in the arms control process.
The secrecy provisions of the SCC, that, arguably allow it to function
relatively successfully, perm it, at best, only small glimpses of the
p rocedu res and accom plishm ents of the SCC. A lthough each
governm ent announces the conclusion of Agreed Statem ents and
Common Understandings, the texts of these, and of the processes used
to obtain them, remain classified. As Duffy points out:
[o]ne can sketch a picture of the SCC's internal functions, 
only by assembling scattered pieces of evidence and relying 
on the recollections of people who have participated in the 
process.16
This serves to foreground the view that if, as postm odernists suggest, 
there is no unm ediated, objective history in any field, this is especially 
the case when applied to any attempt to study the workings of the SCC 
and in trying to unravel the changes in its effectiveness from 1975-85.
16 See G. Duffy Compl iance  and the Future  of A r m s  Control  Stanford 
University/Global Outlook, 1988, p.165
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To construct a framework for the analysis of the SCC and its relations 
to the shifting political landscape m arked by the transition from the 
C arter adm inistration to the early Reagan adm inistration it becomes 
necessary to consider several strands of political life each of which 
borders to a greater or lesser extent on the operations of the SCC. The 
methodological problem faced by the student of the SCC is that of how 
to move away from the frameworks of traditional political historians 
w ho m ay be characterised as being presented w ith an object of 
know ledge, pre-form ed and relatively unitary in character, a centre, 
which in the course of its operation produces, publicly, the symptoms 
of its existence. Documented in reports and discussion papers, position 
papers, accounts, newspaper stories and in the interactions with other 
agencies, m any US governm ent institu tions p resen t them selves 
openly and unproblematically. The SCC, by contrast presents itself as 
an enigma. A rebus. The symptoms of its existence and functioning are 
represented by and m ediated through such flotsam and jetsam as are 
projected into the sem iotic chora 17 of Senate com m ittees, House 
committees and most especially in the chora of the SALT process.
2.2 Origins/Traces
As early as 1969, during  the opening negotiation session on the 
limitation of strategic arms, the issue of a consultative body or process 
for consultation was raised. Harlan Cleveland, President Johnson's 
NATO Am bassador, described one of Clark Clifford's December 15 
negotiation objectives as:
17 Space or domain, see: Julia Kristeva Desire in Language Tavistock: 1984
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...to improve US-Soviet understanding by establishing a 
continuing process of discussion of issues arising from the 
strategic situation.18
R.W. Buchheim19 maintained, from the outset, the usefulness of 
establishing a permanent bilateral body as a mechanism for discussing 
and resolving any problems that might arise in order to make arms 
control agreements more viable. Such a body, it was argued, would 
serve the functions of:
a) implementation of an arms control agreement, and
b) consideration of questions concerning compliance20
The Standing Consultative Commission on Arms Limitation (SCC) 
was formally called into being on May 26, 1972 under Article XIII of the 
Anti-Ballistic M issile treaty21 (ABM) in order to "promote the
18 Newhouse, John. Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT. New York: Holt Reinhart and 
Winston, 1973.p.l38.
19 Source: study presented by Ambassador Buchheim (U.S. Commissioner to the SCC) to 
the Select Committee on Intelligence when he testified on SALT I compliance on July 18, 
1979, cited as Appendix to Briefing on SALT I Compliance Hearing before the Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations 1st Session, 96th Congress, September 25, 1979. 
Hereafter, the Appendix will be cited as Appendix to Briefing on SALT I Compliance 
while the Briefing shall be cited as Briefing on SALT I Compliance.
20 Ibid, p.43
1 Source: ABM TREATY "TREATY ON ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS, 26 MAY 
1972-
Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems. DEPARTMENT OF 
STATE BULLETIN 26,JUNE 1972 pp 918-920 quoted in R. Labrie (ed) S AL T  
HANDBOOK: Key documents and issues 1972-1979 Washington DC: AEI Studies 
(1980)
Article XIII describes the functions of the SCC as follows:
1- To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the 
Parties shall establish promptly a Standing Consultative Commission, within the 
framework of which they will:
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objectives and implementation of the provisions of the [ABM] Treaty" 
and to promote the 'objectives and implementation of the provisions' 
of the Interim Agreement. '22 The commission was established to 
consider, among other things, 'questions of compliance'; to volunteer 
'such information' that either Party considers 'necessary to assure 
confidence in compliance; to look at questions of interference with 
national technical means of verification; to consider the overall 
strategic situation and possible changes to it; to find agreement upon 
procedures and dates for destruction or dismantling ABM systems or 
their components as provided for in the treaty; and to consider 
proposals 'for further measures' to limit strategic arms.
(a) consider questions concerning compliance with the obligations assumed and 
related situations which may be considered ambiguous;
(b) provide on a voluntary basis such information as either Party considers necessary 
to assure confidence in compliance with the obligations assumed;
(c) consider questions involving unintended interference with national technical 
means of verification;
(d) consider possible changes in the strategic situation which have a bearing on the 
Treaty;
(e) agree upon procedures and dates for destruction or dismantling of ABM systems or 
their components in cases provided for by the provisions of this Treaty;
(f) consider, as appropriate, possible proposals for further increasing the viability of 
this Treaty, including proposals for amendments in accordance with the provisions of 
this Treaty;
(g) consider, as appropriate, proposals for further measures aimed at limiting 
strategic arms.
2- The Parties through consultation shall establish, and may amend as appropriate, 
Regulations for the Standing Consultative Commission governing procedures, 
composition and other relevant matters.
22 Interim Agreement on the Limitation of Strategic Arms, 26,May 1972 Article VI.
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Even before the Commission was formally established, its existence 
was invoked in the 'initialled statem ents pertaining to the Interim 
Agreem ent', where, in discussing the procedures for updating  of 
ballistic missile launchers on older submarines, that these were to be 
carried  ou t "under p rocedures to be agreed in the S tanding 
Consultative Commission."23
The tim ing of the establishm ent of the SCC was indicated in a 
statem ent made by Ambassador Smith (May 24, 1972), in which he 
suggested that such arrangem ents (for the establishm ent of the 
Commission) be made early in the follow-on SALT negotiations, but 
that earlier consultation m ay be m ade betw een the two SALT 
delegations. He further suggested that when SALT was not in session, 
that norm al diplom atic channels w ould suffice.24 In his eyes, the 
purpose of the Commission, is to:
23 "Agreed Interpretations and Unilateral Statements" Interim Agreement, Paragraph 
[K] in Labrie, ed. (1980/26)
24 In his Statement, Ambassador Smith said: "The United States proposes that the 
sides agree that with regard to initial implementation of the ABM Treaty's Article 
XIII on the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) and of the consultation Articles to 
the Interim Agreement on Offensive Arms and the Accidents Agreement*, agreement 
establishing the SCC will be worked out early in the follow-on negotiations; until that 
is completed, the following arrangements will prevail: when SALT is not in session, 
any consultation desired by either side under these Articles can be carried out by the 
two SALT Delegations; when SALT is not in session, ad hoc arrangements for any 
desired consultations under these Articles may be made through diplomatic channels"
Minister Semenov replied that, on an ad referendum basis, he could agree that the U.S. 
statement corresponded to the Soviet understanding .
^Footnote in the original of Ambassador Smith's Statement read: See Article 7 of 
Agreement to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War Between the United States 
of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, signed September 30,1971.
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... act as a surveying agent that will watch over the operation 
of the agreement, to which ambiguous situations can be 
referred, which will be a forum for further discussion of the 
possible amendments to see how the treaty is working, and 
to make sure that it stays viable over the years.25
The Commission was formally created in a Memorandum of 
Understanding seven months after the SALT I Agreement was 
sign ed .26 This Memorandum, while establishing the SCC, already 
marked the beginning of a process to extend the responsibilities of the
25 Smith, Gerard. Doubletalk: The Story of the First Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. 
New York: Doubleday, 1980.p.36.
26 Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the United States of 
America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding the 
Establishment of a Standing Consultative Commission; TIAS 7545 (December 21, 1972). 
The Memorandum states:
1- The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics hereby establish a Standing Consultative Commission.
2- The Standing Consultative Commission shall promote the objectives and 
implementation of the provisions of the Treaty between the US and the USSR on the 
Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, the Interim Agreement 
between the USA and the USSR on Certain Measures with respect to the Limitation of 
Strategic Offensive Arms of May26,1972, and the Agreement on Measures to Reduce the 
Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War between the US and the USSR of September 30, 1971, 
and shall exercise its competence in accordance with the provisions of Article XIII of 
said Treaty, Article VI of said Interim Agreement, and Article 7 of said Agreement on 
Measures.
3- Each Government shall be represented on the Standing Consultative Commission by a 
Commissioner, and a Deputy Commissioner, assisted by such staff as it deems necessary.
4- The Standing Consultative Commission shall hold periodic sessions on dates 
mutually agreed by the Commissioners but no less than two times per year. Sessions 
shall also be convened as soon as possible, following reasonable notice, at the request of 
either Commissioner.
5- The Standing Consultative Commission shall establish and approve Regulations 
governing procedures and other relevant matters and may amend them as it deems 
appropriate.
6- The Standing Consultative Commission will meet in Geneva. It may also meet at 
such other places as may be agreed.
Signed this December 21,1972
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SCC beyond those initially proposed .27 The establishment of the 
Commission represented a marked shift in relations between the 
U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. and may be counted as one of the high points 
of the Detente period. Ambassador Gerard C. Smith described the 
setting up of this Commission as "...unprecedented in Soviet- 
American relations."28 Henry Kissinger supported this in his statement 
on the basic principles of the relationship between the U.S. and the 
Soviet Union where he saw the establishment of the SCC as an 
'important precedent' and a useful mechanism that could be carried 
over into other fields of the U.S.-Soviet Union security relationship.29
The centrality of the SCC to the future of the arms control process lies 
in the fluid nature of the arms control process itself. That is to say that 
the establishment of the SCC demonstrated a formal recognition of the 
need for a mechanism for the ongoing maintenance of a treaty, if that 
treaty was, and is, to stand the test of time. As Duffy30 points out:
27 Dan Caldwell notes that the "Standing Consultative Commission on Arms 
Limitation: Memorandum of Understanding", not only ’officially created' the SCC, but 
also called for its responsibilities to be extended to cover the 'promotion of the 
objectives and implementation of the Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of 
Outbreak of Nuclear War between the United States of America and the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics (Sept.30,1971). See D. Caldwell in W.C. Potter Verification 
and Arms Control Mass:Lexington Books (1985/218)
28 U.S. Congress: Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearings, Strategic Arms 
Limitation Agreements, 92nd Congress, 2nd Session, June 19,1972. In Labrie (ed) Op Cit 
1980 p.78.
29 Basic Principles of U.S.-Soviet Relations 29, May 1972 in Labrie, Op Cit p.52
See Kissinger's tenth principle: 'The USA and the USSR will seek to ensure that their 
ties and cooperation in all of the above-mentioned fields and in any others in their 
mutual interests are built on a firm and long-term basis. To give a permanent character 
to these efforts, they will establish in all fields where this is feasible joint 
commissions or other joint bodies..." [emphasis mine]
30 G. Duffy Compliance and the Future of Arms Control Stanford University/Global 
Outlook, 1988/165
29
That the United States and the Soviet Union provided for 
the SCC through SALT I indicated their recognition that the 
strategic situation is dynamic and that there is an ongoing 
need to adapt agreements so that they may endure despite 
technological change or other developm ents unforeseen 
when they were negotiated.
2.3 Composition
In its earliest proposed form, the Commission was to be a compact unit 
w ith 'a structure comprising four or five individuals on both sides’ 
(Smith,1972). It was envisioned that it would be headed by civilians 
w ith  high level m ilitary and technical advisers.31 The body would 
m eet three or four tim es a year depending on needs.32 As the 
negotiations surrounding the establishment of the SCC developed, by 
the  tim e it w as form ally  constitu ted , the M em orandum  of 
Understanding indicated that the Commission would consist, for each 
governm ent, of: a Commissioner, a Deputy Commissioner, and 'such 
staff as deemed necessary' (Caldwell, 1985/2189).
31 Gerard C. Smith, U.S. Congress: Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearings, 
Strategic Arms Limitation Agreements, 92nd Congress, 2nd Session, June 19,1972. In 
Labrie (ed) Op Cit. 1980 p.78.
32 The Memorandum of Understanding provides that the Commission would meet at 
least twice a year in Geneva.
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Figure 2.1 Structure of the U.S. Standing Consultative 
Commission on Arms Limitation
Duffy (1988:164) points out that it was left to the discretion of each 
country to construct bureaucratic support for the SCC in line with its 
respective governmental structure or style. For the U.S. such staff 
would include, besides the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner, 
an executive secretary, a deputy executive secretary, and advisers from 
appropria te  departm ents and agencies. These departm ents have 
included: The D epartm ent of State, the Office of the Secretary of 
Defence, the Organisation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Arms Control 
and Disarmament Agency and the intelligence community, along with 
civilian and military advisers to both Delegations.33 The intelligence 
com m unity liaison is conducted by a senior intelligence officer, 
representing the Directorate of Central Intelligence (DCI) on the 
Delegation who provides guidance to the Commissioner and the US 
Delegation on the protection of sources and m ethods by which
33 See D. Caldwell in Potter,W.C. Op Cit p.219
31
information, relevant to compliance issues, is gathered.34 According to 
R ow ell,35 the Commissioner for the United States to the Standing 
C onsu lta tive  C om m ission is appo in ted  by the P residen t on 
unanim ous recom m endation of the Secretary of State, Secretary of 
Defence, chairm an of the Joint chiefs of Staff, director of the CIA, 
ACDA director, and the President's Special Assistant for National 
Security Affairs.
Table 1 U.S. Commissioners and Deputies to the SCC
U. Alexis Johnson (while SCC was being 
established)
1972
Sydney Graybeal (ACDA) 1973-Nov76
Am bassador Robert W.Buchheim(Acting from 
Jan,77)
August 1977-81
Brig. General John R. Lasater (acting) 1981
General Richard Ellis (Fmr Cm ndr SAC) 1981 +
B rig a d ie r  G e n e ra l W illiam  F .G eo rg i 
(USAF)(DepCom)
1973-5
B rig a d ie r  G e n e ra l F ra n k  E. S erio  
(USAXDep.Comm)
1975-7
R A D M  E d w a r d  F. W e l c h ,  J r . ,
(USN)(Dep.Comm)
1977-8
BrigadierGeneral
HarryA.Goodall(USAF)(Dep.Comm)
1978+
[Sources: Briefing on SALT I Compliance (see Notel) and G.Duffy Compliance and the 
Future of Arms Control Stanford University/Global Outlook, 1988, p.164]
On the Soviet side, the SCC is taken equally seriously, but with a 
different emphasis on the civilian/m ilitary balance.
34 Brießng on SALT I Compliance Hearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations 1st Session, 96th Congress, September 25,1979. p.21
33 W. F. Rowell Arms Control Verification: A guide to policy issues for the 1980s 
Cambridge, Mass: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1986/126
32
Commissioner
Deputy Commissioner
Inter-Agency Group 
~ r
Defence Department M ilita ry  Industrial 
Commission of the 
Council of Ministers
Department of Defence 
of the Central 
Committee of the 
Communist Party
Committee on State 
Security (KGB)Foreign M inistry
Figure 2.2 The Structure of the Soviet Standing Consultative 
Commission of Arms Limitation36
Duffy (1988:165) suggests, that while the Soviet Deputy Commissioners 
are appointed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Commissioners 
and their supporting military staff have been more dominant in SCC 
negotiations, (see Table 2.)
The InterAgency Group, to which the Soviet side of the SCC reports, is 
fairly stable. This is the group that makes decisions on the working, 
operational and day-to-day level of the SCC. The group formulates 
decisions on a consensus basis, and has an input into both arms control 
negotiations and on matters of compliance.
36 Source: Transcript of Author’s interview with Dr. Alexei Arbartov, Department of 
Disarmament and Security Affairs, Institute for World Economy and International 
Relations (IMEMO), USSR Academy of Sciences, Moscow, at the ANU, Canberra 
31/7/91. NB: On Friday 11/10/91 the State Council of the Soviet Union agreed to 
divide the Committee on State Security (KGB) in order to make the organisation more 
accountable to the Republics. Several new agencies are to be established and although 
it remains unclear as to the name of the agency that will take over the KGB's function 
within the SCC structure, it seems most likely to be the as-yet unnamed independent 
foreign espionage organisation. Source: International Herald Tribune 12-13 October, 
1991, p.l.
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The SCC Delegation itself is usually quite small, consisting of the 
Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner, some support staff consisting 
of some diplomats and their ciphering/deciphering experts. Together, 
they use the facilities of the perm anently based Nuclear and Space 
Talks Delegation. They send their inform ation from Geneva to 
Moscow, reporting the positions, argum ents and proposals from the 
other side. In turn , they deliver the replies they receive from the 
Moscow-based Inter-Agency Group. This process continues on a daily 
basis for a week or two, twice a year. Each m eeting is conducted 
formally, such that each Commissioner has their directives written for 
them, with all positions and statements already formulated.
The SCC therefore could be said to function more as a channel for 
communication, rather than for negotiation, on the Soviet side, since 
the delegates are given little room to act on their own behalf. That is to 
say, that the formality of the contact is such that the delegates are not at 
liberty to discuss things which are not included in their directives.
Table 2 Soviet Commissioners and Deputies to the SCC
General Major (Brigadier General) G.I. Ustinov 1973
General-Major Viktor P. Starodubov Mar.1979-86
General Vladimir M edvedev 1986+
Victor P. Karpov (Deputy Commissioner) 1973
Vladim S. Chulitsky (Deputy Commissioner) Mar.1979
Sources: Brießng on SALT 1 Compliance (see Notel) and G.Duffy Compliance and the 
Future of Arms Control Stanford University/Global Outlook, 1988, p.164
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2.4 Functions
U nder the terms of its m andate, the commission has no decisional or 
juridical authority  w ith respect to w hether 'suprem e interests' are 
involved in any dispute concerning the treaties to which the SCC has 
responsibilities,37 being purely consultative in its function. Thus, as a 
consultative forum , the SCC lacks pow er or authority  to "enforce 
either compliance with treaties or joint interpretations of agreements 
reached through the SCC."38 In any given dispute over compliance 
issues w ithin the competence of the SCC, the Commission is not 
em pow ered to formulate a juridical judgem ent as to which Party may 
be at fault. Nor is the SCC empowered to formulate means of ending or 
correcting any non-conforming behaviour - in this sense the SCC does 
not have a 'policing' role. Neither is the SCC responsible for resolving 
specific ambiguities. Its Commissioners' brief is perhaps best described, 
depending on the instructions received, as to "act as representatives of 
their respective G overnm ents," and m ay "intervene as plaintiff, 
defendant, or negotiator." (Calvo-Goller and Calvo:1987/302).
Its initial intention (since broadened slightly by the provisions of 
Article XVII of the SALT II Treaty) was m erely to look into the 
questions indicated by the seven sub-paragraphs of Article XIII of the 
ABM Treaty.39 This was m irrored in the corresponding Article VI of 
the  In terim  A greem ent L im iting  S tra teg ic  O ffensive Arm s. 
Subsequently, its functions were broadened to include: responsibility
37 See Ambassador Gerard C. Smith.
38 Duffy, Op Cit 1988/165
39 See Note 1.
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for reviewing the ABM Treaty40 (1977 &1982); to promote the 
obligations and implementation of the SALT II Treaty (under Article 
XVII of that treaty); to maintain an agreed database on the numbers of 
strategic offensive weapons subject to the limitations of the SALT II 
treaty.41
In the Report of Secretary of State William Rogers to President Nixon 
on the SALT I Agreements, 10 June 1972, Rogers outlined the functions 
of the SCC.42 Besides monitoring compliance issues between the
40 Pursuant to Article XIV, sub-paragraph 2, of the ABM Treaty which states:
"Five years after entry into force of this Treaty, and at five year intervals thereafter, 
the Parties shall together conduct a review of this Treaty."
Although, not specifying the SCC to undertake this responsibility, the Article does 
permit the SCC to do so.
41 See D. Caldwell, in Potter,W.C. Op Cit. p.222-223.
42 See: Report of Secretary of State William Rogers to President Nixon on the SALT I 
Agreements, 10 June 1972. Department of State Bulletin 3, July, 1972 pp.3-11. Labrie 
(Op C it) notes that Secretary Rogers' report was submitted to the Senate and House of 
Representatives, with the texts of the ABM treaty and the Interim Report, on 13 June 
1972.
(In Labrie,Op Cit p.60) Article XIII provides that the Parties shall establish 
promptly a Standing Consultative Commission (hereafter referred to as the 
Commission) to promote the objectives and to facilitate the implementation of the 
ABM Treaty. The Parties have further agreed to use the Commission to promote the 
objectives and implementation of the Interim Agreement. (See Article VI of the Interim 
Agreement.) The Commission will provide a consulting framework within which the 
Parties may consider various matters relating to the Treaty and the Interim Agreement. 
The Parties may also consider these matters in other channels.
A principal function of the Commission will be to consider questions of compliance with 
the obligations assumed under this Treaty and the Interim Agreement and also related 
situations which may be considered ambiguous. Each Party may voluntarily provide 
through the Commission information it considers necessary to assure confidence in 
compliance based on information gathered by national technical means of verification 
and the other Party could provide information to clarify the matter.
Attention was called above to the provisions in Article XII prohibiting intentional 
interference with national technical means of verification operating in accordance 
with its provisions. The Commission is charged by Article XIII with the responsibility 
to consider any questions of interference with such means. The Commission may also
36
Parties, the Commission would be charged with a number of other 
responsibilities. These responsibilities fall broadly into the areas of:
i) providing a consultative framework,
ii) considering questions of interference with national technical means 
of verification,
iii) considering the general strategic situation and propose ways of 
improving the viability of the treaty including the provision of agreed 
interpretations,
iv) negotiation of procedures and dates for implementing Article VIII 
concerning the destruction or dismantling of ABM systems or their 
components.
The expansion of the Commission's role under the provisions of 
Article XVII of the SALT II Treaty devolves partly through the added 
complexity and extent of that Agreement. The SALT II Treaty 
introduces the complexities of qualitative and quantitative provisions 
on weapon systems, in addition to the quantitative scope of the ABM 
Treaty and the Interim Agreement.
consider questions of concealment impeding verification by national means. The 
Commission may also consider changes in the general strategic situation which have a 
bearing on the provisions of the Treaty. Related to this is the Commission's authority 
to consider proposals to further increase the viability of the Treaty-such as agreed 
interpretations after the Treaty has entered into force-and to consider proposals for 
amendment of the Treaty. (Amendments to the Treaty would have to be ratified 
pursuant to Articles XIV and XVI.) The Commission may also consider other 
appropriate measures, not specifically enumerated in Article XIII, aimed at further 
limiting strategic arms. Finally, through the Commission the Parties are to agree on 
procedures and dates for the implementation of Article VIII concerning destruction or 
dismantling of ABM systems or ABM components....
The second paragraph of Article XIII provides for the establishment of regulations for 
the Commission governing procedures, composition and other relevant matters. Such 
matters can be worked out early in the follow-on negotiations. Meanwhile, any 
consultation desired by either side under these Articles can be carried out by the 
Delegations during such negotiations or, when they are not in session, through other 
diplomatic channels.
The Commission is intended as a means to facilitate the implementation of the 
agreements and would not replace follow-on negotiations or use of other diplomatic 
channels.
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The SCC is neither a judicial43 body, nor is its function to monitor44 
agreements although monitoring information may be brought in to 
SCC proceedings45 where appropriate. As Buchheim and Caldwell 
point out, the chief purpose of the SCC is to provide a consultative 
forum to which the parties can come in order to clarify ambiguous 
b eh av io u rs46 before they lead to irretrievable breakdown of an 
agreement.47
Critics of the SALT process in general and of the SCC in particular 
charge that of the fifteen articles in the ABM Treaty (eight characterised 
by Senator Humphrey as 'significant'), as of 1980, serious questions 
have been raised with respect to Soviet compliance with five:
• testing air defence missile and radars in an ABM mode (SA-5 missile 
and radar testing, 1973-5 and SA-10 radar testing,1979;
• deployment of possible new ABM battle management radars;
• development of rapidly deployable (over months rather than years), 
possibly mobile new ABM system;
• camouflage of certain ABM R&D;
43 Rowell 127 
^ I b i d  12 7
45 Ib id  127
46 Ambiguous behaviours: activities that may indicate moves towards a treaty 
violation. Activities that may not, in and of themselves, be direct treaty violations 
but which may establish the preconditions for future violating activitiy.
47 Ambassador Smith in the 'Initialed Statements' comments: (Labrie,1980/36)
We are going to set up a Joint Consultative Commission which will in effect, act as a a 
surveying agent that will watch over the operation of the agreement, to which 
ambiguous situations can be referred, which will be a forum for further discussion of the 
possible amendments to see how the treaty is working, and to make sure that it stays 
viable over the years.
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• falsification of num ber of test range ABM launchers dismantled in 
1973.
These critics of SALT charge the Carter regime of unseemly delays in 
raising questions with the Soviets over the issue of Soviet compliance 
w ith SALT.48 Senator Hum phreys charges that w ith respect to the 
construction of Soviet launch control silos (III-X Silos), these were first 
constructed in 1970, and challenged by the US in 1973, and not resolved 
until 1977, representing a 'delay' of seven years. As Senator Gordon 
Hum phrey puts it:
... while III-X launch control silos first appeared in 1970, we 
did not question the Soviets about them until mid-1973, and 
we did not resolve the question to our satisfaction until 1977. 
Nevertheless, the Adm inistration claims that on detection, 
all SALT compliance problem s have been im m ediately 
protested to the Soviets, and then have been prom ptly  
resolved in the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC). ... 
From first construction of the X-III Silos, it took three years 
before we detected a problem  and even questioned the 
Soviets, and seven years before we "resolved" the question.
And our resolu tion  am ounted  to no th ing  m ore than 
accepting the Soviet position.49
The strident tone of Senator H um phrey's accusations requires closer 
inspection. Firstly, the silos were detected at least as early as 1972, and 
had been erroneously counted am ong existing ICBM silos for the 
purposes of SALT I. Secondly, when additional silos were added in 
early 1973, these were questioned in June 1973 - only 3-6 months after 
detection. The collection and analysis of intelligence evidence is a time 
consuming process, requiring judgem ent and skill to work with often
48 Buchheim, R.W. & D. Caldwell. The US-USSR SCC: Description and Appraisal. 
Working Paper. Providence, Rhode Island: The Centre for Foreign Policy Development, 
Brown University, 1983.
49 Humphrey, Senator Gordon J. "Analysis and Compliance Enforcement in SALT 
Verification." International Security Review. 5.1 (1980): 1-26. p.5
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ambiguous data. To present a case through the SCC requires reasonable 
certainty that an ambiguous or questionable compliance behaviour is 
occurring. D uring the four years in which this question (among a 
num ber of others) was discussed, there were just eight routine 
meetings of the SCC, between which, respective replies to questions 
w ould have been analysed by the appropria te  organisation (see 
organisational chart Figure 2.1). That the issue was resolved by 
’accepting the Soviet position ' reflects and confirms that launch 
control silos are not restricted by the ABM Treaty and therefore was not 
a violation in the first instance. The idea that ambiguous (and in fact 
not a compliance issue) behaviours should be immediately "protested" 
to the Soviets completely fails to recognise the purely consultative and 
non-judicial function of the SCC. Finally, to rush in to protest without 
proper evaluation of the intelligence data would be nothing short of 
irresponsible. This and other issues will be raised later under the aegis 
of the respective adm inistrations under review. The point I want to 
make here, is that any evaluation of the performance of the SCC must 
keep in m ind its purely consultative function. The compliance agenda, 
however, represents only part of the SCC's function.
Importantly, as Buchheim (1979) points out, the SCC was given a wide 
brief from the outset as authorised in Article XIII of the ABM Treaty. In 
addition to its responsibilities relating directly to the raising of 
compliance questions arising from the ABM Treaty itself, the SCC was 
also charged with:
40
consideration of possible changes in the strategic situation, 
c o n s id e ra tio n  of am endm en ts to the T reaty , and  
consideration of proposal for further m easures aim ed at 
limiting strategic arms.50
By incorporating such provisions into a treaty of unlim ited duration, 
Buchheim notes, a channel of communication between the parties on 
the issue of arms control in strategic weapons has become chartered 
and institutionalised in an arrangement that will always be available to 
them. Furthermore, by emphasising the distinct and separate character 
of the SCC from the SALT process, a channel of com m unication 
rem ains available even during  times w hen a difficult negotiating 
climate prevails.
2.5 Privacy
The SCC has been described as "a silent service of our time."51 The 
resolution of compliance issues is, by nature, a delicate and sensitive 
process. Recognising this, the Regulations of the SCC52 (number 8) 
stipulate that:
50 R.W. Buchheim, Briefing on SALT I Compliance 1979, p.5 see notel.
51 Ibid p.2,
52 Standing Consultative Commission Regulations, T.I.A.S. 7637 (May 30 1973) Source: 
Calvo-Goller & Calvo (1987/301)
1 - The Standing Consultative Commission, established by the Memorandum of 
Understanding between the Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding the Establishment of 
a Standing Consultative Commission of December 21, 1972, shall consist of a U.S. 
component and Soviet component, each of which shall be headed by a Commissioner.
2 - The Commissioners shall alternately preside over the meetings.
3 - The Commissioners shall, when possible, inform each other in advance of the 
matters to be submitted for discussion, but may at a meeting submit for discussion any 
matter within the competence of the Commission.
41
The proceedings of the Standing Consultative Commission 
shall be conducted in private. The Standing Consultative 
Commission may not make its proceedings public except 
with the express consent of both Commissioners.53
This allows the SCC considerable flexibility in its dealings, permitting 
issues to be raised with a degree of frankness unavailable to many 
official channels of communication. Buchheim54 (1979) points out that 
the privacy provisions prevent the SCC from degenerating into a 
conduit for propaganda while permitting greater scope for exchanging 
ideas for problem-solving. This way, potentially prejudicial ideas and 
explorations will not be made public prematurely. Any reports issuing 
from the SCC are restricted, under Article 7 of the Regulations, to the 
substantive results of the proceedings. Such results are to be made 
public only with the consent of the Commissioners of both parties.
4 - During the intervals between session of the Commission, each Commissioner may 
transmit written or oral communications to the other Commissioner concerning matters 
within the competence of the Commission.
5 - Each component of the Commission may invite such advisers and experts as it deems 
necessary to participate in a meeting.
6 - The Commission may establish working groups to consider and prepare specific 
matters.
7 - The results of the discussion of questions at the meetings of the Commission may, if 
necessary, be entered into records which shall be in two copies, each in the English and 
the Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.
8 - The proceedings of the Standing Consultative Commission shall be conducted in 
private. The Standing Consultative Commission may not make its proceedings public 
except with the express consent of both Commissioners.
9 - Each component of the Commission shall bear the expenses connected with its 
participation in the Commission.
53 TIAS 7637:1974. pp.1124-8.
54 R.W. Buchheim, U.S. Commissioner to the SCC: Brießng on SALT I Compliance, 
Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 96th Congress, 1st Session, 
September 25 1979:43-5 (declassified November 7,1979)
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Ambassador Buchheim points out that the privacy provisions engage 
with the U.S. political discourse55 in two ways, the first of which, is the 
enhancement of the effectiveness of the SCC through the 'candid and 
direct' exchanges that make possible a degree of understanding of each 
side 's  nego tia ting  p rob lem s and  an ability  to b reak  dow n 
m isperceptions and false assum ptions that can hinder more formal 
forums. Such candor, allowed by the privacy provisions comes at the 
expense of the United States penchant for open, public debate on 
international dealings.
Recognising the d ialogism 56 of the p u b lic /p riv a te  conversation 
surrounding the privacy provision, Buchheim points to three aspects 
of the usefulness of the provision:57
i) current success of the SCC(1979) to which confidentiality has 
substantially contributed.
ii) Public requirem ents already met by the reports on the specific 
u n d e rs tan d in g s  re su ltin g  from  SCC nego tia tions to several 
congressional committees: The Committee on Foreign Relations, The 
Senate Armed Services Committee, The Committee on Foreign Affairs 
and its predecessor com m ittees, and the Com m ittee on Arm ed 
Services of the House of Representatives, The Joint Committee on 
Atomic Energy until its disestablishm ent and the Select Committees
55 Here, the term discourse refers to the U.S. 'frame of reference'. The term is invoked 
to illustrate the fluid and negotiated nature of discursivity as opposed to the rigidity 
implied by the term 'frame'.
56 From dialogic, a term coined by Volosinov (1973) in order to stress the continuous and 
interactive process of language, as opposed to the Saussurian emphasis on the abstract 
structural relations of language. Volosinov suggests that all language is expressive of 
social relations, and therefore he sees each individual utterance as structured as a 
dialogue with a notional addressee. This, he argues is a feature of all expressive acts, 
not merely linguistic ones, but any act of signification. In this sense, Buchheim 
recognises the need to address the publicity requirements of an open democracy, while 
maintaining the need for secrecy to preserve the functioning of sensitive negotiations 
and the liminal bounds of American self/other relations. See Volosinov, V. Marxism 
and the philosophy of Language N.Y.:Seminar Press, 1973.
Ibid p.3
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on Intelligence of both the Senate and the House of Representatives 
since their establishment.
iii)Historical precedent in other negotiations, arguing that negotiations 
tow ards international agreements are usually conducted in private, 
that the SCC is engaged in negotiations aim ed at the continuing 
m aintenance and im plem entation  of in ternational agreem ents, 
therefore the SCC has every right to conduct its proceedings in private.
Sydney Graybeal, in his testimony before the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations, w hile em phasising the privacy clause of the 
Regulations, pointed out that the SCC has no veto power over either 
government. Under this provision, he points out that, should the U.S. 
governm ent consider it to be in its interest to do so, the results and 
activities of the SCC may be m ade public, despite the clause in 
Paragraph 8 of the regulations which states that the results of the 
proceedings may only be m ade public under the consent of both 
Com m issioners.58
Sydney Graybeal, in support of Ambassador Buchheim's comments on 
privacy, m aintains that the privacy provisions have allowed for the 
exchange of considerable useful information in the process of clarifying 
ambiguous situations. Under the cloak of privacy:
58 Sydney Graybeal's statement reads in part: [djuring the negotiation of that very 
controversial paragraph in the regulations, it was made clear that neither 
Commissioner has a veto power over the U.S. Government in the event that the U.S. 
Government decides that it is in its interest to make the results, the activities, or even 
the proceedings of the SCC available.
Source: Briefing on SALT I Compliance Op Cit, p.10
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[a]mbiguous situations can be raised, discussed and clarified 
w ithout outsiders immediately draw ing the conclusion that 
there is a SALT "violation" and that the agreem ents are 
coming unglued...The SCC has proven that sensitive issues 
can be raised, discussed and clarified w ithout revealing 
intelligence sources and methods.59
Graybeal cites the SA-5 radar issue as an example of this.60 This point is 
further borne out on the Soviet side. Alexei Arbatov emphasises the 
importance of privacy on the grounds that it prevents the SCC from 
being used for political grandstanding out of technical details.61 He 
argues that technical m isunderstandings are common and norm al 
within the complexities of applying arms control agreements to specific 
circumstances, as he puts it:
[privacy] ... is im portant so as not to create political problems 
out of technical details ... every treaty of this kind is so 
complicated, so technically arcane that m isunderstandings 
are unavoidable, but those m isunderstandings are primarily 
technical.62
Placing these technical m isunderstandings in the public arena would 
serve to make arms control "the enemy of itself."63 He argues that 
arms control is designed to improve relations between states, so it is 
im portant that arms control details do not become "an aggravation of
59 Ibid p .ll
60 Ibid p .ll This issue will be raised in a later chapter.
61 By this, he refers to the use of strident accusations of non-compliance over ambiguous 
compliance behaviour that required clarification. Arbatov, Alexei. Department of 
Disarmament and Security Affairs, Institute for World Economy and International 
Relations (IMEMO) USSR Academy of Sciences, Moscow. Research Interview on the 
SALT SCC. Taped at Australian National University, Canberra, 31/7/1991.
62 Source: Author's interview with Alexei Arbartov at the ANU, Canberra 31/7/91  
[transcript of tape].
63 Ibid
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relations betw een states" that can turn into "a source of perm anent 
political conflicts."64
2.6 Procedures
Between 1973 and 1986 the SCC has held 28 sem iannual sessions. In 
addition, there have been two special sessions65 and two ABM Treaty 
Reviews (1977&1982). R.W. Buchheim points out that from day to day, 
the procedures of the SCC resem ble m ost o ther in ternational 
negotiations, insofar as there are:
a) Plenary meetings,
b) less formal executive meetings (comprising the Commissioners, 
Deputy Commissioners and Executive Secretaries),
c) W orking groups, for drafting and other purposes,
d) Dialogue between Executive Secretaries on procedural and
substantive matters,
e) Other low-level interactions.66
The m eetings have been held in Geneva (with provision to hold 
meetings elsewhere by agreement between the two Commissioners in 
the M em orandum  of Understanding, December 21, 197267) generally 
alternating between the mission of the USSR and an Annex building
64 Ibid
65 1975 and 1986. Source: U.S. State Department A Concise history of the Standing 
Consultative Commission (Wash. August 6,1984). These were, respectively, SCC 
special session convened by the U.S. to discuss Soviet SS19 in relation to the SALT I 
provision for 'heavy' missiles (January 28-Februaryl3,1975) and SCC special session 
convened by the Soviet Union to discuss U.S. decision to repudiate SALT II (July 22-29, 
1986).
66 Ibid p.8
67 See supra note 7
of the U.S. Mission.68 These meetings are generally held in Spring and 
Autum n each year and each last around two months.69
The internal review  process, by which inform ation pertaining to 
possible compliance questions is evaluated, includes all concerned 
members of the executive branch [see figure 2.1]. Sydney Graybeal70 
em phasises the autonom y of the SCC from the SALT negotiation 
process, stressing that the U.S. Commissioner to the SCC should be 
kept informed over SALT issues (negotiations and proposed language), 
in order to have the background to the origins and purposes of each 
Article, Agreed Statement and Common Understanding, so that they 
can be assessed in terms of their implementation. This way, he argues, 
the U.S. Commissioner to the SCC can advise on issues likely to arise 
from the proposed language. It also ensures that the SCC does not 
become a forum for resolving problems more appropriately dealt with 
by the SALT body.
U.S. Procedure
The United States Departm ent of State Bureau of Public Affairs notes 
that since the signing of the 1972 SALT agreements, procedures for 
monitoring Soviet compliance and dealing with related matters:
68 R.W. Buchheim, Briefing on SALT I Compliance 1979 p.8
69 Sydney Graybeal and Michael Krepon "Making Better Use of the Standing 
Consultative Commission" in International Security 1986/1 p.185
Sydney Graybeal 'Statement of Hon. Sydney N. Graybeal, Former U.S. 
Commissioner to the Standing Consultative Commission, Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency', in Buchheim, Brießng on SALT I Compliance, 1979,p.29
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All intelligence inform ation is carefully analysed in the 
context of the provisions of those [SALT] agreements, and 
recommendations on questions which arise are developed by 
interagency intelligence and policy/advisory groups within 
the NSC [National Security Council] system .71
These com prise an Intelligence Com m unity Steering G roup on
M onitoring Strategic Arms Limitations and the Standing Consultative
C om m ission W orking G roup of the NSC Special C oordination
Committee. In the event of intelligence analysis indicating a question
concerning compliance the latter group:
...review s and analyses the available inform ation and 
provides recommendations. The President decides whether a 
particular question or issue is to be raised with the USSR 
based on the study and recom mendations of the W orking 
G roup and, if necessary, the departm en t and agency 
p rin c ip a ls  w ho com prise the Special C o o rd in a tio n  
Committee or the NSC itself.72
Once a question is raised with the USSR through the SCC the positions 
and actions taken by the US representatives follow the same course.
Procedurally, when the Soviets raise an issue with the United States, it 
goes to the President's office by priority cable from the delegation. 
There, it is discussed and the monitoring capabilities of the intelligence 
com m unity are brought in. The political decision is then made as to 
the appropriate response, which is then relayed to the U.S. delegation 
for discussion with the Soviet counterparts.73
71 Bureau of Public Affairs U.S. Dept, of State Compliance With SALT I Agreements 
Special Report no.55 Washington: Dept of State July 1979 p .l, and see also SALT I 
Compliance: SALT II Verification, Department of State Selected Documents No. 7, 
Bureau of Public Affairs Office of Communication p.45
72 Ibid, p.l
73 Buchheim, R. Brießng on SALT I Compliance 1979 p.29
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Soviet Procedure
The Soviet Com m issioners, according to Sydney G raybeal,74 take  
compliance questions equally seriously, but differently, insofar as for 
sensitive issues, the two Commissioners would work privately and 
w ith  the D eputy  C om m issioners, w hile still form ally passing 
statements. There are indications that these communications reached 
the highest levels of Soviet leadership including the Politburo and 
Prem ier Brezhnev .75 The reciprocity, or m irror-im aging of the SCC 
bureaucratic procedures is emphasised by Buchheim in terms of the 
image of balance. As he points out:
... [a]n agreement m ust not only be good, but it m ust look
good. It m ust look bilateral.76
The importance of bilateral forms is taken very seriously, as signifiers 
of discursive77 equality. One instance of the extent of this emerged 
during the course of a session called by the US Commissioner. The 
Commissioners generally host the sessions on a rotating basis. At one 
of these sessions, the usual room at the US Mission was unavailable, 
and the US Commissioner asked the Soviet counterpart to host the 
session. This m eant that the Soviets w ould have hosted the session 
twice running. Then, according to the former US Commissioner to the
74 Ibid., p.29
75 Ambassador Buchheim supported these observations in Buchheim, Briefing on SALT 
I Compliance, p.30
76 Ibid., p.30
77 Here the term discursive is used in the sense of the 'right to speak' denoting, not 
merely the ability to speak, but a relation of power, such that, in this instance, that 
which is rendered as a 'speech act' (Austin:1964,Searle:1978) by either party carries 
equal weight.
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SCC, Sydney Graybeal: "Immediately they were suspect. 'W hat is 
Graybeal up to? Normally the guest speaks first. Does he w ant to get 
som ething on the table before we have a chance to speak?"’78 Such 
close reading of forms suggest that forms themselves are meaningful, 
in addition to the 'contents' of negotiations. This further supports the 
view that the analyst m ust attend to the 'economy of discourse' - the 
contextual features, the materiality of discourse, - which structures and 
underw rites the essential features of w hat is said between states as 
surely as between individuals.
2.7 Political Functions
M orton Kaplan sustains the thesis that attention to the 'trifling' 
technical details of strategic arm aments cannot be ignored, and that 
failure to do so "involves a genuine and definite major cost with 
respect to other im portant values," He nevertheless quotes Freeman 
Dyson, pointing out that "political factors are more im portant than 
strategic ."79
It is a theme pursued on the Soviet side too, As Arbatov notes:
... arms control is really an instrum ent - of some peripheral 
l im ita tio n s , p e rip h e ra lly  im p ro v in g  p re d ic ta b ili ty , 
transparency, - for the symbolic nature of arms control.80
78 Sydney Graybeal "Soviet Negotiating Practice" in L. Sloss & M. Scott Davis (eds.) A 
Game for High Stakes: Lessons Learned in Negotiating with the Soviets 
Mass.:Ballinger 1986:37.
79 Morton Kaplan "SALT and the International System" in Morton Kaplan (ed.) SALT: 
Problems and Prospects Morristown: General Learning Press, 1973, pp.1-25 p.13.
80 Arbatov, Alexei. Department of Disarmament and Security Affairs, Institute for 
World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) USSR Academy of Sciences, 
Moscow. Author's Research Interview on the SALT SCC. Taped at Australian National 
University, Canberra, 31/7/91, 1991.
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In other w ords, arms control is a symbolic operation81 played out 
through the negotiation of relatively minor technical details that in 
themselves do not significantly alter the strategic position of either 
country, b u t rather, they signal an in tention to engage in the 
negotiation process, and this is the chief value of negotiating arms 
control.
The issue here, is one of the political significance of any country's 
willingness to violate agreements on arms control. As Lowenthal and 
Wit point out:
political significance, refers to the intentions of the non­
complying power, regardless of the military significance of 
the violation. ... in fact the smaller the military significance, 
the m ore troubling  the political significance becomes. 
Violating a treaty for some m ilitary advantage may make 
sense, depending on the calculation of risks and benefits. 
Risking a treaty, or perhaps an entire regime of treaties, for a 
small m ilitary advantage sends a troubling message about 
the intentions of that party. In essence then, all cases of non- 
com pliance have political significance; some also have 
military significance. The amount of importance attached to 
these two factors is a function of political orientation .82
H edley Bull argues that, in negotiating strategic arm s lim itation, 
attention needs to be given, not only to the technical capabilities of the 
weapons systems themselves, but that there should also be negotiation 
on the issue of defence doctrine and force-posture. In the past, arms 
control agreements have been arrived at, he argues, "essentially by a 
process of bargaining, in which the rationale of the positions adopted,
81 Symbolic operation: That is to say, that arms control plays a role at the level of 
speech act as a culturally significant (meaningful) practice.
82 Lowenthal, Mark M. and Joel S. Wit "The Politics of Verification." Verification 
and Arms Control. Ed. William C. Potter. Lexington: Lexington Books, 1985. 153-168. 
p.163
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if not actually an obstruction, has been irrelevant to the outcome ."83
This view of the relative irrelevance of the rationale behind the
bargaining positions can be explained insofar as this occurs between
actors that themselves have to be constituted and empowered so that
they can actually strike such bargains. Moreover, insofar as he argues
for negotiation on force posture and defence doctrine, rather than for
some technical fine-tuning performed with all the theoretical aplomb
of horse traders, he is also arguing that arms control is more correctly
represented as a political, rather than merely technical, process that
performs the function of defining in overt terms the relations between
nations. Once again it is the sym bolic/discursive (articulated as the
political) aspect of arm s control, no tw ithstand ing  the technical
lim itations placed upon actual w eapons system s, that forms the
driving force behind arms control. By concentrating on the defence
doctrine and force posture, Bull strikes at the heart of the intentionality
of the treaty parties. With respect to SALT, he asks:
[slhould questions of strategic and arms control doctrine (e.g., 
defence vs m utual deterrence as a goal) and questions of the 
com putation of appropria te  force levels enter into the 
substance of the negotiations? It is important that SALT 
should be an exchange of strategic ideas and a process of 
mutual education about the bases of strategic thinking84 in 
the two countries. ... the issue is ... to explore by negotiation 
w hether there is common ground betw een two positions 
arrived at by necessarily separate processes of decision .85 
[emphasis mine.]
83 Hedley Bull "Strategic Arms Limitation: the Precedent of the Washington and 
London Naval Treaties" in Morton Kaplan (ed.) Op Cit. in note 50, pp.26-52. p.50
84 Here, Bull is suggesting that SALT can be more than the mere limitation of arms - it 
can also become a forum for greater transparency at the level of strategic doctrine.
85 Ibid, p.50
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Indeed in the SALT SCC there is precisely the mechanism for such 
discussion and negotiation. U nder the terms of the ABM Treaty, 
Sections (d) and (g) of Article XIII state that within the SCC's area of 
competence is the ability to:
(d) consider possible changes in the strategic situation 
which have a bearing on the Treaty. [Andl (g) consider, as 
app ropria te , proposals for fu rther m easures aim ed at 
limiting strategic arms.
And in the M em orandum  of U nderstanding which established the 
SCC its terms of reference state in part: "The Commission may also 
consider changes in the general strategic situation ..." and "Related to 
this is the Com mission's authority to consider proposals to further 
increase the viability of the Treaty..." In other words, the terms of 
reference granted to the SCC upon its establishment by the ABM Treaty 
and the Interim Agreement allow the SCC to 'exchange strategic ideas 
and engage in a process of m utual education '86 about the bases for 
strategic thinking in the two countries. The decision to do so or not is a 
political one, and presents a set of options that arguably have not as yet 
been utilised. [I shall explore the political uses of the SCC in subsequent 
chapters when dealing w ith specific compliance questions raised, and 
the responses to them, by different administrations.]
Nevertheless, the fact remains that, interwoven with the institutional 
structures of the Regulations and designated 'areas of competence’ the 
SCC represents a rem arkable political achievement given the climate 
between the superpow ers at its inception. Former SALT negotiator, 
Gerard Smith, characterised the pre-SALT U.S.-Soviet relationship as
See above, n 83,
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"not unlike two boxers in a ring ."87 The SCC, beyond clearing up 
ambiguities in the implementation of the SALT Treaties, has, arguably, 
an im portant political role as a conduit for addressing misperceptions 
and de-fusing tensions between the Parties. Gerard Smith makes this 
point:
[I]f talk is a prime tool of international politics, [the SCC] is 
an ever-ready instrum ent for talking things out, not just 
about clarifying the past, but also about how to avoid future 
dangers. In past years the United States has often tried to 
signal the Kremlin, through speeches, budgetary actions and 
private communications between W ashington and Moscow, 
about its interest in m utual restraint and its concern about 
certain Soviet moves. This has been a som ew hat random  
process w ithout clear results. The Standing Consultative 
Commission could be used for this purpose, perm itting a 
degree of precision and continuity not possible in ad hoc 
com m unication .88
This point is taken up by Strobe Talbot,89 where he emphasises that,
no t only substantively , bu t sym bolically too, the SCC rem ains
im portant to the extent to which it is able to raise m atters in ways
unavailable to traditional diplomatic means. He describes the SCC as:
[a] unique forum  in which m ilitary officers, intelligence 
officials, and diplom ats from the two sides could sit down 
with each other on a regular basis and talk about subjects that 
used to qualify as military secrets-and, in other contexts, still 
d id .90
87" Smith, Gerard. Doubletalk: The Story of the First Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. 
New York: Doubleday, 1980.
88 Ibid, p.463
89 Strobe Talbot Deadly Gambits The Reagan Administration and the Stalemate in 
Nuclear Arms Control New York:Alfred A. Knopf 1984,p228
90 Talbot Op Cit. 1984 p.228
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Despite the interagency process which formulates the instructions of 
the US delegation to the SCC, the instructions are ultim ately filtered 
through the National Security Council under the advice of the White 
House. Insofar as the White House represents the highest authority 
from  w hich the US C om m issioners to the SCC receive their 
instructions, the SCC cannot be seen as a purely autonomous body, but 
is, rather, a 'pit-face' of political contact between the US and the Soviet 
U nion.
The effectiveness of the SCC therefore depends, to a large extent on the 
quality of instructions issued to the delegations from their respective 
g o v ern m en ts , 91 and, more im portantly, on the political will of both 
governm ents to utilise this channel of communication. As we shall 
see in later chapters, this has led to variable use and effectiveness, 
according to the political climate of the time.
Both sides agree that within a lim ited, or restricted definition of its 
functions, the SCC has been a very  successful channel of 
com m unication on technical 'book-keeping' m atters. For Robert 
Buchheim and Dan Caldwell, as for Alexei Arbatov92, where problems 
have arisen over the effectiveness of the SCC, these have occurred at a 
higher level of policymaking, rather than w ith the SCC itself. As
91 Duffy Op Cit, 165
92 See: Arbatov, Alexei. Department of Disarmament and Security Affairs, Institute 
for World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) USSR Academy of Sciences, 
Moscow. Author's Research Interview on the SALT SCC. Taped at Australian 
National University, Canberra, 31/7/1991. and Buchheim, D. Caldwell & R.W. The 
US-USSR SCC: Description and Appraisal. Working Paper. Providence, Rhode Island: 
The Centre for Foreign Policy Development, Brown University, 1983.
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Buchheim and Caldwell state, among those features of the SCC which
are basic to its record of success is the fact that it:
...does not get involved in aspects of relations between the 
two governm ents that lie outside its field of assigned 
responsibilities .93
Gloria Duffy makes this point on the extent to which the SCC has been
used in relation to its designated areas of competence:
The mandate of the SCC is broad, leaving to the US and 
Soviet governments the choice of whether to use the SCC 
m inim ally or maximally as a joint consultative forum to 
im p lem en t the term s of arm s contro l agreem ents. 
Historically, the two countries have chosen to invoke only a 
small portion of the SCC's m andate, em ploying it almost 
solely to discuss technical compliance issues and to negotiate 
practical measures for the implementation of ag reem en ts '^  
[emphasis mine]
Variations in the quality and style of instructions in m any senses 
reflects the imprecision of the whole arms control process, insofar as 
clear violations of agreements are rare and the products of verification 
technologies themselves require interpretation. In other words the 
choice as to whether or not to bring matters up in the SCC rests upon 
the political choice of standard of verification (adequate vs effective), 
interpretive choices made on ambiguous verification data, intelligence 
community decisions as to whether or not the type of non-compliance 
charge would reveal too much about the m ethods used to obtain the 
evidential data and decisions about whether marginal infringements 
are worthy of the term 'violation'. All these, at one level or another
93 Buchheim, R.W. & D. Caldwell The U S -U S S R  SCC: D escrip t ion  and Appraisal.  
Working Paper. Providence, Rhode Island: The Centre for Foreign Policy Development, 
Brown University, 1983. p.14.
9AIbid p.165.
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constitute 'political' choices that may, ultimately be seen to owe more 
to the mechanisms of, that which in earlier times was called, political 
'signalling' and in less monologic times may be referred-to as political
d isc o u rse d
Such a view reflects the U.S. position. It is a position that desires the 
m andate of the SCC to have a broad interpretation. That is, as (notably) 
Sydney Graybeal and Robert Buchheim have suggested, the SCC has 
the potential under a wide interpretation of its mandate to engage in a 
w ide range of activities: to discuss ways of im proving security, to 
develop positive ways of im proving the effectiveness of the treaties 
under its charge. The Soviet view, however militates against this as 
there is a strong preference on the Soviet side to keep the m andate of 
the SCC focussed  u p o n  pu re ly  technical de ta ils  of trea ty  
im plem entation. While this rem ains the case it seems unlikely that 
unilateral efforts on the U.S.' behalf will enjoy either success or 
reciprocity with the Soviets. The Soviets clearly see the SCC as merely a 
conduit for communication and not for any form of initiating dialogue 
that may extend the domain or application of the treaty with which it 
is principally concerned.
In the following chapters I shall outline the U.S.'s shift in emphasis on 
the SCC;
i. through the shift in standard of verification,
ii. through the increase in the technical complexity of 
agreements and their verifiable elements,
95 here used in the sense of 'the social process of making and reproducing sense’ between 
political (read 'nation-state') subjectivities. See O'Sullivan, Saunders, Hartley and 
Fiske 1983:73 for an elaboration of this use of the term.
through the changes in verification technologies and 
the constitution of the verification com m unity from 
intelligence analysts to the intelligence com m unity 
decisionmakers and decisionmaking context that made 
possible and problematic certain compliance issues,
through the coupling of the deterioration of detente 
w ith the perception of deterioration of deterrence 
through the w ork of the Committee on the Present 
Danger,
and finally, [and related to the latter] through changes 
in the political perceptions of and by, the Carter regime.
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Chapter III
The SCC and the Carter Administration: Compliance Challenge and
World-View
...is not war merely another kind of writing and language for 
political thoughts? It certainly has a grammar of its own, but 
its logic is not peculiar to itself.
- Clausewitz
We know precious little about how 'to do' cultural 
anthropology...
- Amrom Katz
3.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to examine and trace the links between 
US perceptions of Soviet compliance with arms control agreements 
during  the Carter adm inistration and the operation of the Standing 
Consultative Commission on Arms Limitation (SCC). In so doing, this 
chapter, and those that follow, take up a range of issues concerning the 
political/discursive aspects of the use of the SCC to raise compliance 
issues with the Soviet Union and compare the perceived performance 
of the SCC in relation to certain assumptions and perceptions of Soviet 
compliance behaviour as expressed by certain key figures in the Carter 
adm inistration and in the US Congress. It represents an attem pt, in 
other w ords to supply in part some of the 'cultural anthropology' 
desired by Amrom Katz .96 Coeval with this analysis and one of the 
formative assumptions under which it operates is the argum ent that 
the connection betw een language and politics is inextricably
96 See Katz, Amrom. "Technical Collection in the 1980s." Intelligence Requirements for 
the 1980's: Clandestine Collection. Ed. Roy Godson. New Brunswick: National Strategy 
Information Center Inc, 1982. p .l l l  where he notes: "Deficiencies in the collection tools 
(or in the analysis) will continue. We know precious little about how "to do" cultural 
anthropology ..."
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intertw ined with the social world and its history. The consequences of 
this are reflected - in the context of this thesis - in the study of the 
deploym ent of verification technologies (technological and discursive) 
located in terms of their role in the in terpretation/'exegesis' of the 
activities and motivations of the US' notional adversary, the Soviet 
Union. That is to say, that the developm ent/ deploym ent of strategic 
offensive weapons and their support systems may be seen in terms of 
being constitutive of the interpretive communities of the respective 
arm s control regimes. By so doing, my intention is to describe the 
emergence and constitution of a new dom ain of policy, a space of 
action constituted by and through a domain of surveillance within the 
w ider netw orks of the foreign and defence policy community. The 
effect is to re-work the traditional literature on political 'signalling' in 
the light of recent developments in discourse analysis, draw ing on 
some insights linked, in part, with the work of Michel Foucault.
Thus discourse theory, as articulated in this thesis adds a m etatheory 
level to examine the assum ptions underpinning theories of political 
signalling. The purpose is to question signalling theory's assum ption 
that signals exist s relatively discrete units in a relatively uniflow 
com m unication model.
Its focus in the experiential world shall remain on the issue of SALT 
compliance and the texts which surround the relationship between 
security, verification and SALT. Arguing against the simplistic uni­
flow models of signalling, this chapter seeks to engage with that which 
Foucault refers to as the 'economy of discourses' that is:
- their intrinsic technology, the necessities of their operation, 
the tactics they employ, the effects of power which underlie 
them and which they transmit.97
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This encom passes far more than the 'straightforw ard ' assum ption 
underlying political 'signalling' theory, that signals are essentially 
nothing more than the mere elements of a system of representation. 
As Robert Young notes:
The Structuralist m ethod assumes that m eaning is m ade 
possible  by the existence of underly ing  system s of 
conventions which enable elements to function individually 
as signs. Structuralist analysis addresses itself to the system of 
rules and relations underlying each signifying practice.98
Discourse analysis, as described above addresses itself to the analysis of 
w hat makes possible these 'underlying system s of conventions' - 
un d er w hat conditions do these em erge, and how  these are 
articulated/invoked in the production of signs.
The connection between politics and strategic discourse has long been
recognised. The strategic philosopher Clausewitz, as early as 1834, asks:
...is not war merely another kind of writing and language for 
political thoughts? It certainly has a grammar of its own, but 
its logic is not peculiar to itself.99
The theoretical ground for this thesis is premised on the commonality 
of the logic of strategic discourse with that of other forms of life. The 
underlying logic arguably rem ains common to the identity-m aking
97 Michel Foucault The History of Sexuality: an introduction Harmondsworth:Penguin 
Books 1984/69
98 Robert Young Untying the Text: A Poststructuralist Reader. London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1981. p.3
99 Carl von Clausewitz On War Harmondsworth:Penguin Classics 1987/402
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practices upon which all comm unicative/social forms of life are based. 
The specificity here, as C lausew itz rightly points out, lies in the 
articulative frameworks or 'grammars' within which specific forms of 
life may be meaningfully structured. In order to construct a 'grammar' 
or syntagmatic frame100 through which to explore the communicative, 
or overtly  discursive operation of the SCC, I shall outline the 
performance of the SCC through the examination of:
a. Context
(i) the definition of the standard of verification,
(ii) the coupling of detente deterioration with the perception 
of deterrence deterioration, and finally, [and related to the 
latter]
(iii) Internal: changes in the political perceptions of and by, 
the Carter administration.
b. Forms
(i) Internal: the shift in the complexity of agreements and 
their verifiable elements,
(ii) External: the changes in verification technologies that 
made possible and problematic certain compliance issues,
100 Syntagm: Saussurian linguistics argues that all languages and codes are built upon 
the two dimensions of paradigm and syntagm. While a paradigm is a set of units from 
which one may be chosen to combine with units from other paradigms, to form a 
syntagm, a syntagm represents the combination of paradigmatic units into a signifying 
whole. A sentence is an example of a syntagm, in which a word represents a 
paradigmatic unit. An advertisement is a syntagm of signs, a melody is a syntagm of 
notes, arms control treaties are therefore arguably a syntagm of treaty-limited items 
and their elements. O'Sullivan, Hartley, Saunders and Fiske, argue that in a syntagm 
the meaning of a unit is determined by how it interacts with the others, whereas in a 
paradigm it is determined by how it is distinguished from the others. For further 
reading see O'Sullivan, Hartley, Saunders and Fiske Key Concepts in Communication 
London:Methuenl983/166,237 and Ferdinand de Saussure Course in General Linguistics 
NewYork: McGraw-Hill 1966 Section 2.
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These levels of analysis offer an interpretive grid that relates political, 
institutional and technological factors in order to chart the ideological 
shift in culture from Carter to Reagan.
In the chapters that follow this will lead into a reappraisal of these 
issue areas d u rin g  the Reagan adm in istra tion , develop ing  a 
comparative analysis of the handling of compliance and related issues, 
read as symptoms of the shift in world-view between the two regimes. 
In this sense, the reality of US strategic identity is interrogated not in 
individual things bu t in the relationships between them. As the early 
W ittgenstein noted: "The world is the totality of facts, not of things." 
And 'facts' are 'the existence of states of affairs.' It is 'the configuration 
of objects that produces states of affairs' and 'the structure of a fact 
consists of the structures of states of affairs. '101 'The totality of existing 
states of affairs also determines which states of affairs do not exist. '102 It 
is thus the structu res of the relationships betw een things that 
constitutes a view of the world, based on practices of inclusion and of 
exclusion. Arguably, the concepts by which the world is operated are 
constituted by, and through signs and the relations between signs - 
signifying systems - of which language is but a part.
This focus on m ean ing /in te rp reta tion , rather than pure 'content' 
allows Coral Bell to point out that the achievements of SALT are 
valuable "more on a political than a strategic basis"103 and to note that
101 Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus London:Routledge 1988/5-8 
aphorisms 1.1-2.034.
102 Ibid p.8 aphorism 2.05
103 Coral Bell The Diplomacy of Detente: The Kissinger Era London:Martin Robertson 
1977/56
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"arms control proposals m ust be related to the underlying focus-
balance and political reality of their time."104 Indeed, the primacy of the
discursive field in which decisionmaking takes place has long been
recognised, as Sprout and Sprout noted in 1957:
W ith respect to policym aking and the content of policy 
decisions, our position is that w hat matters is how the policy 
m aker imagines the milieu to be, not how it actually is.
With respect to the operational results of decisions, what 
matters is how things are, not how the policymaker imagines 
them to be.105
The point here is that in the light of Saussurian linguistics and the 
discourse theory which developed from it, the second part of the 
statement above must be seen to refer to the fact of how such decisions 
are interpreted and acted upon discursively, rather than the putative 
ontological world it seems to imply. That is to say; that which is 
constituted discursively cannot leave the discursive realm, such that 
where meaning is invoked in the order of signification, such acts as 
follow consequentially are also meaningful in terms of that order of 
signification. They are, to reiterate C lausew itz, "another kind of 
writing and language for political thoughts.106"
104 Ibid p.56
Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout "Environmental Factors in the Study of 
International Politics" Journal of Conflict R esolu tion  Vol 1, 1957, pp309-328 at p.328 
quoted in R.F. Hopkins and R.W. Mansbach S tru ctu re  and Process in In ternational 
Politics New York: Harper and Row 1973/159 [emphasis mine]
See C.von Clausewitz O p cit. p.402
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Language, so construed [as signifying system], may be seen to operate 
asym ptotically107 in its relation to the experiential realm. That is to say, 
that language is socially structured and that social structures are, in 
turn, construed by and through language. Language therefore plays a 
constructive, rather than a merely descriptive role. Language can no 
longer be seen as merely mimicking or reflecting the world, but rather 
shapes the understanding that the analyst brings to the world. Thus 
language may be viewed in terms of its tendency towards greater or 
lesser figurativity, rather than in terms of degrees of mimesis108. It 
m ust be said, however, that this is not to understate the materiality of 
discourse and its effects.
Ole Waever points out that the concept of discourse itself "was 
introduced exactly in order to underline that there was not an external 
relationship between mental phenomena and other social relations"109 
and that to introduce things meaningfully into the social realm is to 
introduce things via language which operates in the symbolic order. 
That is to say that things are, by language, re-presented. Under this 
rubric, everything that is ascribed m eaning [concepts] is discursive. 
This, as Waever points out, "does not mean that there is nothing but
107 that is to say along one axis it tends towards, but never achieves a 1:1 relation to 
reality (mimesis) and along the other, it tends towards but never achieves pure fantasy 
(figuration).
108 Mimesis: literally 'imitation'. For Aristotle, the use of language meant to mirror, or 
imitate a pre-existent world. See Aristotle. Poetics. Michigan: Ann Arbor/University 
of Michigan Press, 1973.p.3. For Plato the term was perjorative, holding that since 
natural objects were themselves mere appearances of the real, then writing or painting 
were imitations of imitations.
109 Ole Waever "Tradition and Transgression in International Relations: a Post- 
Ashleyan Position" Arbejdspapirer Working Papers Copenhagen:Centre for Peace and 
Conflict Research, 1989 p.37
discourse in the w orld” but rather that, phenomena m ust be dealt with 
as "material and symbolic"110
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In describing the political world as a socially constituted entity, then
socially m eaningful political acts m ay be considered in term s of
linguistic, or para-linguistic processes. In the traditional literature of
International Relations, this aspect has been treated under the rubrics
of signalling and perception. By 'signal', I follow Coral Bell's useful
definition as the means by which "the powers convey and receive the
inform ation vital to their respective assessm ents each other's
capabilities and intentions ."* 111 Robert Jervis points out that:
w hat men [sic] do cannot be explained w ithou t some 
reference to or assum ptions about their views about the 
nature of the w orld .112
And further, that rather than conceiving hum an action as the result of 
environm ental pressures, stim uli, motives, attitudes and ideas, his 
view is far more interactive - hum an beings are not simply tabula rasa 
to be w ritten  upo n  by largely  p re-fo rm ed  and  m onolith ic  
environmental factors. Hum an action, in the words of Herbert Blumer 
"arises instead from how he [sic] interprets and handles these things in 
the action he is constructing"113 which lends support to the view that
110 Ibid p.37
111 Coral Bell "Communication between Powers" Crisis and Hierarchy unpublished 
manuscript, Canberra :ANU 1991/52
112 Robert JervisTTie Logic of Images in International Relations Princeton: Princeton 
University Press.1970
113 Herbert Blumer, "Society as Symbolic Interaction," Human Behaviour and Social 
Processes, Ed. Arnold Rose, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1962 quoted in R. Jervis, 1970/4
material political action is predicated on the interpretive act, which is 
played out on the order of representation, or the symbolic order.
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With this in mind the term signal may be characterised as:
... the whole variety of inputs that go to make up the total 
com m unication-flow . Signals m ay be declara to ry  or 
operational, verbal or non-verbal, conscious or unconscious, 
deliberate or inadvertent, bilateral or multi-lateral, direct or 
indirect, secret or open, official or non-official.114
One potential problem posed by this formulation is that it radically 
separates the message from the interpretive community, viewing the 
latter as that which is inform ed or m isinform ed by the 'signal'. 
How ever, insofar as the interpretive com m unity is construed by 
signals which, in their turn, and on that basis produce other signals (be 
they declarative, operational, verbal or non-verbal, conscious or 
unconscious etc), this form ulation renders the separation of signal 
from discursive com m unity som ew hat problem atic. 'Signals', so 
construed embody w hat Ole Waever describes as 'the materiality of 
discourses'.
Why then talk about 'discursive acts' rather than 'signals' other than 
to use so-called 'trendy' terms? The above discussion hints at two 
prim ary reasons. Firstly, the practice of 'signalling' is not monologic, 
despite the form ulation of it in m onologic term s (declaratory, 
operational etc all im ply a un id irec tional/in tensional m odel of 
com m unication). Secondly, insofar as 'signalling ' is located as 
'practice', its theoretical underpinnings are located as intrinsically
114 Coral Bell, Op Cit.
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separate, rather than as an aspect of the relational processes between 
and constitutive of the im age/identities of 'actors'. Yet, as traditionally 
articulated, it is possible to conceive of 'signals' only on the basis of a 
theory of interpretation that assumes:
i) That the sign has a necessary, na tu ra l or substantive 
m eaning.
ii) Language is a substance, not a form.
iii) That structuralist models of signals [seeking out recurrent 
elements and their patterns, resulting in a model consisting of an 
autonom ous entity  of independent parts which reciprocally 
condition each other] assume that meaning and signification are 
both transparent and already in place, and that these can be 
objectively and scientifically verified .115
These assum ptions have come under consistent challenge from
several standpoints. The first two of these, which may be subsumed
into an assumption of the monologism of language, has been critiqued
by Mikhail Bakhtin in who argued that language is inherently dialogic,
tha t is to say that each 'sta tem ent' p resupposes its converse
form ulation (it presum es a receiver which shapes the form of the
'statement'), that to raise a question is to set the agenda for the form of
reply, and that each statem ent contains within itself the seeds for its
inversion .116
The second set of assumptions relates to the practice of (or 
potential for) modelling through structural analysis the structures of 
m eaning /in terpreta tion . The problem  with this form ulation is that
115 Young, Robert. Untying the Text: A Poststructuralist Reader. London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1981.pp.3-4.
116 See Mikhail Bakhtin The Dialogic Imagination 1981
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whereas the model implies an already constituted product, the more 
the surface of the text is analysed the more it can be seen in terms of 
(inter)textuality, which is to say the interaction of reader and text, along 
w ith the interaction between texts or textual worlds (by reference 
explicitly or implicitly to other texts) as a productivity, the production 
of a multiplicity of signifying effects. In turn, as Young points out, this 
implies a questioning of the model of comm unication as a closed 
system and of the attem pt to fix a unified theory of sets of structural 
relations117
To provide a context to the material under discussion in this chapter I 
shall outline a brief historical note on the developm ent of the 
technologies to be lim ited later by the ABM Treaty, the Interim  
Agreem ent and the SALT II Agreement118. By seeking to explain the 
changes in the use of the SCC through a range of issue areas, an 
attem pt is being made to establish connections between the semiotic119 
w orld of political life and the techno-strategic discourse of national 
security 120 as expressed in arms control compliance and verification. 
This way, political discourse may be seen to shift its emphasis from the
117 Young, Robert. Untying the Text: A Poststructuralist Reader. London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1981.p.8
118 See section 3.2 Strategic Background: From 'gap' to parity in this chapter.
119 Here I stay with M.H. Abrams' 1981:170-172 definition of semiotics as: "a science of 
signs" according to which "not only explicit systems of communication such as language, 
morse code, traffic signs and signals, are constituted by signs" but also "a great 
diversity of human actions and productions-our bodily postures and gestures, the social 
rituals we perform ... -all convey shared "meanings" to members of a particular culture, 
and so can be analysed as signs which function in diverse kinds of signifying systems..." 
[emphasis mine]
12(1 See Bradley S. Klein Strategic Discourse and its Alternatives NY:Center on 
Violence and Human Survival Working Papers 1987/1
traditionally realist concerns with causality along the lines of scientific 
modeling and towards a politics of meaning.
Quester points to the signalling aspects of arms control negotiations,
insofar as their achievem ents cannot be lim ited solely to their
'substantive' accomplishments, as he notes:
The mere appearance of agreement in such negotiations may 
have beneficial effects per se, serving in effect as an exchange 
of compliments, an exchange of compliments which can in 
turn trigger new waves of detente and an easing of political 
hostility .121
Of course this works both ways, such that the appearance of non­
agreement may signal a cooling of detente and an increase in political 
hostility. In fact, both of these forms can be seen to be in play 
throughout the whole period of detente. Each can be seen to have had 
an impact at different times on the SALT compliance debates and the 
use of the SCC.
As Ryan122, discussing Winch's critique of social science suggests:
[t]he connections which hold between actions are conceptual 
connections, and ... the terminology which we employ in 
talking about actions is indispensable to our identifying  
actions as actions.123 [emphasis mine]
and that, inter alia
Hum an actions, on this view, are meaningful, and meaning 
is not a category open to causal analysis; so long as
121 George H. Quester The Continuing Problem of International Relations NY:Dryden 
Press 1974/48
122 See Alan Ryan The Philosophy of the Social Sciences London:Macmillan 1980
123 Ibid. pp. 130-131
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meaningful actions form the subject-matter of social inquiry, 
the most im portant category for our understanding of social 
life will not be that of cause and effect, bu t that of 
meaningfulness and rule-guidedness.124
Between SALT I and SALT II, there are a range of quantitative and 
qualitative differences, each of which raise a range of verification 
problem s. In ad d ition  to dom estic political concerns, at an 
instrum ental level it was largely the introduction of new qualitative 
restrictions that made SALT II problematic for the Carter regime. This, 
coupled with political problems raised by perceptions of the Carter 
adm inistration's foreign policy as 'incoherent' and the administration 
itself as a 'failure',125 arguably added difficulties to the ability of the 
adm inistration to activate the SCC to the fullest extent of its terms of 
reference.
To canvass these issues it is necessary first to outline the strategic 
background to the SALT talks, survey the technical differences between 
SALT I and SALT II with respect to the problems of verification and 
then look at the compliance record through the language of the 
Reports to Congress in order to examine how compliance or non- 
compliance has been invoked and in terpreted  by the incum bent 
political com m unities, that is, at the m eaning-potential and rule- 
guidance principles of these com m unities and how  they have
124 Ryan: see note 6 above.
125 There are a range of works outlining these perceptions, including Abernathy, M.G., 
Hill, D., & Williams, P. eds The Carter Years: The President and Policy Making 
London:Frances Pinter, 1984, Coral Bell President Carter and Foreign Policy: The Costs 
of Virtue? Canberra:ANU, 1980, Haregrove, E. Jimmy Carter as President: Leadership 
& the Politics of the Public Good Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ., 1988, Jerel A. 
Rosati The Carter Administration's quest for Global Community Columbia: Univ. of 
South Carolina, 1987, Donald S. Spencer The Carter Implosion: Jimmy Carter and the 
Amateur Style of Diplomacy NY:Praeger 1988, and others. For a contrary view see 
A.D. Campbell Security and Identity Canberra:ANU Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis 1990.
in terpreted  the role and effectiveness of the SCC in raising these 
compliance issues with the Soviets.
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3.2 Strategic Background: From ’gap’ to parity
This section focuses upon the diachronic, or historical, aspect of the 
constitu tion  and  developm ent of an in te rp re tive  com m unity, 
deploying a regime of tru th  based on a systematic engagement with 
what becomes progressively defined as the threat of the Other.126 This 
section argues that much of the early development of strategic defence 
system s was discursively  driven  by US assum ptions of Soviet 
capabilities. This section further argues that the structural realities 
facing the opening of the SALT I negotiations in 1969 were brought 
about, at least in part by the Soviet responses to US responses to 
capabilities that the US, in the absence of any real inform ation, 
assum ed the Soviets to have. The feedback of the discursive reality 
acted upon by the US decisionmakers into the discursive economy of 
defence spending and force posture developments led to a real and 
expensive arms race. For the purposes of illustration I shall outline the 
development of those systems that were subsequently limited by treaty 
through SALT I and II and that thus fell within the purview  of the 
Standing Consultative Commission on Arms Limitation established by 
SALT I. W hat I intend to establish here is the connection between the 
'hard technology' and the 'discursive technology', that is, how the 
technologies of specific and concrete w eapons system s become 
systematically employed and driven by the technologies of discourse in 
order to m aintain the functionality of the US as 'Self' through the
126 The Self/Other distinction is explained in footnote 8 on p.9
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maintenance, identification and threat of the Soviet Union as 'Other'. 
In Clausewitzian terms I am seeking to map the 'language and writing' 
of political thoughts with reference to the way in which the 'hardware' 
of security becomes deployed as textual tokens in a way that is 
analogous to the m anner in which physically inscribed symbols 
become deployed as the physical tokens of writing. This section then 
canvasses the factors leading to the formation of a particular discursive 
community within the wider context of a domain of practice of policy: 
that of the formation of what may be termed the US Security State.
a) Bombers and Radars
The Baruch Plan for the control of nuclear weapons w ould have 
allow ed for a continued build-up  of US atomic weapons, while 
prohibiting all other countries from developing that technology. Such 
a build-up would continue until the establishment of an international 
authority. The compliance provisions were far-reaching and included 
on-site inspection. Those who violated the proposed treaty would be 
subject to punishment. With the US as the sole nuclear power, and the 
USSR as the power principally interested in gaining the technology, 
the proposed plan was seen as directly m anipulating the UN into 
becoming, in Dean Acheson's words, an "alliance to support a United 
States threat of war against the USSR unless it ceased its efforts to 
acquire the bomb"127 The political counter-offensive came from Andrei 
Gromyko just five days after the Baruch Plan. The Soviet proposal 
lacked a verification clause, thus rendering it unacceptable to the US.
127 See Acheson, D. Present at the Creation NY American Library, 1970 p.155
The Bikini Atoll test on July 1, 1946 was interpreted by the Soviets as a 
signal that the US was not serious in its arms control proposals.
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The establishment of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) with 30 
modified B29 bombers, in March 1946, saw the start of an on-going 
nuclear weapons procurement program. This was fuelled by successive 
war plans and the development of a mass-production bomb.128
By the end of August 1949, with the SAC at 60 aircraft and with a 
medium-range jet bomber entering trials, the Soviet Union tested its 
first atomic explosive device. The US reaction to this was to accelerate 
development of a thermonuclear device (the H-bomb). The US 
successfully tested such a device at 1st March 1954. The Soviets 
followed suit in November 1955.
With priority given to the Air Force, 1951-1953 saw a buildup of the 
SAC to over 1,500 aircraft including 1,000 nuclear-capable bombers. By 
1959 the SAC had almost 500 B-52 heavy intercontinental jet bombers, 
2500 B-47s and over 1000 other tanker aircraft.129
The Soviets, by contrast, held a bomber air fleet beginning with the 
Tupolev Tu-4 'Bull' medium range bomber, from 1947, and in the 
1950s introduced the Tupolev Tu-16 'Badger' (medium-range) and the 
Myasischev M-4 turbojet 'Bison'. These, through careful management 
of the May Day military parades led the USAF intelligence estimates to 
considerably overestimate the numbers of these aircraft.
128 See Greville Rumble The Politics of Nuclear Defence Cambridge:Polity Press, 1985 
P-9.
129 Ibid p .ll
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The publicly influential "Gaither Report"130 fuelled speculation about 
Soviet strategic leadership. Its six major points alleged that:
1) Soviet GNP growth outstripped that of the U.S.
2) Soviet defence spending equalled the U.S.
3) The Soviet Union had enough fissionable material for 
more than 1500 nuclear weapons, which could be distributed 
among 4500 long or short-range bombers, 250-300 long-range 
submarines and an extensive air defence system.
4) For more than a year the Soviets had been producing 
ballistic missiles with a greater than 700 mile range
5) that by late 1959 the Soviet Union would be capable of 
launching an attack on the U.S. with 100 ICBMs carrying 
megaton nuclear warheads.
6) That if such an attack came, the U.S. population would be 
unprotected and the bulk of the SAC bomber force would be 
vulnerable.131
Then-President Eisenhower commented to his advisers that the report 
ignored the dispersal of overseas bases and the Allies' role around the 
Soviet periphery which could pose a threat to the Soviets from a 
number of points.132 Nevertheless, the report, leaked to the press, 
applied some public pressure on the leadership. The Eisenhower 
administration responded by stepping up the state of alert of the SAC 
and funding an acceleration of the US ICBM programmes.133
130 Established April 1957 under Mr. H. Rowan Gaither.
131 For more on this see Dwight D. Eisenhower The White House Years 
LondonrHeinemann 1966, p220.
132 Ibid, p.221
133 Ibid, p.222
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The fears of a Soviet-led 'Bomber Gap' unleashed by the Gaither 
Report stim ulated the procurem ent of a further 538 B-52s. The reality 
was, however, that by 1961, the Soviets had only about 190 long-range 
bombers. The US Congress' perception ,134 engendered by the Gaither 
Report, of the potential for the Soviets to develop a larger force was 
sufficient incentive for the US to establish a 150-mile range radar 
netw ork - the Distance Early W arning (DEW) Line which extended 
from Alaska to Greenland. The main section of this radar network was 
completed by 1957.135 In this instance the discourse136 about the ability 
to develop weapons constituted a reality to the extent to which it had a 
pronounced effect upon US policymaking. Arguably, these sets of 
processes w orked to a certain extent [following a m irror image] in 
Soviet policymaking. It is equally arguable however, that the greater 
openness of the US policymaking process, and the greater transparency 
of US military procurem ent, m eant that the Soviets w ould not have 
found it so necessary to respond to 'im aginary' technologies or 
te c h n o lo g y -p o te n tia ls  g iven  g rea te r  access to ac tu a l US 
developments /  deploym ents.
134 Perception: That view of the Other salient to the actions of Self vis-a-vis the 
Other. Perceptions are based on plausible claims by or about the other. Where 
perceptions are held by state decisionmakers, this can lead to reactive behaviour 
which can be directed outward or inward or offensive/non—offensive. In this instance 
the resultant behaviour was to develop greater attentiveness through the early 
warning radar technologies.
U5 See Greville Rumble, 1985, Op.Cit. in note 5, p.12
136 Here I use the term discourse to denote "the inscription of a particular knowledge" - 
see Catherine Belsey’s review of Lynda Nead Myths of Sexuality: Representations of 
Women in Victorian Britain in History of the Human Sciences Vol. 3, No. 1, 1990, pp. 
149-151.
76
b) ICBMs
The W orld-W ar II German V-l and V-2 w eapons represented the 
prototypical cruise and ballistic missiles respectively. Ironically, in the 
context of this thesis, these weapons themselves were developed by the 
Germans to circumvent a previous arms control agreement (the Treaty 
of Versailles137). By May 1946, the US had begun test-firing captured 
and re-built V-2s. In 1954 the feasibility of building intercontinental 
ballistic missiles was established. This led to the development of the 
liquid-fueled Atlas and Titan ICBMs138. In 1958, work began on the 
so lid -fueled  M inutem an ICBM, and , fo llow ing on from  the 
implications of the Soviet Sputnik launch in October 1957 aboard an 
SS-6 launch vehicle, some thought was given to housing Minuteman 
in hardened concrete silos.139 Interestingly, the US had begun work on 
the Nike Zeus ABM project before the Soviets had actually successfully 
tested an ICBM. Following this, the US explored ways in which a 
notional Soviet ICBM might circumvent the US ABM defences. This 
led to research into such technical possibilities as ’spoofing' (decoys, 
radar deflecting chaff) lowering the radar profile, and the use of 
m ultiple w arhead launch vehicles.140 The US was effectively arms 
racing against itself via a notional Other. Michael Sheehan points out
137 To limit the potential to develop offensive artillery, the Treaty of Versailles 
placed a 100mm calibre limit on artillery barrels. Rockets, by definition do not have a 
'calibre' and were therefore outside of the regime of treaty-limited items.
138 Tested in 1959 and 1960 respectively.
139 Greville Rumble Op Cit. in note 5, p.12
140 see m .T. Gallagher and K.F. Spielmann, Soviet Decision Making for Defence 
NY:1972 p.5 quoted in Michael J. Sheehan Arms Control Theory and Practice Oxford: 
Blackwell 1988 p.46.
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that the US defence com m unity was working to overcome purely 
discursive problem s141 generated "not by the Soviet ABM program, of 
which little if anything was known, but by the US ABM program."142 
Indeed, as Sheehan notes, this was the prim ary engine throughout the 
development of MIRVs.
The Soviets, who had undertaken rocket engineering research in the 
1930s,143 began developing a medium-range missile (SS-3) in the 1950s. 
W ith the launch of Sputnik, it was clear that from that point the 
Soviets had a potential intercontinental capability.
The US resp o n d ed  by accelerating  its m issile developm ent 
program m es, increasing the radar netw ork (Ballistic Missile Early 
W arning System) m aintaining the Strategic Bomber Com mand at a 
high level of readiness and surveying the Soviets from high-altitude 
aircraft until May 1960, when Gary Powers, piloting a U-2 aircraft was 
shot down.
The dom inant perception, at the end of the Eisenhower Presidency, 
was that of a significant Soviet lead in ICBMs.144 But this was dispelled 
following the surveillance evidence of the U-2 surveillance aircraft145,
141 That is, problems of perception, rather than actuality - hence it is a language- 
based symbolic-order problem.
142 Michael J. Sheehan Op Cit 1988 p.46
143 Sergei Korolev, among others had developed liquid-fuelled rockets for 
atmospheric research in the 1930s.
144 Greville Rumble Op. Cit. 1985 p.15 puts this at a 4:1 Soviet lead.
145 Burrows, William. Deep Black: The Secrets of Space Espionage. London: Bantam 
Books, 1988.p.ll0
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the CIA's Corona (alias Discoverer) satellites146 and the US Air Force 
MIDAS (Missile Defense Alarm System) geosynchronous infra-red 
surveillance system147 and SAMOS (Satellite and Missile Observation 
System) reconnaissance which became operational early in 1961148 and 
continued until SAMOS 30 launched on November 27, 1963.149 Whilst 
acknowledging that there were shortcomings in the new observation 
technologies (twelve out of the first thirteen Corona/Discovery 
missions failed either to reach orbit or to return images successfully), a 
new domain of knowledge was underway that would, in later years, 
provide additional and ultimately central National Technical Means of 
verification for the SALT arms control treaties.
As Eisenhower later admitted:
...in the analysis of comparative military power there is 
never complete certainty...150
Almost daily, from 1959 the Soviet threat was reassessed downward, as 
Eisenhower points out:
By January of 1960 new intelligence reports narrowed almost 
to negligibility the extent of the Soviet lead in long-range and 
sea-launched missiles; this lead would soon disappear.151
146 Ibid, p . l l l
147 Ibid, p .l l l
14  ^ See Dan Caldwell "Verification and SALT" in William C. Potter Verification and 
SALT: The Challenge of Strategic Deception Boulder:Westview Press 1980 p.229
149 See William E. Burrows Deep Black London:Bantam 1988 p.91 Burrows notes that 
resolution was said to have ranged from 20 feet to about 5 as the program advanced 
(p.92).
150 Dwight D. Eisenhower Op Cit. in note p.390
151 Ibid p.390
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Indeed, the 'lead' turned out to be a discursive152 lead only, largely
generated by Khruschev's rhetoric and a U.S. fear of the unknown. The
role of the U-2 overflights was highlighted by Eisenhower:
During the four years of its operations the U-2 program  
produced intelligence of critical im portance to the US. 
Perhaps as im portant as the positive information - w hat the 
Soviets did have - was the negative information it produced 
- w hat the Soviets did not have. Intelligence gained from 
this source provided proof that the horrors of the alleged 
"bomber gap" and the later "missile gap" were nothing more 
than the imaginative creations of irresponsibility.153
The 'horrors ' were real enough how ever, to influence defence 
policym aking well into the Kennedy adm inistration. Indeed, since 
Kennedy had come to power, partly on promises to redress the so- 
called 'missile gap', he felt obliged by his domestic constituency to 
order a major nuclear build-up to counter the (by then clearly non­
existent, or even negative) missile gap154.
Some time after entering office, Kennedy was able to demonstrate that, 
far from a missile gap favouring the Soviets, the US held a marked 
lead in both quantity  and quality  of ICBMs - the solid-fueled 
M inutem an, for example, was able to be deployed w ithout the 8-10 
hours of refuelling required by the Soviets to ready their missiles. By 
1964 it was clear that the US ICBM advantage was in the order of 
834:200.155
152 Supra note 11 - this is not to underestimate the discursive realm in the constitution 
of realities.
153 Ibid n.l p.547
134 See Michael Sheehan Arms Control: Theory and Practice Oxford :Blackwell, 1988 
p.45
135 Greville Rumble 1985 Op.Cit. in note 5 p.16
In the ensuing years, the Soviets sought to achieve real parity with the 
US through both hardened ICBMs and SLBMs on submarines. By 1970 
quantitative strategic nuclear parity had been reached (see Table 3.1)
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Table 3.1 US and Soviet Strategic Nuclear Missiles 1961-72
Year
United States Soviet Union
ICBMs SLBMs ICBMs SLBMs
1961 63 96 50 some
1962 294 144 75 some
1963 424 224 100 100
1964 834 416 200 120
1965 854 496 270 120
1966 904 592 300 125
1967 1054 656 460 130
1968 1054 656 800 130
1969 1054 656 1050 160
1970 1054 656 1300 280
1971 1054 656 1510 440
1972 1054 656 1530 494
Sources: IISS The Military Balance 1962-72 and Greville Rumble The politics of Nuclear 
Defence Cambridge: Polity 1985
It is not insignificant that as the US and the Soviet Union achieved 
parity, - in part from the Soviet build-up, and in part from the 
diminishing marginal strategic returns from the US exceeding certain 
force-levels - the discursive economies of threat156 dictated that the 
strategic arms race had reached a quantitative boundary threshold157, 
making possible the negotiation of the ABM Treaty and the later 
follow-on Interim Agreement. Thus the ABM treaty itself can be seen
!56 Discursive economies of threat: that which is set in play by invoking the idea of 
danger, placing into circulation a chain of acts in reaction to the notional danger.
15^ Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith How Much is Enough? NY:Harper and 
Row, 1971 p.208, where they point out:
... the main reason for stopping at 1000 Minuteman missiles, 41 Polaris submarines and 
some 500 strategic bombers is that having more would not be worth the additional cost. 
These force levels are sufficiently high to put the United States on the "flat of the 
curve" -that is, at a point where small increases in target destruction capability would 
require enormous increases in forces, and therefore in cost. The answer to the question of 
how many strategic offensive forces are enough rests heavily on such flat of the curve 
reasoning.
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in term s of an effect of the political/discursive context, which, by 
further representing a symbolic boundary between the superpowers in 
delineating the limits to specific and concrete weapons systems served 
to add cumulatively to the identity formation of the US and the Soviet 
Union. That is to say that the ABM treaty (as all treaties do) served, not 
m erely an instrum ental role in the relations between the superpowers, 
but in part, was and continues to be constitutive of their role as such.
c) AB Ms, MRVs and MIRVs
Other factors remaining unchanged, the strategic nuclear parity of the 
end of the 1960s should have sufficed for stable strategic nuclear 
d e te r r e n c e ,  w ith  d u e  a n d  n e c e ssa ry  a llo w a n c e  for 
m a in ten an ce /rep lacem en t opera tions on existing stockpiles of 
weapons. The world, however, refuses to stay as it was. One of the 
dynamic factors is qualitative change158 in strategic forces.
As a contested site at which the multiple meanings of the security state 
are p layed out, nuclear deterrence theory represents one of the 
dom ains of policymaking in which one might interrogate the identity 
of the processes that underw rite the security state. Indeed, nuclear 
security  rests upon the concept of the stability of nuclear parity. 
Moreover, the stability of nuclear parity, arguably rests on the premiss
158 Qualitative change: that is, the results of research and development leading to 
extensions to
i. performance factors (improvements leading to a new capability, or to an 
extension of the performance envelope)
ii. quality design factors (improvements to the reliability or maintainability 
of existing capabilitites) or
iii.  force multipliers (developments external to the specific weapon system, 
but which enhance its capability).
that the threat context is stable. For John Newhouse this is theoretically 
possible if the weapons satisfy three criteria:
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i) they must be capable of delayed response;
ii) they must be invulnerable (ie survivable) and
iii) they must be incapable of inflicting a pre-emptive first strike to 
cripple the other side's forces.159
Newhouse argues that the Minuteman missiles fail in the criteria of 
invulnerability. Not only were the Soviets constructing an Anti- 
Ballistic Missile defence system (and had been since 1961 160) but the 
Soviets were also developing the SS-9 long-range heavy missile, with a 
massive warhead capable of penetrating the most hardened 
Minuteman shelter. The ensuing action-reaction game saw the US 
develop, test and deploy, first Multiple Reentry Vehicles (MRVs) and, 
around 1964, as guidance-systems became more sophisticated, the more 
advanced Multiple Independently-targetable Reentry Vehicle (MIRV). 
While some argued in favour of developing MIRVs as 'bargaining 
chips', Paul Warnke has suggested that this policy can and, in fact has 
backfired. As he notes:
...it was argued in 1969 that American deployment of 
missiles with multiple, independently targetable reentry 
vehicles (MIRVs) would lead to Soviet concessions in SALT 
I. What US MIRVs led to instead was Soviet MIRVs and a 
consequent setback for the arms control process.161
159 John Newhouse The Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT NY:Holt Reinehart and 
Winston 1973, p.20.
160 See Greville Rumble, Op Cit in note 5 p.17
161 Paul C. Warnke in the Forward to N. K. Calvo-Goller and M. A. Calvo The SALT 
Agreements: Content-Application-Verification Dordrecht:Martinus Nijhoff 1987/x.
83
MIRVs required a heavy launcher. This point was readily appreciated 
by the Soviets who had the ideal launch platform in the SS-9. This 
configuration, as Newhouse points out, led to the perception in the US 
that "430 SS-9s, armed with three five-megaton MIRVs as accurate as a 
Minuteman could, for practical purposes, destroy Minuteman. About 
300 SS-9s with six MIRVs each would achieve the same purpose." 162 
This perception, as Newhouse puts it, gave a great boost to SALT 
"especially since the large-scale deployment of the SS-9 roughly 
coincided with the arrival of Mr. Nixon."163 As Table 1 shows, parity 
had been reached, each party being able to inflict devastating second 
strike damage to the other. It was soon clear that, unless an agreement 
on arms could be reached, the action-reaction cycle would lead to an 
unacceptably costly and destabilising arms race.
d) Domestic Political Forces
As the decade wore on, it became clear to the US that ultimately, the 
Sentinel and the later Safeguard ABM systems, despite their wide 
deployment, would be at best of marginal effectiveness. As Rumble 
points out:
By 1970 Defence Secretary Melvin Laird was admitting that it 
could not protect the US missile fields against a fully 
developed MIRV capability and Congress eventually rejected 
Nixon's requests for funds to construct ABM sites.164
There was also an argument to suggest that restricting ABM capabilities 
would actually enhance deterrence since such restrictions would
162 John Newhouse Op. Cit, in note 52, p.21.
163 Ibid. p.21.
164 Greville Rumble (1985) Op Cit in note 5 p.18
reduce retaliatory survivability, and therefore reduce the ability to 
engage in war-fighting strategy. By raising the costs of deterrence 
failure it would thus be better to deter than to engage in war-fighting.
W ith the achievement of num erical parity  around the first half of 
1967, and with the Soviet deploym ent of the Galosh ABM system 
around Moscow, and amongst the early moves by the US to develop an 
ABM system , Soviet Prem ier Kosygin indicated a w illingness to 
negotiate on limiting the arms race in offensive and defensive nuclear 
weapons. This commenced tentatively toward the end of the Johnson 
administration. On July 1 1968, at the signing of the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty, Johnson announced that the Soviets had agreed to commence 
discussions on limiting and reducing strategic nuclear weapons and 
defences against ballistic missiles.165 Talks were postponed with the 
Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, and were not resum ed until 
November 17, 1969.
165 US ACDA Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: Texts and Histories of 
Negotiations Washington: ACDA 1980 p!32.
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With the Vietnam war becoming costly and politically less sustainable, 
the Nixon regime was caught between the proverbial rock and the hard 
place. As Kissinger notes, Nixon was under great pressure to "appear 
responsive to the pressures for trimming the defence budget"166 and to 
reduce military spending as a percentage of GNP.
Indeed, as Figures 3.1 and 3.3 show, there was a real decline in defence 
expenditure both as a percentage of GNP167 and as a percentage of the 
National Budget. Despite the best efforts of Melvin Laird to effect a 
marginal increase in all strategic programs, the overall effect was, in 
Kissinger's terms to prevent the US from developing a "coherent 
response to the growing imbalance in conventional forces."168 This 
meant that the Safeguard ABM system, a chief bargaining chip in
166 H. Kissinger The White House Years Sydney:Hodder & Stoughton, 1979/535
167 Ibid, p.536
168 Ibid p.536
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SALT I, was under dom estic threat from Congress of unilateral
elimination. Thus the Safeguard ABM system, having been built up as
a value-laden signifier of US resolve and as a potential symbol of US
willingness to bargain away a valuable security token for the sake of
the relationship between the US and the Soviet Union, it became in
addition, a site of contestation for the identity of the domestic US
polity as against the SALT negotiating community within the security
state. Kissinger describes the problem as a three-way process:
We were negotiating  disarm am ent on three fronts: at 
Vienna and Helsinki with the Soviets; at home within our 
government, and with the Congress.169
[emphasis in the original]
By this time the Pentagon was seriously reconsidering the expense of the 
ABM program ($US7b by the time the first ABM site became operational170), 
with the overall reductions in defence expenditure, as it m eant reassessing 
defence budget priorities. The conservatism bred in the climate of defence 
contraction, led to serious objections in congress to Phase II of the ABM 
program  which was
169 Ibid
170 Michael Sheehan Op Cit in note 41 p.58
Figure 3.2
increasingly being seen as costly and largely ineffective. The system 
comprised two types of intercept missile: the long-range Spartan for 
space interception and the short-range high speed Sprint for terminal- 
phase interception.
These would be guided by Large Phased-Array Radars (LPARs). [Figure 
3.2 illustrates the main phases of a ballistic missile's trajectory.] As we 
can see from this, and from  the notes below , term inal phase 
interception time is very short and is com pounded by the deployment 
of penetration aids (decoys, radar chaff etc) during the midcourse 
phase. The use of multiple warheads (MIRVs) is thus only one factor
in the difficulties confronting a plausible terminal phase ABM 
program.
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As producers of counternarratives to those of the defense 'hawks', the 
critics of ground-based ABM interception emphasised the inability to 
intercept missiles at the boost-phase171 and thereby counter MIRVs 
before their release and while still a highly 'visible' hot spot aiding 
target acquisition. Their 'visibility' decreases markedly in the post­
boost and midcourse phases.172 The terminal phase (reentry) allows 
only a brief time for target acquisition173, making terminal phase ABM 
defences of questionable utility.
Traditionally, the defence expenditure legislation had become routine 
and was generally passed without significant amendment, or even 
extended discussion. But the political climate was changing. As defence
171 The boost phase lasts from launch to burnout of the final stage. Lasting from 3-5 
minutes, the hot gases exhausting from a missile booster motor emit hundreds of 
kilowatts at short and medium wave infra-red (SWIR and MWIR) wavelengths. This 
radiation plume can be detected by sensors at great distances.
172 In the post-boost and midcourse phases surveillance (target acquisition) becomes 
considerably more difficult. At these phases, the post-boost vehicles cool to around 
room temperature, emitting long-wave infrared radiation (LWIR). It is possible for 
this radiation to be detected by sensors, super-cooled (near absolute zero) to prevent 
their own radiation from swamping the signal. It is technically difficult to put such 
sensors in space because they require long-lived low-power cryogenic refrigerators 
capable of keeping them at their operating temperature. Source: Office of Technology 
Assessment report "Ballistic Missile Defence Technologies" in OTA Strategic Defences 
Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press. 1986.p.l60.
173 The terminal phase represents the final (reentry) phase of a ballistic missile's 
trajectory, during which the reentry vehicles enter the atmosphere and detonate at 
their target. This phase lasts for about 1 minute or less. Detection and tracking systems 
that could be used for terminal phase ABM target acquisition include ground-based 
Large Phased Array Radars (LPARs) and airborne optical and infrared (LWIR) 
detectors. As of 1986 LWIR technology is not as far advanced as that for shorter 
wavelengths. Source: OTA Report Strategic Defenses Op Cit. in note 68.
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expenditure became politicised, it became a battleground without clear 
leadership. Factional in-fighting led to a major congressional assault 
on the structure of the US military establishment.
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The issue was described succinctly by the Washington Post which 
declared:
What was at one time an almost routine piece of legislation - 
passage of the annual military spending bill - has now been 
turned into a lengthy and frequently bitter battle over a score 
of military program s and policies ... [the long ABM debate] 
has obscured w hat is in fact the most w idespread assault on 
all kinds of military activities ever made on Capitol Hill.175
In this atm osphere, the Adm inistration was expected to provide a 
secure defence strategy and a coherent SALT approach. The outcome, 
regarded by Kissinger as somewhat schizophrenic, was that the Nixon 
administration presented two inconsistent and incompatible positions
174 Michael Sheehan Op Cit in note 41 p. 536.
175 The Washington Post August 17, 1970, quoted in Kissinger (1979) Op Cit in note 40, 
p.537
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on ABM. One, in the defence budget, dom inated by the Pentagon, the
other in SALT, the result of an interagency process. Postm odern
readings of this would be less concerned at the apparent inconsistency,
on the grounds that two distinct 'epistemic communities' were being
invoked. The first, relating to domestic budgetary concerns, and the
second relating to bilateral boundary-m aking with the Soviets. The
N ixon A dm in istra tion  w as em bodying the Foucauld ian  tu rn ,
occupying d istinct subject-positions, ranking  the tokens of the
discursive economy of SALT over those of the domestic polity in order
to maintain the exchange-value of the ABM. As Kissinger emphasises:
The Adm inistration had to m arshal all its strength to keep 
the Congress from im posing unilaterally w hat we were 
seeking to negotiate with the Soviets... when we negotiated 
its mutual limitation in 1972, ABM was on the verge of being 
elim inated by the Congress, or sunk to a m eaningless 
prototype.176
The ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement was signed in Moscow on 
May 26, 1972 after two and half years of negotiations.
In 1975, following the ABM Protocol (limiting each Party to one ABM 
site) and following significant change in the international political 
system, the Safeguard ABM system became operational on April 1, 
1975, defending the Grand Forks ICBM fields in North Dakota. A year 
later, follow ing a C ongress vote it was closed dow n .177 The 
vulnerabilities of LPARs (even w ith m assive 'harden ing '), the 
inadequate missile guidance systems (vulnerable to 'spoofing') and its 
reliance on nuclear w arheads contributed to the system 's demise.
176 Kissinger (1979) Op Cit in note 29, p.538
177 Michael Sheehan (1988) Op Cit in note 24 p.58
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Technological development of components continued despite bans on 
testing 'in an ABM m ode’. Sheehan argues that there is a strong link 
between technological advance and political realities:
Technological advance changes political realities by altering
perceptions of what is possible.178
Thus if knowledge is constitutive of realities then new knowledges 
em power the constitution of new realities. In other words, at the level 
of what may be described as ’signalling’179, technological R&D can be 
seen to provide new paradigm atic choices for the articulation of the 
discursive identity of the security state.
In the sections that follow, relevant terms of the SALT Treaties will be 
exam ined more closely in relation to compliance questions raised in 
the SCC, follow ing som e rem arks on the standards applied to 
verification and the issues raised, surround ing  R.W. Buchheim’s 
report to Congress on compliance with SALT I. Such issues include the 
roles of some of the surrounding discursive communities (such as 
those of m onitoring and surveillance) and the intersections of their 
dom ains of knowledge on the power of the SCC to raise compliance 
issues on either side.
178 Ibid p.60
179 See for example Coral Bell President Carter and Foreign Policy: The Costs of 
Virtue? Canberra:ANU Canberra Studies in World Affairs N o.l, 1980/15
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3.3 Verification Standards
Verification has been defined as
The means by which one party determines whether or not 
another party to an agreement is complying with its terms.180
From this follow two functions:
i) to deter cheating on an arms control agreement and 
ii) to build confidence between the parties to an agreement.
There are inherent limitations to verification capabilities, intersecting 
with every every kind of verification measure. Such measures include:
1) N ational Technical M eans (NTMS), such as satellite 
surveillance, radar surveillance from locations outside the 
boundaries of the countries m onitored (SIGINT), radioactive 
air sam pling, teleseism ic geophysical observations, and 
communications interception (SIGINT) [including telemetry 
m onitoring]
2) Cooperative means of verification, such as the deliberate 
open ing  of certa in  fea tu res of m ilita ry  system s to 
surveillance [including military expenditure levels], specific 
channelling of military products through agreed checkpoints, 
and non-interference w ith means of verification [such as 
non-encryption of telemetry];
3) On-site Inspection (OSI) [various levels of intrusivity]
4) "soft" m ethods of verification, such as using agents 
(H U M IN T), in te rv ie w in g  em ig res , and  an a ly sin g  
information leaks.181
The choice of verification standard depends more or less directly on 
the degree of strategic importance of the agreement proportional to the 
technical capabilities of the verifying countries, the m ilitary cost of
G. Duffy Compliance and the Future of Arms Control Stanford University and 
Global Outlook, 1988 p.4
181 Ibid p.4 square parenthetic additions mine.
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inadequate  verification and the political costs of cheating .182 
Assessments of these three elements vary according to perceptions of 
each Party about the other, assum ptions about the state of relations 
between the parties and perceptions of the domestic political elements 
within each Party. On these criteria then, verification can be said to be a 
process of determining compliance with the terms of an arms control 
agreem ent to the extent deem ed adequate to safeguard 'national 
security '.183
Sydney Graybeal points to several factors to be taken into account when 
assessing the likelihood or otherwise of Soviet cheating. In so doing, 
he suggests that in his assessment the Soviets would be unlikely to 
enter an agreement which required them to cheat in order to attain 
their military objectives [albeit that they might explore the limits at the 
m argins of an agreement]. He notes that the risk of being caught is 
always greater than zero184 and he stresses that there are further costs to 
cheating:
There are likely delays in the m ilitary program ; there are 
likely reductions in the reliability of the system if you cannot 
test it in the optim um  m anner; and there are likely 
monetary costs.185
182 Ian Bellany How Much Verißcation? Unpublished manuscript (1990) and author's 
interview at the University of Lancaster May 1990.
183 United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research The Verißcation Issue in 
United Nations Disarmament Negotiations NY: UNIDIR 1987/1.
184 Bellany also emphasised this point. Ian Bellany: author's interview at the 
University of Lancaster May 1990
185 Testimony of Sydney Graybeal in R.W. Buchheim Brießng on SALT I Compliance 
Washington: US Senate Foreign Relations Committee 1979, p.13
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Thus the Soviets w ould have to assess these costs against the military 
gains from cheating and the political implications, if caught, versus 
these questionable military gains.186
The standards applied to verification of the SALT Treaties potentially 
offer a political barometer of the state of bilateral relations between the 
US and the Soviet Union187.
To the extent that total verification is impossible, the extent to which 
data needs to be interpreted, the extent to which 'grey area' violations 
are considered to be violations and the extent to which these potential 
violations are raised w ithin the SCC, the interaction of these four 
elem ents, arguably, can be used to 'read ' the political climate 
underlying the security state, that is, the political context of arms 
control and the role of verification in the political process. This is of 
particular importance w hen considering verification standards and 
their application. Between the Carter and the Reagan administrations, 
the shifts in verification standard are intim ately tied to the state of 
domestic and bilateral relations between the US and the Soviet Union 
with respect to the SALT I and SALT II Treaties.
Inheriting the SALT I Treaties and the beginnings of the SALT II 
negotiations, President Carter adopted the standard of verification laid 
down by Richard Nixon in 1969 when instructing SALT I negotiators, 
that of 'adequate' verification. The term, as defined by Richard Nixon
186 Ibid
187 not necessarily particularly significant by itself, but when read alongside a range of 
other 'barometric' indicators, this aspect could lend important evidence to assist the 
analyst's reading of the perception of bilateral confidence in the intentions of the 
Other to comply with the terms of an agreement.
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relates to the ability to "identify attem pted evasion if it occurs on a 
large enough scale to pose a significant risk, and whether we can do so 
in time to m ount a sufficient response."188 The term also appears in 
the Basic Principles of Negotiations in 1973.189
This appeared to suffice for the ABM Treaty, by which a whole class of 
weapons, their deploym ent systems and the testing of weapons in this 
m ode seem ed at that time to be sufficiently well m onitored by 
National Technical Means (NTM). As negotiations progressed with the 
SALT II Treaty, the standard defined as 'adequate' was continually 
contested and defended by the US Arms Control community.
The term itself appears in a number of congressional reports relating to
verification, and the issue of compliance w ith SALT I190. Sydney
Graybeal, in a p repared  statem ent to Congress, points out that
verification is linked to the ability to deter a nation from violating the
treaty as the political consequences of discovery would be politically
more costly than m aintaining the agreement. Verification adequate to
this task involves a judgement. As he states:
W hat co n stitu tes  "adequate" verifica tion  involves a 
judgem ent. It depends in part on w hat one considers 
constitutes an "adequate deterrent." If one subscribes to the 
"m inim um  deterrence" theory, then one may not be too
188 Richard Nixon's instructions to the SALT I negotiating team quoted in Michael 
Krepon Arms Control: Verißcation and Compliance NY: 1984 p.38.
189 Agreement on Basic Principles of Negotiations on Strategic Arms Limitation, 21 June 
1973 signed by Nixon and Brezhnev Article 4 states: "Limitations on Strategic 
offensive arms must be subject to adequate verification by national technical means." 
[emphasis mine]
19  ^ s ee for example R.W. Buchheim Brießng on SALT I Compliance Hearing before 
the Committee on Foreign Relations U.S. Senate, 96th Congress, 1st Session, September 
25, 1979 (declassified November 7, 1979).
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concerned over comprehensive m onitoring capabilities for 
all provisions of the agreement. On the other hand if one is 
concerned about the viability of our deterrence, then one will 
probably be concerned about our ability to m onitor the 
specific of all the provisions. 191
A report by the State Departm ent's Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency (28 February, 1978) stated that the Carter Adm inistration's 
com m itm ent to a SALT II Agreem ent was such that it w ould not 
"compromise our capacity to independently verify Soviet adherence to 
the agreement by accepting unwarrantable risks"192 the report went on 
to state that any violations "of such a m agnitude as to m odify the 
n u c lea r b a lan ce193 'w ould be discovered in time to m ake an 
appropriate response194"' All this, as Les Aspin and Fred Kaplan point 
out, am ounts to the "recognition that few things in life can be 
determ ined with absolute certainty, that levels of confidence and 
m argins of error are inevitable, and that the im portant questions are 
how high we make the levels of confidence and how narrow  the 
margins of error."195
Paul Warnke, presenting a report on the verifiability of the proposed 
SALT II Agreement, defines adequate such that "any cheating on a
191 "Statement of Sydney N. Graybeal, Former US Commissioner to the Standing 
Consultative Commission, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency" in R.W. Buchheim 
1979 Op Cit in note 59, p.16.
192 Cited in The Congressional Record Proceedings and Debates of the 95th Congress, 
2nd Session August 17 1978 p.26691.
193 Ibid
194 Cited in The Baltimore Sun February 25 1978 p.l as quoted in The Congressional 
Record 95th Cong. 2nd Session August 17 p.26691.
195 Les Aspin and Fred M. Kaplan "Verification in Perspective" in W.C. Potter 
(ed.)Verification and SALT: The Challenge of Strategic Deception Boulder: Westview 
1980/177.
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scale large enough to alter the strategic balance would be discovered in 
time to make an appropriate response ."196 He further points out that 
judgem ent of the adequacy of verification m ust take account of 
detection capabilities existing and future, and the ability of the other 
side to evade detection should it attempt to do so, and the US ability to 
respond to Soviet cheating based on the US technological base, its 
Research and Developm ent program s (R&D) and existing strategic 
forces.197
Moreover, assessment of adequacy of verification m ust also "assess the 
political and military significance of potential violations and the costs, 
risks and gains to the Soviets of cheating ."198 Such assessm ent is 
further complicated by the tradeoff betw een the US allowing itself 
flexibility to take certain actions even though allowing the Soviets to 
take the same action may complicate verification.199
US assessments of Soviet compliance in the face of any US monitoring 
uncertainties or am biguities are supplem ented by US assum ptions 
regarding the likelihood that the Soviets would cheat, based on the 
benefits accruing to them from such cheating and the risks of such 
activities being detected. Among US scenarios of the epistemic context 
of Soviet decisions to cheat are ranked: i) Soviet uncertainties about
196> Paul C. Warnke "Executive Branch Report on Verification of the Proposed SALT 
TWO Agreement" Received in classified form on February 28, 1978 and sanitised and 
released February 23,1978 referred to in, and published with, US Senate. Committee on 
Foreign Relations. Brießngs on the SALT Negotiations. Washington: US Congress, 
Thursday November 3 1977 pp.14-16 at p.14.
197Ibid. p.15
198 Ibid. [Emphasis mine].
199 Ibid.
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the overall US capabilities to monitor and analyse Soviet activities; ii) 
the potential US reaction to the discovery of Soviet cheating; and 
iii) potential Soviet strategic gains from cheating.200
Arguably, then, the standard of verification selected and applied would 
affect the extent to which compliance issues arise as such, the extent to 
which these are pursued through the channel of the SCC and/or the 
extent to which these issues are seen to be resolved.
3.4 Agreements and Their Verifiable Elements
a) SALT I Provisions
The SALT I Agreements comprise the Treaty on the Limitation of 
Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM) and the Interim Agreement. The 
two agreements have different duration provisions, the ABM Treaty 
being of unlimited duration (with a six-month withdrawal provision 
in the event of a party's supreme interests being threatened by 
extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the treaty)201 The 
Interim Agreement, by contrast, had only a five-year span. In addition 
to restricting ABMs to only two sites in each country with a total of 200 
ABM launchers on each side, (a later protocol reduced this to one site 
with provision for 100 ABM launchers on each side202) the ABM Treaty 
banned the deployment or testing of the inward-looking Large Phased 
Array Radars (LPARs) required for ABM target acquisition.
200 Ibid.
201 See ACDA Arms Control and Disarmament Agreement: Texts and Histories of 
Negotiations WashingtonrACDA, 1980, p.135.
202 Protocol to the ABM Treaty, July 3, 1974.
99
The ABM system components concerned, included those which were:
a) operational
b) under construction
c) undergoing testing
d) undergoing overhaul, repair or conversion; or
e) mothballed
Under Article V, paragraph 1, only immobile land-based ABM systems 
and their components are permitted and authorised, each party having 
undertaken to not develop, test or deploy ABM systems or components 
that are sea, air or space based, or mobile land based systems. There 
was also a provision (Paragraph 2) that launchers were to be single-use 
item s, and tha t developm ent, testing or dep loym ent of sem i­
automatic, or rapid reload launchers was prohibited.
Article VI prohibited the adaptation of existing non-ABM systems or 
radars to ABM use, and the testing of such systems in an ABM mode.
To assure compliance, verification w ould be by national technical 
m eans (NTMs) and deliberate  concealm ent or interference to 
verification by NTMs was prohibited.
Further Agreed Statements common understandings and unilateral 
statements were added, as was an Interim Agreement designed to limit 
the competition in strategic
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Table 3.2 SALTI Interim Agreement Ceilings
U nited  States Soviet U nion
ICBMs SLBMs ICBMs SLBMs
’re-SALT Ia 1054 656 1618 494
base levels^ 1054 656 1530 740
ceilings0 1000 710 1320 950
a) includes operational or under construction. The US had none under construction, the USSR 
had 1060 operational and 558 under construction.
b) US had 656 SLBM launchers based on 41 submarines, the USSR had 740 SLBM launchers.
c) these ceilings were only permitted by replacing older ICBM or SLBM launchers which must 
be dismantled or destroyed.
Sources: US ACDA Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements 1980/148 
IISS The Military Balance 1968-72
and Greville Rumble The politics of Nuclear Defence Cambridge: Polity 1985
offensive arms in order to provide time for further negotiations.203 
pending a more comprehensive agreem ent to be negotiated within 
five years. The freeze was som ew hat asym m etrical, holding the 
num ber of strategic offensive launchers to existing levels, be they 
operational or under construction, perm itting an increase in SLBM 
launchers only with the dism antling of corresponding num bers of 
o lder ICBM or SLBM launchers. These launchers cannot be 
significantly enlarged or 'light' or older ICBM launchers cannot be 
replaced by launchers for modern 'heavy' ICBMs under m odernization 
provisions. This provision prevented the Soviets from substituting 
light ICBMs with the new SS-9 heavy missile. Table 3.2 (overleaf) 
sum m arises the Interim Agreem ent ceilings, show ing the extent to 
which increased levels of SLBMs are available only at the expense of
202 3 ACDA Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: Texts and Histories of
Negotiations Washington:ACDA 1980/148
land-based ICBMs. The levels reflect the extent to which a structural 
imbalance was codified (as some SALT critics have noted) to favour 
the Soviets.
Significantly absent from SALT I was the issue of long-range bombers. 
O ther issues, discussed bu t not comm itted to treaty were: mobile 
missiles, cruise missiles, forward-based systems and the enhancement 
of missiles w ith m ultiple independently-targetable re-entry vehicles 
(MIRVs). These issues were to be left for SALT II and their definition to 
the SCC.
b) SALT II Provisions
SALT II negotiations began in November 1972 following the signing of 
SALT I. The SALT II Agreements differed in several im portant respects 
from the SALT I agreements. Article VII of the Interim  Agreement 
com m itted the US and the Soviet Union to continue to pursue 
negotiations on strategic offensive arms.204
The Agreem ent, based on the understandings of the Vladivostok 
accord comprises three parts:205
i) A Treaty based on the Vladivostok accord [5 years, until 
1985].
ii) A Protocol covering specific system s (cruise missiles, 
m obile ICBMs and qualita tive  res tra in ts  on ICBMs,
2 4^ j.l George makes the point that SALT I was deliberately an interim agreement in 
order to foster ongoing negotiations as provided by Article VII of the Interim 
Agreement. See J.L. George The New Nuclear Rules: Strategy and Arms Control After 
INF and START. London:Pinter 1990/87.
205 US ACDA Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: Texts and histories of 
negotiation. Washington:ACDA 1980/202
providing for further negotiation on these issues in SALT III) 
[3 years].
102
iii) A Joint Statement of Principles being an agreed set of 
guide-lines for future negotiations.
A greed Statem ents covered definitional m atters relating to the 
definition of SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, long range Air-Surface 
Ballistic Missiles (ASBMs), launchers developed and tested for MIRVs 
and other procedural matters. Later assessments raised some doubts 
about the value of the associated unilateral statem ents, following a 
shift in perception of Soviet comm itm ent to the agreements. These
Table 3.3 shows the aggregate limits established within the Vladivostok 
accord under which, the principle of equal ceilings for strategic delivery 
vehicles was established.
Table 3.3 SALT II Numerical Limits on Delivery Vehicles206
Category Ceiling
a) Launchers of MIRVed ICBMs 820
b) Launchers of MIRVed ICBMs and MIRVed SLBMs 1200
c) Both (a) and (b)+ heavy bombers equipped for long range cruise missiles 1320
d) (a)-(c)+launchers of unMIRVed ICBMs & SLBMs + heavy bombers not 
equipped for long range cruise missiles: aggregate limit to apply from Jan.1,1981 
to be achieved by Dec. 31,1981
2250
e) Aggregate limit to apply for (d) up to Dec.31/1980 2400
Statements will be discussed later in this chapter in the analysis of 
perceptions of the effectiveness of the SCC and its role in the SALT 
process.
W ithin the verification provisions of Article XV, NTMs were to be 
used and Common Understandings included the undertakings to not
206 Source: Adapted from Greville Rumble The Politics of Nuclear Defence: A 
Comprehensive Introduction Oxford:Polity 1985/21.
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impede or interfere with NTMs, including the encryption of telemetry, 
and construction of shelters.
Com pliance m atters, and specific procedural m atters w ere to be 
negotiated through the SCC.207 These included the maintenance of a 
data  base on the num bers of strategic arm s established by the 
M em orandum  of U nderstanding Regarding the Establishm ent of a 
Data Base on the N um bers of Strategic Offensive Arms of June 18, 
1979.208
The qualitative provisions of the SALT II agreements presented a new 
range of problems for verification by technical means. W hereas the 
SALT I agreements lim ited fairly readily identifiable ICBM launchers 
and large, slow ly-built radar structures, the SALT II agreem ent 
included identifying missiles equipped with MIRVs. Because of specific 
difficulties in identifying MIRVed or non-MIRVed missiles, it was 
agreed that once a missile was tested with MIRVs then all missiles of 
that type would be considered to be MIRVed.
SALT II verification  is by national technical m eans (pho to ­
reconnaissance satellites, SIGINT, etc) and it was agreed to neither 
interfere with each others' NTM, nor to use concealment measures. 
ACDA point out that since 'specific characteristics of some SALT
207 These have already laid out in more detail in Chapter 2.
208 See "TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE 
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC 
OFFENSIVE ARMS JUNE 18, 1978" in ACDA Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agreements: Texts and Histories of Negotiations Washington:ACDA 180/207-230.
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limited systems become apparent during the testing phase, monitoring 
of testing programs is an im portant aspect of SALT verification'209.
It was im portant therefore to be able to m onitor a test-m issile's
telemetry (data relayed to the launch-site on fuel consumption, mass,
tem perature of burn, fuel pressure, speed etc and the in-flight testing of
system components [such as warhead release mechanisms]) in order to
calculate the throw-weight of the launch vehicle which would enable
estimates to be made concerning the MIRV potential of the missile. In
the SALT II Second Common Understanding of Article XV, paragraph
3 concerning the obligation to not use deliberate concealm ent
measures, these were described as including that,
...neither Party shall engage in deliberate denial of telemetric 
in form ation , such as th rough  the use of te lem etry  
encryption, whenever such denial impedes verification of 
compliance with the terms of the Treaty.210
The NTMs relating to verification of SALT II compliance may be 
sum m arised as follows:211 At the test stage, missiles are m onitored 
entering and leaving the deploym ent area, as is any construction 
activity, thus numbers of deployed missiles can be determined. This is 
largely done with the aid of photo-reconnaissance.
With increased redundancy, there comes an increase in the confidence 
of being able to verify compliance. As with any communicative form,
209 US ACDA Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: Texts and Histories of 
Negotiations Washington:US ACDA 1980/205
210 Ibid p.227
211 Testimony of Dr William Perry, Under Secretary of Defence in SALT II Treaty 
Hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Washington:USGPO July 16 
1979/251
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the more codes (or comm unicative channels) used, the clearer the 
m essage becom es - thus there is [literally] an increase in the 
signahnoise ratio. In order to measure the num ber of reentry vehicles 
per missile, photographs are taken of both the launch and impact areas. 
This is also done with infra-red systems which measure the heat of the 
engines in flight. The missiles are tracked by radar, as are the reentry 
vehicles as they approach the impact areas. These allow, not only the 
counting of the reentry vehicles, but also provide a first approximation 
of their size and shape. Radio receivers collect telemetry data, which 
am ong other things, gives a m easure of the num ber of reentry 
vehicles. These system s also provide collateral inform ation on 
estimations of the size of the reentry vehicle (throw-weight) and of the 
accuracy and type of guidance systems [which, as Dr Perry points out, 
although not covered by SALT, are important for strategic planning]212
The following section shall examine SALT I compliance issues raised 
through the SCC and the SALT II Treaty ratification debate as 
applicable to verification during the Carter years.
3.5 Compliance Challenges and the SCC
Until September 25, 1979, the United States had raised eight issues 
concerning Soviet compliance with SALT I.213 Table 3.4 outlines these 
eight issues briefly. Com parable issues were raised by the Soviets 
regarding US compliance with the SALT I agreements. These, outlined 
in table 3.5 give some indication of the extent of reciprocity within the
212 Ibid p.252-3
213 Testimony of Sydney Graybeal in R.W. Buchheim Briefing on SALT I Compliance 
1979 p.16
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lim inal space of the SALT SCC ongoing negotiations process. This 
section discusses some aspects of that reciprocity and the consequences 
of emphasising legalism over relationalem  in terms of the aims and 
objectives of arms control and related compliance questions.
Of the charges of non-compliance that follow, it may be noted that four 
of the eight issues raised were not identified as definite violations. 
Indeed, it needs to be emphasised that the politicality of compliance 
issues rests principally on the am biguities of m arginal compliance 
behaviours and on the ambiguities of the data on non-compliance. Of 
the rem aining four technical violations, two resulted  from poor 
estimates on the time needed to dismantle certain launchers, and one 
from the use of 'weather protection' yet, since the agreement limits the 
num ber of launchers, tem porary shelters did not preclude verification 
by NTMs. The radar at the Kamchatka Peninsula, appears ultimately to 
be a m arginal issue, given that the Soviets have agreed that it be 
considered an ABM test range as perm itted under Article V of the 
ABM Treaty.
One Soviet view  argues that m any of the am biguous compliance 
activities raised  by the U nited States w ere a resu lt of poor 
com m unication betw een the Soviet bureaucracies, particu larly  
betw een the Foreign M inistry and the Defence D epartm ent of the 
Military Industrial Com mission .214 The argum ent was that the Soviet 
SCC D elegation was consistently  m isinform ed by the Defence 
D epartm ent of the M ilitary Industrial Commission about activities 
within the Soviet Union. This was said to result in situations in which 
the SCC w ould have negotiated a procedure, and that established
214 Author's interview with Alexei Arbatov, Canberra:ANU, 31/7/91.
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procedure was simply ignored or garbled by the bureaucratic process. 
This position could be argued if the SCC was staffed solely, or even 
principally by Foreign Ministry officials. This is in fact largely the case 
up
Table 3.4 U.S. Charges of Soviet Non-Compliance with 
____________ SALT I as at September 25,1979.____________
Charge Issue Agreement
Potential violation
Hardened silo 
construction Interim Agreement Art I
Legal & political 
violation
Concealment measures 
impeding NTM 
verification
ABM Treaty,XII.3 
Interim Agreement,V.3
Defeating object & 
purpose of agreement
Conversion of 
launchers from light to 
heavy ICBMs
Interim Agreement, II
Possible Violation
Possible testing of air 
defence radar (SA-5) in 
ABM mode
ABM Treaty,VI
violation
Excess ABM test 
launchers
ABM Treaty
violation
ABM Radar on 
Kamchatka Peninsula
ABM Treaty ,VI; Common 
Understanding C
violation
Exceeding numerical 
ICBM launcher limits
Interim Agreement,II
violation
deliberate concealment 
at test range
Interim Agreement,V,3
Sources: US State Dept Bureau of Public Affairs Special Report No.55,July 1979, and G. 
Duffy Compliance and the Future of Arms Control Stanford University, Global 
Outlook, 1988, Appendix A, p.211 and Testimony of Sydney Graybeal in R.W. 
Buchheim Briefing on SALT I Compliance 1979 Washington:US Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations.
to the D eputy com m issioner of the SCC, bu t the Com m issioner 
himself is appointed from the Defence D epartm ent of the Military 
Industria l C om m ission .215 This being the case, it seems to stretch 
credibility that there could be a total breakdow n in communication
215 See Chapter 2 of this thesis.
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betw een the SCC negotiators and the activities of the Defence 
D epartm ent.216
W hat is interesting about the treatm ent of these questions, w ithout 
denigrating their technical implications, lies in the interpretation of 
their political m eaning. That is, the legal perspective, the SALT SCC 
perspective, and that of the Committee on the Present Danger, all held 
specific and widely differing views as to the meaning of these questions 
when read as political signals. The intersection of these
Table 3.5 Soviet Charges of US Noncompliance with SALT I 
___________ as at Sept 25,1979_____________________________
Charge Issue Agreement
V iolation Shelters over Minuteman 
Silos
Interim Agreement, V 
Common Understanding 
C
V iolation Testing Shemya Radar for 
ABM purposes
ABM T reaty ,1.2 and 
V I(a)
V iolation Privacy of SCC 
Proceedings
ABM Treaty XIII, SCC 
Regulations
V iolation Creation of Large scale 
ABM D efence system : 
PAVE PAWS Radar statn .
ABM Treaty, 1.2
Potential Violation Exceeding numerical 
launcher limits 
(Minuteman II, Titan II)
Interim Agreement, 
V.1,2,3; Common 
Understanding C
Possible Violation Dismantling of Radar at 
Malstrom AFB
ABM Protocol on 
Procedures
Possible Violation Exceeding sublimit on 
MIRVed ICBMS
ABM Treaty, V.l
Sources: US State Dept Bureau of Public Affairs Special Report No.55July 1979 and G. Duffy 
Compliance and the Future of Arms Control Stanford University, Global Outlook, 1988. p.211 and 
S. Graybeal in R.W. Buchheim Briefing on SALT I Compliance 1979 Washington:US Senate 
FRC.
216) Source: Author's interview with Alexei Arbatov, Canberra:ANU, 31/7/91.
competing views arguably provides some insight into the multiple and 
complex subjectivities217 competing for a voice in the Carter security 
state.
Examining these in more detail, I am setting out to show, not the state 
as actor, nor even the security state as actor, but that within the security 
state (insofar as it applies to arms control compliance issues) are always 
factional identities that mobilise and invoke competing world-views; 
that these are constantly in play; that each has a foundation in history; 
that each manifests an identity symptomatic of that history and that 
each exists in relation to other factional identities the specification of 
which may be inferred from the language and actions [both operating 
as forms of signifying system] they invoke.
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217 Subjectivities: In the context of discourse theory the term represents all that can be 
signified by a collision/collusion, even conflation of three established senses, described 
by O'Sullivan, Hartley, Saunders and Fiske (1983:231) in terms of i) Subject of political 
theory: the citizen as subject of the state, implying the positioning of the subject within 
networks of power relations, ii) Subject of Idealist philosophy: a site of consciousness 
implying a division between subject and object, between thought and reality, between 
self and other (an opposition critiqued by Heidegger and Derrida). In this sense, 
subjectivity has been traditionally represented as a unitary identity which appears as 
the source of action and meaning rather than as their product. The individualism of 
this position fails to account for the role of language and social relations in 
determining, regulating or producing what any thinking subject can be. iii) The subject of 
grammar: that which the action is about or determined by.
My use of the term subjectivities (or subjects) refers to that identity which emerges as a 
symptom of the articulation of the difference (or differance [J. Derrida]) between 'self 
and 'other' - that product of boundary-making practices which marks a position - upon 
which further action may be based. The identity so construed is thus historically 
contingent (insofar as it emerges as a product of historical forces) and socially situated 
by and through language [or signifying system] (in which naming practices play a 
significant role).
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3.51 US Charges of Soviet Noncompliance:
(a) Hardened Silo Construction
Article I of the Interim Agreement states:
'The Parties undertake not to start construction of additional
ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers after July 1, 1972.'
W hen the Interim  A greem ent entered into force, the num ber of 
operational ICBMs each Party was perm itted to have totalled 1618 for 
the Soviet U nion and 1054 for the U nited States. In 1973, US 
intelligence sources determined that an additional 150 silos were being 
constructed by the Soviets at ICBM fields along the Trans-Siberian 
Railway in Soviet Asia. If these silos were destined to contain ICBM 
launchers, then they would have constituted a violation of Article I of 
the Interim Agreement.
The U nited States raised this concern in the SCC. The Soviets 
responded that the excavations were for hardened launch-control 
facilities for 'testing and training purposes.' The intelligence evidence 
was ambiguous, purporting to show a remarkable degree of similarity 
between the characteristics of these 'launch-control' facilities and those 
of conventional ICBM complexes. The characteristics in question in 
included their cylindrical shape, with 'blow-away' doors and launcher- 
type suspension equipm ent. The Congressional Record notes this 
ambiguity as a 'potential cause for concern' on the grounds that these 
launch-control facilities could be virtually dual-capable. That said, the 
use of these facilities for the purposes stated by the Soviet Union are 
perm itted under the Interim  Agreement, and moreover, are further
I l l
justified by the United States' Letter of Submittal for the ABM Treaty218 
w hich held that launchers of this type could 'be constructed at 
operation sites.'
While the U.S. State Departm ent report, taking the view of the SCC
(see section Image II in this chapter) concluded that:
"In early 1977, following further discussions during 1975 and 
1979 and a review of our intelligence on this subject, the US 
decided to close discussion of this matter on the basis that the 
silos in question are currently  used as launch-control 
facilities."
The legalistic view (Image I, this chapter) was presented by the
'hawkish' US Senate expressed in the Congressional Record (17/8/78):
It w ould appear that the Soviets w ould risk the illegal 
installation of some 150 new  missiles, know ing that a 
program  of such m agnitude could not go undetected. 
However, the D epartm ent report does not deal with the 
question of w hether former launch control facilities have 
been p roperly  dism antled , in the light of w hich the 
additional silos could theoretically serve a purpose beyond 
that specified by the Soviet Union.
That these views coincide with those of members of the Committee on 
the Present Danger shows the extent to w hich the conservative 
backlash to the Nixon-Ford era of arms control was already taking hold 
in the US Congress. These views are an im portan t factor in 
understanding the failure of SALT II ratification.
(b) Concealment Measures impeding Verification by NTM
Article XII of the ABM Treaty states:
218 US Secretary of State to the President June 10,1972.
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1. For the purposes of providing assurance of compliance 
w ith the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall use 
national technical means of verification at its disposal in a 
m anner consistent w ith generally recognised principles of 
international law.
2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national 
technical means of verification of the other Party operating 
in accordance with Paragraph 1 of this Article.
3. Each Party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment 
m easures which im pede verification by national technical 
means of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty. This 
obligation shall not require changes in current construction, 
assembly, conversion, or overhaul practices.
Article V(3) of the Interim Agreement contains a similar provision:
Each Party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment 
m easures which im pede verification by national technical 
means of compliance w ith the provisions of this Interim  
Agreem ent.
These national technical means, as explained elsewhere in this chapter, 
refer principally to the use of photoreconnaissance satellites and 
electronic surveillance systems, so concern with concealment practices 
can refer to both visual and electronic concealment.
Soviet practices which suggest concealment had been monitored by the 
United States before and after the conclusion of the 1972 SALT 
agreements, however, during 1974, the US State D epartm ent Report 
noted that the extent of concealm ent activities concerning Soviet 
strategic weapons program s "increased substantially." The Report also 
noted that these activities did not prevent the US from verifying 
compliance with the provisions of either the ABM Treaty or the 
Interim Agreement. There was concern expressed that if the pattern of 
concealm ent continued  to expand , then  these could im pede 
verification in the future. The U nited States raised the issue for 
discussion with the Soviets in the SCC, in particular, there were
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concerns over the placing of canvas covers and planking over 
extensive sections of prefabrication, assembly and re-fit facilities for 
ballistic  m issile subm arines (Delta Class) at the Severm orosk 
construction yard on the Kola peninsula. Moreover, similar coverings 
had been noted at the Khabarovsk facilities in Siberia, in addition to 
other strategic construction sites throughout the Soviet Union.
A 1975 review  of the intelligence inform ation on activities in the 
USSR led the United States to conclude that there 'no longer' 
appeared  to be an expanding pa ttern  of concealm ent activities 
associated with strategic weapons programs.
In 1977, how ever, US intelligence inform ation noted a large net 
covering over an ICBM test launcher undergoing conversion at a 
Soviet test site. The Congressional Record (p.26693) suggests that the 
site was probably Plesetsk that had been used to test the mobile SS-X-16. 
Concern was expressed to the Soviet delegation in the SCC that a 
covering which conceals activities at an ICBM silo from national 
technical means of verification "could reduce the confidence and trust 
which are im portant to m utual efforts to establish and m aintain 
strategic arms limitations."219
A lthough the Soviets argued that the provisions of the Interim  
Agreement were not applicable in this case, the nets were subsequently 
rem oved.
219 US DEPT OF STATE, BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, SPECIAL REPORT NO.55: 
COMPLIANCE WITH SALT I AGREEMENTS HEARING BEFORE THE SENATE 
FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE 25/9 /79]
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The point here, is that the authors of the US State Departm ent Report 
(see note 116) place their emphasis on the ongoing process of arms 
limitation and arms control, and on the relationship which engenders 
such arm s control. The same cannot be said of the authors of the 
Congressional Record who dwell, not on the relationship, but on the 
m istrust that labels any level of verification inadequate. As they 
express it:
Assuming that the SS-X-16 mobile ICBM is involved, it must 
be em phasised th a t the Soviets have been less than 
forthcom ing  w ith  reg a rd  to in fo rm ation  abou t the 
production rate an d /o r deployment posture of the system. As 
such, any deliberate concealment activity complicates the 
process of determ ining w hether a permissible replacement 
has been effected or an illegal expansion of the Soviet land- 
based missile force is being pu rsued . It is som ew hat 
problematic to speak of m utually agreed limits, inasmuch as 
the Soviet Union has provided no hard data concerning its 
weapons inventories. The figures derive, instead from US 
intelligence estimates. At any rate the burden of proof that 
only (legally) acceptable developments are concealed m ust be 
held to rest with the Party attem pting the concealment. It 
may be that Soviet compliance was ultimately induced less 
by American blandishments, and more by the simple fact of 
their having acquired the level of test information necessary 
for certain strategic purposes. M oreover, the language of 
Article V of the Interim  A greem ent equally  obscures 
in terp reta tions of perm issible silo-launcher conversion 
practices.220
By focusing blame on am biguities in the treaty  language, the 
conservatives in Congress were able to erode the efforts of the arms 
control community to articulate the Other (in this case the Soviet 
Union) in terms of strategies of inclusion (through the relationship 
established through the arms control process). By articulating the Other 
in threat terms (implied by the suggestion that they were operating
220 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 1 7 /8 /7 8  26693
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independently of US ’blandishments') the conservatives seek to build 
a cumulative weight of instances in which the Soviets may be viewed 
as expansionist and barely 'contained' by the vigilant gaze of the 
United States.
(c) Conversion of Launchers from Light to Heavy ICBM
With the aim of restricting Soviet missile payload, and hence its hard- 
target counterforce potential, limits were placed upon the num bers of 
'heavy' ICBMs it could have under SALT I (313 SS-9s and follow-ons). 
The definition of precisely w hat constituted a 'heavy' ICBM however 
was left ambiguous.
Under Article II of the Interim Agreement:
The Parties undertake not to convert land-based launchers 
for light ICBMs, or for ICBMs of older types deployed prior to 
1964, into land-based launchers for heavy ICBMs of types 
deployed after that time.
Common Understanding 'A' to the Interim Agreement was based on
Ambassador Smith's statement on May 26, 1972 which states:
The Parties agree that the term  "significantly increased" 
means that an increase will not be greater than 10-15 percent 
of the present dimensions of land-based ICBM silo launchers.
M inister Semenov replied that this statem ent corresponded to the 
Soviet understanding.
However, although agreement was reached on the restrictions to the 
dim ensions of launchers there was to be no such agreem ent on a 
definition for 'heavy' ICBMs. The frustration of the US side is evident 
in their Unilateral Statement (May 26,1972) on 'heavy' ICBMs:
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The US Delegation regrets that the Soviet Delegation has not 
been willing to agree on a common definition of a heavy 
m issile. U nder these circum stances, the US Delegation 
believes it necessary to state the following: The United States 
w ould consider any missile having a volume significantly 
greater than that of the largest light ICBM now operational 
on either side to be a heavy ICBM. The United States 
proceeds on the premise that the Soviet side will give due 
account to this consideration."
W hen it was established that the SS-11 ICBM system, the largest light 
ICBM then operational on either side w ith a volume of 69 cubic 
metres, was being replaced with the SS-19 'heavy ICBM whose volume 
was approxim ately 100 cubic metres, The United States charged the 
Soviet Union with violating the Interim Agreement. The conservative 
’legalists,’ served notice that:
[the U nited States] w ould consider any m issile w ith a 
volume exceeding 70 cubic metres to be a ’heavy’ missile, 
thus absolutely qualifying the SS-19 for inclusion in this 
category.
The fact remained that the Soviet Union had not violated the letter of 
the Interim  Agreement or the Common U nderstanding, insofar as 
they had not increased the dimensions of the silo launchers beyond 10- 
15 percent.
The Soviet Union m aintained throughout SALT I that an agreed 
definition of a heavy ICBM was unnecessary in the context of the 
Interim Agreement and made clear that they did not agree with the US 
Unilateral Statement. That said, however, the US State Department, in 
raising the issue was less concerned about the SS-19 in relation to 
SALT I, but rather sought to "emphasise the im portance the US 
attached to the distinction m ade in the context of the SALT II 
agreem ent under negotiation at the time. This was surprisingly thin 
ground on which to base a charge of violation, given that practitioners
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on both sides of the SCC attribute, in large measure, the success of the 
SCC to its restriction to clarifying the strict terms of the treaties within 
its m andate221. Subsequently, the United States and the Soviet Union 
agreed in the draft agreements of SALT II, on a clear demarcation, in 
terms of missile launch-weight and throw-weight, between light and 
heavy ICBMs.
(d) Testing of Air Defence Radar (SA-5) in an ABM Mode
The ABM treaty states that both parties agree under Article VI that for 
the purposes of enhancing assurance of the effectiveness of the 
lim itations on ABM systems and their components provided by the 
treaty:
...each Party undertakes: a) not to give missiles, launchers, or 
rad a rs , o ther than  ABM in te rcep to r m issiles, ABM 
launchers, or ABM radars, capabilities to counter strategic 
ballistic missiles, or their elements in flight trajectory, and 
not to test them in an ABM mode... [and] ... b) not to deploy 
in the future radars for early w arning of strategic ballistic 
missile attack except at locations along the periphery of its 
national territory and oriented outwards.
Radars used for purposes such as range safety and instrumentation are 
exempt from this ban. The SA-5 Griffon radar and the SA-2 Guideline 
radar are conventional air-defence radars deployed throughout the 
Soviet Union at a num ber of sites, including, the Sary Shagan test 
range. The Soviets have periodically operated surface-to-air missiles 
(SAM) radars at the Sary Shagan test range during ABM test flights.
221 Arbatov, Alexei. Department of Disarmament and Security Affairs, Institute for 
World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) USSR Academy of Sciences, 
Moscow. Author's personal Interview on the SALT SCC. Taped at Australian 
National University, Canberra, 31/7/91. and Buchheim, D. Caldwell & R.W. The US- 
USSR SCC: Description and Appraisal. Providence, Rhode Island: The Centre for 
Foreign Policy Development, Brown University, 1983.
O perating these radars concurrently with testing of ballistic missiles 
raised US concerns that the Soviets could be testing the potential for 
using air-defence radars for ABM defence.
On April 7, 1972 the United States had made a Unilateral Statement to 
clarify their interpretation of "tested in an ABM mode." They noted, 
that they would consider a radar to be so tested if, for example, it makes 
m easurem ents on a 'cooperative target vehicle' during the reentry 
portion of its trajectory or makes m easurem ents in conjunction with 
the test of an ABM interceptor missile or an ABM radar at the same 
test range. They further stated that they would consider an infraction to 
have occurred if "an interceptor missile ... [was] flight tested to an 
a ltitude222 inconsistent with interception of targets against which air 
defences are deployed." US satellite reconnaissance of Soviet SA-5 test 
firings at the Kapustin Yar desert range north of the Caspian Sea gave 
"circum stantial indications"223 that the missile's radar system may 
have been tracking ballistic vehicles during the reentry phase of their 
flight trajectory into ABM test ranges. They added that radars used for 
purposes such as range safety, or instrum entation would be exempt 
from application of these criteria.
The Soviet Union argued (May 5, 1972) that high altitude non-ABM 
radars were permissible in 'range safety and instrum ental' roles for 
purposes of precision tracking and data collection outside of agreed test 
sites such as Sary Shagan. The Senate Congressional Record account 
argued that the Soviets, while rejecting any inference that they might
118
222 This refers to testing at altitudes in excess of 30,000 metres.
223 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 17/8/78 26693
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be developing ABM capabilities through the conversion or upgrading 
of c u rre n t su rface-to -a ir m issile  (SAM) system s, rem ained  
'noncommittal' over the types of radar technologies (phased or non- 
phased array) that were acceptable for deploym ent at facilities outside 
those of the agreed ABM test ranges.
The US were concerned in 1973 andl974 when Soviet test ballistic 
missiles were tracked using the SA-5 radar. The US State Department 
R eport224 notes that the importance of this issue was the question of 
w hether or not the Soviets were attem pting to either upgrade the SA-5 
for ABM capability or to obtain data for useful in developing a new 
dual-capable SAM/ABM system. The Report (section 111(D)) points out 
that after formal representations by the US delegates to the SCC "...the 
radar activity of concern during  Soviet ballistic missile tests had 
ceased." The Congressional Record dismisses the Soviet argum ent 
that, as the SA-5 radars had been used only to track the incoming 
reentry vehicle during the test, this did not constitute testing 'in an 
ABM m ode' on the grounds that other radars on the test range 
rendered  use of the SA-5 radar red u n d an t for instrum entation  
purposes.
One reason for this, given in the Congressional Record, refers to 
Section V(c) of the State Departm ent Report which deals with ABM 
testing of air-defence missiles:
O ur close m onitoring of activities in this field has not 
indicated that ABM tests or any tests against strategic ballistic 
missiles have been conducted with an air-defence missile;
224 US DEPT OF STATE, BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, SPECIAL REPORT NO.55: 
COMPLIANCE WITH SALT I AGREEMENTS HEARING BEFORE THE SENATE 
FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE 2 5 /9 /7 9
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specifically, they have not observed any such tests of the SA-5 
defence system missile, the one occasionally m entioned in 
this connection in the open press. 225
The Congressional Record noted that the SA-5 defence system is two­
pronged, having both a radar com ponent and a missile component. 
That one component of this system was tested extensively, (the radar 
component) the other, 'necessary for its effective functioning' was 
alleged by the State Department Report to have not been tested in this 
period, was held by the Congressional Record to 'seem strange.' The 
Soviets argued  tha t to have done so, w ould  have been in 
contravention of the Article VI of the ABM Treaty.
An agreement reached in the SCC in 1978 redefined the phrase "in an
ABM mode" to ban any concurrent testing of ABM and air defence
components other than for the detection [and presumably tracking] of
potentially hostile aircraft that are clearly and dem onstrably in the
area." The Congressional Record points out that the U nderstanding
requires a party seeking an exception to provide justification for the
exception within a period of thirty days or at the next SCC meeting
whichever occurs first.226 Duffy (1988) argues that the US concerns over
the SA-5 issue were "debatable from the start" on the grounds that:
The SA-5 system  is m arginal for in tercepting  ballistic 
missiles with a high weight-to-drag ratio.
22  ^(Congressional Record p. 4964).
226 phig understanding languished in the SCC from 1982 until 1985 because of 
interagency disputes in the United States over the appropriate US approach to the 
SCC. Finally, at the spring 1985 SCC session, the United States and the Soviet Union 
signed this common understanding. In its December 1985 noncompliance report, the US 
administration classified this charge as based on evidence"insufficient fully to assess 
compliance with Soviet obligations under the ABM treaty."
121
Further evidence that the violation, if it was one was m arginal at 
worst, comes from the US State Department Report (1979). This report 
held that if the activity in question was designed to upgrade the SA-5 
system, then it would have only been one step in an effort that would 
require substantial and, more importantly, observable modifications to 
other components of the system. It points out that these modifications 
have not occurred. It m ust be noted, however, that although the 
Soviets did indeed cease the activity of concern, more than a dozen 
tests had been conducted before the United States made their formal 
notification dem anding suspension of the activity. The Congressional 
Record assesses this as 'a num ber sufficient to accum ulate the 
inform ation desired'
The US continued to monitor Soviet activities related to this issue, but
none was noted until 1985, when the Soviets once more resum ed
operations of the SA-5 radar during missile tests. The US raised the
issue in the SCC and the Soviet activity ceased.
(e) Excess ABM Test Launchers
Article IV of the ABM Treaty states:
The limitations provided for in Article III shall not apply to 
ABM systems or their components used for development or 
testing, and located within current or additionally agreed test 
ranges. Each Party may have no more than a total of fifteen 
ABM launchers at test ranges.
The detailed procedures regulating the dism antling of test launchers 
beyond the agreed limit were developed in the Standing Consultative 
Commission and entered into force on July 3, 1972.
In 1973, the Soviet Union advised the US SCC Delegation that excess 
launchers had been dism antled in compliance with the provisions of 
Article IV of the ABM Treaty. US intelligence information determined,
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however, that several launchers were still in place. That is, they had 
not been dismantled in compliance with the procedures established in 
the SCC, bu t rather, had been deactivated227. As the US State 
Departm ent Report notes:
"Even though the launchers were deactivated prior to the 
entry into force of the procedures, and their reactivation 
would be of no strategic significance, the US raised the matter 
as a case of inaccurate notification or reporting to make 
know n our expectation that in the future care w ould be 
taken to ensure that notification, as well as dism antling or 
destruction, was in strict accord with the agreed procedures." 
(CRp.6963)
This was a way of putting the Soviets on notice that the US intended 
the dism antling procedures to be adhered-to strictly, and that the 
national technical means of verification would reveal any activities 
that could be construed as inconsistent with the Treaty. By regarding 
the infringement as 'inaccurate notification' the US State Department, 
once again, is placing em phasis on the ongoing rela tionsh ip  
represented by the treaty, rather than as a structure which permits of 
behaviours as absolute adherence or non-adherence to the law.
This latter view emerges in the Congressional Record 228
Given the Soviet propensity to exploit loopholes to the outer 
limits of legal acceptability, this admonition has a somewhat 
hollow ring. Even though the alleged infraction was not 
considered strategically significant, the implications of even 
minor deviations are of greater interest for what they reveal 
about Soviet behaviour than is the fact of temporary Soviet 
compliance, [emphasis mine]. The inaccuracy of preliminary 
Soviet notifications inevitably calls into question the USSR's
227 See US DEPT OF STATE, BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, SPECIAL REPORT 
NO.55: COMPLIANCE WITH SALT I AGREEMENTS. HEARING BEFORE THE US 
SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE 2 5 /9 /7 9
228 Congressional Record 17/8/78  p.26693
com m itm ent to arm s control m easures which strengthen 
m utual confidence and promote "equal security."
(f) ABM Radar on Kamchatka Peninsula229
Article IV of the ABM Treaty states:
"The limitations provided for in Article III [on deployment] 
shall not apply to ABM systems or their components used for 
developm ent or testing, and located w ithin  current or 
additionally agreed test ranges."
In October 1975 a new radar was installed at the Kamchatka impact area 
of the Soviet ICBM test range. Since Article IV exempts from the 
lim itations of Article III only those ABM com ponents used for 
developm ent or testing at current, or additionally agreed ranges, the 
United States became concerned that the location of this radar, which 
the United States identified as an ABM radar, on the Kamchatka 
Peninsula, could have constituted establishment of a new Soviet ABM 
test range.
Questions arose over the newness of this Soviet test range, and for two 
reasons. Firstly, in 1972, just prior to the conclusion of the SALT 
negotiations, the US delegation provided a list to the Soviets, of US 
and Soviet test ranges. This list did not include the Kamchatka impact 
area. The Soviet side was under instructions to neither confirm nor 
deny the accuracy or completeness of the list, claiming that 'the use of 
national technical means assured against m isunderstandings of Article 
IV; and secondly, by noting that there was a previous and older type 
ABM radar on the site, this could be construed as having established 
the presence of an older type of ABM radar at the date of signing.
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229 See: SALT ONE: Compliance / SALT TWO: Verißcation, U.S. Department of State 
Selected Documents No. 7, Bureau of Public Affairs Office of Communication p.47
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Although not strategically significant the location of the radar was 
deem ed by the US to w arrant raising with the Soviets in the SCC for 
clarification.
N oting that a range containing a radar instrum entation complex 
existed at that site on the date of signature of the ABM Treaty, the 
Soviets stated that they w ould be prepared  to establish that the 
Kamchatka range a 'current test range' w ithin the meaning of Article 
IV of the ABM Treaty. The United States continued exchanges within 
the SCC to establish Kamchatka as test range within the meaning of 
Article IV of the ABM Treaty and that this, with the Sary Shagan range 
are the only two 'current test ranges' within the meaning of the treaty. 
Article IV requires agreem ent over the establishm ent of new, or 
additional test ranges.
There is agreement between the US and the Soviet Union concerning 
the two points (recognising the Kamchatka range as an ABM test range, 
and that the Kamchatka and Sary Shagan are the only two ABM test 
ranges in the Soviet Union. On the third point, however, discussions 
are continuing on the protocols and procedures for discussing and 
agreeing upon the establishment of an ABM test range.
(g) Exceeding Numerical ICBM Launcher Limits
Under the terms and provisions of the Interim Agreement Article III 
states:
The Parties undertake to limit subm arine-launched ballistic 
m issile (SLBM) launchers and m odern ballistic missile 
subm arines to the num bers opera tiona l and  un d er 
construction on the date of signature  of this Interim  
Agreement, and, in addition to launchers and subm arines 
constructed under procedures established by the Parties as 
replacem ents for an equal num ber of ICBM launchers of
older types deployed prior to 1964 or for launchers on older 
subm arines.
and its Protocol of May 26, 1972, the Soviet Union was perm itted to 
deploy no more than 950 SLBM launchers and 62 m odern, nuclear 
pow ered ballistic missile subm arines. A dditional ballistic missile 
launchers on subm arines -up to 740 ballistic missile launchers on 
nuclear powered submarines, operational and under construction, may 
become operational only as one-for-one replacem ents for ballistic 
missile launchers on older submarines which would be dism antled or 
destroyed under agreed procedures. "The deploym ent of m odern 
SLBMs on any submarine, regardless of type, will be counted against 
the total level of SLBMs permitted" for each side.
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Under the Agreed Interpretations, Initialed Statement K of the Interim 
Agreement emphasises the timing of the dismantling or destruction of 
older ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers on older subm arines, 
stating that:
The Parties understand that dism antling or destruction of 
ICBM launchers of older types deployed prior to 1964 and 
ballistic m issile launchers on o lder subm arines being 
replaced by new SLBM launchers on m odern subm arines 
will be initiated at the time of the beginning of sea trials of a 
replacem ent subm arine, and will be com pleted in the 
shortest possible agreed period of time. Such dismantling or 
destruction , and  tim ely  notification  thereof, will be 
accomplished under procedures to be agreed in the Standing 
Consultative Commission.
These dism antlem ent procedures were developed and agreed in the 
SCC and came into force on July 3, 1974.
In 1976 the Soviets had 'developed a requirem ent' to dism antle 51 
replaced launchers. The United States determ ined that the Soviet 
Union would be unlikely to complete the prescribed dism antling in
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accordance with the procedures specified in the SCC agreement, within 
the required time. Accordingly, the United States decided to raise the 
issue in the SCC. The Soviets, however, raised the question on their 
own initiative, explaining that technical obstacles had delayed progress 
on dismantling. They set a target date of June 1, 1976 for completion, 
and agreed that no new submarines with replacement SLBM launchers 
w ould  begin sea trials before such com pletion. The US State 
Departm ent report confirmed that both conditions were subsequently 
m et.
As Sydney Graybeal described the issue:
As a subm arine leaves for sea trials - that means, when it 
leaves its port and not when it moves within the port - that 
is the starting date from which you begin to dism antle or 
destroy the ICBM launcher, which is the replaced launcher 
for the SLBM that is going to sea. So, the idea is that 4 
months from the date the ICBM launchers, which were SS- 
7's and SS-8's, w ould be dism antled or destroyed in 
accordance with agreed procedures and w ithin 4 m onths 
those w ould go out of the inventory and the subm arine 
launcher would begin to count when the submarine went to 
sea. In the Jack Anderson article230 he is stating that those 
that w ent to sea counted, bu t the ones that were being 
dism antled  or destroyed had not been dism antled  or 
destroyed, and therefore they were still in the inventory and 
therefore you had an excess of ICBM and SLBM launchers.231
Graybeal argued that, despite the fact that the Soviets had an excess of 
launchers, the excess launchers were far from operational232. He stated
230 Un-named article by Jack Anderson in The Washington Post September 21, 1979, 
cited in Briefing on SALT I Compliance HEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON  
FOREIGN RELATIONS, UNITED STATES SENATE, 96th CONGRESS, 1st SESSION, 
SEPTEMBER 25,1979, DECLASSIFIED AND MADE PUBLIC NOVEMBER 7, 1979. p.22
231 Ibid.
232 According to Graybeal, the missile launchers were about 80% dismantled according 
to the procedures. Op Cit. p.24.
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that the purpose behind the procedures that had been worked out in 
the SCC was to assure that the launcher in question was pu t into a 
condition that precluded its ability to launch missiles in less time than 
it took to build a new one. This involved the removal of a whole series 
of items.
Mr. GRAYBEAL. [Deleted.] So, I think this is one case where 
the Soviets were in clear violation of the SCC procedures - it 
is the only case of a violation - in the sense that they did not 
dism antle or destroy these launchers w ithin the 4 months 
prescribed period. I do not believe that they had an excess of 
operational launchers during that particular period.233
The State Department report concluded that:
Since that time, although we have observed some minor 
procedural discrepancies at a num ber of those deactivated 
launch sites and at others as the replacem ent process 
continued, all the launchers have been in a condition that 
satisfied the essential substantive requirem ents, which are 
that they cannot be used to launch missiles and cannot be 
reactivated in a short time. As necessary we have pursued 
the question of complete and precise accomplishment of the 
detailed requirements of the agreed procedures.234
In short, for all practical purposes the US State D epartm ent were 
satisfied that there was compliance with the agreed procedures.
Once again, however, the Congressional Record, with judicious use of 
double negatives seems in tent on em phasising the potential for 
marginal infraction by the Soviets:
The acknowledged "procedural discrepancies" suggests that 
the Soviets are not u n p rep a red  to take increm ental
233 Ibid
234 US DEPT OF STATE, BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, SPECIAL REPORT NO.55: 
COMPLIANCE WITH SALT I AGREEMENTS HEARING BEFORE THE SENATE 
FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE 2 5 /9 /7 9  p. 3
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advantages of what may be perceived as a relaxation of its 
surveillance efforts ... Viewed against the backdrop of 
overall Soviet strategic efforts, the Administration cannot 
dismiss lightly even minor abridgements of provisions 
governing the launcher replacement process.235
Such a formulation as "not unprepared to ..." fails to specify what the 
Soviets are prepared to do. While not directly slanderous, this 
statement is clearly designed to imply patterns of behaviour that are 
not spelled out in the US State Department report. These patterns 
support an adversarial image of the Soviets.
(h) Development and Testing of Mobile ABM Radars
Article V(l) of the ABM Treaty states:
Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM 
systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space- 
based, or mobile land-based.
Definitional ambiguity emerged over the term 'mobile.'
In an attempt to clarify the matter Common Understanding C of the 
ABM Treaty, which relates to mobile ABM systems, was made by the 
US Delegation on January 29, 1972.
Article V(l) of the Joint Draft Text of the ABM Treaty 
includes an undertaking not to develop, test, or deploy 
mobile land-based ABM systems and their components. On 
May 5, 1971, the US side indicated that, in its view, a 
prohibition on deployment of mobile ABM systems and 
components would rule out the deployment of ABM 
launchers and radars which were not permanent fixed types.
At that time, we asked for the Soviet view of this 
interpretation. Does the Soviet side agree with the US side's 
interpretation put forward on May 5, 1971?
235 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 1 7 /8 /7 8  "PRINCIPAL ALLEGED SOVIET 
VIOLATIONS RELATING TO THE ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE TREATY" p.26691.
On April 13, 1972, the Soviet Delegation said there is a 
general common understanding on this matter.
129
According to the Congressional Record several radars associated with 
an ABM system have been installed at designated ABM test sites since 
1971. Those at Sary Shagan reportedly  'possess properties which 
obscure the necessary distinctions betw een norm ally verifiable 
stationary systems and those with mobile capabilities236' which could 
presum ably evade detection. The ambiguity rested upon the relative 
rapidity with which the new radars could be assembled. That is, they 
could be assembled over a period of months rather than years. These 
phased-array  radars em ploy electronic steering of the beam  for 
d irection  and elevation. That is im portan t, because the older, 
mechanically- steered radars w ould have been too slow for ICBM 
tracking. Electrom agnetic steering of the beam  enables fast and 
m ultiple target acquisition and tracking.
Evidence given by Senator Percy237 indicates that the radar was judged 
to be 'rapidly deployable' rather than 'mobile' and that was still built 
on a substantial concrete base 'that requires an excavation.' According 
to the Congressional Record the US intelligence comm unity wanted 
the issue raised in order to gain a negotiated definition of 'mobile' and, 
by settling this m atter, to avoid the potential for exploiting the 
am biguity in the treaty language, not only for the ABM Treaty, but,
236 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE. 17 /8 /7 8 . p. 26693
237 Briefing on SALT I Compliance HEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON  
FOREIGN RELATIONS, UNITED STATES SENATE, 96th CONGRESS, 1st SESSION, 
SEPTEMBER 25,1979, DECLASSIFIED AND MADE PUBLIC NOVEMBER 7, 1979. p.26
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more importantly, for the SALT II Treaty that was under negotiation at 
the time.238
3.52 Soviet Charges of US Noncompliance
a) Shelters over Minuteman Silos
Paragraph 3 of Article V of the Interim Agreement states:
Each Party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment 
m easures which im pede verification by national technical 
means of compliance w ith the provisions of this Interim  
Agreem ent. This obligation shall not require changes in 
current construction, assem bly, conversion or overhaul 
practices.
From 1962 to 1972 the United States used shelters of either 300 or 700 
square feet over Minuteman ICBM silos to provide weather protection 
d u rin g  in itia l construction  and m o dern isa tion . From  1973, 
substantially larger prefabricated shelters were used that were some 
2,700 square feet. These were, again primarily for weather protection, 
or, as the US State D epartm ent puts it "environm ental protection" 
shelters. From four to twelve of these were placed over silos for 
periods of time ranging from 10 days to 4 weeks "depending on the 
severity of the weather."239
238 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 17/8/78 26693
239 US DEPT OF STATE, BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, SPECIAL REPORT NO.55: 
COMPLIANCE WITH SALT I AGREEMENTS HEARING BEFORE THE SENATE 
FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE 25 /9 /79  p. 4. Duffy, in Compliance and the 
Future of Arms Control. Stanford: Stanford University and Global Outlook, 1988. p.50, 
notes that the United States claimed that these shelters were designed to protect 
workers against the weather and to assist the curing of the concrete, while hardening 
bases in the Midwest areas that are subject to heavy winter snow.
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The Soviets raised the issue, first in 1973 through diplom atic and 
political channels, then, from 1975 in the SCC on the grounds that 
these shelters could be construed as deliberate concealm ent and 
therefore as inconsistent w ith the provisions of Article V of the 
Interim Agreement. If this were the case, they argued, then the shelters 
m ust be removed. The United States disagreed, on the grounds that the 
shelters were for w eather protection and were not therefore for 
concealment. On this basis, the United States side argued that the 
shelters were not inconsistent w ith A rticle V of the Interim  
Agreem ent.
In early 1977, after four years of Soviet negotiations, the United States 
decided to modify the shelters by reducing them in size by almost 50%. 
The Soviets continued to object in the SCC on the grounds that the 
shelters impede verification by national technical means. The United 
States maintained that the shelters were not for deliberate concealment 
and, in Duffy’s words, "stalled on making further changes."240
In November 1978 the Soviets raised the issue in terms of their ability 
to distinguish between launchers equipped with M inuteman II (non- 
MIRVed) and those equipped with M inuteman III (MIRVed) ICBMs. 
They argued that the problem was exacerbated by the use of shelters 
over the M inutem an launchers. W hile the U nited States side 
m aintained their position that the shelters were for environm ental 
protection they recognised the difficulties they were making for their 
ow n ability  to raise sim ilar questions about Soviet launcher
240 Duffy Op Cit p.51
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coverings.241 The United States then "in the interests of satisfying both 
sides' verification concerns" indicated that they would be prepared to 
remove and operate without the shelters. By May 1979, at the end of 
the SALT II negotiations, and after the silo modernisation program 
was completed, the United States ceased using the shelters.
The United States and the Soviet Union issued a common 
understanding to Paragraph 3 of Article XV of the SALT II Treaty that 
prohibits the use of shelters over ICBM launchers in such a way as to 
impede verification by national technical means.
b) Shemya Radar (COBRA DANE)
Article III of the ABM Treaty states:
Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems or their 
components except:
a) within one ABM system deployment area ... centred on the 
Party's national capital ... and
b) within one ABM system deployment area ... containing 
ICBM silo launchers ... [and no more than two] large phased- 
array ABM radars.
In 1973 the United States commenced construction on a new large 
phased-array radar on Shemya Island in Alaska at the western end of 
the Aleutian Islands.242 According to the US State Department Report, 
the radar was to be used for national technical means of verification, 
deep space tracking, and early warning. The radar became operational
241 See Briefing on SALT I Compliance Op Cit.
242 US DEPT OF STATE, BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, SPECIAL REPORT NO.55: 
COMPLIANCE WITH SALT I AGREEMENTS HEARING BEFORE THE SENATE 
FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE 2 5 /9 /7 9  p. 4.
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in 1977. In 1975, the Soviet Union questioned this designated use and 
requested clarification of the issue, as the radar appeared to be 
potentially an ABM radar which would not have been perm itted at 
this location under the terms of Article III of the ABM Treaty. After 
representations by the U nited States D elegation, the Soviet side 
considered the issue to have been resolved. One may note, however, 
that this Soviet charge arose at about the same time that the United 
States raised the Kamchatka radar issue with the Soviets. It is possible, 
therefore that the Soviets chose to raise this issue in the spirit of 
reciprocity.
c) Privacy of SCC Proceedings
Paragraph 8 of the Protocol, with Regulations, regarding the US-Soviet
Standing Consultative Commission states:
The proceedings of the Standing Consultative Commission 
shall be conducted in private. The Standing Consultative 
Commission may not make its proceedings public except 
with the express consent of both Commissioners.243
In 1975 a number of articles were published in the popular press which 
alleged Soviet cheating on the SALT agreem ents.244 These appeared 
not long before the special SCC session on compliance issues. The 
Soviets expressed concern about the importance of confidentiality in 
the work of the SCC and in particular, concern about press items that 
appeared to have been officially sanctioned by the US government.
243 Goldblat, Jozef, ed. Agreements for Arms Control: A Critical Survey. London: Taylor 
and Francis/SIPRI, 1982. p.208
244 The most notable of these being the article by Melvin Laird that appeared in the 
Reader's Digest
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The U nited  States reaffirm ed the usefu lness of m ain tain ing  
confidentiality, while noting that in the United States the public had a 
right to be kept informed in an open society. The US further noted that 
although the public had a right to an inform ed opinion, that the 
proceedings themselves would continue to remain private.
d) Dismantling of Radar at Malstrom AFB
At the time of the signing of the ABM Treaty on May,26, 1972, the 
U nited States had ABM defences under construction at two ICBM 
deploym ent areas. Under Article 111(b) each Party undertakes not to 
deploy ABM systems or their components at more than one ABM 
system deployment area "containing ICBM silo launchers."
Construction, at that time, was in its early stages at the Malstrom Air 
Force base in Montana. Procedures were negotiated for the dismantling 
or destruction of the ABM facilities as part of the Protocol on 
Procedures for ABM Systems and their Components, which was signed 
on July 4, 1974.
The required dism antling was, according to the State Departm ent 
Report, completed by May 1, 1974. Sometime in late 1974, the United 
States notified the Soviet in the SCC that the dism antling had been 
completed. The Soviet Delegation raised one question about a detailed 
aspect of the dism antling procedures. The United States produced 
photographs of the before, during and after phases of the dismantling 
process. This resolved the question.
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e) Creation of Large-Scale ABM Defence System (PAVE PAWS)
In 1972, when the ABM Treaty was signed, the United States had 
deployed two large radars on its territory as part of the Ballistic Missile 
Early Warning System (BMEWS).245 These comprised the FPS-85 
phased-array radar in Florida and a non-phased-array radar in Clear, 
Alaska.
Article I (2) of the ABM Treaty states:
Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems for a 
defence of the territory of its country and not to provide a 
base for such a defence, and not to deploy ABM systems for 
defence of an individual region except as provided for ion 
Article III of this Treaty.
In Article VI (b) each Party undertakes:
... not to deploy in the future radars for early warning of 
strategic ballistic missile attack except at locations along the 
periphery of its national territory and oriented outward.
Agreed Interpretation [F], initialed by the Heads of Delegation, on May 
26,1972 states:
The Parties agree not to deploy phased-array radars having a 
potential (the product of mean emitted power in watts and 
antenna area in square metres) exceeding three million, 
except as provided for in Articles III, IV and VI of the Treaty, 
or except for the purposes of tracking objects in outer space or 
for use as national technical means of verification.
The BMEWS system complied with the provisions of the ABM Treaty 
and Agreed Interpretation as set out above. Since then, the United 
States has built a large phased-array radar (LPAR) on Shemya Island
245 This system was an upgraded version of the Distance Early Warning (DEW) system 
of the late 1950s.
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and commenced construction of two other LPARS (PAVE PAWS) for 
SLBM early warning. These were based at Otis Air Force Base, 
Massachusetts, and Beale AFB, California.
LPARs can perform a variety of military functions. In October 1978 the 
Soviets noted their concern that the PAVE PAWS radars, coupled with 
other US LPARS, could constitute a violation of the ABM Treaty's 
prohibition on laying the base for an ABM defence. The United States 
declared that the purpose of the PAVE PAWS radar netw ork is to 
provide early w arning of strategic ballistic missile attack (which is 
perm itted under the terms of the ABM Treaty), and that the radars in 
question were simply replacements for older early warning radars that 
had become obsolete. The United States argued that as a secondary 
function the radars would be used to track objects in outer space. The 
Soviets noted the US clarification of the issue. That said, it is 
appropriate to discuss briefly the technical features of LPARs with an 
eye to their potential for a dual-capable role as both early warning, and 
battle m anagement LPARs.
Early warning LPARs are optim ised to operate at the frequencies at 
which reentry vehicles most efficiently reflect electromagnetic waves. 
These frequencies allow the clearest detection of a reentry vehicle over 
the longest range by a radar of fixed antenna size and power. To 
provide rapid early w arning and LPAR m ust have a high average 
pow er and a very large antenna. That is to say, it requires a high 
potential under the definition of the ABM Agreed Interpretation [F] 
cited above. The potentials246 (watts x metres2) of the PAVE PAWS and
246 Sometimes refered to as the 'power-aperture product' - see Duffy, Gloria. 
Compliance and the Future of Arms Control. Stanford: Stanford University and Global
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BMEWS LPARs are more than 40 million and 1.8 billion respectively. 
Duffy points out that basically all surveillance radars that can fulfil a 
strategic ballistic missile early warning function require potentials far 
greater than the 3 million specified in the Agreed Interpretation, while 
those below the 3 million threshold are restricted in the range at which 
they can operate.
ABM Battle m anagem ent LPARs need to operate at a far higher 
frequency247 than that required by early warning dedicated radars. As 
the frequency increases, so the range decreases, so that radars optimised 
for battle m anagem ent will not give m axim um  w arning, and vice 
versa. Moreover, in determ ining the usefulness of a LPAR for ABM 
battle management, consideration has to given to the extent to which it 
is networked into a battle management system.
Krass notes that, while radars may be optim ised for one or other 
p u rp o se , th e ir  p e rfo rm an ce  c h a rac te ris tic s  are "v irtu a lly  
indistinguishable from those needed to support an ABM system." The 
ability of a phased-array radar to function as national technical means 
of verification, while being an apparent violation of the provisions of 
an arms control agreement, renders a technical solution to the problem 
unworkable. Here then, is another instance such which at first sight 
seems to be a purely technical problem , can be seen, on closer 
examination to be in fact a political/discursive problem.
Outlook, 1988. pp.90-92. and Krass, A .Verification: How Much is Enough? 
Massachussetts: Lexington Books and SIPRI, 1985. pp.38-42.
247 Duffy Op Cit. p.91 cites the figure of ten-times the frequency at which early 
warning surveillance LPARS operate.
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f) Exceeding Numerical Launcher Limits (Atlas, Titan-I)
The detailed dism antling procedures agreed in the SCC governing 
excess ICBM launchers, includes the principle that reactivation of 
dism antled launchers should take substantially longer to reactivate 
than to construct new ones. One hundred and seventy-seven obsolete 
launchers for Atlas and Titan-1 ICBM systems are distributed across the 
United States continent at various locations. They were all deactivated 
by the end of 1966.
In 1975 the Soviets' Delegation raised a question concerning the status 
of these launchers w ith respect to their potential for reactivation. 
According to the State Department report the United States were of the 
view that, as the launchers in question were obsolete and had been 
deactivated prior to the signing of the Interim Agreement, they were 
no t governed by the accom panying protocol on deactivation and 
d estru c tio n  of excess launchers. The U nited  States p rov ided  
inform ation on their status and condition which supported the view 
that they could be neither activated quickly nor easily. In mid 1975 
discussion on the question ceased.
Compliance challenge and identity
Non-compliance is an issue of security, and by extension, of identity. 
N on-com pliance threatens, not just m arginal aspects of strategic 
stability but the image of sovereign integrity - it represents a notional 
potential for penetration by the Other. Such a view is predicated upon 
the trad itional realist state-centric theory of the dyad: dom estic 
o rder/in te rnational anarchy. Thus, in symbolic term s, even at the 
levels of overkill available in the nuclear equation, any arms control 
'breakout,' no m atter how marginal, represents a symbolic victory of
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the other, w ithout a physical shot being fired. The same arguably holds 
for advances in verification technologies such as to raise the level of 
deterrence of noncompliance, as applied to the relationship between 
so-called 'Hiders' and 'Finders'.
Image I: The legal view
The legal view holds that any violation of a legally binding agreement, 
no matter how small is still a violation in principle. This view applies, 
moreover, to "the application of m andatory norms" rather than to the 
application of w hat are, strictly speaking, "confidence build ing 
m easures" which are not, in them selves contrary to the law .248 
UNIDIR separates the verification aspect of agreements from CBMs, 
defining these CBMs in terms of establishing "primary obligations" - 
w hat m ust be done or not done [facts, data, or situations] - which are 
ends in them selves. Verification, on the other hand, establishes 
"secondary obligations," that is, norms that operate by virtue of other 
norm s, making verification a form of 'm eta-norm ' or legal norm .249 
This problem  has become particularly apparent w ith respect to so- 
called 'tacit understandings' in terms of the application of unilateral 
statements, such that a party issues a unilateral statement which, if left 
unchallenged by the other party, is understood to become the basis for a 
new behavioural norm.
It is particularly in this arena that Trimble argues that "the emphasis 
p laced  on Soviet 'v iolations' of 'agreem ents' is at best highly
248 UNIDIR A Legal Approach to Verification in Disarmament or Arms Limitation 
NY: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research 1988/3-4
249 UNIDIR in note 99 p.4
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m isleading, in that the im portant distinction between legally binding 
agreements and political commitments has been m uddled."250
For the purposes of analysing the legal image the distinction between 
legally binding agreements and political commitments is an important 
one. In the light of the Carter adm inistration, and particularly the 
Senate Arm ed Services Com m ittee hearing on Soviet Compliance 
with Certain Provisions of the 1972 SALT I Agreements and the 1979 
Buchheim Briefing on SALT I Compliance, this issue emerges from 
the outset as highlighting the political over the strategic implications 
of arms control, with respect to structural ambiguities in the texts of 
the Agreements and with respect to the use of unilateral statements to 
indicate political intention.
Senator Henry Jackson stated on March 6, 1975:
... a significant part of the problem  we face in assessing 
w hether the Soviets are in com pliance w ith  the 1972 
agreem ents is of our governm ent's ow n m aking. By 
resorting to so-called unilateral statem ents as a device for 
building into the 1972 agreements limitations that could not 
be negotiated, the Nixon administration set the stage for the 
current dram a of ambiguity and confusion.251
The m atter was raised w ith specific reference to the issue of the 
definition of 'light' versus 'heavy' missiles. Defense Secretary James 
Schlesinger noted that in a unilateral statem ent, the US defined a 
heavy ICBM as one which had a volume 'significantly greater than the
250 phillip R. Trimble "Soviet Violations of Arms Control Agreements: A Legal 
Perspective" CISA Working Paper No 53 Los Angeles: Centre for International and 
Strategic Affairs 1985/2
251 Testimony of Senator Henry Jackson Soviet Compliance With Certain Provisions of 
the 1972 SALT I Agreements Hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee 
Subcommittee on Arms Control 94th Cong. 1st Session March 6,1975/2
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largest 'light' ICBM then deployed (1972) which at that time was the 
Soviet SS-11252. In 1972, defence Secretary Melvin Laird interpreted that 
statem ent to mean a 30% increase was construed as 'significant'. The 
new Soviet SS-19 ICBM was some 50% larger by volume than the SS- 
11. Thus the Soviets were accused of violating 'the sp irit of the 
Agreem ent', in the absence of any formally agreed definition. The 
issue was 'resolved' in the SCC by accepting the SS-19 as the ceiling size 
for a 'light' ICBM.
As one of four instances of 'am biguous' com pliance253, James 
Schlesinger suggested that for legal purposes there should be "more 
specificity in the provisions and more com prehensive collateral 
restraints" and that the US "should not make unilateral statements in 
association with future agreements."254 The point he makes is that the 
difficulty w ith charging the Soviets w ith non-com pliance is that 
u n ila te ra l sta tem ents are not legally  b ind ing  docum ents. As 
Schlesinger points out:
252 See President Richard Nixon’s Letter of Transmissal to Congress in transmitting the 
ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement June 13,1972 p.16:
"The United States has also made clear that it would consider any ICBM having a 
volume significantly greater than that of the largest light ICBM now operational on 
either side, which is the SS-11, to be a heavy missile."
253 Schlesinger invokes a distinction between two types of ambiguity in compliance 
problems - those that are 'inherently ambiguous' and those that are 'deliberately 
ambiguous’, in which the former are said to 'lend themselves to solutions over time’ and 
the latter which arguably do not.
254 Testimony of Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger Soviet Compliance With 
Certain Provisions of the 1972 SALT I Agreements Hearing before the Senate Armed 
Services Committee Subcommittee on Arms Control 94th Cong. 1st Session March 6, 
1975/4
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... the expectations that the adm inistration  had  w ent 
unfulfilled. But that is not a violation by the Soviet Union255
Schlesinger, wants to distinguish the use of unilateral statements from
the treaty, thereby placing into separate realms for analysis the realm of
the legal and the realm of the ongoing relationship between the parties
to the treaty through ongoing arms control negotiations, which may be
term ed the 'political', view ing the use of unilateral statem ents as
having sent the 'wrong' signals. As he puts it:
we had a propensity to indulge in fairly strong statements on 
the premise that it would pu t us in a position of seeming 
very firm, and in fact it probably turns out to indicate its 
reverse .256
W hat seems to be at issue here is the degree of focus and intended 
outcome or purpose of arms control agreements and their associated 
texts. Those in the SCC negotiating community, and many in the arms 
control com m unity at large support the view that arm s control 
agreements are merely (albeit important) staging points in an ongoing 
process. This view in fact appears to have been dom inant in the 
form ation of the arms control 'epistemic comm unity' from Ford to 
Carter, especially throughout the SALT I negotiation process.257
Testimony of Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger Soviet Compliance With 
Certain Provisions of the 1972 SALT I Agreements Hearing before the Senate Armed 
Services Committee Subcommittee on Arms Control 94th Cong. 1st Session March 6, 
1975/8
256 Testimony of James Schlesinger 94th Congress, 2nd session 1975 p.13.
257 See John Newhouse The Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT NY:Holt Reinehart and 
Winston 1973
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Image II: The SCC View
The legal view is primarily document-based and event-driven. Whilst, 
tactically im portant, such a view is lim ited and tends to neglect the 
broader political context - the raison d'etre of arms control itself. As 
Lowenthal and Wit point out, treaties are commonly thought of as the 
'end product of a process' - the 'conclusion of a negotiation '258 whereas 
this view holds for the majority of treaties, arm s control treaties 
(am ong others as for exam ple environm ental em issions treaties) 
require ongoing and constant supervision. As Lowenthal and Wit 
state:
In the case of arms control agreements, the actual signing 
and enactment of treaties are largely transition points in the 
negotiations .259
From the latter part of the Carter administration, the political stakes of 
verification were raised ,260 from those of deterring or detecting treaty 
violations, and strengthening domestic support for arms control, to a 
point where this issue has risen into virtual opposition to the broader 
aims of arms control.
Nevertheless the view held consistently by the SALT negotiators and 
the US SCC delegations has emphasised the ongoing nature of arms
258 Lowenthal, Mark M. and Wit, J.S. "The Politics of Verification." In Verification 
and Arms Control. Edited by W. C. Potter 1985, pp.153-168. Lexington: Lexington 
Books.p.153
259 Ibid
260 in other words, the profile of verification was raised from that of an instrumental 
assurance of compliance into that of a political device which prevented the conclusion 
of new arms control agreements.
144
control - seen in terms of an ongoing process rather than as a dispersed 
set of completed treaty negotiations.
Henry Kissinger makes this point with respect to the distinction to be
draw n between the legal view and the 'confidence-building' view:
...the two countries have a unique opportunity right now to 
move into an entirely different relationship of build ing 
additional trusts. If it turns out that through le g a lis t ic  
interpretations of provisions that - through failing to specify 
the numbers about which we have absolutely no doubt as to 
our interpretation, and which are hereby reaffirmed. If it 
should turn out that these num bers are being challenged in 
any significant way at all, then this would cast a doubt. It 
would not only threaten disagreement, but it would threaten 
the whole basis of this new  relationship  which I have 
described, [sic]261
The view of the SCC (established to oversee the SALT treaties) hinges 
on the concept of adequate verification: that is, on the ability to detect 
violations of "such a m agnitude as to modify the nuclear balance... in 
time to make an appropriate response ."262 One of its key assumptions 
is that the em phasis rests on the relationship betw een the Parties 
rather than on the treaties themselves - that militarily significant non- 
compliance would reduce the confidence-building function of the arms 
control process. This is underlined by Sydney Graybeal in his testimony 
on Soviet compliance with SALT I, where he stresses the importance 
of raising issues relating to compliance questions as an aspect of 
m aintaining the relationship between the parties:
261 Henry Kissinger Statement made at the White House, June 1972, quoted by Senator 
Henry Jackson in Testimony before the Arms Control Subcommittee of the Senate Armed 
Services Committee Hearing on Soviet Compliance With Certain Provisions of the 1972 
SALT I Agreements Washington:94th Congress, 1st Sess., 6 March, 1975 p.18. [Emphasis 
mine].
262 Congressional Record August 17,1978 p.26691, Proceedings and Debates of the 95th 
Congress 2nd Session Vol.24 Part 20 Washington:Government Printing Office.
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There m ust be a will to raise compliance questions or 
ambiguous situations as soon as we have our facts straight. 
The viability of any arms control agreem ent requires early 
clarification of compliance questions. Raising and clarifying 
such issues contributes to the confidence in the agreement. 
Deferring or delaying adds suspicions and uncertainties and 
could encourage the Soviets to test our will and and our 
intelligence capabilities even m ore .263
Here, the legal provisions represent the currency of interaction 
between the US and the Soviet Union. Implicit in this statement is that 
both action and inaction hold consequences - each, subject to 
in terpretation  - which, in Coral Bell's term s constitute a mode of 
'signalling'. Clearly something is communicated by action or inaction 
on questions concerning compliance. M oreover, this 'som ething' is 
com m unicated along a m inim um  of three directions: US Domestic 
polity, US Officialdom and to the Soviet Union, setting up perceptions 
in each of these realms. Assuming the Soviet Officialdom represents 
the only operative perception on that side, the Soviet perception is 
taken to be undifferentiated. Classical signalling theory might grid this 
as follows:
263 Graybeal in Buchheim Briefing on SALT I Compliance 1979. p.12 [Emphasis mine]
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Table 3.6
U S (D om estic) U S (O fficia l) Soviet U nion
A ction P=A (1) P=A (2) P=A (R)
Inaction P=I(1) P=I(2) P=I(R)
Where P= Perception, A=Action, I=Inaction, 1=US Domestic, 2=US Official, 
R=Assumed Reception.
M oreover, this 'som ething' is com m unicated, not m erely to the 
Soviets by the US, but also within the administration in terms of what 
is assumed to be communicated by specific action or inaction. This set 
of perceptions in itself constitutes an engine for action or inaction in 
response to perceptions w ithin the adm inistration of the domestic 
response to perceived action or inaction. Finally, there can be no 
certainty as to the definition of what may or may not be communicated 
in these cases on the grounds that already several quite distinct 
epistemic communities have been invoked and are implicated in the 
production of meaning surrounding the specific sets of signs set in play 
by action or inaction on questions of compliance. As John Behuncik 
notes:
[the] US insistence on legalistic defenses can be self-defeating 
if sufficient account is not taken of the political context 
w ith in  w hich strategic  arm s control negotiations are 
conducted .264
This point is borne out by Joseph Kruzel, who stresses the problems 
engendered by overemphasising formal negotiations and in particular, 
form al agreem ents w hich a ttem pt to buy  security  w ith  the
264 John G. Behuncik, Congressional Fellow for National Security Affairs at the 
Heritage Foundation, quoted in Congressional Record proceedings and Debates of the 
95th Congress, US Senate, 2nd Session, Vol. 124, Part 20, August 17,1978, p.26691.
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establishm ent of precise and formal limitations on military hardware, 
in his terms:
arms control may have been im peded by too mechanistic a
view of the process265
which he sees as "an effort to give coherence and structure to an 
interstate relationship that involves the risk of war."266
This is borne out in the m ilitary posture docum ents267 in which 
capability is closely linked with assumptions about intention and about 
a binary world order. Examples of this can be found in the US Military 
Posture docum ent for FY 1978 in which the Chairm an of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, General George S. Brown refers in his introduction to 
"the continuing challenges to our national security." He refers to these 
as having been "brought about by the increasing capability of the Soviet 
Union and other nations to project their national power and influence 
and the growing dependency of the United States on the rest of the 
world." Here, intention, equated with the ability to project 'national 
power' articulated as military force, portrayed in the report in terms of 
a direct comparison of w eapon system for weapon system, is one 
indication of a perception of the Soviet Union as monolithic. In 
another sense this docum ent further dem onstrates the US m ilitary 
tendency towards 'm irror imaging' of force posture. That is, to match
26  ^Joseph Kruzel "From Rush-Bagot to START: The Lessons of Arms Control" in C.W. 
Kegley and E.R. Wittkopf The Global Agenda: Issues and Perspectives 2nd Ed. New  
York: Random House 1988 p.148
266 Ibid.
267 See for example US House of Representatives. Committee on Armed Services. Full 
Committee Consideration of Overall National Security Programs and Related Budget 
Requirements 94th Congress, December 1975. p.131 Statement of John T. Hughes.
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the Soviets on a system by system basis with little demonstrated regard
for the different foreign policy goals of the two named powers. Such a
view is reflected in the Statement of John T. Hughes to the House
Committee on Armed Services (December 1975)and many others. This
stands in contrast with the more sophisticated declaratory position of
the US as articulated by Amos A. Jordan, Principal Assistant Secretary
of Defence, International Security Affairs, D epartm ent of Defence
during the same hearings. As he put it:
We are talking about an art, not a science. We are talking 
about a relationship that has m any d im ensions... Any 
statem ent about American military policy, is to some degree 
a statem ent about the role the United States will play in 
w orld affairs. This is true not only in the sense that the 
policies unsupported by means court failure; but also in the 
sense that other states will condition their actions and 
policies upon their anticipation of US actions, anticipations 
which, in turn, reflect their estimates of the ability of the US 
to act.268
This is double-edged insofar as there is a perception of the US role in 
w orld affairs, such that either action or inaction will send signals 
(construe signs) that are the subject of interpretation at the interstate 
and intra-state levels - and therefore any policies which affect defence 
spending in quantity or direction will to some degree alter:
a) the US position in the world,
b) the US’ need to occupy that position and
c) its relation to other states.
As Amos Jordan noted:
268 See for example US House of Representatives. Committee on Armed Services. Full 
Committee Consideration of Overall National Security Programs and Related Budget 
Requirements 94th Congress, December 1975. p.140 Statement of Amos A. Jordan.
program  decisions which affect our m ilitary capabilities 
determ ine not only our ability to influence events, but to 
some degree the need to do so as well.269
Given that these program  decisions are based upon perceptions and 
assumptions regarding the foreign policy objectives of [principally! the 
Soviet Union, these decisions, which in themselves are discursively 
based, become, in turn, constitutive of the world as seen by the US 
m ilitary administrators. This is a world in which the Soviet Union is 
seen as "clearly the focus of our national security concerns" by posing 
the "primary military political and economic challenge" against which 
the US m ust "protect US interests" while seeking to "lessen the danger 
of w ar ."270
The mirror-imaging of the US-SU dyad can be illustrated by the note of 
emphasis implicit in the statement that:
"It is ev iden t th a t the Soviet leadersh ip  sees no 
inconsis tency  betw een  calling  for a re lax a tio n  of 
in ternational tensions and sim ultaneously increasing its 
m ilitary capabilities. In fact Moscow appears to view its 
increased m ilitary capabilities as the foundation of such a 
policy ."271
The tone of surprise indicated by selecting as a 'm arked option' the 
phrase: "sees no inconsistency" [as though they should in the US' 
view] and through the emphasis created by the use of "in fact" and 
"appears to view its increased capabilities as the foundation of such a
269 Ibid.
270 Ibid, p.144.
271 General George S. Brown, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff United States 
Military Posture for FY 1978 Washington:US Congress January 1977 p.121.
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policy" [as though logically it should not! bears interesting comparison
with the US perception of itself as indicated in the statement:
Our policy is a two-track policy, which seeks to relax tensions, 
largely through the m edium  of arms control; while at the 
same time that we pursue a policy of preparedness in an 
effort to buttress the policy of detente and to hedge against 
the failure, [emphasis mine].272
by which the US statement of its own policy appears to differ only in its 
presentation through an apparently 'neutral' language which treats as 
positive its "two-track policy" [as against Soviet 'inconsistency'] and its 
euphem istic "preparedness," "buttress," and "hedge against failure" as 
thin substitutes for increased m ilitary capabilities. It is hard to see 
where the one set of behaviours differs in any significant way from the 
other.
There is a difference, however, and that is a difference in the use of 
language which highlights sim ilar behaviours as articulations of 
difference. W hat is 'neutral' for 'us' is a m arked option for 'them'. 
This is an instance of boundary-m aking practices that m ark off self 
from other and in the process adds to the other boundary making 
processes that go together to construe and delimit identity. In this case 
it marks off the identity of the US security state from that of the Soviet 
U nion.
Despite James Schlesinger's 197 5 273 reservations, it should be kept in 
m ind that of the eight compliance issues raised by the US in 1978 (see
272 Ibid, p.97
273 Testimony of James Schlesinger 94th Congress, 2nd session 1975 p.16 in the course of 
which, Senator McIntyre asked: "What is your assessment of the effectiveness of the 
Standing Consultative Commission in resolving ambiguities associated with Soviet
Table 3.4), not one was considered, by the US delegation to the SALT 
SCC, to be an unequivocal violation of the SALT Agreements.
To correlate better, events in the SCC with w ider aspects of Carter's 
foreign policymaking, it may be useful to divide the period in question 
into four sections roughly correlated with the four years of the Carter 
presidency. Before doing that, however, an interesting general point 
may be gleaned from looking at the period in question in terms of the 
agreements produced through the SCC in relation to other periods.
In the seven years between 1969, when the idea of the SCC was first put 
forward and 1976, four agreements were produced. During the period 
from 1977-1980 inclusive, three agreem ents were produced - a rate 
nearly double that of the previous seven years. From 1980-1985 no 
agreem ents were produced, w ith tw o form al agreem ents finally 
achieved in June 1985. While this may be a small point, it serves to 
illustrate the usefulness of exam ining the SCC as a barom eter of 
political change and at the same time, it underlines the political nature 
of the arms control process.
Carter came to power in January 1977, inheriting a SALT I agreement 
and ongoing negotiations for SALT II, which were, in the words of 
Melvin Laird "90 percent complete."274 During his four years in office 
he turned around the steady decline in defence spending, m ounting an 
average three percent increase in real dollar terms each year that he 
was in office. M oreover he m oved resources into non-nuclear
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non-compliance with SALT agreements?" Secretary Schlesinger replied "As of this 
moment, Senator McIntyre, we just must withhold judgement."
274 Melvin Laird "A Strong Start in a Difficult Decade: Defence Policy in the Nixon- 
Ford Years." International Security. Vol.10, No.2, Fall 1985, pp.5-26, at p.5.
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m odernisation program s, the MX was given a 'survivable' basing 
mode, new Trident submarines were built, nuclear response doctrine 
was m odernised (Countervailing Strategy ), new emphasis was placed 
on arms control through SALT II, he encouraged NATO to develop a 
new Long Term Defence Plan, he upgraded the Long Range Theatre 
Nuclear Forces and he countered the Soviet development of the SS— 
20 in 1979 with the decision to deploy 572 Pershing II and Ground- 
Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCMs) in concert with arms control talks 
on the possibilities for limiting these weapons.275
W hile em phasising  conventional forces in the C arter defence 
appropriations, the Carter adm inistration set about reversing the 
generally dow nw ard trend in US defence expenditure precipitated by 
the end of the Vietnam War. This was in full recognition of the scale 
of the Soviet defence buildup:
there is no evidence from past h istory that unilateral 
reductions in our posture will produce Soviet reciprocity. An 
im portant function of our various arms control negotiations 
is precisely to achieve equitable and verifiable m utual 
reductions w ithout undue risk. ...The steady real increase in 
the size of the Soviet defence program  since the early 1960s, 
and the concurrent decline in real US baseline outlays 
(defined as outlays which exclude the incremental costs of 
war in Southeast Asia), mean that we have a certain amount 
of catching up to do.276
All of which tends to run counter to the charges of 'failure' in 
m ilitary /strategic  terms of "maintaining prospects for peace, and in
275 Komer, Robert W. "What 'Decade of Neg\ect?"'International Security Vol.10, 
No.2, 1985. 
pp. 70-83. p.74
27  ^ US Senate. Armed Services Committee. Department of Defense Authorization for 
Appropriations FY1979 95th Congress, 2nd Session on S-2571, Part 1 - Authorization 
Posture Statement. Washington: US GPO Feb.7,1978 p.43
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maintaining Western ascendancy in the overall balance of power."277 
Carter's failure in this respect, if one needed to be found, was not in the 
reality of the force posture, but in the image with which he 
campaigned prior to his presidency, of lowering military expenditure 
by restructuring the military force posture to take account of threat 
assessments that suggested a new emphasis on conventional forces.278
The Reaganaut critique of Carter rested largely on quantitative analyses 
of strategic nuclear forces alone, rather than looking at the overall force 
posture. This will be analysed in subsequent chapters.
✓  —  ' ^
Figure 3.4 Comparison of US Defence Outlays 
and Estimated Dollar Cost of 
Soviet Defence Programs
M illions o f  FY 1 9 7 0  D ollars
USSR,
Excluding'***««»» 
Sea Increm ent
1960 62 64 66 68 70 72 74 76
277 Bell, Coral. 1980. President Carter and Foreign Policy: The Costs of Virtue? 
Canberra Studies in World Affairs. Canberra: The Australian National 
University.p.l.
278 Other types of foreign policy 'failure' can, however be located in perceptions of 
Soviet adventurism in the Horn of Africa, in the loss of intelligence facilities in Iran , 
the Iran hostage crisis, and in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The point I make 
here is analytically restricted to military force structure as this has the most direct 
bearing on the issue of SALT, and US-SU compliance behaviours.
3.6 The Importance of Being Fuzzy: The Politics of Treaty Language
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Sydney Graybeal, discussing the treaty language of SALT, considers the 
question of precision. He points out that while it is essential to have 
clear and m utually agreed definitions of treaty limited items in order 
to m ain ta in  the v iab ility  of an ag reem en t and  to avoid  
misunderstandings, he warns of the problems of being too specific.
Firstly, he suggests that too much specificity can "invite the other side 
to design around the limitations"279 pointing out that by leaving some 
of the language general then greater flexibility is perm itted  in 
challenging the activities of the other side. He cites the phrases: "not to 
test in an ABM mode" and "deliberate concealment measures" which 
im pede verification by national technical means as examples. In the 
latter case, with respect to the telemetry question, the phrase; not only 
allowed flexibility in challenge, bu t was im portant in relation to the 
protection of sources and methods of verification.
Secondly, and this arises from the aspect of the protection of sources 
and m ethods of verification, general language allows the arms control 
process to cope with technological innovation, both with respect to the 
question of 'designing around' treaty limitations, but also with respect 
to improvements in verification technologies. Over-specificity of treaty 
items invokes the problem of 'observable difference'. Knowing what is 
observable can reveal much about the m ethods of data collection, and 
again invite the o ther to design around  such technologies of 
observation.
279 Graybeal in Buchheim Brießng on SALT I Compliance 1979/14
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Graybeal goes on to point out that such deliberate 'vagueness' leaves 
the U.S. "in a better position to challenge future Soviet actions of 
concern" than if they had "tried to get a very specific definition of 
’deliberate concealment m easures' or to determ ine precisely what 
telemetry data or channels are necessary for monitoring the agreement 
and m ust not be denied the other side ."280
His point is that the element of indeterminacy surrounding the ability 
to determine compliance raises the risk/cost of being caught if cheating 
should be contemplated. In this sense, Graybeal argues that uncertainty 
of the precision of the monitoring technologies is itself a deterrent to 
cheating.
Mark Lowenthal and Joel Wit underline this, pointing out that when 
the U.S. presents a case to the Soviets at the SCC it is always "very 
careful about the evidence it presents, always trying to preserve 
intelligence sources and methods so as to keep the Soviets uncertain 
about w hat we know and w hat we do not know and how the 
information was obtained ."281
This illustrates the point that Foucault makes regarding the operation 
of power, namely that it is 'tolerable only on condition that it mask a 
substantial part of itself. Its success is proportional to its ability to hide 
its own m echanism s . '282 It is, in part, the doubt about the extent and
280 ib id  p.14.
281 Mark Lowenthal and Joel Wit "The Politics of Verification" in W.C. 
P otter(ed )V e r if ic a tio n  and  A rm s C o n tro l Lexington Mass.:Lexington Books 
1985/pp.l53-186 at p.185.
282 Michel Foucault H istory  of Sexuality: A n  Introduction  Harmondsworth: Penguin 
Books 1985/86
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precision of verification technologies that, arguably, contributes to the 
operation of such technologies as a deterrent to large-scale cheating, 
along w ith a reluctance on both sides to precipitate a wholesale 
breakout and consequent costly arms race. Ironically perhaps, the doubt 
over the precision of verification technologies is itself made possible 
by the v irtual im possibility of total accuracy in the verification 
technologies themselves and in the technical and discursive means by 
which the technical evidence is interpreted.
SIPRI further supports this view, referring to the requirem ent for
confidentiality with respect to national technical means of verification
and their efficiency, accuracy, resolution and so on:
The theory behind this requirem ent is that the prospective 
violator, being verified by unknow n m eans, is likely to 
ascribe to those means capabilities greater than they possess, 
and is thus deterred to a greater extent from violating the 
agreem ent.283
3.7 Verification Technologies, Compliance and Power: Disciplining the 
Boundaries
The game of 'Hiders and Finders' is a game of power played out at the 
level of verification technologies betw een bilateral or m ultilateral 
parties to arms control agreements. It is a game, this section argues, 
that along with other defence and security practices, is coterminous 
w ith structures of political identity , form ing one of the m yriad 
practices by which a state polices its boundaries and underscores the 
political costs of cheating in such a way as to deter the 'Other' power 
from circumventing the terms of an arms control agreement. Insofar
283 SIPRI Strategic Disarmament Verification and National Security London: Taylor 
& Francis Ltd., 1977/29
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as this entails the ability of one state to influence another, positively, 
verification technologies can be conceived in term s of power. 
Moreover, insofar as they operate through the ability of that state to 
'know' the other, verification technologies can be analysed in terms of 
w hat Michel Foucault calls 'pow er/know ledge .' This section is 
therefore not so much an exploration or survey of the technologies of 
verification, nor is it about pow er per se but rather it is about the 
equiprim ordiality of verification technologies and the forms of power 
which they invoke and which invoke them.
The im petus for the development of these technologies rests with the 
dual nature of the arms control process, that is, to reduce the 
danger/cost of war and to maintain stability. As Brodie pointed out in 
his now famous statement: "Thus far the chief purpose of our military 
establishment has been to win wars. From now its chief purpose must 
be to avert them ."284 With this classic reversal of the Clausewitzian 
form ula of w ar conceived as an instrum ent of policy ,285 nuclear 
weapons have become a symbol for the emergence of the Postmodern 
w o rld .286 This has been brought about, partly through the nuclear 
problem atisation of the traditional exercise of pow er, and partly 
through the 'calling into being' of new regimes of articulating political 
b oundaries tha t have involved , in p a rt the developm ent of 
unchallengable means of transgressing political boundaries through 
the instrum ents of photoreconnaissance satellite technology and
284 Brodie, Bernard. The Absolute Weapon. New York: Harcourt & Brace, 1946. p.76
285 Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. Penguin Classics. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. 
1987.
28  ^ See Dillon, G.M. "Modernity, Discourse and Deterrence." Current Issues in Peace 
Research. Ed. Perth Joenniemi. Tampere: Tampere Peace Research Institute, 1989.
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signals intelligence (SIGINT). It has also been predicated upon the 
constitution of new forms and regimes of knowledge through the 
estab lishm en t of corps of analysts invoking an expertise  in 
photointerpretation. With the advent of what has been described as the 
'epistem ic transform ation '287 of the face of m odern political identity, 
the m eaning of power itself has become radically problem atised. In 
deconstructing power as classically defined, it m ight be useful to step 
back to a re-examination of the teleological orientation of power. That 
is, to examine pow er conceived as the power to enact boundaries, 
power as sets of practices arraigned within and policing the boundaries 
of forms of knowledge, forms of life. At which point, power becomes 
coterminous with knowledge.
With the developm ent of increasingly sophisticated national technical
means of verification (NTMs), since the early 1960s, such an analysis of
power m ight usefully serve to raise the question of the operation of
verification articulated as a form of deterrence. The question of whence
comes the pow er to deter treaty violations, rem ains problem atic.
Foucault frames the connection between power and knowledge on the
grounds that they are mutually constitutive:
Power produces knowledge (and not simply by encouraging 
it because it serves power or by applying it because it is 
useful); that pow er and know ledge directly im ply one 
another; that there is no pow er relation  w ithou t the 
correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any 
knowledge that does not pre-suppose and constitute at the 
same time power relations288
287 See Dillon, G.M. & B. Klein Back to the Future: Rearticulating the N A T O  Alliance 
of Security and Identity. Washington: International Studies Association, 1990.
288 Foucault -.Discipline and Punish Harmondsworth:Penguin Books 1977.p.27
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Verification technologies, by pin-pointing the Other within a field of 
observation, establish a field of knowledge about the activities of the 
O ther .289 With a history of repeated observations then deviations from 
established 'norms' of behaviour can be readily registered and thereby 
brought to account. The targeting of these observations upon activities 
tha t are functionally  related  to com pliance w ith arm s control 
agreem ents presupposes both a pre-constituted field of knowledge 
established by those precursor activities that established the arms 
control treaty regime in the first instance, and the forms of normative 
power that led to these agreements and which maintain them.
3.72 Disciplinary Power and Verification Technologies
To discuss the technologies of arms control verification articulated as a 
form of power, it is useful to look at verification under the rubric of 
'd iscip linary  pow er'. Foucault isolates three forms of disciplinary 
power, each interrelated as we shall see. These are :
i) hierarchical observation,
ii) normalising judgement, and
iii) examination
3.721 hierarchical observation
This signifies the connection between visibility and power, such that 
not only does an apparatus designed for observation induce effects of 
power, bu t also that a means of coercion290 makes those subject to it
289 That is to say, verification technologies and institutions are designed to collect 
specific kinds of data toward a specific end (to catch Treaty violators and to ensure 
compliance). Thus, coupled with the institutions of verifications they constitute a 
source and a domain of knowledge.
29  ^Coercion is not an abstract term - it is about coercion of someone. Thus technologies of 
coercion imply at least the potential to identify the one to be coerced. Insofar as the
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potentially visible. In this, the Other is constituted by the means to 
isolate and identify, and, further, the operation of deterrence depends 
upon m aking visible that 'O ther' so construed. Thus, a politics 
conceived as the pow er to coerce is also a politics of identity and 
identity formation.
Foucault takes the example of a military camp as an illustrative model 
articulated through the operation of a principle of 'general visibility.'291 
Such an observational regime can be seen to have organised and 
arranged space to facilitate observation of those w ithin, and by 
rendering people visible, it in turn made it possible to know them and 
to m ould them. As Richard Barnett noted in 1981: "The US-Soviet 
rivalry will continue. The identity of each system depends too much 
upon its opposition to the other to perm it anything m ore than 
an tag o n is tic  co llabora tion  betw een  the su p erp o w ers."292 The 
technologies for making-visible the Other, are best characterised by the 
surveillance technologies used in National Technical Means (NTMs) 
of verification in which we can note some parallels with, for example, 
the operational limitations of sweep-areas of surveillance satellites:
very existence of technologies of verification can deter cheating (by raising the risk of 
being caught) then one state is exerting power over another.
291 Ibid.
292 Barnet, Richard J. Real Security: Restoring American Power in a Dangerous Decade. 
New York: Simon and Schuster, 1981. p.107
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The Am erican KH-11 im aging satellite, for exam ple, can gain its 
highest resolution photographs with a sweep w idth of only some 1-3 
Kms on a 'close-look' mission. Such trade-offs are catered for by using a 
wide variety of imaging methods spread over a range of platforms.
U.S. and Soviet photographic reconnaissance satellites, orbiting at 
altitudes of between 200 and 500Kms are equipped with wide-angle 
cameras for area survey work, whilst close-look cameras are designed 
for detailed inspection of features of interest. Typically, these have been 
locii of m ilitary significance. These 'close-look' satellites have been 
estimated to obtain resolutions in the order of 10-15cms on the ground 
under favourable conditions.293 These however, relying on visible 
light, have been typically unable to penetrate fog, haze, smoke, cloud or
293 Source: Assembly of Western European Union, Document 1160, "Scientific and 
technical aspects of arms control verification by satellite - reply to the thirty-third 
annual report of the council" 7th November 1988, p.9 quoted in "Verification in 
Conventional Arms Control" by Volker Kunzendorff Adelphi Papers 245 Winter 1989 
p.53
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rain. Given Europe's weather, the limitations of this system become 
obvious.
To offset these difficulties, other technologies have been developed 
and deployed, including Thermal imaging sensors (better penetration 
but at the expense of much lower resolution in the order of 10-15 
metres) and Synthetic A perture Radar (SAR) satellites which are 
reported to
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achieve "probably" 1.5-3 m etres resolution294 (with the potential for 
achieving resolutions of around 1 m etre295 sometime in the next 
decade). A lthough both the U.S. and Soviet photoreconnaissance 
satellites are manoeuvrable, two further difficulties confront the so- 
called close-look satellites. The first, now largely overcome through 
electro-photographic technologies, was the time-lag between obtaining 
photographs and their secure delivery (the choice was either to wait for 
satellite re-entry or to have the films ejected in re-entry capsules, 
representing a delay of several days, down to several hours depending 
on the option taken, a third option, used on the U.S. KH-11 satellite 
and since, was to use electrophotographic techniques to produce high 
quality video pictures which could be transm itted directly to ground 
stations. With the advent of the U.S. KH-11 satellite, the use of CCDs 
[Charge-Coupled Device] give high quality im aging in real-tim e 
(w ith o u t sh u tte rs ) w hich , w hen used  in con junction  w ith  
photom ultipliers can use low-intensity light for night use, (and with 
different scanners can also 'see' in invisible wave bands); and the short 
life-span of low-orbit close-look satellites (by effectively skimming the 
highest levels of the atm osphere, the rate of orbital decay is rapid - 
around 8-14 days unless m anoeuvered to a higher orbit). A further 
point to make is that any non-geosynchronous satellite will only pass 
over a given object periodically. The paths of such satellites are easily 
tracked and therefore the length of time betw een observations is 
predictable (with the potential for evasive concealment of treaty- 
lim ited items [TLI]). To counter this, since 1981, at least two KH 11
294 Ibid, p.53
295 A. Krass Verification: How Much is Enough? Lexington/ SIPRI, 1985, p.46
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satellites have been in orbit at any given time296. This would mean that 
the frequency of observation of any given area is increased - with one 
satellite  the in terval betw een observations is approxim ately  92 
minutes, whereas with two or more satellites, this frequency would be 
increased depending on the relative positions of the orbital planes. A 
further consideration is that, with spaced orbits, more of the Earth's 
surface is covered at the same time.297 To supplem ent these systems, 
an d  to p ro v id e  c o n tin u o u s , lo w -re so lu tio n  su rv e illan c e , 
geosynchronous satellites (such as the U.S. 'Rhyolite') are able to detect 
the nuclear 'flash' produced by tests, but their prim ary role lies in 
intercepting telemetry, from missile tests.
The technology of course is only one side of the material ability to look 
at and to define the other. The data from these satellites - the images 
themselves, operating at the very limits of the technically visible - is 
itself not unam biguous. The data requires in terpretation  as the 
satellites themselves represent mere extensions to hum an sight, and 
hum an intelligence is required to make sense of and provide meaning 
for the contents of the images. This brings us into another domain of 
policy, one that feeds into the SCC in term s of the provision of 
evidence for non-compliance activities.298
296 From 1981 there seems to have been a pattern of KHlls being orbitted in pairs with 
a spacing of 46°-49*. Sipri suggests that no such relationship appears to operate 
between K H lls and Big Bird satellites, the former operated by the CIA while the 
latter are operated by the US Air Force.
297 Source: Jasani, Bhupendra. "Military Use of Outer Space." The Arms Race and 
Arms Control: Facts and Figures on the Arms Race and Arms Control Efforts. Ed. SIPRI. 
London: Taylor and Francis Ltd, 1982. 97-115. pp.100-101.
298 Krass, Allan E. Verification: How Much is Enough? Lexington, Mass.: Lexington 
Books, 1985.p.l3.
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Tied into the technical apparatus (itself the product of a finance and 
resource economy within an international political economy) is an 
economy of discourse, the product of specialised knowledges, which 
forms a context and a methodology in and with which the satellite 
images can be interpreted.
This ability to 'see' and 'hear' the Other illustrates well the capacity for 
the sort of disciplinary power available in the process of 'objectifying' 
the other. The Soviets, of course, have their comparable systems of 
space-based photoreconnaissance satellites. Since the Soviets' first and 
second-generation photoreconnaissance satellites were launched in 
1962-3, based on the Vostok and Soyuz launch platform s, Soviet 
satellite technology has developed rapidly. Joined by a third generation 
in 1968, (non-m anoeuverable) low -resolution satellites continued 
regular operations until 1985.
M edium resolution satellites, characterised by the regularity of their 
m anoeuvres, typically conduct fourteen-day missions during which 
time they obtain complete global coverage, before the satellite is 
recovered. Fourth-generation close-look and area survey satellites 
began operations in 1975 and 1981 respectively. The first long-life fifth- 
generation satellite was launched tow ards the end of 1982. W hilst 
fourth-generation satellites offer lim ited-term  m issions, extended 
duration satellites, powered by solar panels, possibly transm it their 
information digitally, relayed by geosynchronous data relay satellites.
This ability to 'see' and 'hear' the other constitutes a realm  of 
knowledge deployed as a form of power. Insofar as such technologies 
have been deployed to verify particu lar types of arm s control 
agreement (ABM Treaty, for example), and insofar as the deployment
of these technologies (regimes of the ’gaze') represent a deterrent to the 
breaking of arms control agreements, such deployment can be seen as 
an articulation of disciplinary power.
3.73 The Role of the Intelligence Community299
To m aintain these structures of 'other-ness definition' requires a series 
of supports or relays which take the form of a hierarchy of continuous 
and functional surveillance (which, in the case of photoreconnaissance 
satellites has potentially been available since 1977).
Potentially. As Florini300 points out, no amount of satellite imaging can 
be completely sufficient. To be useful, collateral information is needed 
from the ground to target the imaging systems and to interpret the data 
once received . The C om m and, con tro l, com m unication  and 
in form ation  (C3I) hierarchy w ould seem to support this function 
particu la rly  well, a lthough , for som e specific purposes, other 
organisations involved in the verification of specific agreements, such 
as the IAEA Safeguards Committee, can be seen to occupy the same 
discursive position. Such specialised agencies can be useful for certain 
types of Agreement, as their infrastructure is suited to the particular 
dem ands of their brief. Another reason for the lim ited utility of
299 jhjg section shows that the intelligence community mediates the data on which 
verification of compliance is based. The section shows that despite the technology the 
data is often ambiguous and requires enhancement and interpretation within a 
community of people (who are themselves selected and trained through specific 
interpretive screens). Their product for the SCC is the information on which the SCC 
relies for judgement about whether to raise issues, and in what manner. For this reason 
it is relevant to the thesis. It is also an aspect of the 'gaze' - the generation of fields of 
knowledge that constitute the behaviour of the Other as a 'case.'
300 See Florini, Ann M. "The Opening Skies: Third Party Imaging Satellites and US 
National Security." Back to the Future: Lessons From Experience for Regional Arms 
Control Verißcation. Ed. Brian Mandell. Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1989.
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satellite imaging alone lies in the sheer quantity of data generated by 
these system s, that "would sim ply overw helm  the processing and 
interpretive capabilities of their operators." 301.
Given the extent to which the SCC's ability to raise issues is 
intertextually dependant upon the evidential information provided by 
the intelligence community it is worthwhile to take a short excursus 
into the ways in which the intelligence analysts themselves are trained 
within their specific field of knowledge, or regime of truth.
The constitu tion  of a dom ain of su rve illance /m on ito ring  as a 
disciplinary practice is particularly relevant to the function of the SCC 
insofar as it calls upon and invokes the institutionalising of new forms 
of knowledge, expertise, and interpretive challenges. I shall examine 
therefore some of the m odes and practices w ithin which such 
knowledges are produced and contextualised.
The evidence used by the SCC is prim arily that of photointelligence 
(PHOTINT) and electronic signals intelligence (ELINT) the latter 
relating to the acquisition of telemetry data on the testing of missiles. 
By examining the organisational and training processes of the photo­
interpreters one can understand in part how their analyses become 
constituted as a form of knowledge that in turn becomes a basis for 
compliance challenge within the SCC.
There are two aspects to this: the structure and organisation of the 
institu tions in w hich intelligence analysis takes place and the 
interpretive practices themselves. Both are of course, interrelated, but
301 Ann Florini in Mandell Op Cit. 1989. p.175
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for the purposes of analysis it is useful to separate these out in order to 
specify better, the relationship betw een the in terpretive practices 
themselves and the dissem ination of the products of these practices 
into the wider discursive economy of the arms control community as a 
subset of the security state. Moreover, by specifying the relationship 
betw een the interpretive practices and the dissem ination of their 
products, it becomes possible to specify the role of the supporting 
institutions which form the context in which the SCC can operate as a 
space for the playing out of the contestation of political identity. It 
forms, in other words, a boundary space in which the notion of 
boundary is itself contested and negotiated as an aspect of the relations 
between states (in this case the US and the Soviet Union).
Photointerpretation
P hoto -in te rp rete rs are trained  to m ake assum ptions based on 
association and orders of probability. Their data is based on repetition 
and accum ulation, that is, it is based on frequent and routine 
observation of the routine practices of the one under observation. As a 
result, photo-interpreters become skilled at observing and interpreting 
changes in routine .302 The not unreasonable assum ption behind this is 
that com m and organisations - especially the m ilitary - base their 
operations on routine practices and procedures. To do otherwise would 
lead to inefficiency. On that basis, if the routines are known then these 
can be used by the analyst to make assumptions about the intentions of 
the observed. Moreover, if the styles of routine are known and these
302 Burrows, William. Deep Black: The Secrets of Space Espionage. London: Bantam 
Books, 1988. p.113.
are noted in non-routine places then the photo-interpreter makes 
assumptions about what is occurring in the new location.
The analysis itself involves the process of locating, recognising, 
identifying, and describing objects, activities, and terrain represented 
on images. The quality of the product of imagery analysis, imagery 
intelligence, is subject to a num ber of variables, including: sensor 
coverage, the availability and quality of image enhancement facilities, 
the time available and the abilities of the analyst.303 Photo-interpreters 
are guided in their 'reading' or identification of images by 'the five S's': 
"size, shape, shadow, shade, and surrounding objects."304 Thus objects 
are located in terms of their placement within the environm ent and 
the repetition of general forms establishes recognisable patterns .305
PHOTINT is supported and deployed by and through a bureaucratic 
and institutional process. This process is sometimes referred to as the 
'intelligence cycle.' Briefly, this cycle of activities represents an 
information flow-chart that may be entered at several points.
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303 Hopple, G. & B. Watson, ed. The Military Intelligence Community. Boulder and 
London: Westview Press, 1986. p.83
304 Ibid.
305 Ibid
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(£> • Identification of Requirements
O
• Tasking
o
• Collection
o
• Analysis
o
• Production
o
• Dissemination
o
^  • Decision/New Requirements
Although clearly an oversimplification it serves to illustrate the kinds 
of stages through which intelligence (and such verification monitoring 
as is conducted by the intelligence community) passes. The length and 
sequence of the cycle varies, but there are fairly clearly defined points at 
which there is an interface between the intelligence community and 
the policymakers who rely on the information. Within this cycle there 
may be many sub-routines at each step before the 'product' is passed on 
to the next segment of the cycle. Arthur Hulnick306 is quick to point out 
that, while some parts of the process do work sequentially, others are 
more or less autonomous and therefore "the process might be best 
understood as a matrix of interconnected parts, rather than a simple 
sequence of connected functions."307 Such gilding of the lily should
Hulnick, Arthur S. "Relations Between Intelligence Producers and Policy 
Consumers: A New Way of Looking at an Old Problem." Intelligence and Intelligence 
Policy in a Democratic Society. Ed. Stephen J. Cimbala. Dobbs Ferry, New York: 
Transnational Publishers Inc, 1987. p.l35ff.
307 Ibid, p.136
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not, however, be allowed to cloud the point that these tasks, however 
schematised, are widely accepted as the principal parts of the traditional 
view of the intelligence process or cycle.
In the context of arms control verification, these processes are reflected 
in the processes used to determine compliance or non-compliance, (or 
more precisely the degree of compliance). With the signing of an arms 
control agreement, the 'initialising function' has commenced, in that, 
since the SALT I agreements, the verification requirements have been, 
in broad term s, defined. The 'tasking function' is two-fold, that of 
continuous low intensity m onitoring, and that of specific, short-term 
confirmatory missions, based either upon anomalies revealed by area- 
sweep surveillance that requires closer inspection, or from collateral 
information that suggests the occurrence of non-compliant behaviour, 
that requires closer inspection. Thus the practical distinctions between 
the intelligence gathering processes and the verification process are 
often interconnected.
Krass points out that the monitoring process itself often begins with 
the gathering of data, or 'collection function' involving activities as 
general as reading the scientific journals of the 'other' country and as 
specific as photographing specific m ilitary installations by satellite. 
Collection, too, then is bifurcated into the more or less distinct 
processes of surveillance and reconnaissance. Krass defines these 
activities in these terms:
Surveillance is the systematic observation of some place or 
activity on a continuous or periodical basis.... In contrast, 
reconnaissance is carried out in the form of missions or ad 
hoc activities, generally aimed at a specific objective which 
has for some reason attracted attention. For example high- 
resolution photographic satellites only take pictures when 
ordered or program m ed to do so from the ground. The areas
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photographed are chosen for their particular interest at a 
particular time.308
In the pre-interpretive stage the basic data is processed and assembled 
into an analysable form: photographic images are enhanced by a range 
of techniques to assist photo-interpreters, raw  data from infra-red 
sensors m ust be processed into digital data that computers can use to 
determ ine tem perature, speed, location and altitude of an infra-red 
'event' and so on. This sub-stage can take place as an aspect of the 
collection phase or the analysis phase, or more properly, during both, 
since com puter image enhancem ent can be perform ed in near real 
time by the photo-interpreter using a range of screening techniques.309
We have seen some of the work processes and assum ptions that 
underpin photo-interpretation. W hat remains to be added here is that 
th ro u g h o u t the 1980s developm ents in inform ation  processing 
technologies have taken some of the routine repetition/recognition 
work away from the hum an interpreter, allowing far greater quantities 
of information to be processed automatically, flagging variations from 
statistical norms.
Evaluation, or identification of events as to w hether or not they 
constitute a violation is the phase in which the overtly political 
assessments are made. Up to this point much of the work would have 
been perform ed by members of the intelligence community. At the 
eva luation  stage, the in telligence p ro d u c t is d is trib u ted  for 
consideration by the Intelligence Com m unity Steering Group on
308 Krass, A .Verification: How Much is Enough? Massachusetts: Lexington Books and 
SIPRI, 1985. p.8
309 See Krass, 1985 Chapter 2,
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M onitoring Strategie Arms Limitations. Here, information from other 
sources is brought to bear on a suspected violation, as a single source of 
information, even with considerable technical enhancem ent is rarely 
unam biguous.
SALT verification, as Robert F. Pfalzgraff Jr suggests, is, along with
definitions of what constitutes 'adequate verification':
... both a political and technical issue, as well as an 
intelligence problem... the degree of verifiability is a domestic 
political issue ... [and] to a certain extent, verification 
adequacy is subjective in nature.310
Verification and its political counterpart, compliance, is thus at the 
intersection of a range of discursive practices - the technical, the 
intelligence analysis comm unity and the security dim ension of the 
executive political community that institutionalises the 'security state'.
The In te llig en ce  C o m m u n ity 's311 m on ito ring  in fo rm ation  is 
considered by the office of the Executive Secretary/D eputy Executive 
Secretary (see Fig. 2.1 in Chapter II) along w ith inputs from the 
Organisation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the SCC W orking Group of the 
National Security Council Special Coordinating Committee, the Office 
of the Secretary of Defence, the US Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency and the Department of State. But the end-point of this process,
310 Pfaltzgraff, Robert L. "Intelligence, Deception and Surprise: Implications for 
United States Policy in the 1980s." Intelligence Policy and National Security. Ed. 
Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr, Uri Ra'anan and Warren Milberg. Hamden Connecticut: 
Archon Books, 1981. 297-315.p.309.
311 For the debate on whether there is in fact an intelligence community see Thomas, 
Jack E. "The Intelligence Community." The Military Intelligence Community. Ed. 
Gerald W. Hopple and Bruce W. Watson. Boulder: Westview Press, 1986. 3-15. and 
Strong, J. Thompson. "The Defense Intelligence Community." The Military Intelligence 
Community. Ed. Gerald W. Hopple and Bruce W. Watson. Boulder: Westview Press, 
1986. 15-39.
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as Krass notes, is that, despite the best efforts at identification of a 
suspicious event, the result will be "some probability" that the event 
represents a violation .312 To complicate m atters further, the hum an 
factor in intelligence analysis has its part to play. Not the least of which 
is that, not only is the data often ambiguous to a greater or lesser extent 
(either through technical im perfections, or, m ore commonly, hard 
evidence of activity and no clear explanation as to the meaning of such 
activity), but such intelligence can be based upon preconceived notions 
(a product of rigourous and routine training) that may be reinforced by 
the analyst’s desire to please a superior. Perhaps more problematic is 
the tendency to present intelligence estim ates that run few risks of 
being w ro n g .313 Such a tendency provides the policym aker with 
estimates that are unhelpful as guides to clear policy formation, or in 
the case of arms control issues, no clear answer to the question 'have 
they been cheating?'
The form of pow er, thus realised, is neither a possession, nor a 
property, but rather, "has the character of a machine through which 
power is produced and individuals are distributed in a perm anent and 
continuous field." 314 The field in which is distributed the Other state, 
the other object of security, w ith its boundaries sim ilarly 'SPOT- 
lighted', involves the opening up to a whole regime of inspection the
312 Krass, A .Verification: How Much is Enough? Massachusetts: Lexington Books and 
SIPRI, 1985. p.9.
313 Pfaltzgraff, Robert L. "Intelligence, Deception and Surprise: Implications for 
United States Policy in the 1980s." Intelligence Policy and National Security. Ed. Uri 
Ra'anan and Warren Milberg Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr. Hamden Conn.: Archon Books, 
1981. 297-315. p.308.
314 Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punish. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1977.
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security artefacts of the other, by which its boundaries are policed with 
gestures of nuclear deterrent threat,315 so that the now-objectified 
subject may yield forth the symptoms of its growths - defined in terms 
of any attempt to break out of the treaty regime.
D iscursively, these m odalities of observation are inscribed and 
legitim ated through non-interference clauses reified in arms control 
treaties since the ABM Treaty (1972), where article XII states:
1. For the pu rpose  of p ro v id in g  assurance of 
compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party 
shall use national technical m eans of verification at its 
disposal in a m anner consistent w ith generally recognised 
principles of international law.
2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere w ith the 
national technical means of verification of the other Party 
operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.
3. Each Party undertakes not to use deliberate 
concealm ent measures w hich im pede verification by 
national technical means of compliance with the provisions 
of this Treaty. This obligation shall not require changes in 
current construction, assem bly, conversion, or overhaul 
practices.316
These non-in te rference  clauses rep re sen t the codify ing  and 
legitimating of national technical means (NTM) in law.
315 See K. Enderby "The Political Uses of Nuclear Threat" in Australian Outlook April 
1987, Vol. 41,#1 pp.22-29
316 W. Stützle, B. Jasani and R. Cowen Op Cit. 1987. p.208 [Emphasis mine]
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3.722 International Norms/normalising judgement 
For Foucault, the 'norm alising judgem ent' is the "infra-penalty" or 
"extra-legal penalty" exercised over a mass of behaviours which police 
the boundaries, or the liminal regions of the agreements. This form of 
disciplinary power was arguably exercised to extraordinary lengths 
during the Reagan era at the height of the second Cold War. This time 
w as regarded  by arm s control h isto rians317 as the period of the 
"compliance crisis." Norm alising judgem ent, as the second arm of 
disciplinary power, may be seen in essentially institutional terms, 
invoking the rhetoric of a 'society of states', the 'in ternational 
community of states', or 'common security'.
The punitive mechanism s of norm alising judgem ent; to be judged 
"not good in ternational citizens"; to be judged "not sharing the 
burden," or pulling one's weight, are expressions of the 'correctional 
aspects of disciplinary power.' The object, in this instance is to 'single 
out' instances of 'non-conformity' w ithin a norm ative structure, or 
system .318
The goal of these correctional aspects of disciplinary power is therefore, 
neither "expiation" nor "repression," bu t "norm alization ."319 W ithin 
regimes of verification, the disciplinary mode refers to m odalities of
317 See Manfred Efinger "The Verification Policy of the Soviet Union" in 
Aussenpolitik iv:1989. p.339
318 Invoking international norms Reagan made accusations outside of the legal arms 
control regime over behaviours that were at worst ambiguous and had not at the time 
been construed as violations. This period of 'beat up' was known by some as the 
'compliance crisis.'
319 Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punish. Penguin Books,.Harmondsworth. 
1977.p.l84
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"non observance." It is measured by the degree of departure from the 
rule. Thus, errors of omission become subject to disciplinary penance - 
increased surveillance, greater attention to records, closer monitoring 
of signals and so on through a whole range of diplomatic modalities. 
These regimes address themselves, not to larger concerns of concept or 
principle, but with the letter of the regulation. Krass320 sees this as 
characteristic of the "legalistic school" which sees all violations as 
im portant even if these are not seen to be militarily significant. The 
reasoning behind this view is political, since rigorous adherence to all 
the provisions of a treaty is "an im portant measure of the goodwill and 
trustw orth iness of the Parties ."321 The norm alising judgem ent is 
addressed to matters of procedure - the methods of counting, the types 
of seals or tags, the notificatory procedures for testing, or time limits 
during  on-site inspections. U nder the INF inspection regim e, for 
example, the Treaty specifies that "an inspector's movement will be at 
the discretion of, and under the escort of the inspected parties.” This 
means that the inspectors are escorted at all times, such that billeting, 
transportation, inspection activities, meals and leisure time is closely 
s u p e r v is e d .322 In other w ords, for a state to open its borders to 
disciplinary boundary penetration, that state may set up a special 
bo u n d ary , su rveilling  the surveillors. The sta te  is subject to 
institutional gaze, whilst retaining a token pow er of subjecting the
320 See Krass, A. Verification: How Much is Enough? Massachussetts: Lexington Books 
and SIPRI, 1985.p.l43
321 Ibid.
322 "Insights of an On-Site Inspector" Arms Control Today November 1988/6
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individually sanctioned medium of the gaze (the inspection team) to 
the institutional gaze of the state.
The discourses of policy are characterised by multiplicity, complexity
and uncertainty. The authoritative ordering of these forms of life, the
policing of the boundaries of 'acceptable' international behaviour has
been the principle of political life. The establishm ent of the Normal
thus remains a "principle of coercion ."323 By mobilising a constitutive
discourse of political community in the international realm, through
im puting mem bership to the 'community of nations' the disciplinary
gaze also sets up tables of rank and hierarchy: constituting a field of
knowledge, and situating states within that field. The Euro-centricity of
this normalising field of relations is well recognised in articulations of
"Core-Periphery" status, or "third-W orld" status. M oreover, this is
clear, too, in the field of US - Soviet relations, with respect to their
strategic 'superpower' status. In this sense then:
...the power of normalisation imposes homogeneity; but it 
individualises by m aking it possible to m easure gaps, to 
determ ine levels to fix specialities and to render the 
differences useful by fitting them one to another. It is easy to 
understand how the power of the norm  functions within a 
system of formal equality, since within a homogeneity that is 
the rule, the norm introduces as a useful imperative and as a 
resu lt of m easurem ent, all the shad ing  of ind iv idual 
differences.324
Thus the discursive equality of states under international law allows 
distinctions to remain and gaps to be m easured, not only in terms of 
struc tu ra l economic im balances, b u t also in term s of access to
323 Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punish. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 
1977.p.l84.
324 Ibid.
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technology transfers and access to control of techno-strategic regimes of 
surveillance. This, moreover, is inclusive of the question of access to 
national technical means of verification, leaving open the question of 
verification as an aspect of the constitutional processes of security and 
identity, namely, those of inferiority and exteriority.
3.723 Examination
Hierarchical observation and norm alising judgem ent may be said to 
combine under the rubric of examination to effect a 'normalising gaze'. 
In its techno-strategic form it constitutes "a surveillance that makes it 
possible to qualify, classify and punish."325 It is a process by which the 
behaviours of individual states can be classified or judged within the 
terms of specific Treaty Articles. Articulated as a regime of discipline, 
this cuts two ways: 1) through the subjection of those who are 
perceived as objects, and 2) as the objectification of those who are 
subjected. That is to say, that:
i) these m echanism s operate to ensure that the Parties to an 
agreement abide by the agreement and ii) it forms a way of reducing the 
domestic polity of the Other state to a discursive entity known as a 
'Party' to an agreement, thus forming or playing a constitutive role in 
identifying self as opposed to those others by which the self forms its 
boundaries. In short these form devices for "disciplining the plurality 
of the discourses of policy."326
325 Ibid.
326 Dillon, G.M. and B. Klein "Back to the Future: Rearticulating the NATO Alliance 
of Security and Identity". Working Paper. Washington: International Studies 
Association, 1990.
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The operation of the disciplinary forces of verification conceived as 
examination occur within three fields. These involve:
a) the transform ation of the field of visibility into the dom ain of 
power,
b) the operation of an econom y of record-keeping through the 
collection and collation of files and documents and
c) the constitution of individual cases to allow greater specificity of the 
individual state and its techno-strategic behaviours.
ii) Traditional conceptions of power were m easured in terms of the 
visible use of force - the deploym ent of weapons, expeditionary task 
forces - by which the principle of its force lay in the physical 
deployment of that force. Its power lay in the expenditure of its potency 
through mass exercises and display. Other indices of power included 
'resources' - economic strength , dem ographic cohesion, political 
stability and so on.
Disciplinary power, on the other hand is exercised precisely through its 
invisibility, whilst at the same time imposing visibility on those whom 
it seeks to subject. In the context of the deployment of NTMs there is a 
cautionary note: Insofar as disciplinary power operates by its very 
invisibility, certain kinds of marginal infringem ent of Treaty limited 
items detected by certain kinds of surveillance technology may go 
un repo rted  since, to expose the in fringem ent m ay well reveal 
something of the capabilities of the technologies used in the detection 
of the infringement. Thus, in this sense, the disciplining side is also to 
a certain extent constrained by its d isciplinary technologies of 
surveillance.
iii) The regimes of verification each and together generate data, an 
entire archive of texts, photographs, seismic traces, signals recordings,
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reports etc which constitutes a table, or field of knowledge, situating a 
range of practices across time. The exam ination locates the Other 
(constituted as a State) in a textual network of definition, identification 
and location designed to capture and fix the other within a regime of 
treaty lim itations to bind and lim it the developm ent, testing or 
deploym ent of specific weapons systems or classes of weapon system. 
The effect of this is to fix the other, the individual State within a web of 
pow er relations. The collation of these records into databases allows 
two other possibilities:
a) the state under inspection becomes analysable in its specificity - it is 
the military practices of that state and not others, its force capabilities, 
its troop deployments, its force posture that is rendered visible in its 
specificity, as rendered by a body of knowledge comprising those 
features that are verifiable;
b) secondly, the collation of such data allows the operation of 
com parative schem ata across a range of actual and possible arms 
control agreem ents, h igh ligh ting  po ten tia l problem s w ith  the 
verification of new agreem ents, while also establishing verification 
precedents, the experience from which, can assist in negotiating arms 
control verification for new signatories. Thus the collation and 
centralisation of verification records can allow the constitution of a 
whole comparative system upon which to compare the performance of 
previous instances of inspection or surveillance. This further allows 
for distributive analyses of 'gaps' between states' force potentials, and 
of greater significance to the verification question is the ability to 
analyse gaps in verifiability between states. One instance of this was
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highlighted by the gap in On-Site Inspection technology between the 
U.S and Soviet inspection teams in verifying the INF agreement.327
iii) The constitution of individual sovereign states as individual cases, 
through the mechanisms of arms control agreements, and instances of 
inspection, articulates states as objects for a branch of knowledge and as 
the recipient of a 'branch of power.'328 No longer can these practices of 
observation be seen as merely descriptive of a state of affairs, but rather, 
they seem more appropriately conceived as among the myriad practices 
w hich are constitu tive of the political iden tity  of those states 
them selves, hence, for example, the particu larity  of the bilateral 
rela tionsh ip  betw een the US and the Soviet Union. The rap id  
developm ent of verification techniques, effectively low ers the 
threshold of what may be described and observed. Such settings allow 
for the verification of an increasingly w ider range of weapons, at far 
earlier stages in their development or production, where in the past, 
such weapons could only be detected upon deployment. This may be 
exem plified in the photoreconnaissance resolution requirem ents for 
the detection of specific treaty violations as shown in Table 3.6
327 OSI was discussed by the SALT II negotiating team during the Carter 
administration.
328 Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punish. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1977. 
p.191
Table 3.6: Ground Resolution Requirement for Verification329
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Target a Detect'n b Gen ID c
Precise ID 
d Descrptn0 Tech
Anal^
Bridges
Communications:
6 4.5 1.5 1 0.3
Radar 3 1 0.3 0.15 0.015
Radio 3 1.5 0.3 0.15 0.015
Supply Dumps 1.5-3 0.6 0.3 0.03 0.03
Troop Units (in 
bivouac/or road)
6 2 1.2 0.3 0.15
Airfield Facilities 6 4.5 3 0.3 0.15
Rockets & Artillery 1 0.6 0.15 0.05 0.045
Aircraft 4.5 1.5 1 0.15 0.045
Command /  Control 
Headquarters
3 1.5 1 0.15 0.09
Missile Sites 
(SSM/SAM
3 1.5 0.6 0.3 0.045
Surface Ships 7.5-15 4.5 0.6 0.3 0.045
Nuclear Weapon 
components
2.5 1.5 0.3 0.03 0.045
Vehicles 1.5 0.6 0.3 0.06 0.045
Land Minefields 3-9 6 1 0.03 0.0
Ports &harbours 30 15 6 3 0.3
Coasts, Landing 
Beaches
15-30 4.5 3 1.5 0.15
Rail yards & shops 15-30 15 6 1.5 0.4
Roads 6-9 6 1.8 0.6 0.4
Urban Areas 60 30 3 3 0.75
Terrain - 90 4.5 1.5 0.75
Surfaced Submarines 7.5-30 4.5-6 1.5 1 0.03
Notes:
a. Minimum resolution in metres required to detect target.
b. Detection: location of class of units/object/activity of military interest.
c. General Identification: to determine general type.
d. Precise Identification: Discrimination within known target type.
e. Description: Size/dimension/configuration/layout/components, construction/equipment 
count /etc.
f. Technical analysis: Detailed analysis of specific equipment.
329 Source: Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, NASA  
Authorisation for Fiscal Year 1978 Hearings Before Subcommittee on Science, 
Technology and Space and the Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation 
(S.365) pp.1642-3 & 1647, and McDonnell Douglas Corp. Reconnaissance Hand Book 
1982, p.125 quoted in Ann M. Florini "The Opening Skies: Third-Party Imaging 
Satellites and U.S. National Security" in Brian Mandell (ed) Back to The Future: 
Lessons from experience for regional arms control and verification Ottawa: Carleton 
University,1989/195.
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The question of state's political identity as constituted through the
practices of arms control agreements may be illustrated as follows:
The exam ination, - the fixing, at once ritual and 'scientific', of 
individual differences, as the pinning down of each individual in 
his [sic] own particularity, clearly indicates the appearance of a new 
m odality of power in which each individual receives as his [sic] 
status his own individuality, and in which he is linked by his status 
to the features, the m easurem ents, the gaps, the 'm arks' that 
characterise him and make him a [sic]'case'.330
Thus verification establishes, not only an 'architecture' of observation, 
bu t also a locus for the production of knowledge about those under 
observation. Insofar as the means of observation, and the knowledges 
produced by those means represent a form of power crucial to an 
understanding of the formation of political subjectivity/identity.
Deterrence theory has focused on the threat of nuclear weapons and on 
the scale of their effects should they ever be used again in war. Arms 
control regimes such as the SALT have attem pted to systematically 
reduce the dangers of accidental w arfare, and to m aintain a gulf 
between so-called 'conventional weapons' and nuclear weapons. That 
is, to engage in a constructive form of boundary-m aking between the 
regim e of conventional w arfare and that of nuclear w arfare. 
Verification measures have been put in place to address the problem of 
m ain ta in ing  'national security ' in the face of w eapon-system  
lim ita tions and reductions. L ittle, how ever, has been done to 
interrogate the term 'national security' itself. As R.B.J. Walker notes:
Global patterns there m ay be, bu t there exists a vast 
disjunction in the modern world between the global scope of 
the problems and dangers before us and established forms of
330 Foucault, Michel. D iscip line and Punish. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1977. 
p.192.
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political identity, com m unity and authority  ... how ever 
seriously we may take specific global problems, political life 
remains organised within sovereign states .331
Insofar as verification may be shown to be an aspect of disciplinary
power, and insofar as such power is implicated in the articulation of
the b oundaries betw een states, verification , technologies and
institu tions can be seen to be intim ately tied to the constitutive
processes of political identity. As Todorov notes:
the discovery self makes of the other - is so enormous that 
any general form ulation soon ram ifies into countless 
categories and directions. We can discover the other in 
ourselves, realize we are not a hom ogeneous substance, 
radically alien to whatever is not us... I can conceive of these 
others as ... the Other - other in relation to myself, to me; or 
else as a specific social group to which we do not belong. This 
group can be interior to society: women for men, the rich for 
the poor, the m ad for the 'normal'; or it can be exterior to 
society, ie another society which will be near or far away, 
depending on the case.332
Insofar as the processes of identity making are never 'complete' (since, 
being processes, they are everchanging, ever in need of active 
maintenance) then the practices of arms control verification are rightly 
connected with the security concerns of these identities which are most 
generally articulated as states.
Since the practices of verification typically operate on the basis of 
m utual in terpenetra tion  of the other, w hat rem ains at issue is 
sovereignty, conceived as a form of relation betw een states so 
construed.
331 Walker, RBJ Contending Sovereignties Boulder: Lynne Reinner. 1990. p.163.
332 Todorov, Tzvetan. The Conquest of America: The Question of the Other. New York: 
Harper Torchbooks, 1987. p.3
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As all kinds of other practices operate through interpenetration, such 
practices, although global, require those entities articulated as states to 
act in mutually cooperative ways as they too become implicated as focii 
of forms of knowledge and as instrum ents of and subjects of global 
environm ental changes.
Verification technologies, interestingly, traditionally  conceived as
instruments of military security, may also have a role to play in wider
definitions of security. But equally, their role in the identity-m aking
processes of states remains focused upon the discourse of weapons of
mass destruction (with the exception of the CFE). Since Brodie's paper
in 1946, nuclear weapons have become an issue of global security,
requiring  a new articulation of C lausew itz's form ulation of war
conceived as an instrum ent of policy. With the advent of sophisticated
technologies and institutions (let us not forget the hum an aspects of
verification) the technologies of verification m ay serve in part to
operate a regime of pow er as forceful as the discourse of nuclear
weapons themselves, by playing a role in war conceived as a form of
language. As Clausewitz himself pointed out:
War is nothing but the continuation of political intercourse, 
with a mixture of other m eans... is not war merely another 
kind of writing and language for political thoughts? It 
certainly has a gram m ar of its own, bu t its logic is not 
peculiar to itself.
Accordingly, W ar can never be separated from political 
intercourse, and if, in the consideration of the matter, this is 
done in any way, all the threads of the different relations are,
to a certain extent, broken, and we have before us a senseless 
thing without an object.333
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The same question arguably arises for the technologies of verification 
and their relationship to the politics of compliance, and the way this 
re la tio n sh ip  in its tu rn  relates to the d iscourse  of national 
security /  identity .334
3.8 Detente and Deterrence: The Vance/Brzezinski Divide 
From the beginning, Cyrus Vance shared many goals and perceptions 
in line with C arter .335 These were responses to an image, or w orld­
view  tha t saw  the w orld as a com plex in te rdependen t global 
co m m u n ity .336 Consequently, foreign policy was pursued with this 
image of the world in mind. I want to argue in this fairly short section 
that Carter's responses to potential violations of SALT I in the SCC and 
C arter's overall use of the SCC was linked to the broader Carter 
adm inistration's image of the world, and, related to that, the Carter 
adm inistration 's image of the Soviet Union as exem plified in the 
statem ents of Secretary of State Vance and National Security Adviser 
Brzezinski. As a corollary, it m ay be assum ed that the Carter 
adm inistration's overall set of behaviours tow ards the Soviet Union
333 Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. Penguin Classics. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 
(1834) 1987. p.402 [emphasis mine].
334 ...national security/identity: is predicated upon the integrity of the boundary 
between Self and Other. The boundary being a cultural construct, is argued to be 
inherently prone to dissolution and must therefore be constantly maintained - 'stated' - 
yet always subject to being ’re-stated’ by alternative voices within and between states. 
The war-like tension between boundary maintenance and boundary rearticulation leads 
to the reformulation of Clausewitz.
335 Cyrus Vance Hard Choices: Critical Years in America's Foreign Policy New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1983 pp.31-32
336 Rosati, Jerel A. The Carter Administration's Quest for Global Community. 
Columbia: University of South Carolina, 1987. p.39
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was conditioned, even constituted by images of the Soviet Union as 
principal adversary.337
One complicating factor in this was the shift in perceptions by the US 
Congress. Arguably, this divergence of image, [within a largely shared 
discursive community] became reflected in the 1979 shift in NSC 
Adviser Brzezinski from a view that had been close to that of Secretary 
of State Vance, to one that was highly divergent. With respect to the 
SALT I treaty and the negotiations surrounding the SALT II Treaty, 
several key players emerge, along w ith a divergent set of operant 
images of the Soviet Union as Other. From this, 1979 emerges as the 
transition year into a hard-line, negative image of Soviet behaviour 
which pu t in place m any of the m ilitary developm ents that were 
claimed by Reagan.
Rosati's analysis of frequency d istribu tions of perceived Soviet 
intentions and of positive/negative evaluations of Soviet behaviours 
based on the public statements of Carter, Vance and Brzezinski, yields 
the following table:
3^7 See, for example General George S. Brown, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
United States Military Posture for FY 1978 Washington:US Congress January 1977 p.l.
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Table 3.7 Image of the Soviet Union338
IM A G E 1977
YEAR
1978 1979 1980
Soviet Intentions
Expansionist % 0.0 0.0 0.0 67.2
Opportunistic % 9.1 22.2 -7.1 22.4
Cooperative/Competitive % 36.4 44.4 7.1 1.7
Cooperative % 54.5 33.3 35.7 8.6
Soviet Evaluation
Negative % 28.6 65.4 70.0 91.1
Positive % 71.4 34.6 30.0 8.9
W hat emerges most clearly from this is the large shift evident in the 
year 1979-1980 show n by a m arked dow nturn  in the degree of 
cooperation coupled with the abrupt appearance of a perception of 
expansionism  precipitated by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. 
Overall evaluation of Soviet behaviour shows a turnaround almost 
two years earlier, in 1978. From this it becomes evident that US 
perceptions of the Soviets had deteriorated by the time Carter entered 
his second year of office, and that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
simply confirmed for the Carter regime suspicions that were already 
held about Soviet political intentions.
This, coupled w ith dom estic perceptions of the C arter team, as 
expressed in the words of CBS news announcer Dan Rather: "they 
m ean well ... they just don 't know w hat the hell they're doing"339 
underlay a poor prospect for SALT II ratification.
338 Ibid, p.53
339 Spencer, Donald S. The Carter Implosion: Jimmy Carter and the Amateur Style of 
Diplomacy. New York: Praeger, 1988. p.117.
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3.9 Carter: Perceptions, Assumptions and the Reader’s Construction of 
Political Identity
The late Daniel Frei notes that "whatever a person does refers to an
environment as he or she sees it. For any person, 'reality' exists only as
reflected in the image he or she has of this reality ."340 This represents
another way of expressing the significance of Tzvetan Todorov’s
rem arks on the discovery of America - that the making of the self is
both implicitly and explicitly tied to the idea of identity, which, in turn
is tied to the idea of difference. Indeed one cannot have the one
w ithout constituting the other.
The discovery self makes of the other ... soon ramifies into 
countless categories and directions. We can discover the 
other in ourselves, realize we are not a hom ogeneous 
substance, radically alien to whatever is not us ... But others 
are also "I" s: subjects just as I am, whom only my point of 
view ... separates and authentically  distinguishes from 
myself. ... I can conceive of these others as a specific social 
group to which we do not belong. This group can be interior 
to society, or it can be exterior to society, another society 
which will be near or far away: beings whom everything 
links to me on the cultural, moral, historical plane; or else 
unknown quantities, outsiders whose language and customs 
I do not understand .341
This, he describes as the 'problematics of the exterior.' Strategic reality, 
as an extension of this, is thus predicated upon perceptions and 
assum ptions about the other. As this chapter has sought to show, such 
perceptions and assum ptions also underw rite the m anner in which 
m arginal compliance issues become interpreted - as violations or as
340 Frei, Daniel. Assumptions and Perceptions in Disarmament. New York: United 
Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 1984. p.6.
341 Todorov, Tzvetan. The Conquest of America: The question of the other. New York: 
Harper & Row, 1984. p.3.
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resolvable ambiguities. The discursive realities that construe and are 
construed  by com pliance issues ra ised  th rough  the S tanding 
Consultative Commission on Arms Limitation, are in their place an 
aspect of the larger strategic community whose behaviours are played 
out in the intersecting agencies and legitim ating bodies that mediate 
com pliance issues in both directions. Thus, far from a binary 
relationship between the US and the Soviet Union, the SCC represents 
an interface m ediating between m ultiple sites of discursivity that are, 
singly and together, constitutive of the identity of the strategic arms 
community located as a subset of the larger but no less discursively 
construed political com m unity identified as US or Soviet in their 
place.
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CHAPTER IV
The SCC and the First Reagan Administration
We have never found anything that the Soviets have successfully 
h idden...
- Amrom Katz342
4.1 Introduction
As we saw  in the previous chapter, the S tanding Consultative 
Com m ission on Arms Lim itation (SCC) established by the SALT 
regim e was particularly  active under the C arter adm inistration. 
Between 1981 and 1985, throughout the first term  of the Reagan 
adm in istra tion , the role of the SCC was heavily dow nplayed. 
Allegations of increasing Soviet 'cheating' on the SALT agreements in 
the public press further constrained the abilities of the SCC to engage in 
useful dialogue toward resolving these allegations. This chapter seeks 
to explore the effect on the SCC of the new conservative regime and its 
im pact on the issue of the altered status of US-Soviet relations as 
reflected in the first Reagan adm inistration 's use of the SCC, and 
through specific instances in which the US patently failed to use the 
SCC to resolve compliance issues, and in so doing, this chapter 
examines aspects of the US in terms of its defence policy image and its 
image of the Soviet Union. To explore this, it is im portant to trace the 
rise of conservatism as it was played out before Reagan came to power 
and to look at those forces within US governm entality that, although 
in the m inority, had their effect upon the ability of the Carter
342 Katz, Amrom H. "The Fabric of Verification: The Warp and the Woof." 
Verification and SALT: The Challenge of Strategic Deception. Ed. William C. Potter. 
Boulder: Westview Press, 1980. 193-220. p.212.
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adm inistration  to function in the m anner which their electoral 
m andate should have allowed them to do. That is, in Jervis'343 terms, 
to say that the conservatives m anaged to generate so m uch noise, 
relative to their size that Carter's signals were rendered unclear.
4.2 Prelude: Seeds of Conservatism
The first term  of the Reagan adm inistration may be characterised in 
terms of continuities and discontinuities. As noted in the last chapter 
Reagan continued the bulk of Carter's military initiatives as expressed 
in Defence Appropriations for FY 79, and Military Posture Statement 
FY78. These rem ained largely unchanged despite the rhetoric of 
Reagan's 1983 speech initiating the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI). 
There were additions to strengthen the nuclear posture, but these were 
em placed w ithout any reductions to the conventional program s 
initiated by Carter.
By allocating resources for the MX cruise missile, the development of 
the B-l Bomber represented unnecessary and expensive duplication. 
The B -l's cancellation was not so much an act of unilateral restraint, 
but rather, as Richard Barnet points out, it was "... a very expensive 
weapons system basically conceived in the absence of the cruise missile 
factor..."344
W ith strategic  nuclear parity  and a certain level of qualitative 
evolution of nuclear weapons system s the extent to which further
343 Jervis, Robert. The Logic of Images in International Relations. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1970.
344 Barnet, Richard J. Real Security: Restoring American Power in a Dangerous 
Decade. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1981. p.22
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’overkill’ can be justified is a m atter for political and discursive 
analysis. The former, insofar as perceptions of 'nuclear readiness' can 
be invoked to exert d ip lom atic  influence in ternationally  and 
domestically, and the latter, insofar as to invoke an image for the sake 
of perception is a communicative act, predicated upon the symbolic 
order [notw ithstanding the 'real' or actual potency of the weapons 
systems themselves]. At this point it is worth discussing the formation 
of this symbolic order.
One of the key factors affecting the shape of the symbolic order 
th roughou t the Reagan A dm inistration was the em ergence and 
primacy of the Committee on the Present Danger. Its roots go back to 
the beginning of President Carter's term in office. I argued in the 
previous chapter that the em ergent conservatism in security matters 
became prevalent from 1978, around half way through the Carter 
Adm inistration. It was this conservatism345, most readily observed in 
the operations of Congress that arguably led to the failure of SALT II 
ra tification  and the dow nfall of the C arter Presidency. The 
appointm ent of large numbers of Members of the Board of Directors of 
the C om m ittee on the P resent D anger (CPD) to the Reagan 
adm inistration attests to the extent of their ascendancy346 and their
345 Here I agree with Jim George (ANU, personal communication, 16/9/91), that the 
emergence of the CPD was symptomatic of the conservative forces that led to the rise of 
neo-realism in the 1980s.
346 There were 60 Members of the Board of Directors of the Committee on the Present 
Danger appointed to the Reagan administration, including Ronald Reagan himself. 
Five of these members were women, and of these, three were deployed in traditionally 
'soft' policy areas as for example, Task Force on Food Assistance, National Commission 
on Social Security Reform, US Representative to the [then emasculated] United 
Nations. See Tyroller, Charles II, ed. Alerting America: The Papers of the Committee 
on the Present Danger. Washington: Pergamon Brassey's, 1984. pp.ix-xi.
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ability to constitute a domain of practice in which the terms of debate 
render the discourse of arms control as outside of the domain of the 
'realistic'. This section shall argue that the CPD's power lay in its ability 
to marginalise, even silence, the arms control agenda. In Lyotard's 
terms, arms control became construed as a victim of d i f f e r e n d . 3* 7 
Before examining the Reagan administration's handling of SALT 
compliance issues, therefore, I shall trace briefly the rise and rise of the 
CPD as it plays an important role in structuring the domain of policy in 
which the SCC came to operate under the Reagan Administration.
4.3 The Advent of the Committee on the Present Danger (CPD)
The story of the CPD can be traced back well before the Carter 
administration came to power. One of the key players was Paul Nitze 
whose history in the Pentagon goes back to the 1940s.348 In 1950, at the 
Metropolitan Club in Washington, the first Committee on the Present 
Danger was convened, 349 Paul Nitze was among the committee
34  ^ See: Lyotard, Jean-Francois. "The Differend, the Referent, and the Proper Name." 
Diacritics 14.3, Fall (1984): 4-14. And Lyotard, Jean-Francois. The Differend: Phrases 
in Dispute. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988. p.xi where he defines 
differend as follows: "As distinguished from a litigation, a differend [differend ] 
would be a case of conflict, between (at least) two parties, that cannot be equitably 
resolved for lack of a rule of judgement applicable to both arguments. One side's 
legitimacy does not imply the other side's lack of legitimacy. However, applying a 
single rule of judgement to both in order to settle their differend as though it were 
merely a litigation would wrong (at least) one of them."
348 He came to Washington in the Summer of 1940. Source: Nitze, Paul H., A. Smith, 
Steven Rearden. From Hiroshima to Glasnost: At the Centre of Decision - A Memoir. 
London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1989.p.ix
349 See: Herken, Gregg. Counsels of War. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985. p.274. The 
Committee on the Present Danger derived its name from a remark attributed to Oliver 
Wendell Holmes who held that no one had the right to shout "Fire!" in a crowded 
room unless there was a clear and present danger. The 1950 CPD had among its 
membership, in addition to Paul Nitze, James Bryant Conant, Tracy Voorhees, Robert 
Patterson and others. See Nitze, Paul H., A. Smith, Steven Rearden. From Hiroshima
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m em bers. This Com mittee had been form ed to lobby President 
Truman to pursuade him to take a harder line toward the Soviets and 
to increase defence spend ing  on the K orean W ar. W ith the 
im plementation of Nitze's NSC-68, and a heightening of the Cold War 
the g roup  had  succeeded beyond their expectations, so they 
disbanded.350
After 1972, the conservative opposition to SALT grew slowly and 
w ithout a unified voice. Its growing momentum surfaced with the call 
for the so-called Team  B' inquiry to cross-check the CIAs intelligence 
analysis. The National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) had been criticised 
after the 'bom ber gap351' and the 'missile gap' for overestim ating 
Soviet capabilities352. As a response to this the intelligence community 
progressively  dow ngraded their estim ates until, in 1974, Albert 
W o h ls te tte r  a lleged  p u b lic ly 353 that the NIEs w ere grossly 
underestim ating the Soviet threat. This was echoed by the Members of 
the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board354. Pressure was 
brought to bear for the CIA to perm it a parallel assessment of CIA
to Glasnost: At the Centre of Decision - A Memoir. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 
1989. p.353.
350 Herken Op Cit. 1985, p.275
351 A 'hawk' from the beginning, this was Paul Nitze's own overestimation. See 
Barnet, 1981, p.57
352 Paul H. Nitze with A. Smith, Steven Rearden. From Hiroshima to Glasnost: At 
the Centre of Decision -  A Memoir. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1989. p. 351.
353 See: Wohlstetter, Albert. "Is there a Strategic Arms Race?" Foreign Policy. 15. 
Summer (1974), "Rivals, but No Race." Foreign Policy. 17. Fall (1974), "How to Confuse 
Ourselves." Foreign Policy. 20. Fall (1975).
354 The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Committee was a sixteen member 
body, of whom six were original members of the CPD. These included Edward Teller 
and John Foster. Source: Barnet, Richard J .  Real Security: Restoring American Power in 
a Dangerous Decade. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1981. p. 57.
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intelligence data. As George Bush, the head of the CIA had himself 
become critical of the agency's critics. This led him to choose from 
among the agency's most vociferous critics to form 'Team B' to review 
evidence of the Soviet threat. Gregg Herken notes that several of the 
m embers of Team B, including its Director, Richard Pipes, had been 
founding members of the Committee on the Present Danger.355
The Team B report was subm itted  to the P residen t's Foreign 
Intelligence Advisory Board on December 2, 1976. Its conclusions about 
the extent of the Soviet threat directly contradicted the CIA's own 
assessment. Team B challenged the notion that the United States had 
superio rity  in m issile accuracy,356 that the Soviet civil defence 
preparations w ould prove futile and asserted that the Soviets were 
seeking strategic superiority over the United States.357
Although the Team A /Team  B debate was ultim ately inconclusive in 
objective abstract terms, Herken notes that from a political viewpoint, 
Team B won decisively.358 The outcome was that with the public 
divergence of views between the 'experts', and
355 According to Paul Nitze (1989 p.351) the Team B members were: Paul Nitze (CPD), 
Richard Pipes (Head of Team B, CPD), General Daniel O. Graham, (former Director of 
the Defence Intelligence Agency), Professor William R. Van Cleave (Defence expert, 
CPD), Paul Wolfowitz (ACDA), Thomas Wolfe (RAND) Seymour Weiss, and General 
John W. Vogt Jr. (Commander of US Forces in Europe, Ret.).
356 For the contrary view, laid out in some considerable detail on why, for specific 
technological reasons, the CIA was closer to the truth, see: MacKenzie, Donald. "The 
Soviet Union and Strategic Missile Guidance." International Security. (1988): 5-54. 
Especially p.52-3. And
McKenzie, Donald. Inventing Accuracy: A Historical Sociology of Nuclear Missile 
Guidance. Cambridge, Massachussetts: The MIT Press, 1990.
357 This is outlined in Scheer, Robert. With Enough Shovels: Reagan, Bush and 
Nuclear War. New York: Random House, 1982. pp.53-65.
358 Herken, Gregg. Counsels of War. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985. p.278.
. . .a  series of steady, wearing attacks and disappointm ents ... 
the public attitude tow ards both  the Russians and arms 
control had been transformed.359
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This transform ation, Herken argues, led, by the mid 1970s to a "new 
reality" for arm s control.360 W hat had previously been a marginal, 
m in o rity  v ie w 361 was slow ly tran sfo rm ed  from  "heresy to 
respectability, if not orthodoxy."362
The Carter adm inistration denounced the Team B report, and in so 
doing set in train a set of conditions under which the CPD could 
flourish, and ultim ately provide fertile ground in which the new 
conservatism could take root.
After prelim inary discussions throughout 1975 between Paul Nitze, 
Eugene Rostow, Henry H. Fowler, Charis E. Walker, Richard V. Allen, 
Lane Kirkland and Admiral Elmo R. Zum walt and after consultations 
w ith then Secretary of Defence James R. Schlesinger, an organising 
m eeting was held at the M etropolitan Club in W ashington363, to 
discuss the formation of a formal organisation to "facilitate a national 
discussion of the foreign and national security policies of the United 
States directed tow ards a secure peace."364 The meeting, chaired by
359 Herken 1985 p.278
3^0 Senator Daniel Moynihan, quoted in Herken, 1985 Op Cit. p.278.
3^1 That the Soviet intentions were to surpass the United States in strategic 
capability. Ibid.
3^* 2 3Senator Daniel Moynihan, quoted in Herken, 1985 Op Cit. p.278.
363 March 12,1976
3^4 Nitze, Paul H., A. Smith, Steven Rearden. From Hiroshima to Glasnost: At the
Centre of Decision - A Memoir. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1989. p.353. see also
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Eugene Rostow365 discussed the first draft of what would become the 
CPD manifesto "Common Sense and the Common Danger." After ten 
more meetings and a num ber of private contacts during which the 
Rostow  m anifesto w ent th rough  th irteen  full drafts there was 
agreem ent to 'go public' on November 11, 1976. The first funds had 
been raised in A ugust366 of that year, and by the time of the public 
launch at the National Press Club in W ashington D.C. had raised less 
than $US 80,000.
The date chosen was to be two days after the election which saw Carter 
become President. Despite a large Press turnout, little publicity was 
forthcom ing until two m onths later w ith a small excerpt from the 
'm anifesto ' in the New York Times. By January 1977 little had 
changed. The CPD then began w ork on a series exam ining the 
Superpower military balance. The first appeared in October 1978.367 By 
their own admission, the CPD had its greatest impact on SALT II
Newhouse, John. The Nuclear Age: From Hiroshima to Star Wars. London: Michael 
Joseph, 1989. p.295
365 Also present were: Paul Nitze, Henry H. Fowler, Charis E. Walker, Richard V. 
Allen, Lane Kirkland,Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, James R Schlesinger, David Packard, 
Charles Burton Marshall, Edmund A. Gullion and Charles Tyroler II. Source: Tyroler, 
Charles II, ed. Alerting America: The Papers of the Committee on the Present Danger. 
Washington: Pergamon Brassey's, 1984. p.xv.
366 Some $US 37,000 was raised by Charls Walker and former Texas Governor John B. 
Connally over coffee. By the CPDs November launch, the CPD had received $US 
79,608.
367 See (CPD), Committee on the Present Danger. "Is America Becoming Number 2? 
Current Trends in the U.S.-Soviet Military Balance (October 5, 1978)." Alerting 
America: The Papers of the Committee on the Present Danger. Ed. Charles Tyroller II. 
Washington: Pergammon , 1984. pp39-94
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ratification, beginning with public statements to prom inent editors in 
1977.368
A lthough not the only interest group concerned with the SALT II
negotiations, the CPD was one of the best organised and most vocal
opponents of SALT. Being a 'public education' group, the CPD was able
to debate issues openly long before the Carter Administration was able
to do so. As Dan Caldwell points out:
By the sum m er of 1977, the "facsimile ratification debate" 
had begun, a full two years before the treaty was signed.
The Com m ittee on the Present D anger was w idely 
acknowledged as "the brains behind the opposition," and 
the press conferences that it held were characterised as 
"more like academic seminars given by Nitze to a small, 
select group of W ashington-based journalists covering the 
national security beat for their papers, journals and wire 
services."369
As we saw in the last chapter, public opinion had swung firmly behind 
the CPD by the end of 1978, to the extent that the CPD could conduct a 
poll in March 1979 that showed that public support had moved away 
from SALT II ratification. General Edward Rowny has been quoted as 
saying:
SALT II was dead in the water in the late Summer or early 
Fall [of 1979], and the removal [of the treaty from the Senate] 
from active consideration by Carter after Afghanistan was
368 See CPD "Where We Stand on SALT (July 6, 1977) in Alerting America: The Papers 
of the Committee on the Present Danger. Ed. Charles Tyroller II. Washington: 
Pergammon Brassey's, 1984. ppl6-22.
369 Caldwell, Dan. The Dynamics of Domestic Politics and Arms Control: The SALT II 
Treaty Ratification Debate. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1991. 
p.104.
just an easy way for him to recognise the obvious: SALT II 
d idn’t have a chance.370
Another opponent of SALT II, CPD member Eugene Rostow stated :
We had the [SALT II] Treaty beaten by mid- August [1979]371
Moreover, by the time of the 1980 Presidential elections, the stage had 
been set for the emergence of CPD m em ber Ronald Reagan as 
President.
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The quantity  of public ou tpu t by the CPD was substantial, and
dem onstrated their ability to develop coordinated responses to any
move by the Carter administration. As Caldwell documents:
From the time of its founding in 1976 through the end of 
December 1979, members of the executive committee and the 
board of the Committee on the Present Danger participated 
in 479 TV and radio program s, press conferences, debates, 
public forums, and speaking engagements. The committee 
distributed more than two hundred  thousand copies of its 
pam phlets and reports. During the Senate's hearings on the 
SALT II Treaty, executive committee and board members 
testified on seventeen different occasions before the Armed 
Services and Foreign Relations committees.372
It is worthwhile taking a brief look at the rhetorical strategies invoked 
by the CPD to determ ine and augm ent the shape of the political 
realities of the late 1970s, from  the last half of the C arter 
Administration to the first Reagan Presidency.
370 Edward Rowny in an interview with Dan Caldwell, Washington DC June 3, 1987, 
cited in Caldwell, Dan. "The SALT II Treaty Ratification Debate." Washington D.C.: 
International Studies Association 31st Annual Convention April 10-14, 1990. p.3.
37  ^ Eugene Rostow in an interview with Dan Caldwell, Washington DC, October 27, 
1988, cited in Caldwell, Dan. "The SALT II Treaty Ratification Debate." Washington 
D.C.: International Studies Association 31st Annual Convention April 10-14,1990. p.3.
372 Ibid, p.104.
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There was also considerable coordination with other allied interest
groups that had been set up with related but different agendas, such as
the American Security Council373 and the American Conservative
U nion 374 and the Coalition for Peace through Strength375. The CPD
concentrated on elite decisionmakers, while others took on the wider
brief of direct mass public contact. As Kupperman notes in Caldwell:
...when the Committee received a request for information 
from the general public, it passed this to the American 
Security Council for a response.376
The CPD was thus well coordinated with other interest groups and this 
would have enhanced the effectiveness of their not insubstantial 
resources.
373 This group was specifically established as a lobby group, unlike the CPD. Its 
targeting of the mass public included the production and release of a series of short 
films (Only the Strong, The Price of Peace and Freedom (1978) and The SALT Syndrome 
(1979)) According to Caldwell Only the Strong was televised more than 800 times and 
The SALT Syndrome was televised more than 600 times in 1979 alone. See: Kurkowski, 
David Carl. The Role of Interest Groups in the Domestic Debate on SALT II. Temple 
University, 1982. pp.137-139, cited in Caldwell, Dan. The Dynamics of Domestic 
Politics and Arms Control: The SALT II Treaty Ratification Debate. Columbia: 
University of South Carolina Press, 1991. p.105.
374 Having spent $USlm opposing the ratification of the Panama Canal treaties, they 
turned their attention to SALT II, producing a thirty-minute anti-SALT film that, 
according to Dan Caldwell was shown on more than 200 television stations across the 
United States.
375 The Coalition for Peace through Strength was formed in August 1978 as an umbrella 
organisation to oversee and coordinate the activities of like-minded groups and 
individuals concerned with US defence policy and especially SALT II. This, according 
to Caldwell Op Cit., 1991, p.105-6., arose out of the previous experiences of 
conservative groups during the Carter administration, that had opposed both Paul 
Warnke’s appointment to ACDA, and the ratification of the Panama Treaties. They 
had learned that they could be more effective if their activities were coordinated.
376 Charles Kupperman, a professional staff member of the CPD, cited in Caldwell, 
Dan. The Dynamics of Domestic Politics and Arms Control: The SALT II Treaty 
Ratification Debate. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1991. p.105.
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The CPD announced itself with a policy statement that established and 
sum m arised its politics in the title "Common Sense and the Common 
Danger." Colonising for itself the realm of 'common sense' in much 
the same m anner as the 'realists' sought to colonise 'reality' in the 
interw ar period, the CPD mobilised a discourse of threat377, largely 
directed tow ards a systematic demonisation of the Soviets, with the 
express aim of 'changing the course of US policymaking '.378
W hilst, in terms of their stated modus operandi the CPD was not to 
engage in formal lobbying, the CPDs published views were presented as 
the 'rational' approach, with the implication that other approaches 
m ight not be so 'rational'. Following the m eeting betw een Carter, 
W arnke and Nitze379 in which Nitze gave an im prom ptu, but detailed 
briefing arguing that defence expenditure should be substantially 
increased, N itze's view was seen as a m inority and extreme view. 
Carter was not impressed. In response to what has been characterised as 
N itze's 'hum iliation '380 Eugene Rostow wrote:
A strong and angry tide of concern about the safety of the
nation is running throughout the country ...381
377 This is also condensed into the title. For a useful textual analysis of this policy 
statement, see Dalby, Simon. Creating the Second Cold War: The Discourse of Politics. 
London: Pinter Publishers, 1990. especially chapter 2.
378 See "Common Sense and The Common Danger" in Tyroler, Charles II, ed. Alerting 
America: The Papers of the Committee on the Present Danger. Washington: Pergamon 
Brassey's, 1984. p.3.
379 August 1976.
380 Herken, Gregg. Counsels of War. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985. p.281.
381 Quoted in Herken, Gregg. Counsels of War. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985. p. 
281.
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Significantly, perhaps, Rostow's rem arks were closer to describing a 
'significant absence' rather than the reality of the time. Masking his 
lack of evidence for this 'tide', he mobilises m etaphors of natural 
disaster, invoking the mythology of the futility of Robert the Bruce in 
the face of a 'strong and angry tide' coupled with the Biblical Flood 
'running through the nation' in order, presum ably to claim some sort 
of moral high ground.
The m anifesto "Common Sense and the Common Danger" opens 
strongly with a message about danger. In case we miss the point, the 
w ord 'danger' is repeated five times in as many lines, and twice in the 
opening sentence:
"Our country is in a period of danger, and the danger is 
increasing."382
Dalby points out that the 'common sense' referred to in the title 
represents a distillation of the mix of US hegemony and containment 
militarism that characterised NSC 68. From far Right to common sense 
shows the extent to which US society had come to naturalise the US as 
metonymic of The West, metaphoric for order, security and rationality, 
and whose 'natural adversary ' was the Soviet Union specifically 
named as the Other and primary threat to the established order, to the 
US and its allies.
The principal threat to our nation, to world peace, and to the 
cause of hum an freedom is the Soviet drive for dominance 
based upon an unparalleled m ilitary buildup ... The Soviet 
U nion has not altered its long-held  goal of a w orld
382 See (CPD), Committee on the Present Danger. "Common Sense and the Common 
Danger (November 11, 1976)." A lertin g  Am erica: The Papers of the C om m ittee on the 
P resent D anger. Ed. Charles Tyroler II. Washington, New York, Oxford: Pergamon, 
Brassey's, 1984. p.3. This paper was drawn to my attention by Simon Dalby (Simon 
Fraser University, BC) in a personal communication, February, 1991.
205
dom inated from a single center-Moscow. It continues, with 
notable persistence, to take advantage of every opportunity to 
expand its political and m ilitary influence throughout the 
world: in Europe; in the M iddle East and Africa; in Asia; 
even in Latin America; in all the seas.383
This presum ably differs from the actions of the US and its relations 
w ith "the dem ocratic countries w ith which we are 'naturally  and 
necessarily allied' and in the developing world" although it remains 
unclear about the nature of the differences. The 'Asia' spoken of in 
term s of the Soviet threat rem ains undifferentiated , despite the 
presum ably ally status of Japan, Republic of Korea (South Korea), 
Thailand, and the Philippines. The reader is further left to assume that 
there is some distinction between the Soviets' taking "advantage of 
every opportun ity  to expand its political and m ilitary influence 
throughout the w orld "384 and the US engaging in "effective action to 
ensure the peace and prosperity of the nation" (US) through "peaceful 
deterrence and concerted alliance diplomacy ."385 For such a distinction 
is not easy to locate.
One key question rem ains that underp ins the credibility of the 
presented statem ents, and that is the question of the identity of the 
unnam ed 'we.' It seems that at least two 'we's are discernible, one is 
that of the CPD and the other is that of 'W ashington.' If it is the 
form er, then a lot of pow er is assum ed for an organisation that 
professes to be not even a lobby group. If, however the 'we' refers to 
W ashington [metonymic of place and m etaphoric for governm ent],
383 "Common Sense and Common Danger" in Tyroler, Op Cit. p.3
384 Ibid.
385 Ibid.
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then the accusation directed at "Moscow386" works equally within the 
text to portray W ashington and US hegemony. Indeed, in the context 
of the opening to the second section, the 'we' most probably refers to 
the US (which metonymically condenses into Washington). With that 
single substitu tion , the reader is left w ith the following choice, 
between:
The Soviet Union has not altered its long-held goal of a 
world dom inated from a single center-Moscow. It continues, 
w ith  notable persistence, to take advantage of every 
opportunity  to expand its political and m ilitary influence 
throughout the w orld .387
and:
... a conscious effort of will is needed to restore the strength 
and coherence of [Washington's] foreign policy; to revive the 
solidarity of [Washington's] alliances ... acting together, work 
with the developing nations to create a just and progressive 
w orld economy-the necessary condition of [W ashington's] 
prosperity .388
On these terms it is possible to see how, through a rhetoric of 'us' 
versus 'them ' articulated through a discourse of danger, the CPD 
sought to constitute a dom ain of policym aking driven by 'moral 
panic' in the guise of 'common sense.' It does not end there.
With the suggestion that the Soviets have been systematically engaged 
in 'subtle and indirect' threats, driven by a 'long-held goal' of world 
dom ination, then the detente that brought the Carter Adm inistration 
to power can be seen as illusory. Moreover, the Carter administration
386 Ibid.
387 Ibid.
388 Ibid.
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is implicitly seen to be a victim of the 'unawareness' to danger that, the
CPD implies, blinds the rest of America. For this reason, the Carter
adm inistration is construed as lacking the 'conscious effort of political
will needed to restore the strength and coherence of [US] foreign
policy . '389 The final condemnation of the Carter administration lies in
Carter's own set of agendas, insofar as it is only by addressing the stated
lack of political will, can the US 'promote hum an rights, and help deal
with the great and emerging problems of food, energy, population, and
the environm ent. '390 In the same rhetorical move, the CPD claims for
itself, these self same agendas as Simon Dalby puts it:
This move puts the CPD in a space of superior knowledge. It 
is aware of the real state of the world, not taken in by an 
'illusory detente. Reality is thus defined as a military strategic 
one. Political detente is unreal, illusion. The CPD alone 
understands the presence of the as yet unnam ed 'threat' 
which lurks unseen on the world stage. The implication is 
that those currently in charge of government policy are likely 
to m ake serious b lunders because of their failure to 
appreciate the im pending th reat to the USA. The only 
so lu tion  is the adoption  of the CPD 'com m on-sense' 
perspective .391
The logical inconsistencies in the paper are, as Dalby puts it, ignored .392 
But that does not mean that it was w ithout effect. W hat is of interest 
here, is how its effects operated in the face of some quite dramatic 
logical flaws. To follow this through it is worthwhile situating this text 
in the genre of 'persuasive rhetoric.' For, despite  the CPD's
389 Ibid.
390 Ibid.
391 Dalby, Simon. Creating the Second Cold War: The Discourse of Politics. London: 
Pinter Publishers, 1990.p.48
392 Dalby Op C i t . p.50.
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protestations to the contrary, the CPD manifesto "Common Sense and 
the Common Danger" is a text with an ideological message that goes 
beyond abstract reason. It is a text that is designed to go beyond mere 
information. Its function is to persuade, against the weight of informed 
opinion. Its function in m any ways is to work in the realm more 
traditionally associated with figurative activities like art or religion in 
order to create structures of m eaning .393 It does so precisely by leaving 
gaps in its logical structure, in order to invite the reader to insert 
him /herself into the text in such a way as to bridge the gaps.
In the case of "Common Sense and the Common Danger" the reader is 
invited to understand the threat in terms of one that operates subtly 
and indirectly, leading to the conclusion that w ithout substantial policy 
change, it may soon become too late. Importantly, the CPD maintains, 
no m atter how subtly the Soviet threat operates, the CPD is able to 
m ediate the threat and render it visible. "There is still time for 
effective action" the CPD reassures us, holding that "...there is no 
higher priority than peace with freedom and security for our country." 
That there is no causal connection between these priorities and the 
statem ents about the 'danger,' actually m atters less in this type of 
discourse than that the two semantic fields can be juxtaposed in a 
m anner that allows the reader to make whatever connections may be 
necessary to understand this text as a coherent piece of language. It is a 
text therefore, that operates on a connotative rather than a denotative
393 por further reading on texts of persuasion see: Barthes, Roland. "Myth Today." 
Mythologies. Ed. Roland Barthes. St. Albans: Paladin, 1973. 109-159. Kress, Gunther. 
"Discourses, Texts, Readers and the Pro-Nuclear Arguments." Language and the 
Nuclear Arms Debate: Nukespeak Today. Ed. Paul Chilton. London: Pinter, 1985. And 
Williamson, Judith. Decoding Advertisements: Ideology and Meaning in Advertising. 
Ideas in Progress. London, New York: Marion Boyars, 1983.
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level of cognition .394 For Barthes, the operation of this connotative 
system  yields, at the th ird  order of signification the system  of 
ideo logy .395 Here we see then, the formal apparatus with which the 
CPD set about persuading the US to effectively undo a decade of 
detente and arms control, with the help, one m ust add, of a receptive 
audience.
The CPD and Wamke
Paul W arnke's confirm ation hearings for his appointm ent to the 
directorship of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) 
represents one of the early signs of the growing power of the CPD to 
catalyse the 'hawkish' conservative voices within the US. Warnke had 
worked with Paul Nitze at the Pentagon. Known as 'the two Pauls' 
they were philosophically opposed on Defence force posture. Warnke 
did not subscribe to the apocalyptic thesis of the Pentagon 'hawks,' 
believing that the strength of the subm arine and strategic bomber 
forces (two legs of the strategic triad) more than compensated for any 
weakness in the land-based forces. Strobe Talbot characterised Paul 
Nitze as
W arnke's m ost vociferous d e trac to r-an d  one of the
administration's most formidable opponents on SALT [and]
594 Denotation is, for Roland Barthes, the first order of signification. It refers to the 
simple or literal relationship of a sign to its referent. It assumes that this relationship 
is objective and value-free, whereas Connotative represents the second order of 
signification. It occurs when the denotative meaning of the sign is made to stand for the 
value-system of the culture or the person using it. It thus produces meaning by 
association, locating attitudinal or evaluative shades of meaning. See O'Sullivan, 
Hartley, Saunders and Fiske. Key Concepts in Communication. London: Methuen, 1983. 
p.215-216 and Barthes, Roland. "Myth Today." Mythologies. Ed. Roland Barthes. St. 
Albans: Paladin, 1973. 109-159.
595 For a clear exposition of this topic see Barthes, Roland. Elements of Semiology. 
New York: Hill and Wang, 1983 (1967). pp.90-94 and especially pp.91-2
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... a founder ... of the Committee on the Present Danger, a 
private, unabashedly hawkish lobbying group.396
Nitze, according to Talbot "had become increasingly disillusioned with 
SALT" and "appalled at what he regarded as American complacency in 
the face of ’a clear and present danger' from the Soviet Union." He saw 
Paul Warnke as representative of that "complacency."397
W arnke was appoin ted  to ACDA, bu t the vote m argin for his 
appointm ent as chief SALT negotiator was narrow (58-40). Talbot notes 
that Senator Henry Jackson and Paul Nitze "along with other SALT 
skeptics" read into that vote margin a symbolic victory for the CPD. 
They noted and m ade much of the fact that the vote for W arnke as 
chief SALT negotiator represented less than the two-thirds majority 
required for SALT II ratification (the treaty to be negotiated by Paul 
W arnke).
The anti-SALT II lobby groups had, in sum  four main advantages, 
according to Dan Caldwell:
First, they were united in their opposition to SALT II; the 
same kind of unity did not characterize the protreaty groups. 
Second, the anti-treaty groups had superior resources and 
were more effective in organizing public opinion. Third ... a 
group's likelihood of success is enhanced if it focuses on 
blocking rather than initiating action. The opponents of 
SALT II therefore had the advantageous position. Fourth, 
scholars have found that conservatives tend to write [to] 
their legislators more than liberals and those w ho are 
opposed to a policy tend to write more often than those who 
favor a policy. SALT II was a case in which the conservatives 
w ere opposed to ratification  of the trea ty  and , not
396 Talbot, Strobe. Endgame: The Inside Story of SALT II. New York: Harper and Row, 
1979. p.56.
397Ibid.
surprisingly, mail to senators ran strongly against 
ratification.398
211
By 1978 the SALT process was losing momentum, while the litany of 
criticisms of Carter's administration was growing. With negotiations 
continuing in private, the Carter administration was somewhat at the 
mercy of the public debate over SALT, and Paul Nitze's CPD399, as 
Talbot notes "had been in existence-and on the attack-for more than a 
year, arguing that the United States was falling dangerously behind the 
Soviet Union in military might and that SALT was part of the 
problem."400
398 Caldwell, Dan. The Dynamics of Domestic Politics and Arms Control: The SALT II 
Treaty Ratification Debate. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1991.
p.106.
399 For an extended exposition of the role of the Committee on the Present Danger, in 
galvanising the conservative ’hawkish' lobby, see Simon Dalby, Creating the Second 
Cold War: The Discourse of Politics London: Pinter 1990.
4^0 Ibid. And see (CPD), Committee on the Present Danger. "Does the Official Case for 
the SALT II Treaty Hold Up Under Analysis? (January 29, 1979)." (CPD) "Is America 
Becoming Number 2? Current Trends in the U.S.-Soviet Military Balance (October 5, 
1978)." (CPD), "Public Attitudes on SALT II (March 15, 1979)." (CPD), "What is the 
Soviet Union Up To? (April 4, 1977)." (CPD), "Where We Stand on SALT (July 6, 
1977)." and Richard Pipes "Why the Soviet Union Wants SALT II" in Alerting 
America: The Papers of the Committee on the Present Danger Ed. Charles Tyroler II. 
Washington: Pergammon Brassey's, 1979. See also individual contributions to the 
tirade against SALT II as, for example: Kane, Francis X. "Safeguards from SALT: US 
Technological Strategy in an Era of Arms Control." The Fateful Ends and Shades of 
SALT. Ed. Paul Nitze, et al. New York: Crane, Russak & Co, 1979. 37-89, Nitze, Paul 
H. "The Merits and Demerits of a SALT II Agreement." Ibid., pp.90-132. Nitze, Paul. 
"Assuring Strategic Stability in an Era of Detente (1976)." Paul Nitze on National 
Security and Arms Control. Ed. Kenneth W. Thompson Steven L. Rearden. Lanham: 
University Press of America, 1990. 181-209., Nitze, Paul. "Considerations Bearing on 
the Merits of the SALT II Agreements As Signed at Vienna (1979)." Ibid. 219-240. 
Nitze, Paul. "What To Do About SALT ? (1976)." Ibid. pp. 211-217. Perle, Richard. 
"SALT II: Who is Deceiving Whom?" Intelligence Policy and National Security. Ed. 
Pfaltzgraff et al. Hamden: Archon Books, 1981.
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The Emergence of the Second Cold War
Halliday notes that the elements of the second Cold War were in place 
by the mid-term of Carter's Presidency. To look for the causes, 
however, in a monolithic Soviet push for supremacy, Halliday argues, 
is to gloss over the US' own role in provoking reaction from the 
'Eastern Bloc.' As he states:
... the tensions of this period have their root in the attempt 
by the USA in the early seventies to use SALT talks and trade 
as a means of controlling Soviet foreign and defence policy, 
and in the rebuffs which this attempt encountered-on the 
battle fields of Indochina and Angola, and in the continued 
enhancement of Soviet military capacity within the 
framework of the SALT I agreement. In essence, the New 
Cold War is a response by the USA and its allies to the failure 
of detente as a means of waging globalised social conflict to 
their own advantage.401
The failure of detente, as it applied to SALT II, was also in part the 
result of Carter's own penchant for 'open government' and much of 
the momentum for SALT II was lost in Vance's initial approach to 
Moscow in March 1977. Moving substantially beyond the limits of the 
Vladivostok Accord, Carter sent Vance in with a proposal for deep cuts 
in strategic arms. The public release of the proposals before raising 
them officially with the Soviets was read by the Soviets as a direct piece 
of moral posturing. The vehemence of the rejection meant that there 
could not even be a return to the Vladivostok limits and the 
negotiations were substantially set back.402
40! Halliday, Fred. "The Sources of the New Cold War." States and Societies. Ed. 
David Held. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986.
4^2 Bell, Coral. President Carter and Foreign Policy: The Costs of Virtue? Canberra 
Studies in World Affairs. Canberra: The Australian National University, 1980. p.38.
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Subsequent negotiations eventually resulted in agreement on a general 
framework for negotiation that took account both of the Vladivostok 
ceilings and of the US desire for more comprehensive limitations. This 
framework yielded a three stage set of agreements. These were:
i) a Treaty based on the Vladivostok Accord, to remain in force until 
1985;
ii) A Protocol of three years' duration to constrain cruise missiles, 
mobile ICBMs and qualitative restrictions on ICBMs to allow for later 
negotiations on these matters in a SALT III; and
iii) A Joint Statement on Principles that w ould represent a set of 
guidelines for future negotiations.403
Following a series of high-level meetings in W ashington, Moscow and 
Geneva during 1978 and 1979, the SALT II agreement was signed by 
Carter and Brezhnev in Vienna on June 18, 1979. President Carter 
transm itted  it to the Senate on June 22, 1979 for consent and 
ratification.404
Despite the many successes in the ongoing aspects of arms control, 
compliance with previously established treaties and regular dialogue 
through the SCC, events seem to have conspired against Carter when it 
came to 'closing the deal' as it were, on SALT II. In many ways Carter's 
far-sightedness on arms control issues rendered him pragm atically 
impaired. His vision of a changing, postm odern w orld405 meant that
403 ACDA, US, ed. Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: Texts and Histories of 
Negotiations. Washington: United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 
1980. p.202.
404 Ibid, p.203.
4^5 Campbell, David. Security and Identity in United States Foreign Policy: A 
Reading of the Carter Administration. Australian National University, 1989. And see
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he could not rest content with a treaty that had been under negotiation 
through two previous presidents, even if it was by then "ninety 
percent complete."406 His decision to start afresh meant that the treaty 
was delayed and was left without the bipartisan support that Carter had 
inherited. Additional delays were caused by the pace of technological 
development that meant debates on cruise missiles, by then accurate 
enough to be taken seriously,407 the Backfire bomber, and verification 
procedures of the treaty.408 Caldwell notes that other contributory 
factors included the sequencing of the Panama Canal Treaties and 
SALT II, such that considerable political capital and momentum was 
lost on the Panama Canal Treaties that were ratified with a narrow 
margin. The political reserves were thus not available to the same 
extent for SALT II.409 This held also for the ratification debates 
themselves, as William Hyland notes in Caldwell:
also Rosati, Jerel A. The Carter Administration's Quest for Global Community. 
Columbia: University of South Carolina, 1987. p.39
406 Melvin Laird "A Strong Start in a Difficult Decade: Defence Policy in the Nixon- 
Ford Years." International Security 10.2 (1985): 5-26.p.5.
384 MacKenzie, Donald. "The Soviet Union and Strategic Missile Guidance." 
International Security (1988): 5-54.
408 with the fall of the Shah of Iran, the US lost a major intelligence monitoring post
that would have contributed to verification of the SALT II treaty. Although the loss 
was not critical, the issue was given considerable debate in Congress, and was yet 
another contributing factor to the loss of confidence in the treaty expressed in its 
imminent failure to be ratified at the time it was withdrawn from Senate. See: 
Blacker, Coit D. "The Soviets and Arms Control: The SALT II Negotiations, November 
1972-March 1976." The Other Side of the Table: The Soviet approach to Arms Control. 
Ed. Michael Mandelbaum. New York, London: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1990. 
Caldwell, Dan. "Verification and SALT." Verification and SALT: The Challenge of 
Strategic Deception. Ed. William C. Potter. Boulder: Westview Press, 1980.
Humphrey, Senator Gordon J. "Analysis and Compliance Enforcement in SALT 
Verification." International Security Review 5.1 (1980): 1-26. Talbot, Strobe. Endgame: 
The Inside Story of SALT II. New York: Harper and Row, 1979.
409 Caldwell, Dan. The Dynamics of Domestic Politics and Arms Control: The SALT II 
Treaty Ratification Debate. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1991. 
p.187.
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The [Carter] A dm inistration's handling of the ratification 
process was badly botched; no president should have allowed 
the Senate to dally over such a critical treaty.410
But, of each of the elements noted above, none of them alone would 
have prevented SALT II ratification, indeed, Caldwell suggests that 
even w hen taken collectively there was still a chance that SALT II 
would have been ratified, but these, when taken together with three 
external events appear to have driven the final nails in the coffin of 
SALT II ratification, and into the chances for Carter's reelection as 
president.
These events were; the discovery of a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba
and the politicisation of this issue which delayed the vote on SALT II,
the takeover of the US embassy in Tehran during the first week in
November 1979 which weakened public perceptions of the competency
of the C arter adm inistration, and finally, the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan. Again, it is not so m uch the events in themselves, but
the public perceptions of the Carter administration's responses to each
of these situations that, having been fed on well organised and
concerted conservative interpretations of Carter's handling of these
events, led finally to C arter’s w ithdraw al of SALT II from the
ratification process. It was in this political climate that Ronald Reagan
was elected President. As Richard Barnet describes it:
On Novem ber 4, 1980, Ronald Reagan was elected in a 
landslide. The world view of the Committee on the Present 
Danger, it now appeared, was national policy.411
410 Cited in Ibid,  p.187.
411 Barnet, Richard J. Real Security: Restoring American Power in a Dangerous 
Decade. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1981. p.62.
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My point in labouring the articulations of SALT II ratification failure is 
to provide a contextual basis with which to explain aspects of the 
remarkable shift in US articulations of its national security identity, to 
show that Reagan was not so much the instigator of this, but a product 
of this process, and to establish the context in which the SCC was to 
perform its task in the face of this shift.
Although never ratified, both the US and the Soviet Union agreed to 
respect and abide by its provisions, and to add its provisions to the 
agenda of the S tanding C onsultative412 C om m ission on Arms 
Limitation (SCC) that was established under the auspices of the ABM 
Treaty and Interim Agreement of 1972.
4.4 The SCC and the Politics of Reaganosaurus Rex
While at one level it could be argued that force levels are 'concrete 
facts' that bear little on 'theory', one m ust recall that the processes that 
lead to these force levels, that even the styles of technology 
developm ent are them selves the resu lt of negotiation  and the 
production of text.413 This point is further underscored by Strobe Talbot 
who notes that
412 See particularly Article XVII, Paragraph 1, which states:
To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, 
the Parties shall use the Standing Consultative Commission on Arms Limitation 
established by the Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of 
the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics Regarding the Establishment of a Standing Consultative 
Commission of December 21,1972.
413 For a detailed discussion of this see for example: Mackenzie, Donald. Inventing 
Accuracy: A Historical Sociology of Nuclear Missile Guidance. Cambridge, 
Massachussetts: The MIT Press, 1990.
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What utility nuclear weapons have ... is not so much 
military as political. Nuclear missiles and bombs are symbols 
of power. The way in which their custodians, the leaderships 
of the US and the Soviet Union manipulate these symbols is 
a key factor in how successful their other policies will be. In 
that respect, nuclear weapons exist to be talked about, not to 
be used. Largely for that reason, it is another central and, 
again, paradoxical part of their nature that they exist to be 
controlled. At least implicitly, the terms for the non-use of 
these weapons are always on the agenda of the superpower 
relationship, no matter how tense and antagonistic that 
relationship may be.414
One of the patterns of dispersion to be found in the arms control arena
is thus that of compliance or noncompliance with the provisions of
arms control agreements. It is the possibility of non-compliance that
makes possible the space provided by and for the Standing
Consultative Commission as an important domain of policymaking. It
is a domain that occupies a singular space on the boundaries between
the superpowers. It is a highly regulated space, given that its privacy
provisions allow it to interpenetrate the other's private space of
defence policymaking. It is of importance because it represents one of
the sites at which, in the symbolic domain, the US and the USSR
negotiate their boundaries with respect to their compliance with the
management of the nuclear symbols of power. As Talbot points out:
Nuclear arms control has been one of the most critical 
enterprises in American foreign policy since the early 1960s.
Like the Soviet-American relationship itself, arms control 
involves both cooperation and competition. Because the 
weapons under negotiation symbolize power of the most 
awesome kind, each side can use them as part of its ongoing 
effort to gain political advantages over the other, even as it 
seeks to avoid direct military conflict. An American 
administration's handling, or mishandling, of nuclear arms 
control has a major bearing on how that administration is 
judged by its constituents in the polls, by its legislative
414 Talbot, Strobe. Deadly Gambits. London: Picador, 1984. p.5
partners in governm ent, by its allies in the councils of
NATO, and also, of course, by its rivals in the Kremlin.415
Gloria Duffy and Vitali Loukiantzev note that the first term of the 
Reagan administration was characterised "more by controversies over 
compliance w ith past agreem ents than by progress tow ard new 
lim ita tions."416 This period has been referred to as the "compliance 
crisis"417 which was a period in which the SCC channel was virtually 
ignored, while public accusations were repeatedly levelled at the 
Soviets over alleged non-compliance w ith a range of arms control 
agreem ents, SALT being the m ost notable. M oreover, old issues of 
ambiguous compliance behaviours which had been settled through the 
SCC were now raised again as violations, reclassified from 'possible' to 
'definite' violation.418 This was a period in which US-Soviet relations 
were at a low ebb. Indeed, 1983 was characterised, perhaps ironically, by 
the Reagan adm inistration as "the year of the missile."419 With CPD 
members Fred Ikl4 and Richard Perle formulating arms control policy, 
form er ACDA Director, Paul W arnke, among other form er Carter
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415 Ibid.
416 Duffy, Gloria and Vitali A. Loukiantzev. "Arms Limitation and Control: Improving 
the Institutional Mechanisms for Resolving Compliance Issues." Verification: 
Monitoring and Disarmament. Ed. Caloger et al. Boulder: Westview, 1991. 7-19. p. 7.
417 Efinger, Manfred. "The Verification Policy of the Soviet Union." Aussenpolitik. 
4.iv (1989): 322-348. p.339.
418 see Duffy, Gloria. Compliance and the Future of Arms Control. Stanford: Stanford 
University and Global Outlook, 1988. p. 31. where she states that among the categories 
of non-compliant behaviour raised by Reagan were "cases in which Soviet behaviour 
has improved after a period of questionable compliance; charges retained by the 
Reagan administration despite a burden of evidence to the contrary; charges based upon 
a worst-case interpretation of soviet behaviour that differs little from US behaviour; 
and relatively minor disputes over treaty interpretation in which the US bases a 
charge of Soviet noncompliance upon its a own unilateral treaty interpretation, 
without seeking a new common understanding with the Soviets through the SCC."
419 Talbot, Strobe. Deadly Gambits. London: Picador, 1984. p.3.
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administration officials spoke of "foxes guarding the henhouse"420 and 
"when you have [Retired Army Major General] Ed Rowney reporting 
to Dick Perle there's no chance of getting anywhere."421
From the start of the Reagan Presidency the question of SALT was high 
on the agenda with considerable debate w ithin the adm inistration 
about whether or not to continue to adhere to the provisions of SALT 
II. Seemingly by default the US adm inistration took the view that 
"there's not even a marginal military reason for exceeding the SALT 
limits, if the TTB [threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974] disappeared we'd 
test weapons over 150 kilotons, but if SALT II disappeared, there’s 
nothing we'd do differently."422 Casper W einberger disagreed. There 
were divisions over whether the Soviets had complied with the SALT 
treaties in the past. With the first SCC session to be held under the new 
adm inistration approaching in March 1981 the first decision taken by 
Haig and backed by Reagan was a non-decision. It was a decision to 
postpone the SCC meeting until May, and it took so long to make that 
the meeting was not postponed until just before the scheduled meeting 
was due to take place. As Strobe Talbot pu t it, "there was a delay in 
proposing a delay."423
Part of the problem facing the conservative Reagan team revolved 
around a set of concerns that centre, in part, on the kinds of signals to
420 Quoted in: Herken, Gregg. Counsels of War. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985. 
p.324.
421 Quoted in: Ibid.
422 David Jones, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, quoted in Strobe Talbot 1984 Op 
Cit. p.226
423 Talbot, 1984. Op Ci t . p.229.
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send, both to the US' NATO allies and to the Soviet Union, and in part 
w ith the lack of firm evidence of Soviet cheating. Richard Burt, 
Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, suggested a departure from 
the established SCC practice of providing the Soviets with a written 
statem ent of the steps the United States was taking to rem ain in 
compliance with SALT I by providing a spoken statement only. When 
the issue arose of re-raising the old issue of the SS-19 missile in the 
SCC, Burt sidestepped, and raised the issue through other diplomatic 
channels. This was done to avoid further sullying of the waters of the 
SCC.424
As it happened, there were other issues that were more pressing to 
raise in the SCC meeting in May let alone any provocative and not 
fully substantiated additions. Among these was the question of Soviet 
telem etry encryption in missile tests of the SS-NX-20 SLBM. In a 
climate in which senior members of Reagan's adm inistration (as, for 
example, Casper W einberger and John Lehman), were arguing for a 
complete abandonment of SALT II and for recognition that the Interim 
Agreement had expired, the United States was not in a strong position 
to press for strict compliance with SALT II. Moreover, as calls for a 
wider interpretation of the ABM Treaty became louder there was also a 
growing awareness that under the w ider interpretation the Soviets 
were not in breach of its provisions as its am biguous compliance 
behaviour might have suggested.
424 Ibid.
Pacta sunt servanda
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Furthermore, there were consistent charges from the far right that 
United States compliance with the unratified SALT II Treaty was 
unconstitutional.425 Nevertheless, since June 18, 1979, the United 
States and the Soviet Union were obligated under international law, 
through the principle of pacta sunt servanda, 426 to "do nothing which 
would 'defeat the object and purpose' of the SALT II Treaty" despite its 
being unratified.
42  ^US Senate Congressional Record November 23,1983 p. S 12861.
426 This is the general presumption against unilateral termination. According to Lord 
NcNair. The Law of Treaties. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986. pp. 493-505 - "...no 
government would decline to accept the principle pacta sunt servanda, and the very 
fact that Governments find it necessary to spend so much effort in explaining in a 
particular case that the pactum has ceased to exist, or that the act complained of is not 
a breach of it, either by reason of an implied term or for some other reason, is the best 
acknowledgement of that principle. A long series of inter-governmental discussions of 
this nature can be invoked to show that there is a general presumption against the 
existence of any right of unilateral termination of a treaty." - p.493.
Among the cases cited by Lord McNair supporting this principle with respect to United 
States practice, these include the Memorandum by Sir E. Hertslet dated 20 May 1880 on 
the Proposed Abrogation by the United States of The Clayton - Bulwer Treaty of 1850.
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Rebus sic stantibus
On the subject of international law, the other approach, should the
United States have chosen that route, would be to effect changes to the
treaty (revision) which, under international law, through the principle
of rebus sic stantibus, would require agreem ent between both Parties.
This suggests that if such changes were negotiated through the SCC
then the criterion of agreement by both Parties could be met. Such a
m ove, arguably  lies beh ind  the negotiation  of protocols for
dism antlem ent procedures, for example. Any move beyond technical
fine-tuning of the original Treaty, would however, constitute a new
treaty. This would not be suitable practice for arms control agreements
by which such changes could only be brought about through a
recognition that the circumstances under which the Treaty had been
negotiated had changed substantially. Such a clause was included
within both the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement such that:
each Party shall have the right to withdraw  from this (Treaty) 
(Agreement) ... if it decides that extraordinary events related 
to the subject m atter of this (Treaty) (Agreement) have 
jeopardized its supreme interests.427
As Calvo-Goller notes, the political aspects of this leave wide scope for 
each Party to determine how it defines or interprets the meaning of 
"ex traordinary  events," how  one conceives of one's "suprem e 
interests" and how each Party defines "threat." Calvo-Goller further 
notes that:
None of the withdrawal clauses in the SALT Agreements can 
be viewed as perm itting denunciation due to a change of
427 Calvo-Goller, N.K., and M.A. Calvo. The SALT Agreements: Content - Application 
- Verification. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987. p.178.
circum stances unless the new  circum stances constitute 
extraordinary events.428
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Thus the clause of rebus sic stantibus, could only be applied to 
exceptional circumstances under the Vienna Convention on Treaties, 
if "it is absolutely impossible for a state to execute a treaty or if a treaty 
is found to be in conflict with its most vital interests."429
’’Window of Vulnerability”
Reagan's rhetoric of danger served to further demonise the Soviet 
Union. It did nothing to ease growing Soviet concerns that the United 
States was working to develop a first-strike capability. From the 
beginning of his presidential election campaign the term "window of 
vulnerability"430 was mobilised to condense the idea that Carter had let 
the country down, that by cancelling the MX missile program  the US 
had effectively unilaterally disarmed, and that the Soviet Union would 
soon reach such strategic superiority that the United States would soon 
become vulnerable to a pre-emptive nuclear attack. On the basis of this 
catch-phrase, Reagan was set to justify his opposition to SALT II and to 
a nuclear freeze. That this rhetoric was not unlike the 'missile gap' 
rhetoric that brought Kennedy to power should not be so surprising as 
it was prom ulgated by Paul Nitze's Committee on the Present Danger - 
Nitze himself having been the architect of the rhetoric of the original 
bomber and missile 'gap' of the 1950s.
428 Ibid, p.178, see note 797.
429 Ibid, p.177-8
4 30 gee Scheer, Robert. With Enough Shovels: Reagan, Bush and Nuclear War. 
Random House,.New York. 1982. especially chapter 6, pp. 66-82.
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The so-called 'w indow of vulnerability ' held that the Soviet Union 
was acquiring the capability to pre-em ptively destroy the bulk of 
United States land-based ICBMs. The theory being that, at some point 
in the near future:
the Soviets will have a strategic  advantage of such 
m agnitude that they can launch a first-strike sufficient to 
prevent a devastating U.S. response431
The Reagan adm inistration seemed in this to ignore the fact that
earlier adm in istrations had p lanned  for such a possibility  by
developing two other legs to what had become known as the strategic
triad. The triad consisted, not only of land-based ICBMs, but also of air-
launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) and subm arine-launched ballistic
missiles (SLBMs), both of which were w idely considered to be
'survivable.'432 However, as late as 1983, David Sullivan observed:
Beyond American num erical inferiority, Soviet strategic 
forces of 1980 have a lready  opened  a "w indow  of 
vulnerability" on all US strategic forces, and this w indow 
will gape open all the wider throughout SALT II. The SALT 
process itself has contributed to US strategic vulnerability by 
offering the false promise that somehow the Soviets would 
agree to limit their threat to American land-based missiles. ...
The "window of vulnerability" once again leaves America 
open to Soviet nuclear blackm ail, as in the period of 
Krushchev's rocket rattling in the 1950s and early 1960s.433
431 Scheer, Robert.With Enough Shovels: Reagan, Bush and Nuclear War. New York: 
Random House, 1982. p.71.
432 See Report of US Secretary of Defence Harold Brown to the Congress on the FY1982 
Budget, FY1983 Authorization Request and FY 1982-6 Defence Programs January 19, 
1981.
433 US Senate. Congressional Record . September 23, 1983. p.S 12840. This article also 
completely ignores the air and submarine legs of the triad, dwelling instead on throw- 
weight and megatonnage without regard to the survivability of their basing platforms.
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W ith statem ents like these in the public arena, the prospects for
effective negotiations on arms control compliance were not good. As
Thomas Schelling lamented in 1985:
For several years w hat are called arms negotiations have 
been mostly a public exchange of accusations; and it often 
looks as if it is the arms negotiations that are driving the 
arms race.434
This was brought out through studies of Soviet responses to Reagan's 
policies and rhetoric as expressed through, for example, Bialer and 
Afferica where they note:
President Reagan's concentration on the Russian danger as 
the fundam ental issue in w orld politics is m atched in 
intensity by Russia's preoccupation w ith Reaganism as a 
clear m enace to its internal stability  and in ternational 
authority. ... Like American commentators on international 
problem s, they regard as the key aspects of policy the 
direction of military decisions, the use of economic power, 
the climate of relations and the approach to negotiations and 
to regional conflicts. ... In Soviet eyes, the most significant 
element of the Reagan approach is its attem pt to alter the 
balance of military power between the United States and the 
Soviet Union.435
As Coral Bell points out, by 1983 relations between the United States 
and the Soviet Union were "at their lowest point since the death of 
Stalin 30 years earlier."436 That said, she also points to Reagan's first 
term  as fundam entally a continuation of the foreign and defence 
policies of Carter, with a discursive overlay of moral panic. For Bell the 
principal difference lay in the symbolic order, or to use her phrase "on
434 Schelling, Thomas "What Went Wrong With Arms Control?" Foreign Affairs. 64.2 
(1985-6): 219-233. p.219.
435 Bialer, Serwyn, and Joan Afferica. "Reagan and Russia." Foreign Affairs. 61.2 
(1982-3): 249-271. pp.250-251.
436 Bell, Coral. "From Carter to Reagan." Foreign Affairs. 63.3 (1984): 490-510. p.495.
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the rhetorical front."437 The key difference, for her, lay in the
declaratory policy rather than in operational policy. The Foucaultian
sophistication of her Foreign Affairs article lies in her inclusion of the
Reagan defence budget within the discursive framework of a "strong
declaratory signal" insofar as it represents "a statement of intent about
the future balance of forces-rather than a transformation of the
existing balance of the 1980s."438 Hinting at the power of the
Committee on the Present Danger and of their continuing role in the
Reagan presidency, Bell argues that
...since the image of US military weakness was created chiefly 
by words (mostly from the Reagan camp from the 
Republican nomination fight of 1976 onwards) it is logical 
that more words from the same sources should have been 
effective in readjusting that somewhat distorted image to 
reflect the reality of effective (though asymmetrical) 
superpower parity.439
In following sections I shall examine some of these 'words' and their 
effect (reception) on the arms control process as expressed through the 
SALT SCC. The importance of the rhetorical in constituting the 
political reality is strongly hinted at in Bell:
... from the point of view of the theory of foreign policy, the 
greater importance of declaratory over operational signals in 
an age of surveillance may be the idea to be noted 440
Although discourse theorists may put it more strongly and with 
greater confidence, Bell nonetheless recognises that declaratory and
437 Ibid, p.496.
438 Ibid, p.492.
439 Ibid.
440 Ibid, p.510.
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operational policy, insofar as they are politically meaningful, can both 
be considered as species of the genus 'discursive practice.'
W hat is im portant here, is not that the 'Soviet threat' was a 'mere 
p roduct of w ords,' bu t that for com pelling dom estic reasons a 
particular representation of Soviet strategy was necessary in order to 
draw  together the disparate frameworks that constituted the United 
States under the unifying rubric of security against a common and 
'present' danger .441
441 For an elaboration on a similar point made regarding the NATO alliance see: 
Klein, Bradley. "How the West Was One: Representational Politics of NATO" ISQ 
34/3 September 1990 pp.311-315. p.313.
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SCC Activity from 1980-1985
At the Spring session of the SCC in 1980, work was suspended on SALT 
II implementation procedures following the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan and the failure of the US Senate to ratify the SALT II 
Treaty.
As noted earlier in this chapter the 18th SCC meeting scheduled for 
March was delayed until May 27, 1981. This was due to internal debate 
within the newly elected Reagan administration over whether or not 
to continue to uphold the SALT Treaties and whether or not to 
continue using the SCC.
During the October round of the SCC (19th meeting) the Soviet SCC 
delegation responded to US concerns regarding the location of Soviet 
LPARs by stating that their placement took account of "technical and 
practical considerations."
In the September 1982 round (21st meeting) the United States asserted 
that Soviet SS-16 ICBMs were secretly deployed at Plesetsk. The Soviet 
maintained that they were neither deployed, nor in production. They 
further contended that no clause of the SALT II treaty applied to those 
missiles. The two sides deadlocked on the issue and held a recess until 
December when the SCC convened an ABM Treaty review.
In October of the same year the Soviets flight-tested their SS-24 
MIRVed ICBM.
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US Charges of Soviet Noncompliance 
with SALT Agreements 1980-1985
This section provides the empirical data on which the analysis of the 
political shift between the Carter and Reagan Presidencies is based. It 
serves to reinforce the thesis that there is an indexical link between 
arms control policy (a subset of national security policy) and state­
m aking view ed through the activities which m aintain the state 
boundaries.
This record of SALT compliance in the first Reagan term  draw s 
principally, but not exclusively upon the 1984 and 1985 Congressional 
Hearings before the US Senate Armed Services Committee on Soviet 
Treaty Violations with additional background material as required to 
examine the degree to which compliance concerns are raised in this 
period, coupled with an examination of the m anner and rhetoric with 
which often am biguous behaviours are construed in this period as 
concrete examples of Soviet violations of the SALT Agreements.
Overall, as Duffy points out, of the twenty arms control agreements 
between the US and the Soviet Union, fewer than half have been "the 
subject of significant, unresolved complaints regarding compliance."442 
Eight agreements have been the subject of some forty United States and 
Soviet reciprocal charges of noncompliance since 1983, reflecting the 
deteriorating political climate of the time. Of those, we are concerned 
here only with those agreements that fall within the m andate of the 
SCC. It is also relevant to consider the legal status of these agreements
442 Duffy, Gloria. Compliance and the Future of Arms Control. Stanford: Stanford 
University and Global Outlook, 1988. p.17.
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as this may have some bearing on the implications of noncompliance. 
Those that fall within the purview of the SCC are the ABM Treaty, 
1972; SALT I Interim Agreement, 1972; SALT II Treaty, 1979. The ABM 
Treaty is a fully ratified treaty, the SALT I Interim Agreement was an 
executive agreement in force until November 1986, and the SALT II 
Treaty holds the status of a treaty for which the ratification process had 
been discontinued.443 Although the first two can claim a similar degree 
of authority, SALT II falls into an ambiguous category, without the full 
binding force of a ratified treaty, yet laying claim to some force on the 
basis of the international law principle of pacta sunt servanda. 
According to Duffy, expectations for compliance with SALT II are based 
on the declaratory political commitment of the Parties.444
By 1982 the conservatives, including the CPD, had become increasingly 
strident, forming a suitable context within which Reagan could 
establish an arms control working group, as Reagan put it, "to examine 
verification and compliance issues." With some sixty CPD members, 
drawn from both Democrat and Republican sides, it seemed only a 
matter of time before Congress should call on President Reagan to 
report to it on Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements 
under the FY 1984 Arms Control and Disarmament Act. Even the 
negative titling of the report that was submitted seemed to prejudge, 
not the degree to which the Soviets complied with their obligations
443 Ibid, p.18.
444 Ibid.
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under the various arms control agreem ents, bu t the degree of 
noncom pliance.445
In 1984 the United States reviewed seven initial issues of concern and 
charged the Soviet Union with "violations and probable violations 
w ith respect to a num ber of Soviet legal obligations and political 
commitments in the arms control field."446 The relevant concerns for 
our discussion here, bear on compliance with the SALT agreements 
that fall under the purview of the SCC.
The 1985 President's report on Soviet noncom pliance provided 
'updated ' information on the seven issues raised in the 1984 report 
and added six others covering aspects of compliance with the SALT I 
Interim Agreement, the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) and the ABM 
Treaty.
Of the four issues of concern in the 1984 Report that pertain to the 
SALT Agreements; one was of the ABM Treaty - the Krasnoyarsk radar 
issue - and represents probably the only full violation of a legally 
binding agreement, while the other three were grey area violations of 
the unratified SALT II Treaty. These concerns were (i) the encryption of 
telemetry, (ii) SS-X-25 missile, considered to be a second new type 
(where only one was permitted) and (iii) SS-16, possibly representing a 
banned deploym ent of an ICBM. The Krasnoyarsk radar issue is of 
particular interest, and for that reason I shall defer its exploration until
445 PRESIDENT'S REPORT TO CONGRESS ON SOVIET NONCOMPLIANCE WITH 
ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS, Washington: US ACDA. 1984, President Reagan's 
Letter of Transmittal, House Documents No. 98-158 98th Congress.
446 Ibid.  p.l.
after a brief review of the other SALT-related issues raised within the 
S C C .
Conversion of launchers from 'light* to 'heavy'
Article II of the Interim Agreement states:
The Parties undertake not to convert land-based launchers 
for light ICBMs, or for ICBMs of older types deployed prior to 
1964, into land-based launchers for heavy ICBMs of types 
deployed after that time.447
GAC Report (1983) cites as violation of SALT I Interim Agreement of 
1972 the Soviet deployment of the large-throw-weight SS-19 and SS-17 
ICBMs from 1972 to the time of the report. The charge alleged 
circumvention defeating the stated US object and purpose of limiting 
throw-weight of Soviet ICBMs and breach of the 1972 Principles 
Agreement.
This charge did not arise in the 1985 President's Report on Soviet 
Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements, and appears to have 
been an attempt to resurrect an issue that had been settled long before, 
as documented in R.W. Buchheim's Briefing on SALT I Compliance 
in 1979 448
232
447 US Government, ACDA, ed. Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: Texts and 
Histories of Negotiations. Washington: United States Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency, 1980. p.150
448 See: Buchheim, R.W., and Sydney Graybeal. Briefing on SALT I Compliance. 
Washington DC: US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 1979.
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Use of telem etry encryption: ’D eliberate concealment m easures that 
impede verification by NTMs
Article XV(3) of SALT II states in part:
Each Party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment 
m easures which im pede verification by national technical 
means of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty.
The Second Common Understanding states:
Each Party is free to use various forms transm itting  
telem etric  in fo rm ation  d u rin g  testing , inc lud ing  its 
encryption, except that, in accordance with the provisions of 
Paragraph 3 of Article XV of the Treaty, neither Party shall 
engage in deliberate denial of telemetric information, such as 
through the use of telem etry encryption, w henever such 
den ial im pedes verification  of com pliance w ith  the 
provisions of the Treaty.
a) GAC Report (1983) cites as a violation the encryption of telemetry 
which impeded the ability of the US to determine the characteristics of 
test missiles, including those characteristics prohibited by SALT II.
The 1984 P residen t's  R eport to C ongress concerning  Soviet 
noncompliance with arms control agreements notes that, as the SALT 
II Treaty had not been ratified, and that, as of 1981 the US had made it 
clear that ratification w ould not take place, then two degrees of 
noncompliance could be applied. Before 1981, both nations would be 
obligated under the conventional practice of in ternational law to 
comply with the Treaty's provisions (under the principle of pacta sunt 
servanda ). After 1981, both the United States and the Soviet Union 
declared their political com m itm ent to 'refrain from actions that 
undercut SALT II' for as long as each other continued to comply. 
Under this set of unilateral declarations, any breach of compliance with 
SALT II would thereby constitute violations of a political commitment.
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The 1984 Report concluded that 'Soviet encryption practices constitute 
a violation of a legal obligation prior to 1981 and a violation of their 
political commitment subsequent to 1981’ with particular reference to 
the Soviet SS-X-25 missile. This charge was reaffirmed in the 1985 
Report, emphasised in the 1986 Report, and noted again in terms of a 
'deliberate denial of missile test information.'449 The Soviets countered 
by asking the US to supply details of which telemetry channels need to 
be de-encripted to complete the requirements for verification. 
Unfortunately, for the US to reveal those details would, by implication, 
reveal the sources by which the US determines compliance - thus 
providing the Soviets with the information they would need to design 
around the US' national technical means of verification of compliance 
with the Treaty.
The SS-X-25 Missile: Second new type
Article IV(9) of the SALT II Treaty states:
Each Party undertakes not to flight-test or deploy new types of 
ICBMs not flight-tested as of May 1, 1979, except that each Party 
may flight-test and deploy one new type of light ICBM
The Second Agreed Statement attached to Paragraph 9 of Article IV of 
the SALT II Treaty states:
The term 'new types of ICBMs,' as used in paragraph 9 of 
Article IV of the Treaty, refers to any ICBM which is different 
from those flight-tested as of MAY 1, 1979 in any or more of 
the following respects:
a) the number of stages, the length, the largest diameter, 
the launch-weight, or the throw-weight, of the missile;
449 ACA, Arms Control Association. "Analysis of the President's Report on Soviet 
Noncompliance With Arms Control Agreements." Arms Control Today 17.3 (April) 
(1987): la-10a. p.9A.
b) the type of propellant (that is, liquid or solid) of any 
of its stages.
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The First Common Understanding attached to Paragraph 9 of Article 
IV of the SALT II Treaty states:
As used in the First Agreed Statement to paragraph 9 of 
Article IV of the Treaty, the term 'different,' referring to the 
length, the diameter, the launch-weight, and the throw- 
weight, of the missile, means a difference in excess of five 
percent.
The Second Agreed Statement attached to Paragraph 9 of Article IV of 
the SALT II Treaty states:
Every ICBM of the one new type of light ICBM permitted to 
each Party pursuant to paragraph 9 of Article IV of the Treaty 
shall have the same number of stages and the same type of 
propellant (that is, liquid or solid) of each stage as the first 
ICBM of the one new type of light ICBM launched by that 
Party. In addition, after the twenty-fifth launch of an ICBM of 
that type, or after the last launch before deployment begins of 
ICBMs of that type, whichever occurs earlier, ICBMs of the 
one new type of light ICBM permitted to that Party shall not 
be different in any one or more of the following respects: the 
length, the largest diameter, the launch weight, or the throw- 
weight, of the missile
The reason for this set of provisions, as expressed in the President's 
Report on Soviet non-compliance 1985, is that these represented an 
attempt to 'constrain the modernisation and the proliferation of new, 
more capable types of ICBMs.'450 By constraining the 'one new type' of 
light' (that is, single-warhead) missile, such that the post-boost reentry 
vehicle must not be less than fifty-percent of the throw-weight (defined 
as the weight of the warheads and the mechanisms that target and
450 US Government, Ronald Reagan. "Soviet noncompliance with arms control 
agreements, report transmittal." P residen tial D ocum ents 20.4/ January 30,1984 (1984): 
73-77. p.6.
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release them451) it was intended that single-warhead ICBMs should not 
be read ily  convertible to MIRVed system s. The throw -w eight 
allowance differential between the post-boost vehicle greater than fifty 
percent, but less than one hundred percent of the throw-weight would, 
however allow for a limited degree of penetration aids ('spoofing,' in 
the form of radar chaff, or light-weight decoys).
As Duffy points out, 'm odernisation' of existing types did not mean
that the modernised version had to be specifically related to a previous
type. The constraints are merely that:
as long as the launch-weight, throw -w eight, length, and 
largest diameter of a missile tested are within 5 percent of 
those of any missile of an existing type, (and the kind of 
propellant and num ber of stages are the same) [then] ... the 
new  m issile is for treaty  purposes to be considered a 
modification of that existing type...452
W ith the flight testing of the SS-N-24 in October 1982, the Soviet 
Union declared that this was to be the 'one new type' as allowed by 
Article IV of the SALT II Treaty. The SS-N-24 was MIRVed with ten 
warheads, and designed to be rail-mobile and silo-based. The United 
States in turn designated its MX [Missile: Experimental] missile as its 
one new type under SALT II.
In February 1983 a missile was flight-tested from Plesetsk. Designated 
the SS-25, it was thought to represent the first of a second new type of 
ICBM, although heavy telemetry encryption m ade it difficult for the
451 See John Newhouse The Nuclear Age from Hiroshima to Star Wars London: 
Michael Joseph p.242
452 Duffy, Gloria. Compliance and the Future of Arms Control. Stanford: Stanford 
University and Global Outlook, 1988. p.64. Duffy notes further, that the new missile 
could even be the product of a different design bureau.
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US to be able to state unequivocally that the missile represented a new 
type, and hence a treaty violation.
Although stating that the evidence was ’somewhat ambiguous,' the 
GAC Report (1983) cited the SS-X-25 as a possible second new type of 
ICBM and therefore a 'probable violation' of the provisions of the 
SALT II Treaty.453 From 1985454 onwards the charge was listed as a 
definite violation and was reaffirmed in every subsequent report to the 
present (1990).
The December 1985 report charged that the throw-weight of the SS-25 
exceeded by more than five percent the throw-weight of the SS-13 
ICBM. This would mean that the SS-25 could not be considered a 
permitted modernisation of an earlier type, as permitted by SALT II 
and as claimed by the Soviets. Its testing, in addition to the testing of 
the SS-X-24 (the Soviet's stated 'new type') would render the SS-25 a 
prohibited second new type. This was claimed by the US to be a 
'violation of the Soviet Union's political commitment to observe the 
'new type' provision of the SALT II Treaty.'455 The December report 
goes on to add to this a related violation by the deployment, in 1985, of 
the SS-25.
The Reagan administration charged that the SS-25 was a violation of 
both the 'new type' rule and of the 50% rule. The 'new type’ charge
453 Later named the SS-N-25
454 The February 1984, and February 1985 reports did not specify the manner in which 
the SS-25 constituted a violation
455 US Government, Department of State. Soviet Noncompliance With Arms control 
Agreements Special Report No. 136. Bureau of Public Affairs, December, 1985.p.6.
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arose from claims that the throw-weight of the SS-25 was estimated to 
be around 90% greater456 than the SS-13 that the Soviets held up for 
com parison. The Reagan adm inistration  further alleged that the 
reentry vehicle of the SS-25 violated the 50% rule on the grounds that 
it constituted only about 45% of the missile's throw-weight.
The process of determining throw-weight from flight-test telemetry is 
neither easy nor straightforward, especially when there is a high level 
of telemetry encryption.
At a press conference on June 4,1986, a Soviet official457 stated:
At variance with [the throw -w eight definition] provision, 
the weight of certain elements which make up the throw- 
weight of the old missile [SS-13] (means to overcome ABM 
defence and the warhead guidance device) is not included by 
the United States.458
W hat he was pointing out is that the United States had overestimated 
the throw -w eight of the SS-25 by including the w eight of an 
instrum ent package used during testing that would not be included in 
the actual deploym ent of the missile, and that other components had 
been excluded in estimates of the throw-weight of the SS-13. The net 
analysis, according to Marshal Akhromeyev is that the US assessment
456 ACA, Arms Control Association. "Analysis of the President’s Report on Soviet 
Noncompliance With Arms Control Agreements." Arms Control Today 17.3 (April) 
(1987): la-10a.p.8a. Other sources point to Secretary of Defence, Casper Weinberger as 
claiming that the throw-weight of the SS-25 was nearly twice that of the SS-13. On 
this point see: Duffy, Gloria. Compliance and the Future of Arms Control. Stanford: 
Stanford University and Global Outlook, 1988.p.65.
4^7 Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev, chief of staff of the Soviet military
458 Marshall Sergei Akhromeyev, Chief of Staff of the Soviet Military quoted in 
Duffy, Gloria. Compliance and the Future of Arms Control. Stanford: Stanford 
University and Global Outlook, 1988. p.66-7.
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was in error, not because of faulty m easurem ent, but because of 
inappropriate  calculations which apportioned the ratio of throw- 
weight to launch-weight.
Duffy notes that the US has to rely on 'best estimates’ of throw-weight 
derived from the analysis of test data, which operates with a broad 
m argin of uncertainty. The Stanford Research Group observes that 
there is still some overlap of the distributions which allow for a small 
percentage chance that the parameters of the SS-25 may fall within the 
five-percent limit, and that the apparent differences may be due to 
measurement or statistical errors. They note, however, that the chance 
is small, and that the 1985 Report's use of the phrase 'based on 
convincing evidence'459 suggests that the Reagan adm inistration was 
confident that the difference was real and significant. Moreover, the 
Reagan adm inistration  charged that, w hether or not the SS-25 
constituted a violation of the re-entry vehicle to throw-weight ratio, 
the encryption of the test telemetry was "illustrative of the deliberate 
im peding of verification of compliance in violation of the USSR's 
political commitment.
The Arms Control Association's staff assessm ent of the charge 
concludes that:
Until the administration is prepared to explain on what basis 
it excludes ... additional devices from its calculation of the 
SS-13's throw-weight, and on what basis the instrumentation 
package on the SS-25 should be included in the missile's 
throw-weight, its case will remain weak. W hether or not the 
SS-25 fits w ithin the five-percent lim it on throw -w eight 
using the Soviet reading of the treaty language depends upon
459 US Government, Department of State. Soviet Noncompliance With Arms control 
Agreements Special Report No. 136. Bureau of Public Affairs, 1985. p.6.
the weights of the various elements of the throw-weight.
This information, which the United States may not know in 
detail, has not been volunteered by the Soviet Union.460
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The Stanford Research Group came to similar conclusions, suggesting 
that the evidence that the SS-25 represents a violation is not at all clear 
cut. In concluding comments reviewing both the US and the Soviet 
positions they note:
It appears that a reasonable though legalistic case can be made 
for the Soviet position. Secretary of State Schultz in effect 
conceded as much when he stated in a television interview, 
"there are questions about whether in a purely technical 
sense, the SS-25 fits within the treaty language as might be 
interpreted by a lawyer."
A reasonable case can be made for the administration as well.
The situation appears to be one in which a literal reading of 
the treaty language and a common sense interpretation of its 
intent lead to opposite conclusions. A more forthright 
presentation of the issue would have at least made it clear 
that there is a Soviet side to the story, a side not totally 
devoid of substance.461
Military significance
The issue of verification standard has been canvassed in earlier 
chapters. However, the application of these standards requires an 
assessment of the alleged non-compliant behaviour in terms of 
military significance. Particularly, but not exclusively, with respect to 
the standard of 'adequate verification' (this also applies to Reagan's 
standard of 'effective verification') the object of verification is to detect 
non-compliant, or potentially non-compliant behaviour before the
46)0 ACA, Arms Control Association. "Analysis of the President's Report on Soviet 
Noncompliance With Arms Control Agreements." Arms Control Today 17.3 (April) 
(1987): la-10a. p.8a.
461 Duffy, Gloria. Compliance and the Future of Arms Control. Stanford: Stanford 
University and Global Outlook, 1988. p.70.
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effect of such behaviour becomes 'militarily significant.' This in itself 
can be the object of intense debate over how one applies the term 
'm ilitary significance,' but at some point these behaviours require 
some form of proportional response. This again is a political issue, as 
even technical breaches of a treaty can be assessed in multiple ways as 
regards their military significance.
If one assumes that the SS-25 issue represents a clear violation of the 
SALT II Treaty, the question arises as to the military significance of this 
breach. Such an assessment has to take account of the m anner or style 
of breach, and it has to take account only of that aspect of the missile 
system that is in breach of the treaty. Finally the breach needs to be 
assessed in terms of the value of its contribution to the strategic 
capability of the notional adversary and assessed in terms of what the 
degree of change indicates about the intentions of the other side. Note 
that the overall capability itself need not be taken into account with 
respect to the 'intentions' of the other, but the direction and degree of 
change to the other side's force posture. In this sense, w hat is 
significant is the degree and m anner in which a breach can be read in 
term s of gesture. In interpersonal term s (as we are dealing w ith 
subjectivities, however m ultiple and contradictory) one does not read 
the other in terms of whether or not they possess arms, hands or face, 
but in the m ovem ents of these parts by which they signal their 
intentions - their gestures. In this sense, then, the other's responses to 
the formal behaviour codes instituted by an arms control regime are 
enunciated by gestures that can be 'read' by and through various 
interpretive schemata in terms of com pliance/violation, enunciative 
force of the agreem ent (whether formal ratified treaty or political 
commitment) modality and degree of violation (is it a material breach
by extension (vertical proliferation); that is, by exceeding numerical 
limits; or by lateral proliferation, that is, by developing and deploying 
prohibited new types).
In the case of the SS-25, as Duffy notes,462 the significance lies in the 
differential in throw-weight between the SS-13 and the SS-25, rather 
than in the significance of the total package of the SS-25. If the mass of 
the SS-25's reentry vehicle were held down to SS-13 specifications as 
read by the US, then there would be no technical violation and the SS- 
25 would have represented a permitted modification of the SS-13. If 
that were the case, Duffy argues, although the nuclear yield would be 
'somewhat less' than the actual SS-25, this would be readily offset by 
developments in yield-to-weight ratios and improvements in targeting 
accuracy463 that would more than offset any marginal decrease in the 
warhead's fissile mass. Duffy points out that the real significance of the 
SS-25 is its mobile basing mode which would enhance its survivability. 
As Duffy notes:
Whatever the strategic significance of the SS-25, very little of 
that significance is attributable to the extra throw-weight that 
constitutes the compliance issue.464
Assuming that the SS-25 is a violation in the terms stated by the 
Reagan administration assessments of the RV:Throw-weight ratio, 
then the question remains as to the extent of the violation in terms of
462 Duffy, Gloria. Compliance and the Future of Arms Control. Stanford: Stanford 
University and Global Outlook, 1988. p.71.
463 por a detailed analysis of the role of increased accuracy in decreasing the yield 
side of the equation see: Mackenzie, Donald. Inventing Accuracy: A Historical 
Sociology of Nuclear Missile Guidance. Cambridge, Massachussetts: The MIT Press, 
1990.
464 Duffy, Op.Cit 1988, p.72.
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the potential to derive a MIRVed mode for the SS-25. If the US figures 
are correct and the RV represents between 40-50% of the throw-weight, 
then two immediate questions arise:
i) why go to all the trouble of violating a treaty for the sake of an 
ambiguous ability to add only one extra warhead. Duffy argues that if 
the RV had been only 10% of the throw-weight then it would seem 
logical to assume MIRV capabilities for this missile.
ii) It is not at all clear that it would be possible to mount an extra 
warhead in any case, since to do so would require the addition of yet 
another post-boost vehicle (PBV), with a corresponding increase in 
instrumentation - itself no light weight. A second reentry vehicle (RV) 
would leave only about 10-15% of the throw-weight for the additional 
post-boost vehicle. Duffy notes that it seems unlikely that the Soviets 
would have one light enough to fall within these specifications. 
Therefore, claims made by the Reagan administration that "the SS-25 
also could be modified to carry more than a single warhead"465 seem to 
be more a case of imputing to the other capabilities one does not 
possess oneself.
The political climate in which the SCC was expected to operate at this
time was at its most confrontational as we have seen for reasons given
at the beginning of this chapter. According to Duffy:
The SCC has discussed the SS-25 but has made no progress 
toward resolving the dispute. Apparently, the United States 
has simply accused the Soviets of a violation and insisted 
that they terminate the SS-25 program. For their part, the 
Soviets have not provided any information that might be
46,5 See US Government, Department of State. Soviet Noncompliance With Arms 
control Agreements Special Report No. 136. Bureau of Public Affairs, 1985. p.3.
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helpful, such as the natu re  and w eight of the SS-13's 
"guidance device" or the nature of the penetration aids that 
they claim it carries and that the United States has not 
detected.466
This instance is one of many that reflect the political nature of what 
has often been described as a technical issue. That no agreements were 
signed in the SCC during the first term of the Reagan administration 
was no accident. Nor did this reflect a failure in the SCC process itself, 
but rather an unwillingness to utilise the SCC for that for which it was 
intended.
Grey-Area Disputes
There were a number of issues raised in the SCC as potential violations 
of the SALT Treaties that fall under the purview  of the SCC. In many 
cases, the m anner in which they were approached by the Reagan 
administration followed closely the pattern of responses set out in the 
SS-25 issue above.
Non-permanently fixed ABM radar
GAC R eport (1983) cites as a violation the developm ent and 
deploym ent of a non-permanently fixed ABM radar on the Kamchatka 
peninsula in 1975 and 'continuing developm ental activities between 
1975 and the present (1983).
These issues are largely a raking over of old issues - the 'Pawn Shop' 
and 'Flat Twin' radars were more than a decade old at the time of the 
allegations. At no time were they mobile in any m eaningful sense of
466 Duffy, Gloria. Compliance and the Future of Arms Control. Stanford: Stanford 
University and Global Outlook, 1988. p.69.
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the word. While they could be erected in a shorter time than previous
ABM system s, they still needed to rest on p repared  concrete
foundations, and, according to the ACA assessm ent of the 1987
President's report on Soviet noncompliance:
... a single operational site would take about half a year to 
construct. A nationw ide ABM system  based on this new 
system would take a matter of years to build467
The Arms Control Association assessment concludes:
A pparently, very little activity w ith regard to these two 
radars has taken place since the 1978 report was written and 
none of the radars have been deployed at the perm itted 
Moscow deployment area or elsewhere in the Soviet Union. 
Therefore there is little evidence for the adm inistration 's 
charge that these radars represent a "potential violation" of 
the treaty.
Exceeding launcher limits
GAC Report (1983) cites as a violation the deploym ent of DELTA 
subm arines resulting in exceeding the lim it of 740 launch tubes 
w ithout dism antling sufficient older ICBM or SLBM launchers. This 
accusation represents a review  of the 1975 violation, bu t now 
suggesting that the actions were 'probably not inadvertent but rather 
part of a deliberate Soviet challenge to US arms control verification 
capabilities.
Deployment of SS-16 ICBMs at Plesetsk
GAC Report (1983) cites as a violation the 'probable continued 
deployment' of the Soviet SS-16 ICBM at Plesetsk. The report charges
467 ACA, Arms Control Association. "Analysis of the President's Report on Soviet 
Noncompliance With Arms Control Agreements." Arms Control Today 17.3 (April) 
(1987): la-10a. p.3a.
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that Soviet 'deliberate' use of concealment which impedes verification 
of compliance by US national technical means has been associated with 
probable SS-16 deployment. After 1979, modifications of sites that had 
been associated with the SS-16 ICBM, and the lack of evidence that the 
SS-16 missiles had been destroyed, led the United States to assume the 
SS-16 was still deployed
Duffy notes that US surveillance satellites have reportedly never
actually observed SS-16 missiles at the Plesetsk site. Duffy also notes:
In late 1985 US intelligence observed the Soviets moving 
warhead transporters and other support equipment for 
mobile missiles onto rail-cars at Plesetsk. Much of the 
intelligence community drew the conclusion that the Soviets 
were removing the SS-16s from Plesetsk and sending them 
into storage. This charge therefore, does not currently 
represent Soviet non-compliance, if it ever did.468
Mobile Missile Base Construction at Dismantled SS-7 ICBM Sites
The 1985 report on Soviet non-compliance reaffirmed the February
1985 report that the Soviets had been using former SS-7 ICBM facilities
for the storage, support, or launch of SS-25 mobile ICBMs in violation
of the SALT I Interim Agreement. This issue was again reaffirmed in
the 1986 report. What needs to be remembered here, is that under the
SALT I Interim Agreement there is no limitation to the deployment of
mobile, land-based ICBM launchers. Moreover, the 1985 report, while
raising the issue, concludes that:
...Soviet activity apparently related to SS-X-25 ICBM 
deployments at two former SS-7 bases does not at present 
violate the agreed implementing procedures of the SALT I 
Interim Agreement. However, ongoing activities raise
468 Duffy, Gloria. Compliance and the Future of Arms Control. Stanford: Stanford 
University and Global Outlook, 1988. p.43.
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concerns about compliance for the future, since use of 
"remaining facilities" to support ICBMs at deactivated SS-7 
sites would be in violation of Soviet commitments. The US 
will continue to monitor developments closely.469
Reconfiguration of Yankee-Class Ballistic Missile Submarines
The 1985 Report raised the issue of whether the reconfigured Soviet 
'Yankee' class subm arine violated the SALT I Interim  Agreem ent 
under which submarines limited by the Interim Agreement m ust be 
dism antled or reconfigured into subm arines w ithout ballistic missile 
capabilities. The report concluded that the reconfiguration of this 
submarine into a longer, cruise-missile-capable one was not a violation 
of the Soviets' political com m itm ent under the SALT I Interim  
Agreement .
The 1985 Report also added three issues concerning the ABM Treaty:
i) w hether the Soviets had concurrently tested SAM and ABM 
com ponents,
ii) w hether the Soviets had developed, tested, or deployed mobile 
ABM components, an d /o r
iii) whether the Soviets had provided a base for territorial defence.
Mobility of New ABM System
The 1985 report raised questions over the issue of whether the Soviet 
Union had developed a mobile ABM system  in violation of its 
obligations under the ABM Treaty. The report concluded that the 
activity in question was 'ambiguous,' and remained cautious over the
469 US Government, Department of State. Soviet Noncompliance With Arms Control 
Agreements Special Report No. 136. Bureau of Public Affairs, 1985. p.32.
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potential for a system which was reportedly deployable at sites with 
relatively little preparation. Again the problem arises over the lack of a 
definition for the term 'mobile.'
Concurrent Testing of ABM and SAM Components
The 1985 report exam ined the issue of w hether the Soviets had 
concurrently tested ABM and SAM elem ents in contravention of 
Article VI of the ABM Treaty and Protocol. This issue was raised again 
in 1986 and 1987.
The 1985 report concluded that there was 'insufficient evidence ... to 
assess fully compliance w ith Soviet obligations under the ABM 
Treaty.' The United States was concerned that concurrent testing, if it 
should occur, with other activities, meant that the Soviet Union could 
be preparing an ABM defence of its national territory.
This issue first arose over questions to do with the Soviet SA-5 SAM 
system in 1973-1974. As noted in chapter three of this thesis, the issue 
was raised in the SCC and the concurrent testing ceased shortly 
afterwards. A classified Agreed Statement was negotiated in the SCC 
and signed in 1978. The Statement regulated the concurrent testing of 
air defence and ABM components.
Operation of air defence radars at the Sary Shagan range led to this 
issue being revived in the SCC. This, in turn, led to a Common 
Understanding signed in 1985. The Understanding reportedly bans all 
use of air defence radars during ABM testing, except in the unlikely 
event of a hostile aircraft being clearly in the vicinity. This should 
have brought the matter to a close.
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However, the December 1985 Report does not mention the Common 
Understanding reached in 1985 in the SCC, which was designed to 
resolve the problem, preferring to note publicly that the Soviets have 
'probably violated' the ABM Treaty. The ACA expresses this in 
stronger terms:
This issue is a prime example of the administration's tactic of 
making public charges on issues that could be (or in this case 
apparently already had been) resolved in the SCC. The SCC's 
record in handling this has been impressive: The Soviets 
ceased their initial activity soon after the question was raised, 
and two subsequent agreements have been negotiated. The 
1985 understanding ... should resolve the issue once and for 
all. Despite this constructive history, the administration has 
consistently referred to this issue as a 'highly probable' 
violation in its compliance reports470
ABM Territorial Defence
The February 1985 report examined the issue of whether the Soviets 
had, by the combination of a number of factors, deployed or provided a 
base for an ABM defence of their territory. Citing radar construction, 
concurrent testing SAM upgrading, ABM rapid reload and ABM 
mobility, concluded that the Soviet Union may be in the process of 
preparing such a defence system for its national territory. This 
conclusion was reaffirmed in the December 1985 report, and expanded 
in the February 1986 report.
That these conclusions were drawn does not, however, render them 
conclusive. While noting that some of the activities are permitted 
within the ABM Treaty, when considering those activities that fall 
outside of the Treaty the language changes in tone to the less certain
470 ACA, Arms Control Association. "Analysis of the President's Report on Soviet 
Noncompliance With Arms Control Agreements." Arms Control Today 17.3 (April) 
(1987): la-10a. p.4a.
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register of ’potential or probable Soviet violations or other ambiguous 
activity. Each of the charges laid was qualified by modal auxiliaries 
'apparent', 'probable,' 'may have' and so on. The 1986 report concludes 
with a statement of the dire consequences for the West, if the Soviets 
should develop an ABM defence for their national territory. Citing 
'profound implications for W estern security and the vital East-West 
strategic balance' and concluding:
A unilateral Soviet territorial ABM capability acquired in 
violation of the ABM Treaty could reorder our deterrent and 
leave doubts about its credibility, such a capability might 
encourage the Soviets to take increased risks in crises, thus 
degrading crisis stability, [emphasis mine]471
The ACA assessment of the 1987 Report on Noncompliance concludes 
that, despite the seriousness of the charge, the evidence on which it is 
based 'rests on old and largely discredited or irrelevant assertions.'472
At this point it is relevant to consider the trajectory of the most 
significant of the claimed violations - that of the Krasnoyarsk radar - in 
the context of an exam ination of the extent to which even the 
seemingly most obvious violation is itself the product of a range of 
political processes, from the allocation of resources for the acquisition 
of the intelligence assets, through the production of the intelligence 
product as such, through the decision to raise the issue in the SCC, the 
Soviet responses, the US responses to the Soviet responses, both 
within the SCC and in the mobilisation of this issue as a sign through
471 US Government, Ronald Reagan. Soviet Noncompliance With Arms Control 
Agreements. Department of State: House of Representatives, 1986. p.66.
472 ACA, Arms Control Association. "Analysis of the President's Report on Soviet 
Noncompliance With Arms Control Agreements." Arms Control Today. 17.3 (April) 
(1987): la-10a. p.5a.
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which the Soviet Union has been demonised as threat and as other, 
and how this sign has been juxtaposed with other signs to construe a 
virtual reality space of threat and, within the United States, of security 
articulated as identity.
Krasnoyarsk: Collusion of Discourses.
Large phased-array radars were limited by the Anti-Ballistic Missile 
Treaty because, if properly located, they represented a necessary 
elem ent of ABM battle-m anagem ent and, if constructed , were 
therefore indexical of an intention to deploy an ABM system. They 
would have to be very large, perm anent structures with attendant long 
construction times spanning a num ber of years. Peter Zim m erm an 
notes:
They were recognised during the negotiations of the ABM 
Treaty as the key elements of an ABM system which would 
most severely limit the rate at which one of the Parties could 
'break out' to provide a m issile defence for all of its 
territory .473
Being very large structures, they w ould be verifiable by national 
technical means of verification (NTMs), and being slow to build, they 
would be detected before becoming operational, and detectable with a 
sufficient tim e-m argin to react to possible treaty violations w ith 
consultation to clarify ambiguous behaviour, and such other action as 
may be necessary to prevent a violation from occurring. W hether the 
Krasnoyarsk radar is considered to be a full violation of the ABM 
Treaty depends upon one's definition of the word 'deploy,' but if the 
purpose of limiting LPARs is to have an indicator of an intention to
Zimmerman, Peter. "The Thule, Fylingdales, and Krasnoyarsk Radars: Innocents 
Abroad?" Arms Control Today. 17.2 (March) (1987): 9-11. p.9.
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construct an ABM system, then logically, the lead time should be 
construed as detection time, and deploym ent should, as with the 
submarine missile launchers, be construed as any time after the radar 
is tested as such and becomes ready for operation. Although considered 
to be a violation of the most conclusive kind, this section shall argue 
that deploym ent is the point at which a violation should be charged, 
while any time after detection falls within the boundaries of 'potential 
violation' or 'notice of intent to violate,' rather than as a violation in 
itself. This would give both Parties the opportunity to make use of the 
Standing Consultative Com mission as a forum  in which private 
negotiation can take place over whether or not an activity represents a 
violation or an activity which, if continued could become a violation. 
A lthough this seems to be the intention of the treaty, the issue of 
definition is extremely important. The choice to limit LPARs is based 
on their potential for use as ABM battle-m anagem ent radars. LPARs, 
however, have other functions which fall outside the boundaries of 
the ABM Treaty. Any understanding of the specific terms of the ABM 
Treaty with respect to LPARs rests upon an understanding of the 
relation of particular specifications to the kinds of uses to which they 
can be put. That is to say, what are the characteristics held in common 
by LPARs for ABM battle management, for early-warning of ballistic 
missile attack, or for space tracking as national technical means of 
verification? The following table lists the characteristics required for 
each of the potential
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Table 4.1 LP AR Functional Characteristics
ABM
b a ttle -
mangnt
E arly
warning
S p ace­
tracking
Kras­
noyarsk
• Structural hardening against blast • •
• H ardening against Electromagnetic Pulse • •
• Independent power generation • •
• Underground facilities • •
• Frequency in low  gigahertz •
• Frequency in low  hundreds of m egahertz • •
• Frequency in high  hundreds of m egahertz •
• Periphery location looking outw ards •
• Southw ard orientation  to face m ost space  
orbits
•
Based on information derived from: Downey, Thomas Bob Carr, and Jim Moody. "Report from 
Krasnoyarsk." Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. November (1987):11-14.
functions of an LPAR, showing how the Krasnoyarsk radar compared 
with those characteristics.
This table points to the kinds of ambiguities that can arise when US 
assum ptions about the required characteristics of a particular radar 
system are used to 'read' the intended use of a non-US system. Clearly, 
according to the table, the 'closest fit' of characteristics to function is 
with space tracking and NTM. The problems with that assessment are 
that the frequency is not optimised for space tracking (according to US 
experts, the frequency of 180 megahertz is too low for space tracking) 
and the radar faces almost directly away from the majority of space 
orbits. (Northeast, instead of South) and the radar is oriented toward 
the horizon, an orientation more suited to the detection of missiles at
the earliest possible moment, whereas a space track radar looks directly 
up through the thinnest possible slice of atmosphere.474
The Krasnoyarsk radar case is im portant for several reasons. Firstly, of 
all the charges brought by the US against the Soviet Union of violation 
of the ABM Treaty, the Krasnoyarsk large phased-array radar is the 
m ost w idely acknow ledged, even, since 1989,475 by the Soviets 
them selves. Secondly, this case raises significant issues regarding 
remarkably similar activities conducted by the United States at Thule 
in G reenland, and at Fylingdales Moor in the U nited Kingdom. 
Thirdly, although the reports and other writings surrounding the issue 
of arms control compliance, that raise the issue of Krasnoyarsk, take as 
their point of entry the discovery of the radar as the starting point for 
their narrative, a discourse analytic approach would not be satisfied 
with such sharp and clear beginnings. For a play to begin in medias res 
is fine for the encouragement of the willing suspension of disbelief, but 
politics is about the discourses that shape political reality; and arms 
control, as we continue to see, is very much about politics. Fourthly, 
w hat is particularly interesting about this case is the way in which, 
through the medium of the virtual space between states represented by
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4^* 4 See Zimmerman, Peter. "The Thule, Fylingdales, and Krasnoyarsk Radars:
Innocents Abroad?" Arms Control Today 17.2 (March) (1987): 9-11 at p.10, and also
Mack, Andrew. 'Threats to the ABM Treaty." A.C. 9.2 (Sept.) (1988): 99-115. p.101.
4^5 Although it had been argued earlier that the Soviets implicitly acknowledged a 
violation by offering to cease work on the Krasnoyarsk radar in the October 1985 round 
of the SCC if the United States ceased work on their 'upgrade' of the Thule and 
Fylingdales Moor radars, the Soviets only acknowledged the radar as a violation 
explicitly when then Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Schevardnadze noted in 1989 
that "the Krasnoyarsk radar had been built at a location not permitted under ABM and 
was a technical violation of the treaty." See: Garthoff, Raymond. "Case of the 
Wandering Radar." Bulletin of Atomic Scientists July/August (1991): 7-9. p.7. In 1991, 
Garthoff notes, the Soviets agreed to dismantle the radar, thus removing it as an 
obstacle to further strategic arms negotiations.
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the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) the Krasnoyarsk radar 
was made to acquire levels of m eaning beyond that of a fairly plain 
trapezoidal concrete structure the size of the Great Pyramid at Giza, 
in to  an issue of sovereignty  and of ideological Manachaeism. 
Krasnoyarsk, over a period of years, and within a specific political 
context became a symbol of Otherness for the US, that led weight to 
assumptions already held, in which belief systems were confirmed and 
boundaries m aintained. Moreover, in order to show that events do 
not simply appear without context, w ithout prior discursive structures 
being in place, this section shall bring together some relevant traces of 
those formations that made possible the rasing of Krasnoyarsk as an 
issue and as a sign.
Chapter three teased out two major themes: Carter's commitment to a 
world view of a world in flux. It was a complex world view that flew in 
the face of the modernist conceptions of linearity and progress. Partly 
as a reaction to the Realpolitik of Nixon and Kissinger's foreign policy, 
C arter's was a w orld view that valued diplom acy, that valued a 
comm itm ent to security through arms control and the processes of 
dialogue based on his reading of the signals of detente established by 
and through the two Republican presidencies that preceded his own. 
T hat com m itm en t and  th a t v ision  w as re flec ted  in his 
adm inistration 's use of the Standing Consultative Commission to 
discuss and, where necessary to react to am biguous compliance 
behaviour. D uring his term  of office there were no unequivocal 
breaches of any legally binding arms control agreement. The other 
major theme, rendered explicit in the intertext on the rise of the 
Committee on the Present Danger, represented the reactionary and 
conservative force of modernism at its most dogmatic, leading to what
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has been characterised as "the irrational presidency."476 In the clash of 
world views between Carter and Reagan, what is often forgotten are 
the continuities, the longer cycles of defence capital acquisition and 
intelligence assets acquisition for example, that, in the Krasnoyarsk 
case, made possible the discovery of the Krasnoyarsk radar, and 
provided the institutional/discursive framework around which 
Krasnoyarsk as sign could be set in play.
Two sets of intelligence assets that are central to the Krasnoyarsk 
narrative are the development of the 'JUMPSEAT' radar 'ferret' 
satellites and the development and acquisition of photoreconnaissance 
imaging satellites. Their respective histories go back many years before 
the discovery of the Krasnoyarsk radar, yet the use of the two types in 
concert, in 1983, made possible the discovery of the Krasnoyarsk radar.
March 21, 1971, marked the launch of the first operational JUMPSEAT 
satellite. It was designed for the interception of Soviet ABM radar 
signals.477 The JUMPSEAT occupies a highly elliptical orbit with its 
apogee (highest point) of about 24,000 miles reached as it passes over 
the Arctic region. This not only allows the JUMPSEAT to remain over 
the Soviet Union for around eight or nine hours,478 but also, because 
the orbit is identical to the Satellite Data System (SDS) satellites [that
478 Newhouse, John. The Nuclear Age: From Hiroshima to Star Wars. London: Michael 
Joseph, 1989.
477 Richelson, Jeffrey T. "US Space Reconnaissance after the Cold War." paper 
presented to conference: Australia and Space. 27-29 November 1991. The Australian 
National University: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, p.7.
478 Ibid.
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relay intelligence data from imaging satellites], the Soviets can confuse 
the JUMPSEAT with a data relay platform.479
W hile photoreconnaissance satellites date back to the SAMOS 
('Keyhole' or KH-1) series in the early 1960s, detailed imagery from 
orbit became finely honed with the advent of the Lockheed-designed 
KH-6 (operated by the CIA, rather than the US Air Force) which was a 
m anoeuvrable, 'close-look' satellite, first launched in 1963 aboard a 
Thrust Augm ented Thor. With orbits as low as 76 miles, excellent 
resolution was available, although at the price of short life-span 
(averaging just 5.3 days each.).
With the advent of the fourth generation KH-9 (Hexagon, more widely 
known as 'Big Bird'), the dual-function surveillance satellite had come 
of age. Primarily an 'area-survey' satellite, the KH-9 was made capable 
of close-look missions as well. With an impressive array of sensors, the 
image could be directed to infra-red sensors, multi-spectral scanner, 
thematic m apper and photo-multipliers for enhanced night vision.480 
W ith im age-splitting through the use of a second m irror, a three- 
dimensional effect could be produced, that would enhance the ability 
of analysts at the National Reconnaissance Office to determ ine the 
heights of buildings and the depths of holes. Central to all this was the 
Perkin-Elmer Cassegrain telescope, that had a focal length of about 
twenty feet (three metres), and a prim ary m irror, some six feet (two 
metres) in diameter.
479 Burrows, William.Deep Black: The Secrets of Space Espionage. London: Bantam 
Books, 1988. p.223.
480 Burrows, William. Deep Black: The Secrets of Space Espionage. London: Bantam 
Books, 1988. p.237.
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The whole thing was made relatively compact by having a so-called 
'folded' focal length, by which the light collected in the primary mirror 
was reflected, via a secondary mirror, through a hole in the primary 
mirror to the focal plane (see Figure 4.1). With the use of prisms and 
small mirrors the light at the focal plane could be redirected onto any 
of the array of sensors, providing multi-spectral scanning for greater 
discrimination of the target image.
Photographic images would be wound onto spools and later ejected in 
capsules from orbit to be collected by specially equipped aircraft as they 
parachuted to earth. Ground resolution, according to Burrows was in 
the order of one foot.481 It was this quality of resolution that allowed 
the US to discover the Krasnoyarsk radar under construction deep in 
Siberia, in 1983.482
481 Ibid p.238. Other authoritative accounts put the resolution a little lower, at about 
two feet, either way the resolution would have presented no problem in the 
identification of the Krasnoyarsk radar, which measured in the hundreds of feet. See 
Richelson, Jeffrey T. America's Secret Eyes in Space: The US Keyhole Spy Satellite 
Program. Grand Rapids, London: Harper and Row, 1990. p.361.
482 Other accounts suggest that the Krasnoyarsk radar was discovered after test 
transmissions had been detected by a 'Jumpseat' Signals Intelligence satellite. This 
would make some sense, given that, in order to target a 'close-look' mission, the 
photoreconnaissance satellite needs fairly precise coordinates of where to gather its 
images. See, for example: Mack, Andrew. "Threats to the ABM Treaty." A.C. 9.2 
(Sept.) (1988): 99-115. p.101, n. 6. Mack points out, that this seems to run counter to the 
report of Downey, Thomas J., Bob Carr, and Jim Moody. "Report from Krasnoyarsk." 
Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. .November (1987): 11-14. in which these US 
Congressional visitors to Krasnoyarsk in 1987 reported that they "...saw no no installed 
antenna elements, computers, or other electronic equipment anywhere. The transmitter 
had a completed antenna face and extensive plumbing and electrical power wiring (but 
no electronic cables); the receiver did not." (Downey, et al., 1987 p.13). This does not 
preclude, however the gathering of site-location test transmissions used to test wave 
propagation characteristics and other transmissions used to optimise the frequency, 
pulse-rate, band-width etc. that would optimise the characteristics of the completed 
radar. Further test transmissions would be used to determine interference patterns set up 
during the course of electronically steering the several thousand LPAR elements. These 
tests would have taken place over a number of years dating from the time of site choice, 
with calibration tests continuing long after the LPAR had been built. That these tests 
from mobile radar transmitters were not picked up by a US Jumpseat ELINT satellite
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Figure 4.1. Diagram of KH-9 telescope.
Focal length = (AB)+(BC)
At some point, probably around the end of May, 1983, a the radar 
m icrowave frequency sensors aboard a JUMPSEAT satellite, (one of 
probably two in orbit at the time) collected suspicious radar test 
transmissions from a site in central Siberia. The signals would have 
been part of the preparation for the construction of a large phased-array 
radar, designed to test the atmospheric wave propagation properties of 
different radar w avelengths of a type suited for early warning. 
RADINT analysts at the National Security Agency's SIGINT complex at 
Fort Meade would have been alert to the fact that, if a large phased- 
array radar were undergoing preliminary site tests at a site as far inland
until mid-1983 is probably due to a combination of the small number of Jumpseat 
satellites (2 at any one time) and to the practice of conducting such tests during the 
period when the ELINT satellites are not overhead or within range of the signals. 
(Source: author’s discussion with Desmond Ball, ANU, 26/11/91).
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as central Siberia, then it was possible that such a radar could, if 
deployed represent a potential violation of the ABM Treaty.
On June 20, 1983, a Big Bird (KH-9) satellite was launched from 
Vandenberg Air Force Base in California, by a M artin-M arietta Titan 
3D, into a 96-deg. inclined, elliptical orbit w ith a closest approach 
(perigee) of 163 km. (101 mi.) and an furthest reach (apogee) of 218 Km. 
(136 mi.).483 Image analysts at the Central Intelligence Agency's 
N ational Photographic Interpretation Centre located the new radar 
almost three weeks later in mid July.484
The radar was located near the village of Abalakova, in south-central 
Siberia, at a latitude of approximately 58.08 N. and longitude of 92.4E., 
near a spur line running north from the Trans Siberian Railroad. It is 
about 750 kilometres from the nearest Soviet border, and the radar is 
oriented away from the nearest border, that of Mongolia and towards 
the north-east where the next border is some 4600 kilometres away. 
This w ould enable it to detect T rident m issiles launched from 
subm arines in the Bering Sea or Gulf of Alaska. This has im portant 
implications for the ABM Treaty, in which Article VI(b) states that the 
Parties undertake:
not to deploy in the future radars for early w arning of 
strategic ballistic missile attack except at locations along the
483 Jeffrey Richelson has slightly different figures for this mission. He cites the 
orbital inclination as 96.45 degrees, with a perigee of 105 miles (169 Kms) and an 
apogee of 142 miles (228 Kms). This KH-9 remained in orbit for 275 days. See Richelson, 
Jeffrey T. America's Secret Eyes in Space: The US Keyhole Spy Satellite Program. 
Grand Rapids, London: Harper and Row, 1990. p.361.
484 Klass, Philip J. "US Scrutinizing New Soviet Radar." Av. \Neek & S.T. August 
(1983): 19-20. p.19.
periphery of its national territory and oriented outward. 
485[emphasis mine].
Other relevant provisions of the ABM Treaty and Agreed Statements 
that refer to the deployment of large phased-array radars and that have 
been invoked in the case of the K rasnoyarsk radar have placed 
em phasis on its potential uses and on its specifications as a large 
phased-array  radar, as these form indicators of the appropriate  
'gramm ar' into which this radar can be situated in order to 'read off' 
various forms of violation, the specificity of which depends upon its 
technical capabilities.
Agreed Statement (F) of the ABM Treaty states:
The Parties agree not to deploy phased-array radars having a 
potential (the product of mean emitted power in watts and 
antenna area in square metres) exceeding three million, 
except as provided for in Articles III, IV and VI of the Treaty, 
or except for the purposes of tracking objects in outer space or 
for use as national technical means of verification.486
Its specifications, based on its dimensions and external similarities to 
other Soviet large phased-array radars (LPARs) suggest that its mean 
potential would exceed the limitations described in Agreed Statement 
F. The radar is reportedly around 100 metres in length and 33.8 metres 
high and similar in design to those at Pechora, Kiev and Komsomolsk. 
According to the estimates of the team that inspected the Krasnoyarsk 
site the radar w ould operate at a frequency in the order of 180
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488 ACDA, US, ed. Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: Texts and Histories of 
Negotiations. Washington: United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 
1980. p.141.
486 ACDA, US, ed. Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: Texts and Histories of 
Negotiations. Washington: United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 
1980. p.144.
262
m egahertz  in the VHF range.487 This w ould lim it its ability to 
discrim inate betw een reentry  vehicles and decoys and booster 
fragments, or to act as a guide for an ABM interceptor.488 Its design 
w ould allow a 120° azim uth (coverage fan).489 According to the US 
inspection  team  the s truc tu re  was not b last hardened , being 
constructed from m ortared cement blocks, nor was it electronically 
hardened, there being no sign of metal shielding, and the structure 
containing w indow s which w ould preclude electronic hardening 
ag a in st nuclear electrom agnetic  pu lse  (EMP). A lthough  the 
assessm ents based on national technical means gave the external 
dim ensions of the structures, the subsequent onsight inspection 
suggested that the Krasnoyarsk structure was in fact poorly configured 
for an ABM role.
Article III (b) of the ABM Treaty states:
Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems or their 
components except that:
(b) within one ABM system deployment area having a radius 
of one hundred and fifty kilometres and containing ICBM 
silo launchers, a Party may deploy: (2) two large phased array 
ABM radars comparable in potential to corresponding ABM 
radars operational or under construction on the date of 
signature of the ABM Treaty in an ABM system deployment 
area containing ICBM silo launchers.490
487 Downey, Thomas J., Bob Carr, and Jim Moody. "Report from Krasnoyarsk." 
Bulletin of Atomic Scientists .November (1987): 11-14. when they asked the Soviets to 
confirm their estimate of 180 megahertz, the Soviet reply was translated as 
"something like that."
488 Durch, William J. "The Future of the ABM Treaty." London: IISS, 1987. Adelphi 
Papers 223.p.l4.
489 Durch, William J. Op. Cit 1987 p.13.
490 Ibid p.140.
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Article IV provides that the Article III limitations shall not apply to 
ABM systems or their components used for developm ent or testing, 
and located within current or additionally agreed test ranges. Article VI 
includes an undertaking by each Party not to give radars, other than 
ABM radars, capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their 
elements in flight trajectory, and not to test them in an ABM mode.
The report by the General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and
Disarmament (GAC) of 1983 "A Quarter Century of Soviet Compliance
Practices Under Arms Control Agreements 1958-1983," a declassified
sum m ary of which was issued in October 1984, listed the Krasnoyarsk
radar as a violation of the ABM Treaty Article VI(b) which limits the
location and orientation of radar deployment
... by the construction of a large, phased-array radar not 
located on the periphery of the Soviet Union and not 
oriented outward, [violation duration:] 1981 to present.
...The design of the facility is substantially  identical to 
another radar declared by the Soviets to be an early warning 
radar. The Soviets, how ever, have s ta ted  th a t the 
Krasnoyarsk radar is a ’space tracking' radar. All early 
w arning radars can also perform  lim ited 'space tracking' 
functions, and while this radar is no exception, its location 
and geometry are inappropriate for a dedicated space tracking 
radar.491
U nder the provisions of Articles III, IV and VI of the ABM Treaty, 
LPARs may be deployed within perm itted ABM deploym ent areas, 
w ithin ABM test ranges, as early-warning radars deployed along the 
periphery of its national territory and facing outw ard, or for space 
tracking, or for national technical means of verification. At no point is
491 US Government, General Advisory Committee of ACDA. A Quarter Century of 
Soviet Compliance Practices Under Arms Control Commitments 1958-1983: A Summary. 
General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament (GAC), 1984. p.60
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there an agreed definition of the w ord 'deployed,' however, and the 
case against the Soviet Union in the charges of violation relating to the 
Krasnoyarsk radar hinge on the m anner in which this term is defined. 
This section will return to this question later, but first it is important to 
examine the ways in which this case was handled by both Parties.
The United States raised the issue in the September 1983 round of the 
S tanding  C onsultative Com m ission in Geneva, along w ith the 
question of Soviet tests of a solid-fueled ICBM492 (to be considered 
later). The US delegation stressed the sim ilarity of the Krasnoyarsk 
radar to other permitted Soviet early warning radars and coupled with 
this the fact that, by virtue of its estimated operational frequency the 
radar w ould not be suitable for other perm itted functions, as, for 
exam ple, space tracking, and for these reasons, the United States 
declared the radar a violation of the ABM Treaty and called for it to be 
dism antled. The Soviet response was that the radar was for space 
tracking and was therefore not in violation of the ABM Treaty.
In the US Arms Control and D isarm am ent Association (ACDA) 
Annual Report 1985 ACDA argued that the Krasnoyarsk radar did not 
substantially contribute to existing Soviet capabilities for space tracking. 
Since most space tracking radars w ould need to look to the South, 
ra ther than  the N ortheast, and since Soviet capabilities were 
reasonably well serviced for space tracking equipm ent, it was argued 
that both the location and the orientation of the radar were neither 
suitable for spacetracking missions nor for national technical means of 
verification (NTM). Moreover, it was argued that the wave band in
492 Klass, Philip J. "US Scrutinizing New Soviet Radar." Av. Week & S.T. .August 
(1983): 19-20.
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which it was designed to operate was considered to be more suited to
ballistic missile detection and tracking. As the ACDA report concludes:
It closes the last remaining gap in Soviet coverage. It could 
have major significance if it is part of a large scale future 
Soviet ABM deployment. Together this radar and the five 
others like it form an arc of coverage from the Kola 
Peninsula in the northwest, around Siberia, to the Caucasus 
in the Southwest. We have concluded that the Krasnoyarsk 
radar is not for space tracking as claimed by the Soviet 
Union.493
Part of the initial concern was that the radar was seen to be in the same 
region as three of the six Soviet SS-18 ICBM fields and one SS-11 
facility494, raising concern over whether the radar represented an 
attempt to provide battle management for a Soviet ABM system. It was 
conceivable that the Krasnoyarsk radar could detect launches of US 
ICBMs, combine the data with that gained from the Pechora radar to 
provide some limited triangulation and therefore a more accurate 
attack assessment than could be obtained from a single radar (see 
Figure 4.2). This led to concerns that this could be translated into better 
target acquisition and tracking for interceptor missiles. If this were the 
case, it was argued, that Krasnoyarsk radar would represent a 
substantial 'break-out' from the ABM Treaty if the Soviets should later 
opt to develop and deploy ABM interceptors.495
493 US Government, ACDA. US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 1985 Annual 
Report. US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), 1985. p.52.
494 Duffy Op Cit. 1988 p .l l l  cites three SS-18 sites to the southwest of Abalakovo at 
Uzhur, Aleysk, and Zhangiz, and one SS-11 base to the southwest at Gladkaya, and 
another to the southeast at Svobodny.
495 Klass, Philip J. "US Scrutinizing New Soviet Radar." Av. Week & S.T. August 
(1983): 19-20.
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However, when considered in strategic terms, any gains claimed for 
the Krasnoyarsk radar are at best marginal in comparison with the 
same radar located at the periphery and with the same orientation. Its 
inland location represents a loss of several minutes of warning time of 
a missile launched from the northern Pacific, and this loss represents 
the important several minutes of warning time during the launch 
phase in which the incoming missile would present its largest radar 
profile. Moreover, since no major strategic targets are located forward 
of the area covered by the Krasnoyarsk radar, its usefulness for ABM 
target acquisition and tracking is doubtful.496
Some analysts have suggested that more prosaic and mundane
considerations may have contributed to the siting of the Krasnoyarsk
radar in its inland location. These being the not inconsiderable climatic
characteristics of the northern Siberian periphery of the Soviet Union.
William Durch, for example notes:
According to Article VI of the ABM Treaty, an early-warning 
radar with this orientation should have been located on the 
Pacific coast or in the outer Arctic reaches of Siberia. Terrain, 
climate and sheer inaccessability may have ruled out the 
latter location.497
The author's discussions with a political geographer498 revealed that to 
build a stable structure of the design and mass of the Krasnoyarsk radar 
requires a stable subsoil for the foundations of an extent largely 
unavailable east of Krasnoyarsk. As Duffy notes, the heat generated by
496 See Duffy, Gloria. Compliance and the Future of Arms Control. Stanford: Stanford 
University and Global Outlook, 1988.
497 William Durch Op Cit. 1987 p.13.
498 Author's discussion with Simon Dalby
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the radar would be sufficient to melt the upper levels of permafrost, 
thereby rendering the foundations unstable.499 The Krasnoyarsk site 
marks the eastern boundary of continuous [year-round] permafrost of a 
prevailing thickness in excess of three hundred metres. The Bering Sea 
and the Sea of Okhotsk boundaries are characterised by discontinuous 
permafrost, with a further inland belt of continuous permafrost of a 
prevailing thickness of less than three hundred metres. The argument 
concerning the relative costs of building on the two types of terrain is 
significant if the figures given by former air force general Boris T. 
Surikov, cited in Raymond Garthoff,500 are accurate. According to 
Surikov the radar at Krasnoyarsk was originally planned to be sited at 
Norilsk to fill a gap in early-warning coverage, inland from the Arctic 
Ocean, but less further inland than the Pechora LPAR.
The cost of building on the permafrost, however, was estimated to be 
around a billion rubles (1979). By moving outside the permafrost zone, 
costs could be reduced to as little as one-third: around 350 million 
rubles.501
499 Duffy, Gloria. Compliance and the Future of Arms Control. Stanford: Stanford 
University and Global Outlook, 1988. p.149.
500 Garthoff, Raymond. "Case of the Wandering Radar." Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 
.July/August 1991 (1991): 7-9.
501 According to Garthoff (1991) p.8 this figure would have been closer to 500 million 
rubles.
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The furthest East for such a site was at Abalakova, between Yeniseysk 
and Krasnoyarsk (see map on previous page502). M oreover, as Duffy 
points out, a site much further north would have been remote from 
the rail transport infrastructure that has been associated w ith the 
construction of previous LPARs as, for example, at Pechora, Lyaki, 
Olenogorsk, Sary Shagan, and Mishelevka503
Strategically, the radar, representing a comprom ise for the Soviet 
Union, does not necessarily provide an indication of the level of treaty 
breakout that the Reagan adm inistration's response held it to be. US 
analysts in 1984 noted:
A single, highly vulnerable radar installation is of only 
marginal importance in relation to any large-scale breakout 
from the ABM Treaty504
While in 1987 the Arms Control Association, in their analysis of the 
Reagan adm inistration's report on Soviet non-compliance concluded 
tha t the K rasnoyarsk radar provides neither substan tia l battle- 
m anagem ent capabilities nor does it fundam entally  undercu t the 
treaty 's objectives in constraining the location of LPARs to prevent
502 Map constructed by the author based on information derived from a map in Duffy, 
Gloria. Compliance and the Future of Arms Control. Stanford: Stanford University and 
Global Outlook, 1988. p.151.
503 Duffy Op. Cit 1988 p.106.
5 4^ See: Bundy, McGeorge et al. "The President's Choice: Star Wars or Arms Control." 
Foreign Affairs 63.Winter (1984-5): p. 275 cited in Duffy Op Cit 1988 p.110.
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their being used in a battle-management role.505 The ACA concluded 
that:
The Krasnoyarsk radar appears to have been placed in its illegal inland 
location primarily to provide cost-efficient early warning and not to 
serve a battle management function in connection with a nationwide 
ABM system ... it would be of very little value as part of a nationwide 
defence ... it is vulnerable to direct attack and susceptible to degradation 
from nuclear blackout effects. ... it is not well suited for an ABM role 
because it does not cover the path of incoming US ICBMs because it is 
too far east and is pointing in the wrong direction.506
505 ACA, Arms Control Association. "Analysis of the President's Report on Soviet 
Noncompliance With Arms Control Agreements." Arms Control Today 17.3 (April) 
(1987): la-10a.p.2a.
506 Ibid.
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Figure 4.2. Estimated Soviet Radar Coverage Including Krasnoyarsk
[Map constructed by the author based on information in Duffy, Gloria.Compliance and the 
Future of Arms Control. Stanford: Stanford University and Global Outlook, 1988. p.106.]
On the United States' side, assessment of the extent to which, if any, 
the Krasnoyarsk radar represented a violation of the ABM Treaty was 
filtered through a set of reading practices, by which the specifications of 
the radar were set against the potential uses to which it could be put, 
and in what sense it constituted the violation with respect to the 
radar's capabilities as against the specific criteria laid down by the 
treaty.
The institutional technologies of the United States had photographed, 
noted, analysed and filed the radar. Its resemblances to other Soviet 
large phased-array radars had been noted. Its physical proximity to
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other ICBM fields was coupled with its notional proxim ity to the 
capabilities of ABM radars and noted. Its distance from the national 
boundary  was placed alongside its distance from its potential to 
perform  certain kinds of task. Its transform ations from the type of 
radar that could be labeled 'perm itted,' according to w hether its 
function was determined to be for early-warning, space tracking, or 
ABM battle-m anagem ent w ere taken into account. All of these 
established the Krasnoyarsk radar as discursive object above and 
beyond its mere Being in the form of a trapezoidal lump of cement. All 
of these had some bearing on the m anner in which the Krasnoyarsk 
radar was raised as a subject for and of discussion, both inside the 
Standing Consultative Com mission and outside, in Congressional 
R eports, Senate hearings, the S tanford Research G roup and 
elsew here .507 These formed the body of evidence used to determine, on 
the US side, that the Krasnoyarsk radar was indeed a violation of he 
ABM Treaty. However, on the basis of the SALT II usage of the term 
'deployed' the balance of evidence suggests that the Krasnoyarsk radar, 
far from being an unequivocal violation was in fact either an example 
of the grey area known as 'ambiguous compliance behaviour' or it was 
at best an example of behaviour, which if continued may represent a 
potential violation in the future. In either event the issue was 
rightfully raised as an issue w ithin the SCC, and, albeit with some 
external pressure from the US the issue could be said to have been 
settled w ithin the SCC, thereby proving its value as a consultative 
body. This interpretation flies som ewhat in the face of the hard liners
507 phis schema which situates one discursive object in relation to other discursive 
objects is adapted from that in chapter three of: Foucault, Michel. The Archeology of 
Knowledge. London: Tavistock, 1977.
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who assert that the SCC has been a failure. Nevertheless, if one takes as 
the object of the ABM Treaty's lim itation on LPARs, the setting in 
place of a provision which is adequately verifiable under the definition 
of the adm inistrations from Nixon to Carter, such that potential 
breakout from the treaty could be discovered and raised with the other 
side before becoming operational and thereby militarily significant, 
then the Krasnoyarsk radar fits that description.
Politically there are problems with that, since there is no definition; in 
the treaty, in the agreed statem ents, or even in the unilateral 
statem ents concerning the proper use of the term 'deploy' within the 
confines of the ABM Treaty. Thus the hardliners in the Reagan 
administration were able to cite as violations activities that the Central 
Intelligence Agency had already argued were at best potential or 
ambiguous violations. The Krasnoyarsk radar was considered, in the 
President's reports to Congress on Soviet noncompliance with arms 
control treaties and in the report by the General Advisory Committee 
of the Arms Control and Disarm am ent Agency in 1983 (declassified 
version, 1984), to be a violation while still a very incomplete structure. 
Certainly its presence rated concern, and clearly there were enough 
elements of its construction that w arranted its being raised in the 
S tanding  C onsultative  C om m ission as am biguous com pliance 
behaviour, but it was not yet a clear violation of the treaty because it 
never became operational, and even if it had, as we have seen, its 
utility in non-compliant roles would have been less than adequate. In 
m any ways though, regardless of the actual strategic implications of 
compliance at the m argins of arm s control treaties, such as those 
represented by the Soviet Krasnoyarsk radar, are the questions relating
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to the m anner in which such a technicality becomes a sign, and more 
than that, the embodiment of an ideology.
Examining the rhetoric that surrounded the major reports on Soviet 
non-compliance with arms control treaties from 1983-1986 and beyond, 
it is w orth noting that, in the reports dealing with Soviet compliance, 
the compliance aspect is played down, the significance being given to 
potential or m aterial breaches of arms control agreements. This is 
perhaps not altogether surprising, since the US has more at stake in the 
event of noncom pliance than w ith compliance. N evertheless, in 
seeking to present a 'balanced' report, one could reasonably expect 
observations on why the Soviet should comply w ith those treaties 
w ith which it has, in the view of the reports authors, complied. 
Instead, under the heading: "Patterns in Soviet Compliance Practices" 
in the GAC Report, the interpretation concludes that since 1958 the 
Soviet Union's actions:
... dem onstrate a pattern  of pursuing  m ilitary advantage 
through selective disregard for its international arms control 
duties and commitments508
after allegations of "deliberate Soviet efforts to counter US national 
technical means of verification" the report goes on to state categorically 
that "US verification capabilities have not deterred the Soviets from 
violating arms control commitments." The report concludes with an 
attack on the SCC process for a ttem pting to resolve compliance 
ambiguities outside of the political grandstanding that had, by 1981 
come to characterise the US approach to arm s control under the 
guidance of the Committee on the Present Danger. As the report notes:
508 GAC Op Cit p.62
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... the near total reliance on secret diplomacy in seeking to 
restore Soviet compliance has been largely ineffective. The 
US reco rd  of ra is in g  its concerns ab o u t Soviet 
noncom pliance exclusively in the Standing Consultative 
Com mission and through various high level diplom atic 
dem arches dem onstra tes the ineffectiveness of th is 
process.509
That the SCC had been rendered largely ineffective by the extensive 
leaking and public posturing over alleged violations, causing the 
Soviet Union to raise the issue of SCC privacy in the SCC, did not seem 
to enter the calculations of the members of the GAC. By 1983 the arms 
control process had so completely bogged down that the Soviets had 
walked out of the negotiations on strategic and intermediate nuclear 
forces. N evertheless, even w ith such strained  relations the SCC 
continued to function with each side raising and discussing narrow 
technical issues pertaining to the SALT agreements.
The point here is that although the GAC report alleges material 
breaches for four SALT com pliance issues that had previously 
appeared as non violations in the State Department report of 1978, the 
GAC report places the responsibility for these 'material breaches' in 
terms of a failure of the SCC to resolve these problems. The previous 
report, not only denied that there had been m aterial breaches of the 
treaties but that "in every case [of a questionable practice raised by the 
US in the SCC] the activity has ceased, or subsequent information has 
clarified the situation and allayed our concern."510 Yet, we have seen in
509 Ibid.
510 US Government, Department of State Hearings. SALT ONE: Compliance, SALT 
TWO: Verification US Department of State, 1978. (February 21) cited in Graybeal, 
Sydney, and Michael Krepon. "Making Better Use of the SCC." International Security 
10.2, Fall (1985): 183-199. p.187.
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chapter two of this thesis that privacy of the proceedings, and even, in 
m any instances of the outcomes of those proceedings, is crucial to its 
opera tion  in o rder to p reven t precisely  the so rt of political 
grandstanding embodied in the GAC Report.
The question remains as to the extent to which the political climate of 
the time influenced the extent to which the Krasnoyarsk radar was 
used and re-used as a sign of Soviet willingness to abrogate the terms 
of the treaty, and the extent to which it served the purposes of the US 
hard liners to construe this as a violation in order to push for their 
own abrogation or 'wide definition’ of the ABM Treaty in order to 
pursue development of the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI), following 
Reagan's famous 'star wars' speech in 1983.
We have seen earlier how a particular lobby group, the Committee on 
the Present Danger had exerted a great deal of influence on rendering 
the Carter adm inistration SALT II arms control program  ineffective 
through a set of well coordinated media campaigns, and we have seen 
how  this same group, which included Ronald Reagan am ongst its 
members had helped the Reagan adm inistration come to power on a 
platform  of anti-Soviet ideology and rhetoric. W hen Reagan invoked 
the independence and b ipartisansh ip511 of the General Advisory 
Committee on Arms control (GAC) to lend credibility to the charges of 
Soviet treaty violations and to the ineffectiveness of the SCC, one
511 In his Letter of Transmittal of the report A Quarter Century of Soviet Compliance 
Practices Under Arms Control Commitments: 1958-1983 Reagan stated: "The General 
Advisory Committee's report to me resulted from a year-long analysis, by this 
bipartisan and independent body, of Soviet practices with regard to arms control 
treaties ... Neither the methodology of analysis nor the conclusions reached in this 
report have been formally reviewed or approved by any agencies of the US 
Government." [emphasis mine]
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should perhaps note that of the twelve members of the GAC, nine, 
including the chairman, were members of the board of the Committee 
on the Present Danger (CPD).512 Not surprisingly, the members of the 
GAC were themselves appointed by the President and confirmed by the 
S e n a te .513 The report produced by the GAC, unlike the reports 
subm itted by President Reagan to Congress, were not the result of 
interagency clearance and agreement, and hence is not considered to 
carry the same weight as the Presidential reports. Nevertheless, that 
P re s id e n t R eagan invoked  th e ir  in d ep e n d en c e  from  the 
adm inistration in order to assert their 'objectivity,' som ewhat stretches 
the concept of independence.
The point that was missed by the General Advisory Committee is that 
the SCC has no powers of enforcement and it cannot impose sanctions. 
Its success, therefore is entirely dependent upon the political will of the 
treaty partners to negotiate solutions to the problems that ambiguous 
compliance behaviours impose upon the treaty regime. As I have 
po in ted  ou t in C hapter two of this thesis, the US and Soviet 
Com m issioners are dependent upon their instructions from  their 
respective leaders. Graybeal and Krepon note that during times of 
friction the negotiation latitude allowed the Commissioners to resolve 
disputes tends to become narrower. The same holds true for frictions
512 The CPD board members who were on the GAC were: Chairman William R. 
Graham, Colin S. Gray, Francis P. Hoeber, Eli S. Jacobs, Charles Burton Marshall, 
Jaime Oaxaca, John P. Roche, Donald Rumsfeld and Laurence Hirsch Silberman. The 
three who were not were: Harriet Fast Scott, Roland P. Herbst and Robert B. Hotz.
513 US Government, Congressional Research Service. Fundamentals of Nuclear Arms 
Control: Treaty Compliance and Nuclear Arms Control. Report to the Subcommittee on 
Arms Control, International Security and Science of the Committee on Foreign Affairs 
US House of Representatives, 1985. p.18.
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within the US administration, thus, as we have seen before, the SCC
operates its boundaries, not merely betw een states, but also within
them. As Graybeal and Krepon suggest:
W hen friction within the executive branch is pronounced, 
instructions tend to become increasingly rigid. If, for 
example, governm ent agencies cannot agree on a proposed 
course of action, the US Commissioner at the SCC is not free 
to suggest one to his Soviet counterpart. W hat flexibility the 
US Com m issioner has relates to his choice of tactics to 
implement negotiating instructions .514
When, in the same year that the US raised the issue of the Krasnoyarsk 
radar, the Soviets raised similar complaints regarding the so-called 
'm odernisation' of US LPARs at Thule and Fylingdales Moor, the US 
displayed precisely the same intransigence over the correctness of their 
own position as the Soviets had, and more, since the m odernisation 
has gone ahead w ithout regard for the views of many analysts that 
these radars constituted a greater contravention of the ABM Treaty, 
than had the Krasnoyarsk radar.
Thule and Fylingdales Moor Radars
Significant questions are raised by the 'modernisation' of the radars at 
Thule, in G reenland, and Fylingdales M oor, in the UK. These 
questions concern, not m erely w hether or not they were in fact 
technical violations of the ABM Treaty, but more im portantly, from 
the perspective of the SCC is the question of response to 'violations' of 
this kind. W hereas the Soviets ultim ately 'backed dow n' over the 
Krasnoyarsk radar issue, the US has not been so forthcoming with
514 Graybeal, Sydney, and Michael Krepon. "Making Better Use of the SCC." 
International Security. 10.2, Fall (1985): 183-199. p.185.
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respect to its two LPAR radars that are not on the periphery of US 
territory.
This section shall argue that, in terms of US approaches to evaluating 
the effectiveness of the SCC the key issue is not necessarily the Soviet 
Krasnoyarsk radar, which ultimately was declared a technical violation 
of the ABM Treaty and which, at the time of this writing, is in the 
process of being dismantled, but rather, if the SCC is to be considered in 
any sense 'ineffective' it is over the issue of the Thule and Fylingdales 
Moor LPARs. Moreover, this issue raises the question of how one is to 
define the term 'effectiveness' w ith respect to the SCC. This is the 
central question for this section as it concerns the politics and ideology 
of treaty compliance more than any narrow ly defined technicality 
resulting from inconsistent definition of the basic terms of the treaty. 
The Soviet view of SCC, based on Graybeal and Krepon (1985) and on 
the author’s interview with a Soviet arms control expert (1991) holds 
that its effectiveness rests on the degree to which the SCC functions as 
a conduit for communication between governm ents, and not on the 
ability of the SCC to 'resolve' disputes. This view falls more closely in 
line with the param eters under which the SCC was first established 
(See the MOU concerning Regulations of the SCC in Chapter two).
The issue of the Thule and Fylingdales Moor LPARs rests on the 
definition of the term 'modernisation' which was invoked by the US 
as justification for their construction. Their stated intention was to 
replace two conventional, mechanically steered early warning radars 
that had been in existence since the late 1950s.515 According to
515 Zimmerman, Peter. "The Thule, Fylingdales, and Krasnoyarsk Radars: Innocents 
Abroad?" Arms Control Today 17.2 (March) (1987): 9-11. p.9.
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Zim m erm an they had been planned to be replaced with updated 
versions of the same technology, that is to say, w ith m odern, 
mechanically steered conventional radars.
That these radars had specific drawbacks over the new type of phased- 
array radar led, in 1979 and 1980, to consideration of replacing these 
mechanically steered radars w ith the new LPARs.516 The benefits of 
LPARs over conventional mechanically steered radars were threefold:
• that they operated with electronic speed,
• that they could track multiple targets and
• their lack of moving parts rendered them less susceptible to
mechanical breakdown under adverse weather conditions.
The drawbacks at that time were considered to be the long lead time 
(the prim ary reason for limiting LPARs in the ABM Treaty), their high 
cost, and, according to Lt. General Kelly H. Burke in testimony to the 
Senate  A p p ro p ria tio n s  C om m ittee , "po ten tia l ABM T reaty  
conflicts."517 Clearly, the Carter adm inistration was concerned to 
uphold  the letter of the ABM Treaty, even if it m eant forgoing the 
benefits of LPAR technology for Ballistic Missile Early W arning 
Systems (BMEWS). Just three years later, under Reagan, when the time 
came to call for tenders for the upgrading of the Thule and Fylingdales 
Moor radars, the same considerations held a different priority.
Reagan had come to power under an anti-SALT banner, and with open 
criticism of the way in which Carter had m anaged the evidence of
516 fold p.9.
517 Lt. Gen. Kelly H. Burke, Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for research, development 
and acquisition, in testimony given before the Senate Appropriations Committee on 
April 18, 1980, cited in Peter Zimmerman, Op Cit. 1987, p.9.
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alleged Soviet violations of the SALT Treaties.518 By 1983, as the 
rhetoric of the second Cold War was being fed with accusations of 
Soviet violations of SALT and other arms control agreem ents, the 
contract for the 'm odernisation of the Thule and Fylingdales Moor 
radars was let to the Raytheon Company, for a PAVE-PAWS-style large 
phased-array radar, the A N /FPS 115. The Central Processing Unit 
(CPU) comprises two CYBER 174-12 com puters which perform  the 
tasks of beam steering, the storage and display of data, and post-mission 
data reduction and analysis. The Thule radar, like the PAVE PAWS, 
has two circular planar phased arrays approxim ately 30 m etres in 
diam eter, inclined about 20° from the vertical, yielding a combined 
coverage of the two beams of about 85° elevation and 240° azimuth, 
and a range of around 4,800kms these will replace the older AN/FPS-50 
and AN/FPS-49a radars. The Fylingdales Moor radar, when complete 
will be a modified AN/FPS-115 with three faces, rather than the usual 
two, yielding an azimuth of 360°, replacing the older AN/FPS-50 and 
AN/FPS-49 radars. The Thule radar became operational in 1987, while 
work continues on the Fylingdales Moor site.519
Article IX of the ABM Treaty states:
To assure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty, each
Party undertakes not to transfer to other states, and not to
518 See: Porteous, Holly. US Perspectives on Arms Control Verification. Aberystwyth: 
University College of Wales, Working Paper No 3, May 1988. p.19.
519 Technical specification of the AN/FPS-115 radar derived from: Jane's Radars and 
Electronic Warfare. London, New York: Jane's Publishing. 1989-90. p.61. and 
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). The Military Balance. Director 
Robert O’Neill. London: IISS, 1986.
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deploy outside its national territory, ABM systems or their 
components limited by this Treaty .520
The issue of Thule and Fylingdales, with respect to the ABM Treaty is 
that, being located, respectively, in G reenland and the U nited 
Kingdom, neither of these radars is located on the periphery of the 
United States, nor are they oriented outw ard as required by Article 
VI(b) of the ABM Treaty. Moreover, the only radars excluded from this 
provision are the original BMEWS radars. The US argues that these 
new LPARs are just sophisticated m odernisations, rather than total 
replacements (which would not be perm itted under the provisions of 
the ABM Treaty). Zimmerman sums up the problem, arguing that the 
Thule and Fylingdales Moor radars are not mere 'm odernisations' of 
old radars, rather:
They incorporate entirely new technologies and wholly 
different operating principles, a fact not missed by the ABM 
Treaty, which clearly treats [LPARs] differently from other 
types of radars. Nor will the new radar at Fylingdales directly 
replace the old one. It will be built on a different site, and the 
old radar will operate concurrently for at least a year after the 
new one is finished .521
This interpretation of 'deploy,' implying a definition after the style of 
the SALT II definition of deploym ent of submarine launched ballistic 
missiles; such that deploy means after 'sea trials,' flies in the face of the 
definition that the Reagan administration operated with respect to the 
Soviet Krasnoyarsk radar.
520 US Government, ACDA, ed. Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: Texts and 
Histories of Negotiations. Washington: United States Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency, 1980. p.141.
521 Zimmerman, Peter. "The Thule, Fylingdales, and Krasnoyarsk Radars: Innocents 
Abroad?" Arms Control Today 17.2 (March) (1987): 9-11. p.10.
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At issue here, too, is that of the definition of the word 'modernise.' 
According to the Stanford Research Group's 1988 report, the Reagan 
administration argues that:
... the ABM Treaty generally  perm its m odernisation . 
Proponents of this view note, for example, that Article VII 
explicitly approves modernisation of components or systems 
that are identified as primarily associated with ABM systems.
The United States argues that the BMEWS radars were 
originally designed as and continue to be early-w arning 
facilities. The ABM Treaty is silen t w ith  respect to 
m odernisation of early-w arning system s. Therefore, the 
Reagan adm inistration argues, since the treaty generally 
perm its m odernisation of perm itted systems and does not 
specifically prohib it the m odernisation of BMEWS, the 
LPARs at Thule and Fylingdales are entirely legitimate.522
However, in the case of Fylingdales Moor the LPAR is being built at a 
different site from the older AN/FPS-50 and '49 radars. This would 
seem to stretch the notion of m odernisation to its elastic limit at the 
very least.
This debate hinges on how one is to read the material texts of radar 
deploym ent and of LPAR deploym ent in particular. It rests upon 
whether one is to accept the US Reagan administration's reading of the 
Thule and Fylingdales Moor radars as a metonymic transform ation - 
more of the same, just more refined - or whether one reads the Thule 
and Fylingdales M oor LPAR dep loym ents as a m etaphoric  
transformation, in which case one stands-in for the other - a process of 
replacement while invoking a different, if parallel, discursive order. 
Using the [literally] concrete examples of the deploym ent strategies of 
large phased array radars, it is possible to see, as with any other cultural
522 Duffy, Gloria. Compliance and the Future of Arm s Control. Stanford: Stanford 
University and Global Outlook, 1988. p.94.
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artifact, such as a statue, elem ents of the world-view  or e p i s t e m e  
within which these artifacts were and are produced.
In the same way, the dispute over the Krasnoyarsk radar represents the 
sam e sets of choices w ithin the 'gram m ar' of arm s control. The 
question of compliance with the ABM Treaty centred upon whether 
the Krasnoyarsk radar represented a metonymic transformation of the 
concept of early-warning radar, extending the notion of territorial 
boundary to take account of technical problems of siting, or whether 
the radar represents a transform ation on the m etaphoric plane in 
which the radar is construed as an early-warning token standing-in for 
an ABM battle-management radar. The choice between these positions 
is ultimately political rather than technical.523
The Formation of Enunciative Modalities:
A Semiotics of Arms Control
This section is about the texting of history, the use of a discourse 
analytic approach to the study  of the operation of a political 
community in the context of the sets of relations between that political 
com m unity and those other political com m unities that, through a 
complex of kinship netw orks makes possible the operation of this 
particu lar political com m unity. That com m unity is the Standing 
Consultative Commission on Arms Limitation (SCC). And finally this 
section is about the materiality of discourse and the view of text seen as 
an essentially political activity - a process, rather than a noun, a process 
that is, m oreover, constitutive of the specific dom ain of political
523 that is to say that it is a matter of interpretation which changes according to the 
'screen' through which it is viewed - it is not, therefore, an objective, technical issue.
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practice delineated by the broad term 'arms control.' Kenneth Dyson 
states:
Words are a part of human behaviour. They are mental 
categories which both represent, and are part of, the world 
and which impose intentionality and coherence on that 
world. Language is not just an intellectual activity distinct 
from the reality of the material world. Concepts and contexts 
are inseparable. Language is part of the social and political 
structure; it reveals the politics of a society. Hence analysis of 
political discourse will indicate how the political world is 
perceived, and a diachronic analysis of concepts can be 
helpful in uncovering long-term structural changes by 
showing how words acquire new meanings in the context of 
such changes.524
This chapter has set out to show something of the complexity and 
scope of the range of discourse communities that feed into the process 
of constituting an event as a potential arms control compliance 
violation. This section seeks to explore some of the deeper issues at 
work in constituting an event in this way. I want to argue here that the 
political process and orientation of the administration, in each of its 
bureaucracies, not only influences the way in which an event is treated 
as a violation, but in the way in which the event is constituted as such 
- an event. This section is not only about the SCC as a conduit for 
policy, but about the SCC as representative of the constitution of a 
whole domain of policy, a space for action in which are brought 
together a number of other policy domains. The chapter as a whole 
has sought to bring together a range of sub communities, within the 
wider domains of the defence and foreign policy community. At this 
point it seems reasonable to draw together a range of themes arising 
from these various domains of policymaking into building a picture of
524 See Dyson, Kenneth. The State Tradition in Western Europe: A Study of an idea and 
institution. Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1980. p.l
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the operation of the field in which identity  is articulated as the 
practices of military security.
Reading a set of concrete practices author-ised by one state, through the 
framework and ideological habits of another state give rise, not only to 
the potential for conflict, but these practices of reading in themselves, 
are constitutive of the reality in which arms control is itself articulated 
as a practice of boundary-making and therefore of identity-making. By 
iden tify ing  (and dem onising) the O ther, the sense of Self is 
strengthened and security, (itself articulated as the integrity of the 
state), is, thereby, maintained.
The narrative I have been engaged in writing to this point concerns, 
broadly speaking, an exam ination of the changing conditions that 
make possible the turning of an event (such as the building of a large 
concrete structure) into an issue (a sign worthy of the gaze of those 
concerned w ith arms control compliance). In the course of this 
narrative I have examined some of the factors driving the constitution 
of the 'w orld-view ' of the adm in istration , and the role of the 
C om m ittee on the P resent D anger in p rom oting  a particu lar 
ideological view of the Soviet Union as Manichaean Other. In so doing, 
I have examined the factors leading to the rise of what has been termed 
the 'second Cold War.' I have briefly looked at the principles of 
international law that led both the United States and the Soviet Union 
to continue to uphold the SALT II Treaty, despite its non-ratified 
status, and the SALT I Interim Agreement, and I have analysed some 
of Ronald Reagan's rhetoric and that of the Committee on the Present 
Danger that brought him to power. W ithin the context of these 
developments, the analysts w ithin the intelligence community, who, 
in their turn  have been form ed w ithin, and w ho in their turn
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reproduce the ideological form ations that influence the m anner in 
which the raw intelligence data is interpreted.
We have see also, how the decisions concerning resource allocation 
that author-ised the development of specific intelligence asset forms, 
are them selves the product of specific and ultim ately  political 
decisions, taken m any years before. These intelligence assets, in the 
technological forms that permit, or privilege, the gathering of specific 
kinds of information, as opposed to other kinds, provide the raw data 
for interpretation by intelligence analysts, who, themselves are the 
product of particular kinds of schooling, of selection criteria set by the 
intelligence organisations themselves and of the regime to whom the 
final, digested intelligence product is submitted.
We have seen also, how these satellites, their support systems, and the 
specificities of their technologies m ade possible the discovery and 
observation of activities and events w ithin the Soviet Union (and, by 
the Other, of the United States) that could be compared with past 
patterns of behaviour (situated w ithin discursive continuities, or 
identified as discontinuities with past practices) in order to constitute 
these events as m eaningful w ithin the discursive constellation of 
activities inscribed525 in terms of arms control compliance. As Dyson 
notes:
Reality is a function not just of sense data bu t also of the 
conceptual apparatus that m en [sic] have developed, for 
concepts shape experience by providing categories in terms of 
which, men [sic] see and understand the world 526
525 Here I use 'inscribed' rather than 'described' as the latter implies a separation 
between the events in themselves and the process of ascribing meaning top the events.
526 Kenneth Dyson Op Cit 1980. p.2.
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Disciplining Space: LPARs and boundary-making practice.
The dispute over LPARs and ABM treaty com pliance, m ediated 
th rough  the S tanding C onsultative Com m ission represen ts an 
example of the materiality of discourse. The purpose of the LPARs was 
to discipline and maintain the integrity of the boundaries between Self 
and Other. The ABM Treaty lim itations on LPARs, in turn, serve to 
discipline the practice of disciplining the boundaries. By situating the 
LPARs away from the territorial peripheries, either by placing the 
LPAR gaze within the boundary - as in the Soviet Union - or outside 
the territo ria l boundary  - as in the U nited States' Thule and 
Fylingdales Moor radars - the boundaries become problematised. At 
this point a process of boundary-m aking negotiation is indicated. The 
forum for this negotiation is required to be a liminal space between 
boundaries. The S tanding C onsu ltative  C om m ission on Arms 
Limitation (SCC) is the space designated by the ABM Treaty regime to 
serve this function. It can serve this function because it exists between 
states, like an amoebic pseudopod extending out across the boundaries 
to 'test the waters' as it were. This space is especially disciplined 
because it lies at the cutting edge of the boundaries between states527, 
particularly as its functions concern the issue of narrow ly defined 
security of states - military security.
527 perhaps a more apt metaphor would be 'liminal space’ rather than cutting edge, for 
at this locus, the boundaries are constantly under negotiation, like the wash between 
high and low tides - the edge is, therefore, fuzzy and often ill-defined. Indeed, the 
political and ill-defined nature of these boundaries is, I argue, precisely the reason for 
the existence of negotiating bodies designed to operate these sets of negotiations in 
order to maintain the integrity of those boundaries. I argue further that, by operating 
at/across the boundaries, in the space of anarchy between states, that this is the reason 
for the highly ritualised and formalised sets of behaviours that characterise the 
negotiation process.
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Interestingly, and the reason for dwelling at some length on the issue 
of the Krasnoyarsk Radar, the constitution of that event as an 
ambiguous event and therefore an object of interest to the Standing 
Consultative Commission (represented as a possible violation) reveals 
the gap between the event and its interpretation. That is to say, that the 
technology was not merely 'objectively there' but functioned as a 
cultural artefact that required interpretation according to a set of 
interpretive schema. That the technology was produced by a culture 
other than the United States rendered the object of knowledge, in part, 
incomprehensible, as it did not neatly fit the interpretive schemata of 
the United States according to which particular characteristics were 
required for particular functions. What has clearly happened in this 
instance is that, by existing outside of the United States’ interpretive 
schema, the Soviets' radar at Krasnoyarsk was rendered as ambiguous.
This raises the question of
the extent to which it is safe to assume that Soviet designers 
with the same goals as their American counterparts would 
make the same technical decisions 528
In the case of the Krasnoyarsk radar it is clear that the Soviets made 
quite different technical decisions to their American counterparts - a 
point seemingly lost on the team of US observers who visited the 
Krasnoyarsk radar site in 1987. Their surprise seemed greatest at the 
lack of blast or EMP hardening exhibited in the Krasnoyarsk structure. 
However, as Desmond Ball529 pointed out, it remains doubtful how
528 Mackenzie, Donald. Inventing Accuracy: A Historical Sociology of Nuclear Missile 
Guidance. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1990. p.342.
529 Author’s discussion with Desmond Ball 25/11/91.
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long even a hardened LPAR could remain functional in the face of 
quite m odest overpressures, so it seems not unreasonable that the 
Soviets could have decided that the potentially m arginal benefits of 
hardening did not justify the cost. This is borne out in the decision to 
build outside of the permafrost zone, sacrificing around six minutes of 
w arning time for a saving of tw o-thirds of the cost of building on 
perm afrost. Cost was a clear factor in the decision to build  at 
Krasnoyarsk, rather than at Noril'sk; cost may well have been a factor 
in the decision not to harden the structure .530
W hat seems increasingly clear from all of this is that the SCC is 
engaged in both the operation and application of sets of knowledges, 
w hile at the sam e time it is engaged in the p roduction  and 
dissemination of knowledges. The SCC in this sense is constituted by 
and  co n stitu tiv e  of p a rticu la r  subject positions. The SCC 
Com m issioners literally 'speak the state ' - hence their status as 
Am bassadors. As the Commissioners deal w ith the negotiation of 
activities that affect [ultimately] the integrity of the state, they are 
therefore constitutive of the boundaries between states. This analysis of 
the role of the SCC thus ontologically goes beyond traditional 
fram eworks of interpretation and interpretive communities. It goes 
beyond simple policy analysis, instrum ental rationality and problem 
solving, although the SCC is, as we have seen, engaged in all of these. 
It goes beyond traditional frameworks of interpretation by linking the 
macro and microstructures of state making and institutional practice as 
viewed through the SCC.
530 See: Garthoff, Raymond. "Case of the Wandering Radar." Bulletin of Atomic 
Scientists .July/August 1991: 7-9.
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The U nited States and the Soviet Union, having been constituted 
throughout the Cold War as Manichaean Other to each other - in a 
system dependent upon modernist conceptions of power articulated as 
military force - the advent of nuclear weapons was early recognised as 
the postm odern wild-card in the m odernist world order. As Bernard 
Brodie recognised as early as 1946, nuclear weapons were and remain 
too pow erful, too potentially destructive to ever be used again as 
weapons in the modernist sense of the word. Their value lay in their 
use as tokens of discourse, as signifiers of power, of superpower status. 
Moreover, the shift in world-view ushered in by the 'postm odern'531 
weapon led, in an ironic twist, to the notion that m ilitary security 
depended upon ensuring that nuclear weapons would not be used.
The consequences of this shift in thinking led to a view that ultimate 
security lay along the path of ultimate vulnerability. With the doctrine 
of M utually Assured Destruction coupled with the limitation on anti- 
ballistic missile systems through the ABM Treaty, it was clear that if 
the Treaty were to remain for all time in a changing world, it was clear 
that a space was needed in which the United States and the Soviet 
Union could explore the extent to which a jointly produced discursive 
economy could be established and m aintained such that these states as 
speaking subjects could be construed as self-policing subjects within a 
new  regim e of norm alising and discip linary  control. The SCC 
established this space. Although other international fora existed, the 
SCC was and is unique insofar as it represents a space in which the two
531 they are postmodern weapons because their value is greater as a sign than as a 
weapon. This does not alter the fact of their destructive potential, merely that the 
modalities of their use dictate a strategy of war avoidance rather than of war­
fighting.
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adversarial powers could negotiate on an ongoing basis their mutual 
vulnerability to each other.532
The maintenance of such a space exacts a price - the ability to raise 
issues that at times has required the exchange of inform ation that 
remains classified to their own side, but is necessary in order to account 
for behaviours that would otherwise be construed as ambiguous with 
respect to compliance with the Treaty. In order to protect that level of 
openness, the space itself m ust be highly disciplined, m aintaining full 
confidentiality with respect to the negotiations, the procedures and, in 
m any cases, w ith respect to the agreem ents them selves that are 
negotiated within the SCC.533
The ABM Treaty formalises more than one kind of vulnerability, 
insofar as it not only formalises the principle of defencelessness, but it 
also formalises vulnerability to the gaze of the Other through the 
acknowledgem ent of the legitimacy of national technical means of 
verification (NTM) and through non-interference clauses with respect 
to this vulnerability .534
While it lacks specifically juridical powers to sanction violations of 
arms control agreements, the SCC is not w ithout power. Taken in
532 Although the SCC represents only a small contribution to the arms control process, 
its uniqueness is in the indefinite functioning of the ABM Treaty - it will therefore be 
available for use continuously, while other negotiating fora may come and go.
533 while the ultimate decisionmaking is not separate from the governments that 
established and that maintain the SCC, the body does have an existence mandated by 
the ABM Treaty and by norms of international law through the principle of Pacta Sunt 
Servanda.
534 thereby abdicating the sovereign nation's right to visual privacy for the sake of an 
international security regime.
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concert with the other arms of the security state that is articulated as 
m uch through arm s control as through m ilitary power, forms of 
norm ative power operate to m aintain compliance with at least the 
spirit of the agreements and Treaties that stand between unrestrained 
arms racing and a fairly stable deterrence regime.
W hat is not addressed adequately in the literature on arms control is 
the operation of compliance w ith arms control agreem ents in the 
absence of specified sanctions. While this is not central to this thesis, 
some aspects of the kind and scope of analysis used in Section III of this 
thesis may go some way towards pointing toward the mechanisms at 
w ork behind  the operation of compliance. Here I refer to the 
disciplinary power embodied in the verification regime of observation, 
and the norm alising gaze of 'w orld opinion' articulated at several 
levels, from quiet diplomacy within the SCC that has operated to great 
effect over, for example the SA-5 radar issue and the concurrent testing 
of air defence elements with elements of a ballistic missile defence, to 
the publication of treaty  'violations' over a period of years, to, 
ultim ately the expression of norm alising judgem ent in term s of the 
potential for trade sanctions, tit-for-tat counter-violations, or at the 
extreme, abrogation of the Treaty under the principle of rebus sic 
stantibus. Interestingly, even in the most oppositional times of the first 
term of the Reagan administration and its rhetoric of the 'evil empire,' 
both Parties to even the unratified SALT II Treaty gave unilateral 
undertakings not to undercu t the term s of the Treaty under the 
international law principle of pacta sunt servanda. Could it be that the 
Word is mightier than the Bomb?
At the heart of this range of options for response, the SCC operates as 
the front-line forum for response. It is a space in which ambiguous
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compliance activities are raised before they are fully formed - named -
as violations. The need for such an organisation, small as it is, arises
because, despite the technical form of the treaties under its care, arms
control is more about hum an behaviour than about the purely
technical. The decisions about whether or not a particular activity is to
be deemed a violation are ultimately political, and rest with the White
House and the Kremlin respectively. These decisions are informed by a
range of inputs from a variety of sources, ranging from the intelligence
community to the representatives of the military industrial complex,
to security analysts within the State and Defence Departments, and, in
the case of the United States, from com m unity lobby groups that
themselves seek to promote particular political positions. Each of these
groups represents a knowledge-producing community535 with a range
of backgrounds and political positions. As MacKenzie notes:
W hat we find ... is that there is no sim ple continuum  
whereby the closer we approach to 'use' the less problematic 
becomes the knowledge generated. Knowledge is indeed a 
netw ork w herein different kinds of tests are perform ed 
against differently constructed backgrounds, with no one test 
... and no one background being accepted by all as the 
ultimate arbiter 536
In each case of a suspected violation of the SALT Treaties, the SCC 
m ediates537 between a multiplicity of cultures. Not merely the cultures
The point here is that the arms control process is also informed by knowledge 
producing communities that are outside of the narrow institutional basis of the SALT 
regime.
336 See Mackenzie, Donald. Inventing Accuracy: A Historical Sociology of Nuclear 
Missile Guidance. Cambridge, Massachussetts: The MIT Press, 1990. p.378.
337 it does this by, and through language as descriptive of action, through 
interpretation of instructions, presentations at Plenary Sessions, translation and 
negotiation of meaning of terms and referral back through the Commissioners’ chain of 
command.
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of the United States and the Soviet Union, but of the cultures within 
these larger cultural formations articulated as states: - the culture of the 
security state, the culture of the policym aking com m unities, the 
culture of the strategic analysts, the culture of the arm s control 
communities, the culture of Congress and of the Senate and of the 
range of Committees that have an input into the arms control process. 
Also im plicated are the cultures of technology that construe the 
activities of the Other in terms of assumptions about technical facticity 
that is itself the product of political decisionmaking. At the end of the 
day, two people face each other across the table as Commissioners in 
the Standing Consultative Commission, charged with negotiating the 
m eaning of a set of behaviours that are am biguous with respect to 
compliance with the SALT Treaties.
These two people operate at the extreme ends of their respective 
pyram ids of bureaucratic and technical support to enact and to 
m aintain  the boundaries betw een their respective states. They 
represent one site among uncountable sites. For the purposes of the 
present analysis, and because this site operates to maintain one of the 
m any layers of the boundaries of the security state, this study has 
focused upon the SALT Standing Consultative Commission (SCC). It is 
part of the mechanism  by which two security states secure their 
identity . This is suppo rted  th rough  a netw ork  of interlocking 
knowledge-producing mechanisms, ranging from the electro-optical 
physics that led to the production of high-resolution surveillance 
satellites, to the adm inistrative apparatuses that serve to process the 
surveillance data w ithin a regime of norm ative behaviours against 
which the behaviours of the O ther, so construed as an object of 
knowledge and hence of surveillance, may be assessed.
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We have, in effect, examined the relations betw een institutions in 
terms of how their behavioural patterns and systems of norms, their 
modes of classification (taxonomy) and the relations of economic and 
social processes have converged at an historically specific space and 
time and under specific sets of conditions, in order to produce an object 
of discourse - the security state articulated in relation to the Other, the 
non-self. This other has been identified in terms of its resemblances 
(LPAR design, surveillance technologies, its goals and aims - security, 
integrity); its proximity as other but still W estern, as other but still 
sharing a common boundary (NATO, WTO); its distance (physically, 
ideologically); and its transformations - its symptoms of expansionism, 
of the changes that may presage the development of a ballistic missile 
defence system, its increased defence spending and production, and so 
on.
We have seen how the discursive object, so construed, operates as an 
actant (not as monolithic, unitary  actor) in term s of engaging in 
activities and gestures that the Self (articulated as The West, or The 
United States) interprets as meaningful behaviour - signals. We have 
seen how these signals (themselves neither unidirectional, or unitary) 
are 'sent' or at least received and interpreted (thereby 'produced') at 
particular sites that legitimate the authority  of those signals. Such sites 
include, b u t are not restric ted  to the S tanding  C onsultative 
Commission on Arms Limitation (SCC). The SCC is, therefore one of 
the institutional sites within which particular patterns of discourse are 
legitimated in order to articulate state interests in terms of the practices 
of maintaining the boundaries, both physical and notional/conceptual.
Within these formalised institutional settings there are enacted a finite 
set (at any given place and time) of available subject positions that are
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rigidly defined by grids of specification and regimes of interrogation. 
For each instance of ambiguous behaviour with respect to arms control 
compliance, the SCC operates as a mechanism within which the Self 
may interrogate the Other, such that the burden of proof rests with the 
O ther538 to demonstrate that such and such behaviour is in compliance 
with such and such an Article of the SALT Treaties.
As was pointed out before, and running as a thread of continuity 
throughout the author's interviews with arms control negotiators and 
policymakers in the US, UK, NATO, and the Soviet Union, the treaty­
making process is exactly that - a process. It is not a fixed object. Even 
after a Treaty is signed, ratified and in force, there are still ongoing 
regim es of verification to m onitor compliance, there are ongoing 
questions of definition of ambiguous terms within the treaty, and there 
are ongoing negotiations towards the next treaty. All of these activities 
(for such they are) represent ways of articulating boundaries - stating 
and re-stating the State. We have also seen how the very process of 
constituting an activity as one of ’violation’ also represents a practice 
of boundarymaking.
I w ant to argue here that the boundary-m aking process itself is an 
integral part of the process of ’creating’ the Subject - the United States 
security state, for example. Moreover, I want to argue that the process 
of enacting the state is analogous to (indeed, is another form of) the 
process at work in the constitution of the individual subject in classic 
realist novels. Given the common historical and philosophical ground
538 por an explication of the terms Self and Other, as used in this thesis, see footnote 8. 
and page 190ff.
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upon which both the classic realist novel, and classic realist political 
theory, are based, this should not be too surprising.
Catherine Belsey points out that the conceptual framework of classic 
realism is founded upon the consistency and continuity of the subject. 
But, as she further states:
it is characteristic of ... the narrative process itself to disrupt 
subjectivity, to disturb the pattern of relationships between 
subject-positions which is presented as normal in the text. In 
m any cases the action itself represents a test of identity, 
putting identity in question by confronting the protagonist 
w ith alternative possible actions ... to this extent classic 
realism recognizes the precariousness of the ego .539
The importance of returning the subject to a fictive closure is central to
the control of anarchy in the subject - the maintenance of identity:
... the movement of classic realist narrative towards closure 
ensures the reinsta tem ent of order, som etim es a new 
(world?) order, som etim es the old restored, but always 
intelligible because familiar. Decisive choices are m ade, 
identity is established .540
It was precisely this form  of closure that was practiced, by the 
Committee on the Present Danger, and in the rhetorical strategies of 
President Reagan in order to maintain an increased level of defence 
expenditure, while prom oting the sense of a strengthened American 
identity. As Belsey notes:
Harm ony has been reestablished through the redistribution 
of the signifiers into a new system  of differences which 
closes off the threat to subjectivity, and it remains only to 
make this harm onious and coherent world intelligible to the
539 Belsey, Catherine. Critical Practice London: Methuen New Accents. 1980. p.75.
540 Ibid.
reader (voter), closing off in the process the sense of danger 
to the reader's subjectivity.
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The US dom estic polity as 'reader' of the discourse of danger 
prom ulgated by President Reagan, can rest assured that the dangers 
posed by Soviet noncompliance with arms control treaties will be met, 
in an 'anarchical' world with
...our own actions, either to produce agreement by the other 
side to cease and correct the problem , or to offset the 
consequences by our own unilateral steps.541
W hat is left to us here is to trace the links between the creation and 
operation of figurative texts such as novels with the figurative in the 
constitution of the real that may go some distance towards explaining 
how subjectivity, central to the formation of identities and speaking 
positions, is equiprim ordial in the form ation and constitution, not 
only of individuals as subjects, but also the form ation of states as 
subjects. I w ant to stress here, that this represents a departure from 
classic realist political theory that operates a m odel of states as 
(relatively) unitary actors within a uniflow communication model. In 
the past, analyses of the ind iv idual/sta te  dichotomy have tended to 
look for the sources of change in social theory - in analyses that 
addressed  'society' rather than the indiv idual. O ther m odes of 
addressing the same dichotomy have oversimplified articulations of 
the state by viewing the state as a unitary and coherent actor, analogous 
to the m odernist, hum anist, individual. This thesis has set out to 
operate a theory of the state which effectively collapses the dichotomy
541 US Government, Special Panel on Arms Control and Disarmament of the 
Procurement and Military Nuclear Systems Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed 
Services, House of Representatives. Review of Arms Control and Disarmament 
Activities 98th Congress Washington USGPO 1984. p.22.
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between state and individual by positing both the individual and the 
state as persona ficta  each produced by and through the same sets of 
processes. That is to say that under this rubric both the state and the 
individual are at once constituted by, and constitutive of, social 
practices. The theory of the state as subject operated within this thesis 
rests upon the premise that the individual is a non-unitary actor, and 
that subjectivity is construed by and through the signifying processes, 
of which language forms a part. This formulation combines elements 
of Lacan’s and Foucault's theories of subjectivity. At this point it seems 
useful to step through the assumptions and argum ent upon which this 
premise is based.
The Individual/State analogue
1. The individual enters the social world in two ways:
a) via what Lacan terms the 'mirror stage' by which the child 
sees herself as other, exterior to the child who does the 
seeing. This necessitates a division between the T  that is 
seen and the T that does the seeing, and
b) through language which necessitates a division between 
the T of discourse (that is, the socially construed idea of what 
the term T means) and the T who speaks.
2. Of the two Ts of language, only the T  of discourse (the concept) is 
fully represented to the conscious self. The self that speaks engages in a 
selection process in order to speak, necessitating the silencing of the 
other possibilities in order to construe what is to be spoken. For Lacan 
the unconscious comes into being in the gap which is formed by the 
division betw een the T  of discourse and the T  that speaks. The 
unconscious is thus an aspect of the subject's entry into the symbolic 
(hence social) order. The constitution of the unconscious at the same 
m om ent as the subject's entry into the symbolic order, creates a
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problem for the subject. By entering the symbolic order the speaking 
subject can articulate desires and hence assert full consciousness or 
autonomy over the immediate present. Nonetheless, however desires 
are articulated, they remain metonymic of the structure of desire itself, 
leaving unarticulated those aspects of desire that remain in the 
unconscious, and are thus,by definition, unaddressable. As Belsey 
points out:
The subject is ... the site of contradiction, and is perpetually 
in the process of construction, thrown into crisis by 
alterations in language and in the social formation, capable 
of change.542
Moreover:
... the displacement of subjectivity across a range of 
discourses implies a range of positions from which the 
subject grasps itself and its relations with the real, and these 
positions may be incompatible or contradictory, [tjhese 
incompatibilities and contradictions within what is taken for 
granted ... exert a pressure on concrete individuals to seek 
new, non-contradictory subject positions.543
3. In the same way in which individuals enter the social world, (in the 
process establishing/maintaining subjectivity,) so too, the social world 
construes sites at which subjectivity can be enacted in particular forms. 
The individual thus represents a social formation within the symbolic 
order.
4. Individuals articulate their identity across a range of discourses. 
Among the subject positions available are those subject positions 
which require the subject to 'speak for' or 'in the place of' other
542 Belsey, Catherine.Critical Practice. London: Methuen, 1980. p.65
543 Ibid
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individuals (as, for example the family as a site of intervention for a 
range of practices concerned with health, economic viability, social 
conformity within normative frameworks, and so on).
5. Insofar as the individual represents and is represented by and in a 
range of discourses, the subject cannot be said to be unitary, continuous 
or cohesive, except, provisionally, and for the purposes of analysis, the 
subject may be said to articulate a particular position at a particular 
point in time within specific boundaries of operation. It follows, then, 
that the individual speaking subject may be construed as such only 
insofar as the subject enacts a specific regime of boundaries, 
establishing and maintaining the identity of self in opposition to the 
anarchic exterior.
6. Subjectivity, a function of the socially/historically construed 
symbolic order, is enacted by individuals or groups of individuals (who 
in their authorisation are empowered to speak), in the course of which, 
are produced individuals (through boundaries established between self 
and other) and collective subjects (through boundaries enacted 
through 'us' and 'them'). In each case any attempt to maintain the 
dichotomy between the individual and the social symbolic orders 
remains artificial and arbitrary.
The linguistic and other semiotic means by which we operate a shared
social and political world form in fact the currency by which the values
that define our shared sense of community. As Terence Ball argues:
It has long been a truism that our being moral and political 
creatures presupposes a shared capacity for communication.
We therefore live, not as a luxury but as a logical (indeed 
ontological) necessity, in a world of words. It is by virtue of 
being communicating creatures that we are tied together not 
by physical bonds but by the words which are our bonds. ...
Who and what we are, how we arrange and classify and
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think about our world - and how we act in it - is deeply 
delimited by the conceptual, argumentative and rhetorical 
resources of our language. The limits of my moral and 
political language are the limits of my moral and political 
world544
In the context of this thesis it would seem more useful to render Ball's 
use of the term 'words' as 'signifying elements’ insofar as they can, in 
addition to words, be realised as actions (examples being troop 
deployments, 'gunboat diplomacy' and so on). Thus Ball's use of 
language can be broadened semiotically to mean any signifying system.
What is important to note here is that the meanings explored in the 
articulation of the security state seen through the practices of arms 
control compliance at the site of the Standing Consultative 
Commission, is that these meanings are never divorced from the 
practices that produce them, and that discourse (and its boundaries so 
enacted) represents an active struggle for and against the production of 
particular types of statements. Moreover, the state so construed is 
operable for only as long as particular kinds of representation delimit 
the state in that form.
These practices of representation are always material. That is to say that
they go beyond the bare expression of a system of ideas. They also occur
within a context. As Tilley notes:
The use, production and meaning of material culture is not a 
context-free event. Equally, material culture does not simply
544 Ball, Terence. Transforming Political Discourse: Political Theory and Conceptual 
History. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988. pp.3-4.
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consist of a set of signs to be read in which inheres a teleology 
of intentional meaning .545
As a result, the state as a material cultural artefact cannot be reduced to 
a system of ideas, either at the level of the individual or at the level of 
social theory. As both product of and producer of practices of 
representation, the state cannot be reduced to simple utilitarian or 
social functions. The state is neither a-historical, nor immutable - that 
is it cannot occur w ithout a context in which it is produced and 
sustained - therefore it cannot be used or understood in precisely the 
same way across cultural boundaries .546 We have seen how this has 
led, betw een the U nited States and the Soviet U nion to much 
misreading of each other's practices and motives. Nor can the state be 
construed in evolutionary term s as the 'h igh-point' for civilised 
governance. As Tilley notes:
Material culture ... exists in a space falling between rules and 
principles for action and actual social practices ... These 
practices are to be linked with power-knowledge strategies 
both producing material culture and constraining the forms 
it may take according to context. So the use and form of 
material culture can be understood in relation to power and 
knowledge as can the social practices producing it.
In the context of this thesis, the importance of the ABM Treaty was 
precisely the recognition that meanings can change across time. If the 
Treaty w ere to stand  for all tim e (unlim ited  duration) then 
m echanism s w ould need to be set in place for the constant 
renegotiation of the m eaning of essentially or at least contingently
545 Tilley, Christopher. "Michel Foucault: Towards an Archeology of Archeology." 
Reading  M ater ia l  Culture: S tru c tu ra l ism , H erm eneu tics  and P os t-S tru c tu ra lism .  Ed. 
Christopher Tilley. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990. p.338.
546 This argument is sustained analogously in Tilley's archeology of Archeology in 
Tilley, Op. Cit. 1990. p.338ff.
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contested terms. That m echanism was, and rem ains, the Standing 
Consultative Commission on Arms Limitation (SCC). The narrative 
invoked by this thesis is precisely the story of the charting of political 
change. We have noted the change in how the United States has 
defined itself in relation to its dom inant Other - the Soviet Union - 
through the practices of one of the mechanisms charged with the 
enactment of the boundaries of the United States as speaking subject 
within the discourse of arms control compliance. The time-scale I have 
examined has been roughly the period between 1975 and 1985 which 
saw the transition from the practice of the U nited States under 
President Carter, to the practice of the United States under the first 
term of President Reagan. The changes w rought in these states so 
enacted have been felt in the practice of the ongoing negotiations 
w ithin the SCC over the subject of com pliance w ith the SALT 
Agreements. As we have seen this mechanism does not operate in a 
context-free environment any more than any other practice of identity 
creation and maintenance.
In the conclusion that follows I shall draw  together m any of the 
threads that have been woven throughout the thesis so far. I shall 
make explicit what has to this point remained largely implicit and set 
this w ithin the theoretical fram ew ork that has underp inned  this 
research. I shall conclude the conclusion with a gesture tow ards the 
role played by the SCC and, within the START regime, of the Joint 
Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC), and their importance 
for the future of the arms control process.
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Chapter V 
Post Scriptum
After the Soviet Union: The SCC and the JCIC under the CIS
This post-script examines the role of the SCC-style Joint Compliance 
and Inspection Commission (JCIC) established by a Protocol to the 
Strategic Arms Reduction Talks Treaty (START) on July 31, 1991.
With the resignation of Mikhail Gorbachev from the Presidency of the 
Soviet Union on December 25, 1991, the Soviet Union ceased to exist. 
However, the inheritor body of the Soviet seat on the United Nations 
Security Council, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) led, 
at least hegemonically, by Russia, remains. All of the former Soviet 
Republics that have long-range strategic nuclear weapons have agreed 
to uphold the terms of all existing nuclear arms control agreements, 
including SALT and START. Moreover, it appears increasingly likely 
that control over nuclear weapons will rem ain centralised under 
Russian control (albeit w ith U kraine, Byelorussian and Kazakh 
consultative safety mechanisms over their use).
The Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission was established 
under Article XV of the Treaty Between the United States of America 
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and 
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START). The m andate under 
this Article was threefold:
a) to resolve questions relating to compliance w ith the 
obligations assumed;
b) to agree upon such additional m easures as m ay be 
necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of [the 
START] Treaty; and
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c) to resolve questions related to the application of relevant 
provisions of [the START] Treaty to a new kind of strategic 
offensive arm, after notification has been provided in 
accordance with Paragraph 16 of section VII of the 
Notification Protocol.
With the establishment of the Joint Compliance and Inspection 
Commission (JCIC) under START as a forum in which to raise 
concerns over ambiguous compliance behaviour, the compliance 
infrastructure is already taking shape. In terms of the identity making 
processes described in earlier chapters, strategic nuclear weapons can be 
seen to have had an important input into the process of forming a new 
union between the former Soviet republics. This can be seen to have 
operated in two directions. On the one hand, the strategic nuclear 
weapons have long operated as the dominant sign in the binary 
equation between East and West throughout the Cold War, they have 
thus served a unifying function in terms of maintaining a distinctly 
Soviet identity. On the other hand, control over these weapons would 
arguably reinforce the individual sovereignty of the States, thereby 
operating as a disintegrative force.
It can be noted that throughout the breakup of the Soviet Union into 
its component states the command and control of the strategic nuclear 
weapons remained under central control. These weapons have 
remained dispersed among four States: Russia, Ukraine, Byelorussia 
and Kazakhstan. Outside of Russia, the Ukraine, in addition to hosting 
long-range strategic bombers (Bear-H and Blackjack comprising about 
35% of all Soviet heavy bomber weapons and about 3% of all Soviet 
strategic nuclear warheads), also bases 56 SS-19 and 120 SS-24 strategic 
long-range ballistic missiles, while Kazakhstan bases 104 SS-18 ICBMs 
and Byelorussia bases 72 SS-25 ICBMs. These missile forces comprise
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about 36% of all Soviet ICBM w arheads and about 23% of all Soviet 
strategic nuclear warheads.547
In part, this is not too surprising since more than ninety percent of the 
senior personnel of the Strategic Rocket Forces are ethnically 
Russian.548 The same applies to the upper positions of the other armed 
forces. Thus Russian hegemony, it could be argued, is based on control 
over the legitimate means of force. Nonetheless, the recognition of the 
discursive (notional) power of strategic nuclear weapons has made the 
former Soviet Republics reluctant to relinquish those weapons that are 
on their soil.
The JCIC, in line with its function has a structure similar to that of the 
Standing Consultative Commission (SCC). Each delegation is headed 
by a Commissioner and a Deputy Commissioner. Under the terms of 
the START Treaty the names of each Party 's Com m issioner and 
Deputy Commissioner are to be notified to the Commission "as soon 
as practicable, but in any case no later than 30 days after the Treaty was 
signed."
Each D elegation  com prises the C om m issioner and  D eputy  
Commissioner, members, advisers and experts. The Commission may 
establish working groups in order to consider specific questions raised 
in the Commission. Assuming that the JCIC functions institutionally 
in a m anner similar to that of the SCC then the teams would include 
advisers from  appropria te  departm ents. On the US side such
547 Arms Control Today 21:8 October 1991. p.30.
548 Forum discussion with Mr. Jeffrey Jukes, ANU December 13,1991.
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departments would include the Departm ent of State, the Office of the 
Secretary of Defence, the Organisation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the 
Arm s Control and D isarm am ent Agency and the intelligence 
community, along with appropriate civilian and military advisers. The 
Russian (formerly Soviet) side, assum ing that it too follows the 
established practice of the SCC would operate with a Commissioner, a 
Deputy Commissioner and a team w ith input from an Interagency 
Group that w ould be draw n from the D epartm ent of Defence, the 
Military Industrial Commission, the Foreign Ministry and the Foreign 
Intelligence organisation derived from the former Committee on State 
Security (KGB). In line w ith  the opera tion  of the SCC the 
Commissioner would probably be draw n from the military, while the 
Deputy Commissioner w ould probably be draw n from the Foreign 
Ministry.
Unlike the SCC the JCIC has no regular semi-annual meeting. Sessions 
of the JCIC are convened at the request of either Party. Such requests 
m ust be answered within 14 days, the requests and responses must 
include the questions that the Party intends to raise, the name of the 
head representative of the Party (as sessions may be convened without 
the presence of a Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner), and the 
date and venue for the session. These sessions shall be convened in 
Geneva, Switzerland, or in another place agreed by the Parties. Outside 
of the formal sessions, questions can be raised and clarified by direct 
contact betw een the Com m issioners or D eputy  Com m issioners 
w ithout calling a formal session. Special sessions can be convened at 
the request of either Party where there is an urgent concern relating to 
compliance of the other Party with the obligations assumed under the 
Treaty.
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Requests for a Special Session must include the nature of the concern, 
including the type of strategic offensive arms related to the concern; 
the name of the head representative of the Party and the proposed date 
and venue of the Session. In addition, the requesting Party may 
propose a specific method for resolving the concern. Such a proposal 
may include a request to visit with special right of access to the location 
or facility where, in the opinion of the requesting Party that ambiguous 
compliance behaviour took place. The response will either indicate 
acceptance of the date and location for the special session, or will 
include a proposed alternate date and/or location. This date will be no 
later than 10 days after the date proposed by the requesting Party.
The response may also indicate acceptance of the proposed method for 
resolving the concern, or offer an alternative method for resolving the 
concern. Moreover, if the Parties agree to a visit with special access 
rights this may make a Special Session redundant. In such a case the 
Special Session need not take place. Insofar as an onsite visit with 
special access rights constitutes a permitted way of resolving a 
compliance concern, such visits may be conducted in accordance with 
the provisions of the Inspection Protocol. The maximum duration of a 
Special Session of the JCIC is restricted to 30 days.
In line with the formal nature of the discursive situation within which 
the JCIC operates and enacts its national and notional boundaries the 
agenda for a session of the JCIC is restricted to those questions that 
have been provided within the communications that led to the 
convening of the session. Although each Party may raise questions that 
arise immediately preceding or during a session, subject to the 
approval of both Parties, and subject to allowing sufficient time for
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consideration of the questions or to change the composition of the 
delegation as necessary.
As with the SCC privacy of the proceedings is important for all of the 
reasons outlined in Chapter two of this thesis. In general, all of the 
work of the JCIC is confidential, however, the Commission may record 
agreements or the results of the work in a document. In line with the 
need for discursive equality in the Commission, such documents will 
be done in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, 
"both texts being equally authentic."
Costs of participating in the Commission shall be borne by each Party 
participating. If the delegations are of similar size and constitution to 
those of the SCC then each Party would be bearing a cost of around $US 
3.5-4 million per year. A Joint Statement was issued with respect to the 
costs of convening a session of the JCIC on the territory of one of the 
Parties to the effect that questions that may arise over the settlement of 
costs that may be incurred during such a session would be resolved 
prior to the convening of that session. Communications, as with the 
SCC, and including encryption of transmissions would be done 
through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centre. This Centre, as for the 
SCC would also supply clerical support.
Pending the entry into force of the Treaty, the JCIC and the provisions 
of the Protocol establishing the JCIC shall remain in force for a 12 
month period. Once the Treaty is in force, the JCIC and the provisions 
of the relevant Protocol shall remain in force for as long as the START 
Treaty.
Moreover, the Protocol allows for change across time with a provision 
for Parties to agree on any additional measures as may be necessary to
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improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty. In addition, the 
Parties agree that if it is necessary to effect changes to the JCIC Protocol 
that do not affect the main substantive rights or provisions of the 
Treaty, then the JCIC can be used to reach agreement on such changes 
w ithout resorting to the procedure for m aking am endm ents to the 
main START Treaty under Article XVIII.
Interestingly, the domain of the SALT SCC and the START JCIC are 
interlocked. This arises because the operation of the START Treaty has 
been m ade conditional, by a Unilateral Statem ent at the US-USSR 
Nuclear and Space Talks, upon the upholding of the provisions of the 
ABM Treaty. Moreover, the USSR declared that w ithdrawal from the 
START Treaty based on 'extraordinary circumstances' in which their 
suprem e interests w ould be jeopardised w ould include the US 
w ithdraw al from the ABM Treaty or its m aterial breach. The US 
declared that operating to and within the limits of the ABM Treaty or 
agreed m odifications to the ABM Treaty should  not constitute 
'extraordinary circumstances' or placing in jeopardy the suprem e 
interests of the Soviet Union.
With respect to the post-Soviet, post Cold War world, it seems likely 
that the START Treaty will be applied and im plem ented in all of its 
provisions. In all probability the only change to the Treaty will be that 
the words "Soviet Union" will be removed and replaced by the words 
"C om m onw ealth  of In d ep en d en t States" and  sim ila rly , the 
abbreviation USSR will be replaced by CIS. Indeed, for the purposes of 
ratification, the Treaty itself may remain unchanged in wording, but a 
subsequent aide memoire may indicate that the CIS intends to apply 
the provisions of those arms control Treaties signed by the former 
Soviet Union.
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W hat is im p o rtan t here, is th a t an ad d itio n a l channel of 
communication has been established between the United States and 
the inheritors of the former Soviet Union. W hat is indicated by this, is 
that the arms control process is still seen as an ongoing process rather 
than as a static treaty. The purpose of the treaty is simply to lock-in the 
process. Treaties of this kind, then, represent the beginnings of a 
process, as well as the culm ination of a process. M oreover, the 
intention to m aintain the process in the face of a w orld whose 
condition of being is change is em bodied in the establishm ent of 
consultative mechanisms, through which ambiguities can be resolved 
and new m easures initiated to im prove the im plem entation of the 
objects of the Agreement.
Consultations over START compliance are not restricted to the use of 
the JCIC as there are a variety of diplomatic channels through which 
consultations can take place. H ow ever, m any of the notification 
requirem ents set forth in the START Treaty are to take place 
specifically through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centre.
Unlike the SALT I and SALT II Treaties, START lists a num ber of 
specific instances that would call for consultation w ithin the JCIC 
framework. Thus the mandate for the JCIC has been rendered far more 
clearly than that for the SALT SCC. The majority of these may be found 
in the Agreed Statements Annex to START.
The Agreed Statements clearly indicate the range w ithin which the 
JCIC is designed to operate. This clarity should overcome a number of 
the problem s of vagueness that plagued, and arguably ultim ately 
narrow ed, the operation of the SALT SCC. Instead of the SALT 
injunction to consider the general strategic situation and propose ways
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of improving the viability of the Treaty, the START JCIC has a very
specific mandate. The START Second Agreed Statement states:
The Parties agree that, in the event of the emergence in the 
future of a new kind of arm that one Party considers could be 
a new kind of strategic offensive arm, that Party shall have 
the righ t to raise the question  of such an arm  for 
consideration by the Joint Com pliance and Inspection 
Commission in accordance with subparagraph (c) of Article 
XV of the Treaty.
Under the terms of the Fifth Agreed Statem ent and relating to the 
provisions of subparagraph 2(d) of Article V of the START Treaty 
concerning the replacem ent or relocation of heavy ICBM silo 
launchers, agreement was reached that such relocation or replacement 
may only be done in the case of silo launchers destroyed by accident or 
other exceptional circumstances. The Fifth Agreed Statem ent holds 
that should such relocation be required then "the Party planning to 
construct the new silo launcher shall provide the other Party with the 
reasons and plans for such relocation in the Joint Compliance and 
Inspection Commission prior to carrying out such relocation."
The Seventeenth Agreed Statem ent provides that w ith respect to 
heavy bombers, if functionally related observable differences (FRODs) 
are considered by one Party to be insufficient to determine whether a 
heavy bomber or former heavy bomber is not equipped for a particular 
kind of armament, then it may raise the issue within the JCIC.
The Nineteenth Agreed Statement records the agreem ent that in the 
event either Party wishes to develop mobile space launchers or related 
space launch boosters then this question may be addressed in the Joint 
Compliance and Inspection Commission. The Statement goes on to list 
the circumstances under which such a system would be allowed, and
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concludes that additional provisions relevant to such systems could 
also be agreed within the JCIC.
W ith such an extensive inspection and exhibition regim e as that 
agreed within the START Treaty, it was noted that there could be seen 
to be concurrent continuous m onitoring activities with those of the 
1987 INF Treaty. This led to the Twenty-Second Agreed Statement 
which states in part:
Issues relating to the concurrent continuous m onitoring 
activities in accordance with paragraph 14 of Article XI of the 
Treaty and continuous m onitoring in accordance w ith 
paragraph 6 of Article XI of the ... INF Treaty, shall be agreed 
upon, prior to entry into force of the Treaty, w ithin the 
fram ew ork of the Joint C om pliance and  Inspection  
Com m ission and w ithin the fram ew ork of the Special 
Verification Commission (SVC) [established under the INF 
Treaty to oversee compliance issues].
The Thirtieth Agreed Statement concerns the conditions under which 
objects may be delivered into space or the upper atmosphere that are 
launched from waterborne vehicles other than subm arines or from 
aircraft other than heavy bombers or former heavy bombers, which 
would otherwise be banned under subparagraph 18(a,d) of Article V of 
the Treaty. Provisions concerning procedures for such launches shall 
be agreed w ithin the fram ew ork of the Joint Com pliance and 
Inspection Commission.
The JCIC also has responsibility for negotiating elem ents of the 
im portant, if m undane questions of who bears the costs, not only of 
hosting a JCIC session on the home territory of one of the Parties, but 
of the purchase and copying of telemetry data tapes used in flight tests 
where a Party provides more telemetry data tapes than the other, such
that:
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the other Party shall reimburse the tape-associated costs 
resulting from the difference in the number of flight tests. 
The costs associated with the purchase of the tapes and the 
copying of telemetric information onto the tapes, as well as 
the procedure for the reimbursement, shall be subject to 
agreement in the Joint Compliance and Inspection 
Commission.
Finally, the Thirty-eighth Agreed Statement concerns the procedures
for establishing agreed provisions for establishing reference cylinders
for the purposes of calibrating national technical means of verification
pursuant to paragraph 23 of Section VI of the Inspection Protocol for
ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs containing a liquid-fueled first
stage. The Agreed Statement notes that:
...such procedures will be agreed within the framework of the 
Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.
The mandate then, for the Joint Compliance and Inspection 
Commission is far more specific than that for the SALT Standing 
Consultative Commission. This reflects a more business-like approach 
to arms control which in turn reflects the changes in the international 
climate between the United States and the former Soviet Union. Since 
the signing of the START Treaty on July 31, 1991, the pace and scope of 
change has been far reaching. The discursive power of strategic nuclear 
weapons, reflecting their potential material force is acknowledged in 
the opening preamble to the START Treaty in which can be read traces 
of Bernard Brodie's classic statement to the effect that grand strategy in 
the nuclear age must be geared away from war-winning and towards 
war avoidance:
Conscious that nuclear war would have devastating 
consequences for all humanity, that it cannot be won and 
must never be fought.
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The START pream ble goes on to state that the reduction and 
limitation of strategic offensive arms will contribute to reducing the 
risk of nuclear w ar while strengthening  international peace and 
security. The pream ble adds to this that it is in the interests of the 
Parties to strengthen strategic stability, and concludes with a statement 
of the intertextuality of the nuclear arms control agreements with a 
reinforcing (by reaffirm ation) rem inder of the other obligations to 
which the Parties are held, namely; the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT), the Anti-Ballistic M issile Treaty (ABM), and the 
W ashington Summit Joint Statem ent (in the absence of a binding 
SALT II Treaty).
This statem ent of intertextuality serves to situate the START Treaty 
within a discourse genre of other nuclear arms limitation treaties, thus 
emphasising the ongoing and interconnected nature of, not only the 
arms control process, but also of the relationship between the Parties. 
By carrying out the provisions of the Treaty, not only is there a 
lim itation on strategic offensive forces, but, by enacting that which 
renders each Party more secure, more stable, the Parties reinforce the 
practices that maintain their identity as such - as Parties. That is to say 
that by enacting the terms of the Treaty the two Parties recognise the 
circumscription of each other's notional and national boundaries. By 
doing this, the identity of the 'security state' of each Party is reaffirmed.
This last statem ent m ay sound ironically hollow  w hen we have 
observed the demise of the Soviet Union that signed this Treaty - so 
soon after it was signed. But closer observation serves to confirm the 
soundness of the basic argument. The Parties defined by the Treaty are
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not unitary identities .549 We have seen throughout this thesis that I 
have operated the notion of identity as that which is produced as a 
sym ptom  of the enacting of site-specific boundaries. Thus the Soviet 
entity which signed the START Treaty as President of the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics did so in order to enact that part of the 
Soviet boundary that was notionally concerned w ith w hat I have 
term ed the 'security state.' In terms of the specific discourse genre 
invoked in the preamble of the START Treaty this 'security state' can 
be defined operationally by the 'strategic nuclear security state.'
In the developm ents that have im m ediately flowed-on from the 
breakup of the former Soviet Union one identity has rem ained to be 
reaffirm ed within the Com m onw ealth of Independent States (CIS). 
That identity is that represented by the Strategic N uclear Forces. 
Throughout the upheavals whose finale began with the August Coup 
the leaders of the former Republics (now Independent States) made 
many public statements to reassure the West that all strategic nuclear 
arms control agreem ents w ould be upheld, and that the Strategic 
Nuclear Forces would remain under some form of centralised control. 
One aspect of the identity of the Strategic Nuclear Forces is the interface 
between the Strategic Nuclear Forces (whether USSR or CIS) and their 
Other, the security state of the United States of America and the West 
in general. One aspect of that interface has been established by the 
SALT SCC. That interface has been and remains reaffirmed with the 
establishm ent of the START Joint Com pliance and Inspection 
Com m ission.
549 ...rather, they are culturally produced linguistic entities. (See Thomas Hobbes' 
Persona Ficta.)
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CHAPTER VI 
Conclusion
Metapolitics: towards the culture of verification
This thesis offers a philosophical underpinning to national security, 
even as it is played out in the m arginal practices of nuclear arms 
control. The thesis argues that national security is as much an issue of 
identity as of realpolitik.
This thesis has set out to show that the state is linked to the countless 
processes (or acts) that invoke it. To illustrate this I have taken a small 
and m arginal section of state-m aking activity - the strategic arms 
control community - in order to examine in some detail the processes 
underlying state-making. I have set out to show that, in addition to all 
of the overt, or surface operations of the arms control community, that 
there is an unstated, but logically prior agenda which is tied to the 
nature of political community itself.
At this point it may be useful to render explicit what, until now, has 
been an implicit thread running throughout the course of this thesis. 
In so doing I shall locate a set of theoretical and methodological 
questions that have informed and shaped the direction of my analysis. 
Moreover, I shall explore both the rationale behind, and the usefulness 
of, this mode of analysis in relation to the discursive environment for 
which the SALT SCC was conceived. In the process, I shall locate what I 
believe to be the strengths and limitations of this mode of analysis. 
Finally, in a w ork of this scope I have not in tended to give a 
comprehensive history of the sets of theoretical debates, of which this 
thesis inevitably forms a part - other works have been and are being
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devoted entirely to the grand sweep of theory. My aim is more modest. 
It is to address in a small way the question raised by a specific set of 
practices within security discourse in terms of the role they play in the 
constitution of the identity of what I term the 'security state.’
Chapter One introduced the discourse analytic approach, arguing that 
States become visible through the sets of military /strategic practices by 
which they enact their boundaries. This is what I have termed the 
'security state.' This chapter argues that although States police their 
boundaries in a literal form, there is, in addition, an underlying and 
unstated cultural aspect. This cultural 'subtext,' when taken 
collectively with the countless other state/boundarymaking practices, 
constitutes the identity of the state. Moreover, I have argued that, if the 
security state is a product of the practices that enact and maintain it, 
then one can examine this process by looking at political /cultural 
micro-structures. One such microstructure is the SALT Standing 
Consultative Commission on Arms Limitation (SCC).
Chapter Two has set out the history, structure and overt function of the 
Standing Consultative Commission. This chapter noted the 
importance of privacy for its successful operation insofar as this allows 
for a degree of frankness in the exchanges between the US and the then 
Soviet Union. In these terms the SCC has been shown to operate as a 
boundary space between the two then superpowers. The chapter 
sketched out the structure of the Soviet SCC bureaucracy in a manner 
not previously covered in the Western literature. The chapter also 
covers the procedures insofar as they can be ascertained from the open 
literature. Finally, the chapter compared the political functions of the 
SCC with its legal mandate, suggesting that the political constraints that
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were placed on its operation m eant that it was ultim ately unable to 
make full use of its mandate.
Chapter Three expanded the interpretive fram ework laid out in the 
introduction. The chapter drew together the relation between discourse 
analysis and analysis of political 'signalling.' The chapter then 
considered the conditions that m ade possible the Strategic Arms 
Limitation Talks that led to the establishment of the SCC. It did this by 
outlining a brief history of the development of strategic nuclear arms 
and the accompanying systems required for their functioning. This was 
necessary in order to show why particular systems were placed under 
control. These system s were subsequently  raised as compliance 
questions, so it was im portant that their role was clearly outlined. The 
chapter concluded that it was the achievement of nuclear 'parity' that, 
coupled with domestic political and economic factors, made the SALT 
Agreements possible.
The chapter examined verification standards as an indicator of the state 
of relations betw een the Parties. It argued that w here a state is 
considered to be secure, then arm s control can be enacted with 
confidence under adequate verification to ensure compliance. It is 
argued that these were the perceptions under which President Carter 
operated. Verification standard is a political issue which, as Chapter 
Four show s, is subject to change. The chapter also noted that 
assessm ents of the lim itations of N ational Technical M eans of 
verification, the US ability to respond to Soviet cheating and the 
political and m ilitary significance of potential violations w ould all 
affect the extent to which compliance issues would be raised and the 
extent to which these would be pursued through the channel of the 
SCC.
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Chapter three also set out the relevent agreements and their verifiable 
elements as these form the issue fram ework for the operation of the 
SCC. The chapter then presents the empirical data on compliance 
challenges and their responses in the SCC for consideration on their 
relative m erits. The texts su rround ing  the com pliance challenge 
debates are analysed, not only for their content, but also for the way 
their discursive forms insofar as they indicate the philosophical 
assum ptions about Self and Otherness that sustain the statemaking 
apparatus described in this thesis.
Chapter Three then examined the relationship betw een compliance 
challenge and state identity and the politics of treaty language itself. 
This led to a more sustained and detailed theoretical discussion on the 
foucaultian relationship between knowledge and pow er as applied 
th rough  verification technologies. In this section, verification 
technologies and institutions are considered as a mode of disciplinary 
power through techniques of; hierarchical observation, through the 
role of the in telligence com m unity  and the technologies of 
p h o to in te rp re ta tio n ; norm alising  judgem en t and  the role of 
in ternational norm s; and form s of exam ination as a m ode of 
Confession. The chapter concluded w ith a discussion of Carter's 
construction of a particular political identity for the United States.
Chapter Four examined the political environm ent that led to a major 
ideological shift towards the end of the Carter regime. Ther chapter 
argues that this was in large measure coordinated by and through the 
Committee on the Present Danger, founded by Paul N itze among 
others. The chapter argues that the CPD, along with other conservative 
political groups were largely responsible for establishing a climate in 
which SALT II was doomed to failure.
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The chapter further argues that, between Carter's perceived failure on 
SALT (and on domestic crises, such as the Hostage crisis), coupled with 
Soviet expansionist activity in Afghanistan, led to the downfall of 
C arter and paved the way for CPD m em ber, Ronald Reagan. The 
chapter argues that Reagan's Manachaeist view of US-Soviet relations 
led directly to the Second Cold War and an almost unprecedented level 
of rhetorical boundarym aking (leaving Carter's defence policies almost 
unchanged).
The chapter argued that the decision to uphold SALT II provisions was 
due  alm ost en tirely  to the norm alising  judgem ent pow er of 
international norms under the p r in c ip le  of Pacta Sunt Servanda.
Chapter Four considered SCC activity during the Reagan first term and 
exam ined the evidence for the US charges of Soviet noncompliance. 
After considering the long list in general terms on its merits, a detailed 
discussion of the Krasnoyarsk Large Phased Array Radar was pursued. 
In so doing, the texts surrounding the dispute were examined both for 
their content and for their rhetorical modalities that were to indicate in 
fairly precise ways the shift that had occurred in the state-making 
practices of the US from Carter to Reagan.
This led to a detailed examination of the structures underlying political 
discourse, and the relationship between the discursive constitution of 
the individual and the discursive constitution of states and state-like 
identity structures.
Chapter Five gestures tow ards the future. As the Soviet Union was 
b reak ing  dow n, or transfo rm ing  in to  the C om m onw ealth  of 
Independen t States, this brief chapter discusses the role of the 
analogous institution to the SCC that was established for START and
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considers the benefits of this type of institution, and some of the 
lessons learned from the SCC experience.
My purpose has been to locate the SCC, both as, and in the context of, a 
set of representational practices through which the US and Soviet 
security state identities have been enacted. Therefore, this thesis is 
concerned less with evaluating the 'success' or otherwise of the SCC, 
than with the kinds of positions that have been invoked in order to 
effect such an evaluation.
Lyotard has suggested that to speak is inevitably to do so at the expense 
of silencing or marginalising other positions. Such a view arises from 
an attempt to provide a theoretical base with some explanatory power 
in terms of why large social structures (like states) should appear and 
behave as they do. In other words behind this enterprise lies an 
attempt at descriptive, rather than prescriptive philosophy.
As I hag* shown, The SCC has been, on a number of counts, remarkably 
successful given the political climate in which it was called upon to 
operate. On other terms the SCC has been an abject failure. The reasons 
for this have been offered in terms of the domestic political shift that 
brought Reagan to power. Behind such evaluations rests a range of 
perspectives, or to borrow from literary philosophy, a range of 
discursive positions and rhetorical moves.
Insofar as these rhetorical moves have been shown to condition the 
conceptual environment within which decisions are made and actions 
are taken, such rhetorical moves can be seen to form the 'stuff' of 
political forms of life. The methodology I have used has involved and 
invoked both historical and discourse-analytic modes of analysis. 
These offer the benefits of combining both a structural and an
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historical schema. Past modes of analysis have tended to concentrate 
on one at the expense of the other.
As I have stated from the outset, this thesis is based on assumptions 
that reject the simple binarism and foundationalism implicit in 
maintaining a dichotomy between theory and practice. As a result, as 
far as possible, the theoretical implications of specific practices have 
been noted w ithin discussion about the practices themselves, rather 
than in a separate chapter on 'theory' or 'methodology' per se. By 
doing this I have performed two moves:
i) By focusing on the theoretical implications of practices, 
an emphasis has been placed on the theory-laden-ness of 
practice, which is a way of saying that practices are always 
meaningful - insofar as they are performed within a social 
context in a socially meaningful way. This move leads to the 
suggestion that 'real-world' practices are not merely the 
'objective' domain of 'truth,' but rather, insofar as they are 
meaningful, they are what might be termed 'concretised 
textual practices.'
ii) This approach brings to the surface a problem for 
another dichotomy. If practice is, as it were 'theory-laden,' 
then practices within the object domain (the 'real world') are 
not 'objective.' If, as this approach might suggest, there is a 
problem  w ith  the dualism  invoked in the 
subjective/objective distinction, surely this raises equivalent 
questions for the agent/structure debate and, along with this, 
questions for those formations announced by the so-called 
'anarchy problematique.'
Throughout the Cold War, simplistically speaking, the world was 
divided, for Western observers, into a largely binary opposition 
between the notional 'Self' defined loosely (if uncomfortably) with 'the 
West', and the Other defined equally loosely as the 'Eastern Bloc.' It 
was an opposition that at the height of the Cold War was centred 
largely on two (at least rhetorically) nuclear powers and more 
specifically on the language by which they were said to possess specific
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kinds of nuclear weapon. The actual world was and remains, of course, 
more complex than that. But the language of the Cold War, that set the 
terms of debate about the actual world, was ultim ately not about the 
actual world, but the cultural world. Despite the fact that the political 
world can also be defined as a world of interests and institutions, the 
political world is perhaps better defined as a conceptual world - a world 
of m eanings - in which action is filtered through institutionalised 
processes of interpretation on the basis of which other actions are 
initiated in the actual world. Under this rubric the interests form part 
of the currency of value and m eaning that is exchanged between 
comm unities, both w ithin and betw een states. We have seen also 
throughout this thesis that institutions can be effectively seen as sub­
com m unities form and are form ed by comm unicative action. The 
same process, I have argued, forms states and communities of states. 
This has been shown in Chapter Three, especially in the section on the 
role of the intelligence community. Thus the world of international 
relations is also a world of in te rn o tio n a l relations. The process of 
identity-making that this entails, runs as a thematic base throughout 
hum an culture in all its formations, from the individual through the 
family, group, corporation or nation-state. It is a culture based on the 
twin principles of inclusion and exclusion.
We have seen in this thesis that the process of defining them  as 
opposed to us rests largely upon the perceptions of similarity and 
difference. Insofar as this process m ay be seen at the analytic level of 
the state, the governm ent or chief decisionmakers play an im portant 
role in defining the us-ness of us and the them-ness of them.
We have seen that sovereign statehood can be seen in terms of the 
potential or actual use of the means of force, the study of the means
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and modalities of force remain an im portant aspect of international 
relations. Yet, insofar as a government's decision to act is determined 
by the way it perceives the intentions of the putative Other, it is 
appropriate to analyse the factors affecting the processes of perception 
and the role of a-priori assumptions in shaping perception. In other 
words in addition to the material aspects of the strategic behaviours of 
states, they also signify. Indeed, there is a large body of literature 
within strategic studies on the subject of the signalling , or discursive 
behaviours of states.
As Foucault notes:
...it is in discourse that pow er and knowledge are joined 
together. And for this very reason, we m ust conceive 
discourse as a series of discontinuous segm ents whose 
tactical function is neither uniform nor stable. To be more 
precise, we m ust not imagine a world of discourse divided 
betw een accepted discourse and excluded discourse, or 
between the dominant discourse and the dominated; but as a 
multiplicity of discursive elements that can come into play 
in various strategies.550
In this thesis I have examined the interactive behaviours of three such 
sets of discursive behaviours: that of strategic assets (missiles, radars 
etc), that of NTMs (satellites, SIGINT etc) and that of the deployment 
of these w ith in  the fram ew ork of the S tanding  C onsultative 
Commission on Arms Limitation (SCC).
The thesis is intended as a contribution to the 'conversation' that is 
engaging the study of international relations theory under the rubric of
550 Michel Foucault The History of Sexuality: An Introduction Harmondsworth: 
Penguin Books 1984.p.l00.
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the 'th ird  debate '551 and to ground this conversation w ithin the 
analysis of certain concrete practices that form part of the central 
concerns of the traditional conceptions of international relations: 
namely, the concerns of security w ithin a changing pattern of global 
interrelationships between peoples.
Since nuclear weapons were first used in war, strategists have been 
caught up in a triple problem that has forced a major re-thinking of the 
traditional strategic outlook. That problem  lies in the enorm ous 
destructive potential of these weapons, the fact of their invention, and 
in the articulation of security /identity  through force 552
The late m odern, or postm odern inversion of the C lausew itzian 
form ulation stands in recognition of the enorm ous destructive 
potential of these weapons, and in recognition of the fact of H istory: 
that these weapons, once invented cannot be uninvented, and in the 
recognition that, beyond a certain point the competitive acquisition of 
ever larger numbers and increasing size of the these weapons brought 
decreasing marginal returns in the currency of added security. With
551 Yosef Lapid 'The Third Great Debate in IR" ISQ Spring 1989
552 Max Weber "Politics as a Vocation: Types of Political Authority" The Great 
Political Theories ed by Michael Curtis NY:Discus Books 1962, p372:
"Like the political institutions historically preceding it, the state is a relation of 
men dominating men, a relation supported by means of legitimate violence" and
Karl von Clausewitz On War Harmondsworth: Penguin books, especially the 
chapter:"War as an Instrument of Policy" in which Clausewitz states:
"We maintain...that War is nothing but a continuation of political intercourse, with 
a mixture of other means" and that this political intercourse "...does not cease by the 
War itself, is not changed into something quite different, but that in its essence, it 
continues to exist, whatever may be the form of the means which it uses, and that the 
chief lines on which the events of the war progress ... are only the general features of 
policy... p.402
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the attendant risks of accidental war, the two largest nuclear powers 
have come to recognise that these weapons m ust be made to exist in a 
lim inal space that bounded and separated  them  from so-called 
'conventional' forces. They m ust be controlled.
At the same time, these weapons have been seen as indispensable 
insofar as they cannot be uninvented, and therefore 'sufficient' stocks 
of these weapons are seen to be necessary to 'deter' their used by Other 
powers. This is the dilemma of deterrence, or, in Plato’s terms, nuclear 
deterrence can be viewed as a pharmakon. That is, as simultaneously 
medicine and poison.
In order to make nuclear deterrence 'credible' (that is to say, that the 
preferred reading by the ideal reader is that under certain conditions, 
nuclear forces will be interpreted as usable), force structures and force 
postures m ust be such as to indicate a willingness to transgress the 
boundaries into the lim inal space of nuclear strategy. Given the 
potential global effects of all-out use of the present and planned 
nuclear arsenals, that liminal space m ust be defined and m aintained 
rigourously in order to render the world 'secure'.553
As early as 1946 Bernard Brodie554 foreshadow ed the problem atic
nature of nuclear weapons conceived as such.
The awful menace to both parties of a reciprocal use of the 
bomb may prevent the resort to that weapon by either side, 
even if it does not prevent the outbreak of hostilities. But
553 By this i want to suggest that by rendering nudear weapons as of a different order 
from conventional weapons and by keeping a wide gap between the two orders, the 
incentive to cross the gap into actual use in anger might be considerably reduced.
554 See Brodie, Bernard "Implications for military policy" The Absolute Weapon: 
Atomic Power and World Order NY: Harcourt, Brace And Company, 1946 p.76
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even so, the shadow of the atomic bomb w ould so govern 
the strategic and tactical dispositions of either side as to create 
a wholly novel form of war... The conclusion is inescapable 
that war will be vastly different because of the atomic bomb 
whether or not the bomb is actually used, [emphasis mine]555
Arms control agreem ents are not new, even nuclear arm s control 
agreements are not new, but arguably, the Treaty on the Limitation of 
Anti-Ballistic Missiles, the Interim Agreement and the SALT I and II 
A greem ents m arked a significant shift in strategic thinking about 
nuclear arms. The difference lay in two critical areas: i) the application 
of quantitative and qualitative limits on strategic weapons, and ii) in 
the provisions for verification of the agreement.
The Treaty on the Lim itation of Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM) and 
related treaties, represented a set of new beginnings for the arms 
control process, emphasising in their provisions the continuity of arms 
control as an ongoing process. W ith the S tanding Consultative 
Commission on Arms Limitation and the unlim ited duration of the 
treaty, the pattern  was set for arms control to be thought-of as a 
continuity, punctuated by agreements. These agreements, coming out 
of ongoing negotiations represent starting points, rather than end­
points of a process.
By fram ing my work in cultural term s, my intention has been to 
examine the cultural frameworks surrounding the shift in behaviours 
represented by the shift in use and function of the SCC between two 
U.S. administrations under consideration in this thesis.
See Bernard Brodie (f/n l) p.83
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William J. Durch, writing of verification, points out that "verification 
is a political and judgemental process that uses intelligence monitoring 
data to reach conclusions about a treaty partner's compliance with the 
term s of an agreement."556 Thus, he argues, judgem ent criteria for 
verification can change across time despite the relatively stable 
inform ation acquisition methods. President Carter's criteria centred 
around a notion of 'adequate ' verification (detection of m ilitarily 
significant breaches within sufficient time to respond) while President 
Reagan's criteria were more stringent, centring on the term 'effective' 
verification. This has been interpreted to mean closer to 'absolute' 
verification (that is, detection of any violation, no matter how small.)
"Once upon a time the w orld was not as it is." This elegant 
form ulation of the historical process by RBJ Walker (1989) condenses 
several processes that I have delved into in the course of this thesis. 
The first of these is the seemingly self-evident one that events happen, 
and that the fact of these events happening changes things.
The study of International Relations represents a particular genre of 
sets of organisational structures by which we can construct meaning 
for, or in terpret, a particu lar subset of events-in-the-w orld. The 
in terpretive principle referred-to here, is the Peircean one which 
suggests that "a sign is som ething by know ing which we know 
som ething more."557 Unpacking Walker's formulation a little further 
we can see that, in order to construct a schema by which the 'salience'
556 See William J. Durch "The Future of the ABM Treaty" Adelphi Papers Number 
223, Summer 1987 p.9
5 5  ^ Quoted in Umberto Eco Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language 
London:Macmillan, 1985, p.2.
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of specific observable events may be identified, it is necessary to select 
first the particular articulation of 'w orld ' according to which these 
events may be rendered 'salient'. International relations then, for all 
the claims of 'Realism', represents a selection process which also 
entails a process of interpretation.
As I complete this thesis the world continues to rearticulate its political 
spaces. In the context of the subject matter of this thesis this process is 
most dram atically represented by the dissolution of w hat had been 
known for more than seventy years as the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics. On December 25, 1991 the era of the USSR ended with the 
resignation of President Mikhail Gorbachev. In its place, and largely 
within the old boundaries of the USSR (without the Baltic States and 
w ithout Georgia) the Com m onw ealth of Independent States (CIS) 
continues to enact the notional boundaries constraining the possession 
and deployment of strategic nuclear arms. The strategic offensive arms 
look from this vantage point to be set to rem ain under centralised 
control - the one Soviet identity that remains little changed by the 
emergent independence of the former Soviet Republics. That this has 
occurred is testament to the continuing power of the referent of the 
nuclear weapon articulated as a sign system. The establishment of the 
Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC) to complement 
the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) represents a positive 
sign of commitment by both Parties, however named, to uphold and 
continue to maintain the principles enacted within the currently active 
nuclear arms control agreements. This above all has been the value of 
the SCC's contribution to the process of state-making initiated by the 
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.
Th u p*<-c
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APPENDIX A
TREATY BETWEEN THE USA AND THE USSR ON 
THE LIMITATION OF ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS
Signed at Moscow on 26 May 1972 Entered into force on 3 October 1972
The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 
hereinafter referred to as the Parties,
Proceeding from the premise that nuclear war would have devasting consequences 
for all mankind,
Considering that effective measures to limit anti-ballisdc missile systems would be 
a substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic offensive arms and would lead 
to a decrease in the risk of outbreak of war involving nuclear weapons,
Proceeding from the premise that the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems, as 
well as certain agreed measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive 
arms, would contribute to the creation of more favorable conditions for further 
negotiations on limiting strategic arms,
Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation 
of Nuclear Weapons,
Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the 
nuclear arms race and to take effective measures toward reductions in strategic 
arms, nuclear disarmament, and general and complete disarmament,
Desiring to contribute to the relaxation of international tension and the 
strengthening of trust between States, Have agreed as follows:
Article I
1. Each Party undertakes to limit anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems and to adopt 
other measures in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty. 2. Each Party 
undertakes not to deploy ABM systems for a defense of the territory of its country 
and not to provide a base for such a defense, and not to deploy ABM systems for 
defense of an individual region except as provided for in Article 111 of this Treaty.
Article n
1. For the purposes of this Treaty an ABM system is a system to counter strategic 
ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, currently consisting of:
(a) ABM interceptor missiles, which are interceptor missiles constructed and 
deployed for an ABM role, or of a type tested in an ABM mode
(b) ABM'launchers, which are launchers constructed and deployed for launching 
ABM interceptor missiles; and
(c) ABM radars, which are radars constructed and deployed for an ABM role, or 
of a type tested in an ABM mode.
2. The ABM system components listed in paragraph I of this Article include those 
which are:
(a) operational;
(b) under construction;
(c) undergoing testing;
(d) undergoing overhaul, repair or conversion; or
(e) mothballed.
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Article III
Each party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems or their components except 
that:
(a) within one ABM system deployment area having a radius of one hundred and 
fifty kilometers and centered on the Party's national capital, a Party may deploy: 
(1) no more than one hundred ABM launchers and no more than one hundred 
ABM interceptor missiles at launch sites, and (2) ABM radars within no more than 
six ABM radar complexes, the area of each complex being circular and having a 
diameter of no more than three kilometers, and
(b) within one ABM system deployment area having a radius of one hundred and 
fifty kilometers and containing ICBM silo launchers, a Party may deploy: (1) no 
more than one hundred ABM launchers and no more than one hundred ABM 
interceptor missiles at launch sites, (2) two large phasedarray ABM radars 
comparable in potential to corresponding ABM radars operational or under 
construction on the date of signature of the Treaty in an ABM system deployment 
area containing ICBM silo launchers, and (3) no more than eighteen ABM radars 
each having a potential less than the potential of the smaller of the above- 
mentioned two large phased-array ABM radars.
Article TV
The limitations provided for in Article in  shall not apply to ABM systems or their 
components used for development or testing, and located within current or 
additionally agreed test ranges. Each Party may have no more than a total of fifteen 
ABM launchers at test ranges.
Article V
1. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or 
components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based.
2. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM launchers for 
launching more than one ABM interceptor missile at a time from each launcher, 
nor to modify deployed launchers to provide them with such a capability, nor to 
develop, test, or deploy automatic or semi-automatic or other similar systems for 
rapid reload of ABM launchers.
Article VI
To enhance assurance of the effectiveness of the limitations on ABM systems and 
their components provided by this Treaty, each Party undertakes:
(a) not to give missiles, launchers, or radars, other than ABM interceptor missiles 
ABM launchers, or ABM radars, capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles 
or their elements in flight trajectory, and not to test them in an ABM mode; and
(b) not to deploy in the future radars for early warning of strategic ballistic missile 
attack except at locations along the periphery of its national territory and oriented 
outward .
Article VII
Subiect to the Drovisions of this Treatv. modernization and replacement of ABM 
systems or their components may be carried out.
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Article VIII
ABM systems or their components in excess of the numbers or outside the areas 
specified in this Treaty, as well as ABM systems or their components prohibited 
by this Treaty, shall be destroyed or dismantled under agreed procedures within 
the shortest possible agreed period of time.
Article IX
To assure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty, each Party undertakes not 
to transfer to other States, and not to deploy outside its national territory, ABM 
systems or their components limited by this Treaty.
Article X
Each Party undertakes not to assume any international obligations which would 
conflict with this Treaty.
Article XI
The Parties undertake to continue active negotiations for limitations on strategic 
offensive arms.
Article XII
1 For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of this 
Treaty, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal 
in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.
2. Each party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of 
ve-ification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph I of this 
Article.
3. Each party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede 
verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of this 
Treaty. This obligation shall not require changes in current construction, 
assembly, conversion, or overhaul practices.
Article XIII
1. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, 
the Parties shall establish promptly a Standing Consultative Commission, within 
the framework of which they will:
(a) consider questions concerning compliance with the obligations assumed and 
related situations which may be considered ambiguous;
(b) provide on a voluntary basis such information as either Party considers 
necessary to assure confidence in compliance with the obligations assumed;
(c) consider questions involving unintended interference with national technical 
means of verification;
(d) consider possible changes in the strategic situation which have a bearing on 
the provisions of this Treaty
(e) agree upon procedures and dates for destruction or dismantling of ABM 
systems or their components in cases provided for by the provisions of this Treaty;
(f) consider, as appropriate, possible proposals for further increasing the 
viability of this Treaty, including proposals for amendments in accordance with the 
provisions of this Treaty;
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(g) consider, as appropriate, proposals for further measures aimed at limiting 
strategic arms.
2. The Parties through consultation shall establish, and may amend as appropriate, 
Regulations for the Standing Consultative Commission governing procedures, 
composition and other relevant matters.
A rticle XIV
1. Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed amendments shall 
enter into force in accordance with the procedures governing the entry into force of 
this Treaty. 2. Five years after entry into force of this Treaty, and at five year 
intervals thereafter, the Parties shall together conduct a review of this Treaty.
A rticle XV
1. This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.
2. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to 
withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the 
subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give 
notice of its decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from the 
Treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the 
notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.
ARTICLE X V I
1. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional 
procedures of each Party. The Treaty shall enter into force on the day of the 
exchange of instruments of ratification.
2. This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the 
United Nations.
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APPENDIX B
INTERIM AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE USA AND THE USSR ON 
CERTAIN MEASURES WITH RESPECT TO THE LIMITATION OF 
STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS (SALT I AGREEMENT)
Signed at Moscow on 26 May 1972
Entered into force on 3 October 1972
The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 
hereinafter referred to as the Parties
Convinced that the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and 
this Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of 
Strategic Offensive Arms will contribute to the creation of more favorable 
conditions for active negotiations on limiting strategic arms as well as to the 
relaxation of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States,
Taking into account the relationship between strategic offensive and defensive 
arms,
Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation 
of Nuclear Weapons,
Have agreed as follows:
Article I
The Parties undertake not to start construction of additional fixed land-based 
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers after July 1, 1972.
Article II
The Parties undertake not to convert landbased launchers for light ICBMs, or for 
ICBMs of older types deployed prior to 1964, into land-based launchers for heavy 
ICBMs of types deployed after that time.
Article III
The Parties undertake to limit submarinelaunched ballistic missile (SLBM) 
launchers and modem ballistic missile submarines to the numbers operational and 
under construction on the date of signature of this Interim Agreement, and in 
addition to launchers and submarines constructed under procedures established by 
the Parties as replacements for an equal number of ICBM launchers of older types 
deployed prior to 1964 or for launchers on older submarines.
Article IV
Subject to the provisions of this Interim Agreement, modernization and replacement 
of strategic offensive ballistic missiles and launchers covered by this Interim 
Agreement may be undertaken.
Article V
1. For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of 
this Interim Agreement, each Party shall use national technical means of verification
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at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of 
international law.
2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of 
verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph I of this 
Article.
3. Each Party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede 
verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of this 
Interim  Agreement. This obligation shall not require changes in current 
construction, assembly, conversion, or overhaul practices.
Article VI
To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Interim 
Agreement, the Parties shall use the Standing Consultative Commission established 
under Article Xlll of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems 
in accordance with the provisions of that Article.
Article VII
The Parties undertake to continue active negotiations for limitations on strategic 
offensive arms. The obligations provided for in this Interim Agreement shall not 
prejudice the scope or terms of the limitations on strategic offensive arms which 
may be worked out in the course of further negotiations.
Article VIII
1. This Interim Agreement shall enter into force upon exchange of written notices 
of acceptance by each Party, which exchange shall take place simultaneously with 
the exchange of instruments of ratification of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti- 
Ballistic Missile Systems.
2. This Interim Agreement shall remain in force for a period of five years unless 
replaced earlier by an agreement on more complete measures limiting strategic 
offensive arms. It is the objective of the Parties to conduct active follow-on 
negotiations with the aim of concluding such an agreement as soon as possible.
3. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to 
withdraw from this Interim Agreement if it decides that extraordinary events related 
to the subject matter of this Interim Agreement have jeopardized its supreme 
interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party six months prior to 
withdrawal from this Interim Agreement. Such notice shall include a statement of 
the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its 
supreme interests.
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APPENDIX C
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE USA 
AND THE USSR REGARDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A 
STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION
Signed at Geneva on 21 December 1972 Entered intoforce on 21 December 1972
I. The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics hereby establish a Standing Consultative 
Commission.
II. The Standing Consultative Commission shall promote the objectives and 
implementation of the provisions of the Treaty between the USA and the USSR 
on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26 1972, the Interim 
Agreement between the USA and the USSR on Certain Measures with Respect to 
the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of May 26, 1972, and the Agreement 
on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War between the USA 
and the USSR of September 30, 1971, and shall exercise ItS competence in 
accordance with the provisions of Article Xlll of said Treaty, Article VI of said 
Interim Agreement, and Article 7 of said Agreement on Measures.
III. Each Government shall be represented on the Standing Consultative 
Commission by a Commissioner and a Deputy Commissioner, assisted by such 
staff as it deems necessary.
TV. The Standing Consultative Commission shall hold periodic sessions on dates 
mutually agreed by the Commissioners but no less than two times per year. 
Sessions shall also be convened as soon as possible, following reasonable notice, 
at the request of either Commissioner.
V. The Standing Consultative Commission shall establish and approve 
Regulations governing procedures and other relevant matters and may amend 
them as it deems appropriate.
VI. The Standing Consultative Commission will meet in Geneva. It may also 
meet at such other places as may be agreed
APPENDIX D
343
PROTOCOL, WITH REGULATIONS,
REGARDING THE US-SOVIET STANDING CONSULTATIVE 
COMMISSION ON ARMS LIMITATION
Signed at Geneva on 30 May 1973 
Entered into force on 30 May 1973
PROTOCOL
Pursuant to the provisions of the Memorandum of Understanding between the 
Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union 
of the Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding the Establishment of a Standing 
Consultative Commission, dated December 21, 1972, the undersigned, having 
been duly appointed by their respective Governments as Commissioners of said 
Standing Consultative Commission, hereby establish and approve, in the form 
attached, Regulations governing procedures and other relevant matters of the 
Commission, which Regulations shall enter into force upon signature of this 
Protocol and remain in force until and unless amended by the undersigned or 
their successors.
ATTACHMENT
REGULATIONS
1. The Standing Consultative Commission, established by the Memorandum of 
Understanding between the Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding the 
Establishment of a Standing Consultative Commission of Decembel 21, 1972, 
shall consist of a U.S. component and Soviet component, each of which shall be 
headed by a Commissioner.
2. The Commissioners shall alternately preside over the meetings.
3. The Commissioners shall, whel possible, inform each other in advance of the 
matters to be submitted for discussion, but may at a meeting submit for 
discussion any matter within the competence of the Commission.
4. During intervals between sessions of the Commission, each Commissioner 
may transmit written or oral communications to the other Commissioner 
concerning matters within the competence of the Commission.
5. Each component of the Commission may invite such advisers and experts as 
it deems necessary to participate in a meeting.
6. The Commission may establish working groups to consider and prepare 
specific matters.
7. The results of the discussion of questions at the meetings of the Commission 
may, if necessary, be entered mto records which shall be in two copies, each m 
the English and the Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.
8. The proceedings of the Standing Consultative Commission shall be 
conducted in private. The Standing Consultative Commission may not make its 
proceedings pubhc except with the express consent of both Commissioners.
9. Each component of the Commission shall bear the expenses connected with 
its participation in the Commission.
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APPENDIX E 
PRO TO CO L ON THE
JO IN T  COM PLIANCE AND IN SPECTIO N  COM M ISSION
RELATIN G  TO
TH E TREATY BETW EEN TH E UNITED STATES OF AM ERICA
AND
TH E UNION OF SO V IET SO CIA LIST REPU BLICS ON 
TH E REDUCTION AND LIM ITA TIO N  OF STRATEGIC 
O FFEN SIV E ARMS
Pursuant to and in implementation of the Treaty Between The United States of 
America and the Union of Soviet socialist Republics on the Reduction and 
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinatier referred to as The Treaty, the 
Parties hereby agree upon provisions governing the operation of the Joint 
Compliance and Inspection Commission, hereinafter referred to as the 
Commission, established pursuant to Article XV of the Treaty.
I. Com position of the Com m ission
1. Each Party shall communicate to the other Party the names of its designated 
Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner to the Commission. The Parties shall 
communicate to each other the names of the initially designated Commissioner and 
Deputy Commissioner to the Commission as soon as practicable, but in any case 
no later than 30 days after signature of the Treaty.
2. Each Party shall have the right to be represented at a session of the Commission 
by its Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner as well as by their alternates, and 
by members, advisors, and expens. A session of the Commission may be 
convened without the participation of the Com m issioner and Deputy 
Commissioner. In such a case, any other individual provided for in this paragraph 
may be the head representative of a Party to a session of the Commission.
3. The head representatives of the Parties shall alternately preside over meetings 
during a session of the Commission.
4. The Commission shall have the right to constitute working groups consisting of 
any of the individuals provided for in paragraph 2 of this Section for the 
consideration of specific questions raised in the Commission.
II . C onvening a Session of the Com m ission
1. A session or the Commission shall be convened at the request of either Party. 
No later than 14 days arter receiving Such a request, the requested Party shall 
submit a response. Requests and responses shall include the following:
(a) the questions that the Party intends to raise;
(b) the name of the head representative of the Party; and
(c) the proposed or accepted date and location for the convening of the session.
Each Party may also submit additional questions to the other Party in the period 
from the submission of the initial response to the initial request until the convening 
of the session.
2. A session of the Commission shall be convened as soon as possible after receipt 
of the response provided for in paragraph 1 of this Section.
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3. A session of the Commission shall be convened in Geneva, Switzerland, or, as 
appropriate, in another place agreed by the Parties.
4. The Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner of each of the Parties may, 
without the convening of a session of the Commission, communicate with the 
Commissioner of the other Party in order to clarify any unclear situations or to 
resolve questions.
III. Convening a Special Session of the Commission
1. A special session of the Commission shall be convened at the request of either 
Party to address what the requesting Party considers to be an urgent concern 
relating to compliance of the other Party with the obligations assumed under the 
Treaty. Such a request shall include, at a minimum, the following:
(a) the nature of the concern including the kind and, if applicable, the type of 
strategic offensive arms related to the concern;
(b) the name of the head representative of the Party; and
(c) the proposed date and location for the convening of the special session.
The requesting Party may also propose in the request a specific method for 
resolving the concern. Such a method may include, but is not limited to, a visit 
with special right of access to the facility or location where, in the opinion of the 
requesting Party, the activity that caused the concern took place.
2. No later than seven days after receiving such a request, the requested Party shall 
submit a response. Such a response shall include either:
(a) acceptance of the proposed date and location for the convening of the special 
session; or
(b) a proposal for an alternate date and location for the convening of the special 
session. The alternate date shall be no later than ten days after the date proposed by 
the requesting Party.
3. The response of the requested Party may also include:
(a) acceptance of the proposed specific method for resolving the concern, 
including, if a visit with special right of access is planned, the proposed date, 
location and procedures for such a visit; or
(b) a proposal for a special method for resolving the concern, including, if a visit 
with special right of access is planned, the proposed date location and procedures 
for such a visit.
If the Parties agree to a visit with special right of access or another method for 
resolving the concern, the Parties may agree not to convene the special session.
Visits with special right of access may be conducted in accordance with the 
provisions of the Inspection Protocol, as applicable.
4. Either Party may request additional information related to the concern. A 
response to such a request shall be submitted no later than seven days after receipt 
of the request, but shall not affect the time for convening the special session of the 
Commission, if such a session is held.
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5. A special session of the Commission shall remain in session for no more than 
30 days.
IV. Agenda
1. The agenda for a session of the Commission shall consist of those questions that 
the Parties have included in the communications provided to each other in 
accordance with paragraph 1 of Section II of this Protocol.
2. Each Party shall have the right to raise the Commission questions that arise 
immediately preceding or during a session of the Commission; provided, however, 
that consideration of such questions during the current session shall be subject to 
agreement of the Parties. In case of such agreement, the Parties shall allow 
sufficient time prior to consideration of such questions for preparation and any 
changes in the composition of their delegations that are required.
3. Sessions of the Commission shall be convened irrespective of the number of 
questions on the agenda.
V. Work of the Commission
work of the Commission shall be confidential except as otherwise agreed by 
the Commission. The Commission may record agreements or the results of its 
work in an appropriate document, which shall be done in two copies, each in the 
English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic. Such 
documents shall not be confidential, except as otherwise agreed by the 
Commission.
VI. Costs
Each Party shall bear the cost of is participation in the work of the Commission.
VII. Communications
Communications pursuant to this Protocol shall be provided through the Nuclear 
Risk Reduction Centers
VIII. Additional Procedures and Provisional Application
1. The Parties shall have the right to agree upon additional procedures governing 
the operation of the Commission.
2. The provisions of Article XV of the Treaty and the provisions of this Protocol 
shall apply provisionally from the date of signature of the Treaty for a 12-month 
period, unless, before the expiration of this period:
(a) a Party communicates to the other Party its decision to terminate the provisional 
application of the provisions of Article XV of the Treaty and the provisions of this 
Protocol; or
(b) the Treaty enters into force.
The Parties may agree to extend the provisional application for additional periods, 
subject to the same conditions specified in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of this 
paragraph.
3. The provisions of Article XV of the Treaty and the provisions of this Protocol
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shall apply provisionally in light of and in conformity with the other provisions of 
the Treaty.
This Protocol is an integral part of the Treaty and shall enter into force on the date 
of entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force so long as the Treaty 
remains in force. As provided for in subparagraph (b) of Article XV of theTreaty, 
the Parties may agree upon such additional measures as may be necessary to 
improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty. The Parties agree that, if it 
becomes necessary to make changes in this Protocol that do not affect substantive 
rights or obligations under the Treaty, they shall use the Commission to reach 
agreement on such changes, without resorting to the procedure for making 
amendments set forth in Article XVIII of the Treaty.
Done at Moscow on July 31, 1991, in two copies, each in the English and Russian 
languages both texts being equally authentic
FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
GEORGE BUSH
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:
M. GORBACHEV
PRESIDENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
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